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58 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Shewardgreen2 sentences2024Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 1999-Ohio-123, ¶ 132, 33 , to claim that he does not have to meet the traditional standing requirement. 2024Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 1999-Ohio-123 , ¶ 132, 33, to claim that he does not have to meet the traditional standing requirement. | 2 | 4 |
State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of Common Pleasgreen2 sentences2024Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 179 (1973). {¶ 11} The standing requirement is deeply rooted in our caselaw. 2024Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176 , 179 (1973). {¶ 11} The standing requirement is deeply rooted in our caselaw. | 2 | 3 |
State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensationgreen2 sentences2024Compare Ohio AFL-CIO, 2002-Ohio-6717 , with Food & Water Watch, 2018-Ohio-555 . 2024Compare Ohio AFL-CIO, 2002-Ohio-6717 , with Food & Water Watch, 2018-Ohio-555 . | 2 | 2 |
Fortner v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1999See id.; see, also, Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35, 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371, 372 (courts decide “actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts”). 1999See id.; see, also, Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35, 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371, 372 (courts decide “actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts”). | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Shewardgreen2 sentences2025Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451 (1999), and no longer permits parties to assert the public- right doctrine as a means to “bypass” the standing requirement. 2008Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward , 86 Ohio St.3d 451 , 1999-Ohio-123 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, to support her contention. {¶ 10} In Sheward , the Supreme Court applied a "public action" exception to the traditional standing rule, and allowed several Ohio organizations and a private individual to challenge the constitutionality of comprehensive tort reform legislation by an action in *Page 5 mandamus. | 1 | 5 |
Baker v. Carrgreen2 sentences2022Standing requires a litigant to have " 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult * * * questions.' " Id., quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). 2000Standing is a threshold test that, if satisfied, permits the court to go on to decide whether the plaintiff has a good cause of action and whether the relief sought can or should be granted to plaintiff. * * * The standing doctrine requires that a litigant have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult * * * questions." Williams v. Ohio State Attorney General (Apr. 30, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97AP-980, unreported, quoting Baker v | 1 | 4 |
State ex rel. Halak v. Cebulagreen2 sentences2026Varnau v. Wenninger, 2012-Ohio-224, ¶ 14 (holding that losing candidate for sheriff could not seek to invalidate incumbent’s present term of office based on an alleged prior disqualification from an expired term of office); Halak at 293 (holding that losing candidate for city council was not 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO entitled to office if successful candidate was declared ineligible because vacancy would be filled by city council, not by accession of losing candidate). {¶ 11} Esrati also argues that he satisfies the standing requirement as a “qualified elector” and “the only person willing to en 2026“R.C. 2733.06 sets forth the standing requirement for a private citizen to file the action.” Flanagan at ¶ 19; see also Halak at 292 (“a private person cannot maintain an action in quo warranto except under the authority of [R.C. 2733.06]”). | 1 | 1 |
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Ex Rel. Barezgreen2 sentences2026What is clear, however, is that parens patriae standing “does not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent themselves.” Id. at 600. 2026As a standing doctrine, parens patriae refers to the State’s standing to “assert an injury to what has been characterized as a ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to 10 January Term, 2026 a simple or exact definition.” Id. at 601. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenningergreen1 sentence2026Varnau v. Wenninger, 2012-Ohio-224, ¶ 14 (holding that losing candidate for sheriff could not seek to invalidate incumbent’s present term of office based on an alleged prior disqualification from an expired term of office); Halak at 293 (holding that losing candidate for city council was not 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO entitled to office if successful candidate was declared ineligible because vacancy would be filled by city council, not by accession of losing candidate). {¶ 11} Esrati also argues that he satisfies the standing requirement as a “qualified elector” and “the only person willing to en | 1 | 1 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen1 sentence2025Accord In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 28, citing Troxel at 66 (explaining the 4 The Supreme Court of Ohio recently observed that “election-mandamus cases represent the outer bounds of the standing requirement.” State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Travis v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen1 sentence2025Comm., 123 Ohio St. 355, 359 (1931). {¶ 10} Mootness has been understood as a temporal aspect of the standing requirement. | 1 | 1 |
State, Ex Rel. v. Indus. Comm.green2 sentences2024In Sheward, this court abruptly departed from our long history of “always adher[ing]” to the standing requirement, Williams at 56. 2024In Sheward, this court abruptly departed from our long history of “always adher[ing]” to the standing requirement, Williams at 56. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Compare Ohio AFL-CIO, 2002-Ohio-6717 , with Food & Water Watch, 2018-Ohio-555 . 2024Compare Ohio AFL-CIO, 2002-Ohio-6717 , with Food & Water Watch, 2018-Ohio-555 . | 1 | 1 |
| Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlifegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environmentred | 1 | 1 |
| Brannon v. Adkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doylegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tschantz v. Fergusongreen | 1 | 1 |
| CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rakas v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Asarco Inc. v. Kadishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jasper Junior Moodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jenkins v. City of Gallipolis
green
2 sentences2013Id.; Jenkins v. Gallipolis, 128 Ohio App.3d 376, 381 , 715 N.E.2d 196 (4th Dist.1998). 2013Id.; Jenkins v. Gallipolis, 128 Ohio App.3d 376, 381 , 715 N.E.2d 196 (4th Dist.1998). | 3 | 2000–2013 |
Warth v. Seldin
green
2 sentences2004The standing doctrine "encompasses `the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 2309 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737 , 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . "`Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon to decide abst 2004The standing doctrine "encompasses `the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 2309 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737 , 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . "`Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon to decide abst | 3 | 2004–2006 |
Moore v. City of Middletown
green
2 sentences2026This standard ensures that parties “have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case,” id. {¶ 12} Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), and TransUnion, L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), Quicken argues that Voss fails to meet the standing requirement 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO because he has failed to establish that he suffered an actual injury from the failure of Quicken to timely record the release of mortgage. 2024Id. | 2 | 2024–2026 |
State ex rel. Newell v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2024Newell v. Brown, 162 Ohio St. 147 (1954)). {¶ 33} It is paradoxical and absurd in this context for the majority to conclude that Sheward “abruptly departed” from “deeply rooted” caselaw while in the same opinion noting that Sheward relied on caselaw—namely, State v. Brown— that the majority reaffirms, even if declaring that it exists at “the outer bounds of 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the standing requirement,” majority opinion at ¶ 12. 2024Newell v. Brown, 162 Ohio St. 147 (1954)). {¶ 33} It is paradoxical and absurd in this context for the majority to conclude that Sheward “abruptly departed” from “deeply rooted” caselaw while in the same opinion noting that Sheward relied on caselaw—namely, State v. Brown— that the majority reaffirms, even if declaring that it exists at “the outer bounds of 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the standing requirement,” majority opinion at ¶ 12. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
green
2 sentences2023“Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the [ ] courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” Id. {¶19} As such, “[t]he issue of standing is a threshold test that, once met, permits a court to determine the merits of the questions presented.” Langin at ¶10 , citing Hicks v. Meadows, 9th Dist. 2022“Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the [] courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” Id. {¶10} Indeed, “standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” (Emphasis added.) Federal Home Loan Mortg. | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Lager v. Plough, Unpublished Decision (6-2-2006)
green
2 sentences2022“Under the basic doctrine of standing, a person will not be deemed a ‘real party in interest’ simply because he claims to be concerned about an action’s subject matter; instead, he must be in a position to sustain either a direct benefit or injury from the resolution of the case.” Lager v. Plough, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2006- P-0013, 2006-Ohio-2772, ¶ 7 , citing State ex rel. 2021Portage No. 2006-P-0013, 2006-Ohio-2772, ¶7 , citing State ex rel. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Davis v. Federal Election Commission
green
2 sentences2020Moreover, “[w]hile the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * *, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 734 , 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). 2020Moreover, “[w]hile the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * *, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 734 , 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald
green
2 sentences2022Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13 , 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 24 , quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, fn. 5 (1992). "'While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * * the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.'" Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 35, fn. 3, quoting Davis v. Fed. 2022Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13 , 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 24 , quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, fn. 5 (1992). "'While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * * the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.'" Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 35, fn. 3, quoting Davis v. Fed. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Society National Bank v. Wood County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences2005Bank, 81 Ohio St.3d at 404 , 692 N.E.2d 148 , in which we noted that since the complainant in that case “failed to show that it [had] met the threshold standing requirement of R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), * * * [we did not need to] consider whether [it] met the requirements of R.C. 5715.13.” {¶ 10} We also reject VCOA’s assertion that R.C. 5311.20 permits the association to contest the valuation of the condominium’s common areas. 2005Bank, 81 Ohio St.3d at 404 , 692 N.E.2d 148 , in which we noted that since the complainant in that case “failed to show that it [had] met the threshold standing requirement of R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), * * * [we did not need to] consider whether [it] met the requirements of R.C. 5715.13.” {¶ 10} We also reject VCOA’s assertion that R.C. 5311.20 permits the association to contest the valuation of the condominium’s common areas. | 2 | 2005–2013 |
Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Bicking
green
2 sentences2006Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Bicking (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 318 , 643 N.E.2d 1088 , citing Worth v. Seldin (1975), 422 N.E.2d 490 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 . 1998The same court found that “[t]o be compensable, the injury must be concrete and not simply abstract or suspected. * * * [W]here no bid was submitted and there was consequently no concrete injury suffered by any private contractor, [the association] does not have the standing to challenge the legality of the village’s bidding procedure.” Ohio Contractors Assn. at 320, 643 N.E.2d at 1090 . | 2 | 1998–2006 |
Allen v. Wright
red
2 sentences2004The standing doctrine "encompasses `the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 2309 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737 , 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . "`Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon to decide abst 2004The standing doctrine "encompasses `the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 2309 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737 , 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . "`Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon to decide abst | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
red
2 sentences2004The standing doctrine "encompasses `the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 2309 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737 , 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . "`Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon to decide abst 2004The standing doctrine “encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’ ” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004), — U.S. —, —, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2309 , 159 L.Ed.2d 98 , quoting Allen v. Wright (1984), 468 U.S. 737, 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 . “ ‘Without such limitations * * * the courts would be called upon | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
green
1 sentence2026This standard ensures that parties “have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case,” id. {¶ 12} Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), and TransUnion, L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), Quicken argues that Voss fails to meet the standing requirement 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO because he has failed to establish that he suffered an actual injury from the failure of Quicken to timely record the release of mortgage. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2026This standard ensures that parties “have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case,” id. {¶ 12} Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), and TransUnion, L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), Quicken argues that Voss fails to meet the standing requirement 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO because he has failed to establish that he suffered an actual injury from the failure of Quicken to timely record the release of mortgage. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay Mun. Court
green
1 sentence2025In such cases, it is the “particular injury to [the elector’s] vote” that allows the elector to “satisfy the standing requirement.” Id. “right to parent one’s children is a fundamental right”). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Highland Holiday Subdivision
green
2 sentences2024The purpose of the standing requirement is to “enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to assure [the defendant] finality of judgment, and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party at [sic] interest on the same matter.” Shealy at 24-25 , quoting In re Highland Holiday Subdivision, 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240 , 273 N.E.2d 903 (4th Dist.1971). 2024The purpose of the standing requirement is to “enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to assure [the defendant] finality of judgment, and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party at [sic] interest on the same matter.” Shealy at 24-25 , quoting In re Highland Holiday Subdivision, 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240 , 273 N.E.2d 903 (4th Dist.1971). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Powers v. Ohio green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tiemann v. University of Cincinnati
green
2 sentences2022Standing requires a litigant to have " 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult * * * questions.' " Id., quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). 2022Walgate v. Kasich, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-548, 2013-Ohio-946 , reversed in part, 136 Ohio St.3d 1449 , 2013-Ohio-3210 : Under the doctrine of standing, a litigant must have a personal stake in the matter he or she wishes to litigate. [Tiemann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 127 Ohio App.3d 312 (10th Dist.1998)] at 325. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State ex rel. Village of Botkins v. Laws green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ridgeway v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 06ap-1197 (10-23-2007) green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Westgate Shopping Village v. City of Toledo green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Midwest Fireworks Manufacturing Co. v. Deerfield Township Board of Zoning Appeals green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc. (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State ex rel. Countryside Investors, L.L.C. v. Carroll Cty. Bd. of Commrs. neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State ex rel. Food & Water Watch & FreshWater Accountability Project v. State green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Huffman green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Sierra Club v. Morton green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| City of Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bar's Sahara, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Thompson v. Hayes, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2006) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Nat. Amusements v. Union Township B.Z.A., Unpublished Decision (10-13-2003) neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cincinnati City School District v. State Board of Education green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Stidham green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stidham neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Shealy v. Campbell green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Minnesota v. Carter green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Akron Standard Division of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Lindley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bloom v. Wides neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Diana green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Phipps green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.