standing inquiry in West Virginia

2026“Typically, ... the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination ... to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 94-95 , 576 S.E.2d at 821 -22 (quoting Int’l Primate Protection League v. Adms. of Tulane Educ.

2021Typically, . . . the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination . . . to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted. 213 W.

2023Thus, we do not need to address the validity of Respondents’ claimed injury-in fact because “[t]he focus of a standing analysis is not on the validity of the claim but instead is ‘on the appropriateness of a party bringing the questioned controversy to the court.’” Healthport, 239 W.

2021We have clarified that “The focus of a standing analysis is not on 11 the validity of the claim but instead is ‘on the appropriateness of a party bringing the questioned controversy to the court.’” HealthPort, 239 W.

2023See, e.g., Warick v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276 , 282 (Ky. 2019) (“Byrd [] recognized [] why the Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ terminology remains in use, cautioned against its confusion with the U.S. Constitution’s Article III standing, and provided explicit guidance in addressing a motion to suppress.”). 11 Succinctly stated, rather than being a jurisdictional bar, “the standing inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context, is shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been implicated.” United States v. Cole, 11 See also United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1

2023See, e.g., Warick v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276 , 282 (Ky. 2019) (“Byrd [] recognized [] why the Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ terminology remains in use, cautioned against its confusion with the U.S. Constitution’s Article III standing, and provided explicit guidance in addressing a motion to suppress.”). 11 Succinctly stated, rather than being a jurisdictional bar, “the standing inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context, is shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been implicated.” United States v. Cole, 11 See also United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1

2023For example, in State v. Worley, we found that although standing was not raised by either party, the defendant’s standing to challenge the search was “necessary to a resolution of the Fourth Amendment issues . . . .” 179 W.

2023Va. 403 , 408 n.3, 369 S.E.2d 706 , 711 n.3 (1988).

2023See, e.g., Warick v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276 , 282 (Ky. 2019) (“Byrd [] recognized [] why the Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ terminology remains in use, cautioned against its confusion with the U.S. Constitution’s Article III standing, and provided explicit guidance in addressing a motion to suppress.”). 11 Succinctly stated, rather than being a jurisdictional bar, “the standing inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context, is shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been implicated.” United States v. Cole, 11 See also United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1

2017Cir. 1996)). 12 Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.Va. at 275 , 284 S.E.2d at 248 . 13 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 14 Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citations omitted). 15 Id. “‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Id., 136 S.Ct. at 1549 . 8 not conjectural or hypothetical.

2017Cir. 1996)). 12 Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.Va. at 275 , 284 S.E.2d at 248 . 13 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 14 Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citations omitted). 15 Id. “‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Id., 136 S.Ct. at 1549 . 8 not conjectural or hypothetical.

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Moreover, a resolution of the standing question herein may be determined, primarily, within the context of this State’s municipal annexation statutes, particularly W.Va.Code, 8-6-4 [2001], which sets out the requirements for “annexation without an election.” Thus, as this Court held in syllabus point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 4, Harri *152 son County Commission v. Harrison Co

2011Accordingly, to the extent that Syllabus Point 1 of our decision in Chesapeake & Ohio System Federation, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Hash, 170 W.Va. 294 , 294 S.E.2d 96 (1982), may be construed to imply that an unincorporated association (or any party entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action), is not required to show that it has standing beyond the fact that it is an "unincorporated association," it is modified. [13] Our review reveals that forty-three states (including West Virginia) have adopted some version of representative standing. [14] Our decision in Adkins v.

2011Accordingly, to the extent that Syllabus Point 1 of our decision in Chesapeake & Ohio System Federation, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Hash, 170 W.Va. 294 , 294 S.E.2d 96 (1982), may be construed to imply that an unincorporated association (or any party entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action), is not required to show that it has standing beyond the fact that it is an "unincorporated association," it is modified. [13] Our review reveals that forty-three states (including West Virginia) have adopted some version of representative standing. [14] Our decision in Adkins v.

1996"If the inspection by the police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no `search' subject to the Warrant Clause." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 , 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983).

1996"If the inspection by the police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no `search' subject to the Warrant Clause." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 , 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983).

1988As we recently said in Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156, 163 , 366 S.E.2d 117 , 124: "At the threshold, ... one who asserts a Fourth Amendment violation must demonstrate a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the subject of the seizure." We are persuaded that the defendant possessed the requisite expectation of privacy in the trailer.

1988As we recently said in Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156, 163 , 366 S.E.2d 117 , 124: "At the threshold, ... one who asserts a Fourth Amendment violation must demonstrate a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the subject of the seizure." We are persuaded that the defendant possessed the requisite expectation of privacy in the trailer.