standing requirement in Massachusetts

2009Authy., 374 Mass. 37, 46 (1977) (“when an issue involves an area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute and not by a general grant of standing”).

2005As a general rule, “when an issue involves an area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute . . .” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Board of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 493 (1989), quoting Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 44-45 (1977).

2009See United States v. Sal vucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

1991See United States v. Salvucci, supra at 92-93 ; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

2009See United States v. Sal vucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

1991See United States v. Salvucci, supra at 92-93 ; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

2002“Only a limited class of individuals — those whose property interests will be affected — is given the standing to challenge the board's exercise of its discretion to grant a special permit or variance.” Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 469, 479 (1988).

1989However, “only a limited class of individuals — those whose property interests will be affected — is given the standing to challenge the board’s exercise of its discretion.” Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 479 (1988), S.C., 404 Mass. 571 (1989). 4 Individual or corporate property owners acquire stand *493 ing by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest.

1993Compare, e.g„ Irons v. FBI, 811 F.2d 681, 683-684 (1st Cir. 1987) (order directing Federal Bureau of Investigation to produce documents identifying informants cannot be effectively reviewed after the government has “let the cat out of the bag, without any effective way of recapturing it”).

1993Although in this case there was no motion to dismiss before the judge at the time of the preliminary hearing after remand, we think instructive and analogous the treatment of appeals from the denial of such motions raising the issue of standing. [10] The preliminary standing hearing mandated by C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. at 690 , is procedurally consistent with Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(d), 365 Mass. 756 (1974), which requires that rule 12(b) motions to dismiss "shall be heard and determined before trial," and Rule 9A(c)(3) of the Rules of the Superior Court, which provides for presumptive hearings (when

2005As a general rule, “when an issue involves an area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute . . .” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Board of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 493 (1989), quoting Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 44-45 (1977).

2002Such individuals acquire standing by asserting “a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest or a private legal interest.” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 492-93 , review denied, 405 Mass. 1204 (1989).

2004As we see it, the issue inescapably centers on Columbo’s eligibility, the review of which is governed by statute. “[Wjhen an issue involves an area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute and not by a general grant of standing.” Bello v. South Shore Hosp., 384 Mass. at 780 , quoting from Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev.

1996“The purpose of both the ’’actual controversy" and the standing requirement is to ensure the effectuation of the statutory purpose of M.G.L.c. 231A, which is to enable a court ‘to afford relief from . . . uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status and other legal relations.’ “ Bello v. South Shore Hosp., 384 Mass. 770, 778 (1981) (quoting Massachusetts Ass’n of Indep.

2025Co., 92 F.4th 325, 329 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing Rogan for conclusion that, under Massachusetts law, "obtaining a judgment is a necessary predicate for maintaining a cause of action against" insurer). "[W]hen an issue involves an area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute and not by a general grant of standing." Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev.

2023See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702-703 ; Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 723 n.5 (1996) (contrasting "tangible loss of parking spaces" with "uncorroborated speculations" about possibility that headlights would shine into window); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 58-59 (1992), rev'd other grounds, 415 Mass. 329 (1993) (plaintiff aggrieved by variance allowing construction that would partially block plaintiff's water view).

2023See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702-703 ; Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 723 n.5 (1996) (contrasting "tangible loss of parking spaces" with "uncorroborated speculations" about possibility that headlights would shine into window); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 58-59 (1992), rev'd other grounds, 415 Mass. 329 (1993) (plaintiff aggrieved by variance allowing construction that would partially block plaintiff's water view).

2017Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs lack standing because they have no private right of action to enforce the Sunday premium pay statute “confuses the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim with the standing inquiry.” See Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 332 (2d Cir. 2016).

2009See Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Arlington, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985) (“fact that the original plaintiff may not have had standing or presumptive standing ... is not a reason for denying an amendment to allow the substitution of parties who have standing”); Rule 7 of the Rules of the Probate Court (2006) (“The Court in its discretion may allow the parties to amend their pleadings ... or any act to be done . . . and may in all cases impose just and reasonable terms upon the parties”). b.

2008Barrett Assoc., Inc. v. Aronson, 346 Mass. 150, 152 (1963).

2007Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354-355 (Del. 1988).

2005Pratt, 396 Mass. at 42 (“From an early day it has been an established principle in this Commonwealth that only persons who have themselves suffered, or who are in danger of suffering, legal harm can compel the courts to assume the difficult and delicate duly of passing upon the validity of the acts of [another] branch of the government”).

1998Furthermore, we have not allowed its use by other than natural persons, see Pilgrim Real Estate, Inc. v. Superintendent of Police of Boston, 330 Mass. 250, 253 (1953), 5 and we will not do so now.

1998See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984).