Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
45 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fox v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2026Brown, 414 Wis. 2d 601, ¶¶17, 25 (citation omitted); see also Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 525. ¶16 Brown makes clear that the first step of the two-prong standing analysis—determining whether the party establishes an actual or threatened injury in fact—is the same under WIS. 2025See Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 526 ; Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499 , 502 n.2, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988) (holding that “just because a party has requested and been granted an administrative hearing, the party does not obtain thereby the standing to challenge the resulting administrative decision,” even though the party disagreed with the resulting administrative decision). | 4 | 7 |
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2022Assocs., Ltd. v. DILHR, 92 Wis. 2d 53, 61 , 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed ['person aggrieved'] to impose a standing requirement similar to the federal rule in [WED I]."). 14 ¶19 We construe the law of standing "liberally, and 'even an injury to a trifling interest' may suffice." McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524 ); see also WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Kubista v. State Annuity & Inv. 1979(Emphasis supplied.) The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed this language to impose a standing requirement similar to the federal rule in Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. PSC, 69 Wis.2d 1, 10 , 230 N.W.2d 243, 248 (1975): The first step under the Wisconsin rule is to ascertain whether the decision of the agency directly causes injury to the interest of the petitioner. | 4 | 4 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2006When we assess a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, "the critical inquiry is 'whether the person... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, ¶ 26 , 246 Wis. 2d 261 , 630 N.W.2d 555 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). ¶ 13. 2001When assessing a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, the critical inquiry is "whether the person . . . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); accord State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 710 , 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Fillyawgreen2 sentences2001When assessing a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, the critical inquiry is "whether the person . . . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); accord State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 710 , 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981). 2001When assessing a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, the critical inquiry is "whether the person . . . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); accord State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 710 , 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981). | 2 | 4 |
McConkey v. Van Hollengreen2 sentences2026See McConkey 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15. 45 Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (“Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a matter of judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.”). ¶121 Accordingly, I conclude McConkey’s reasoning provides a clear and additional basis for addressing the merits of Pellegrini’s claim. 2022Assocs., Ltd. v. DILHR, 92 Wis. 2d 53, 61 , 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed ['person aggrieved'] to impose a standing requirement similar to the federal rule in [WED I]."). 14 ¶19 We construe the law of standing "liberally, and 'even an injury to a trifling interest' may suffice." McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524 ); see also WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Kubista v. State Annuity & Inv. | 2 | 2 |
Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. State Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences2025See Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 526 ; Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499 , 502 n.2, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988) (holding that “just because a party has requested and been granted an administrative hearing, the party does not obtain thereby the standing to challenge the resulting administrative decision,” even though the party disagreed with the resulting administrative decision). 2025See Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 526 ; Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499 , 502 n.2, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988) (holding that “just because a party has requested and been granted an administrative hearing, the party does not obtain thereby the standing to challenge the resulting administrative decision,” even though the party disagreed with the resulting administrative decision). | 1 | 3 |
Village of Slinger v. City of Hartfordgreen2 sentences2011Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis. 2d 522, 526-28 , 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983) (parents of injured child challenge dismissal of action against their insurer even though they asserted no claim to appeal against insurer; parents are aggrieved parties with standing; dismissal adversely affected their financial interest in having insurance coverage); Kiser v. Jungbacker, 2008 WI App 88, ¶ 12 , 312 Wis. 2d 621 , 754 N.W.2d 180 (appeal of award of attorney's fees; "[t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking review has alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"); Shovers v. 2011Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis. 2d 522, 526-28 , 329 N.W.2d 157 (1983) (parents of injured child challenge dismissal of action against their insurer even though they asserted no claim to appeal against insurer; parents are aggrieved parties with standing; dismissal adversely affected their financial interest in having insurance coverage); Kiser v. Jungbacker, 2008 WI App 88, ¶ 12 , 312 Wis. 2d 621 , 754 N.W.2d 180 (appeal of award of attorney's fees; "[t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking review has alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"); Shovers v. | 1 | 2 |
City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburggreen2 sentences2011We again examined the two parts of the standing test in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224 , 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983). 2011We again examined the two parts of the standing test in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224 , 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983). | 1 | 2 |
Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condominium Ass'ngreen2 sentences2021Ass’n, 2011 WI 36, ¶40 , 333 Wis. 2d 402 , 797 N.W.2d 789 (citation omitted). 5 ¶11 The standing requirement, in essence, excludes would-be plaintiffs that have not suffered harm or whose alleged harm cannot be remedied within our legal system. 2021Ass’n, 2011 WI 36, ¶40 , 333 Wis. 2d 402 , 797 N.W.2d 789 (citation omitted). 5 ¶11 The standing requirement, in essence, excludes would-be plaintiffs that have not suffered harm or whose alleged harm cannot be remedied within our legal system. | 1 | 2 |
Bence v. City of Milwaukeegreen2 sentences1994Rather: [t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 479 , quoting, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. 1994Rather: [t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete *133 adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 479 , quoting, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Trecrocigreen2 sentences2006When we assess a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, "the critical inquiry is 'whether the person... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, ¶ 26 , 246 Wis. 2d 261 , 630 N.W.2d 555 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). ¶ 13. 2006When we assess a defendant's standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, "the critical inquiry is 'whether the person... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, ¶ 26 , 246 Wis. 2d 261 , 630 N.W.2d 555 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). ¶ 13. | 1 | 2 |
Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School Districtgreen2 sentences2026See McConkey 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15. 45 Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (“Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a matter of judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.”). ¶121 Accordingly, I conclude McConkey’s reasoning provides a clear and additional basis for addressing the merits of Pellegrini’s claim. 2026See McConkey 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15. 45 Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (“Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a matter of judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.”). ¶121 Accordingly, I conclude McConkey’s reasoning provides a clear and additional basis for addressing the merits of Pellegrini’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2026P’ship, 2002 WI 108, ¶46, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (citation omitted). ¶20 Pellegrini’s entire factual analysis of the first step (injury in fact) of the standing inquiry rests on one contention—that he has asserted a right to have a future WIS. 2026P’ship, 2002 WI 108, ¶46, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (citation omitted). ¶20 Pellegrini’s entire factual analysis of the first step (injury in fact) of the standing inquiry rests on one contention—that he has asserted a right to have a future WIS. | 1 | 1 |
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimelgreen2 sentences2026“Plaintiffs need to demonstrate they actually ‘have a personal stake in the outcome and [are] directly affected by the issue [] in controversy.’” Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 2016 WI App 19, ¶19, 367 Wis. 2d 712, 877 N.W.2d 604 (alterations in original; citation omitted); see, e.g., City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) (UDJA standing requires “a personal stake in the outcome[.]”); Village of Slinger v. City of Hartford, 2002 WI App 187, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 859, 650 N.W.2d 81 (UDJA standing requires “a personal stake in the outcome” that 2026“Plaintiffs need to demonstrate they actually ‘have a personal stake in the outcome and [are] directly affected by the issue [] in controversy.’” Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 2016 WI App 19, ¶19, 367 Wis. 2d 712, 877 N.W.2d 604 (alterations in original; citation omitted); see, e.g., City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) (UDJA standing requires “a personal stake in the outcome[.]”); Village of Slinger v. City of Hartford, 2002 WI App 187, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 859, 650 N.W.2d 81 (UDJA standing requires “a personal stake in the outcome” that | 1 | 1 |
Cornwell Personnel Associates, Ltd. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relationsgreen2 sentences2022Assocs., Ltd. v. DILHR, 92 Wis. 2d 53, 61 , 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed ['person aggrieved'] to impose a standing requirement similar to the federal rule in [WED I]."). 14 ¶19 We construe the law of standing "liberally, and 'even an injury to a trifling interest' may suffice." McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524 ); see also WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Kubista v. State Annuity & Inv. 2022Assocs., Ltd. v. DILHR, 92 Wis. 2d 53, 61 , 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed ['person aggrieved'] to impose a standing requirement similar to the federal rule in [WED I]."). 14 ¶19 We construe the law of standing "liberally, and 'even an injury to a trifling interest' may suffice." McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524 ); see also WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Kubista v. State Annuity & Inv. | 1 | 1 |
Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Uniongreen1 sentence2022As substantively reflected in many of our prior decisions, this inquiry centers on a textually-driven analysis of the language of the specific statute cited by the petitioner as the source of its claim to determine whether that statute "recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect" the interest 22 advanced by the petitioner.13 Id. at 505, 508 ; see also Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 529 (1991) ("[T]he relevant statute [under the APA] of course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint." (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 886)). ¶29 In | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation. Celanese Corporation and Fiber Industries, Inc. v. Leesona Corporation, Lex Tex Ltd., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dawson v. City of Bartlesville, Okl.green | 1 | 1 |
| Zehetner v. CHRYSLER FINANCIAL CO., LLC.green | 1 | 1 |
| International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Peterson v. Browninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowman v. State Bank of Keysvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmontgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Christelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Polan v. Wisconsin Department of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Builders Ass'n v. Village of Germantown
green
2 sentences2026Our decision relied on Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, which “recognized a special variation of th[e] standing rule for associations”: “as long as members of [Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. (WED)] could meet the two-part standing test,” which asks “first, whether the challenged action caused direct injury to the petitioner’s interest and second, whether the interest affected was one recognized by law,” then “WED could stand in their shoes.” Metropolitan Builders, 282 Wis. 2d 458, ¶¶13-14 . 2025Given our obligation to construe standing liberally and take public policy into account, see Metropolitan Builders, 282 Wis. 2d 458, ¶12 , we decline to apply Friends of Black River Forest beyond the context of ch. 227. | 3 | 2025–2026 |
Krier v. Vilione
green
2 sentences2023Being harmed "without more, does not automatically confer standing." Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20 . ¶137 Standing analysis can vary "depending on the nature of the claim asserted." Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 533 , 685 N.W.2d 573 . 2023Being harmed "without more, does not automatically confer standing." Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20 . ¶137 Standing analysis can vary "depending on the nature of the claim asserted." Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 533 , 685 N.W.2d 573 . | 3 | 2011–2023 |
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland
green
2 sentences2023Being harmed "without more, does not automatically confer standing." Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20 . ¶137 Standing analysis can vary "depending on the nature of the claim asserted." Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 533 , 685 N.W.2d 573 . 2023Being harmed "without more, does not automatically confer standing." Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20 . ¶137 Standing analysis can vary "depending on the nature of the claim asserted." Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 533 , 685 N.W.2d 573 . | 3 | 2005–2023 |
Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR
green
2 sentences2025Under the majority’s dissonant 3 The majority’s standing analysis is also at odds with the standing policy three of its members proffered in Friends of Black River Forest v. Kohler Company, 2022 WI 52, ¶50 , 402 Wis. 2d 587 , 977 N.W.2d 342 , in which Justice Jill J. 2025Under the majority’s dissonant 3 The majority’s standing analysis is also at odds with the standing policy three of its members proffered in Friends of Black River Forest v. Kohler Company, 2022 WI 52, ¶50 , 402 Wis. 2d 587 , 977 N.W.2d 342 , in which Justice Jill J. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission v. City of Evansville
green
2 sentences2025For instance, in Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission v. City of Evansville, a municipality appealed an agency’s decision to set aside union election results due to the municipality’s engagement in prohibited practices prior to the election. 69 Wis. 2d 140 , 167-68, 230 N.W.2d 688 (1975). 2025For instance, in Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission v. City of Evansville, a municipality appealed an agency’s decision to set aside union election results due to the municipality’s engagement in prohibited practices prior to the election. 69 Wis. 2d 140 , 167-68, 230 N.W.2d 688 (1975). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Kubista v. State Annuity & Investment Board
green
2 sentences1975S. E. of A. v. WERB (1944), 245 Wis. 636 , 15 N. W. 2d 844 , concerning not a narrow application of the standing doctrine, but rather the reviewability of an order that affected no one’s interests. 19 (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 243 , 94 N. W. 2d 609 , 95 N. W. 2d 788 . 20 (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 120 , 115 N. W. 2d 498 . 21 Kubista v. State Annuity and Investment Board (1960), 257 Wis. 359 , 43 N. W. 2d 470 . 22 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1970 Supp.), p. 722, sec. 22.00-4. 23 The petition also alleges that the order will encourage environmentally destructive practices such as strip mining. 1975S. E. of A. v. WERB (1944), 245 Wis. 636 , 15 N. W. 2d 844 , concerning not a narrow application of the standing doctrine, but rather the reviewability of an order that affected no one’s interests. 19 (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 243 , 94 N. W. 2d 609 , 95 N. W. 2d 788 . 20 (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 120 , 115 N. W. 2d 498 . 21 Kubista v. State Annuity and Investment Board (1960), 257 Wis. 359 , 43 N. W. 2d 470 . 22 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1970 Supp.), p. 722, sec. 22.00-4. 23 The petition also alleges that the order will encourage environmentally destructive practices such as strip mining. | 2 | 1975–2022 |
State Ex Rel. First National Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma
green
2 sentences2004First Nat'l Bank of Wis. Rapids v. M&I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 307-08 , 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980) (citation omitted). 2004First Nat'l Bank of Wis. Rapids v. M&I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 307-08 , 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980) (citation omitted). | 2 | 1988–2004 |
Barlow v. Collins
green
2 sentences1993This approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Data Processing Service v. Camp [ 397 U.S. 150 (1970)] and Barlow v. Collins [ 397 U.S. 159 (1970)] as follows: (1) Does the *448 challenged action cause the petitioner injury in fact? and (2) is the interest allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question? 1979This approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Data Processing Service v. Camp [ 397 U.S. 150 (1970)] and Barlow v. Collins [ 397 U.S. 159 (1970)] as follows: (1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner injury in fact? and (2) Is the interest allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question ? | 2 | 1979–1993 |
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
green
2 sentences1993This approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Data Processing Service v. Camp [ 397 U.S. 150 (1970)] and Barlow v. Collins [ 397 U.S. 159 (1970)] as follows: (1) Does the *448 challenged action cause the petitioner injury in fact? and (2) is the interest allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question? 1979This approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Data Processing Service v. Camp [ 397 U.S. 150 (1970)] and Barlow v. Collins [ 397 U.S. 159 (1970)] as follows: (1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner injury in fact? and (2) Is the interest allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question ? | 2 | 1979–1993 |
St. Croix Scenic Coalition, Inc. v. Village of Osceola
neutral
1 sentence2026Croix Scenic Coal., 414 Wis. 2d 549 , ¶22 n.6. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
green
1 sentence2025The “‘[f]reedom of men under government’ . . . ‘is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it … and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.’” Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43 , 72-73 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 22, at 13 (J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022U.S.C.A. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 11 ¶15 The United States Supreme Court later clarified in Lexmark that the "zone of interests" inquiry is more appropriately understood as a question of whether a cause of action exists, rather than a matter of "prudential standing." Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Milwaukee Brewers v. DH&SS
green
2 sentences2020We conclude that the Friends have alleged sufficient facts in its Amended Petition to satisfy the first step of the standing analysis. ¶25 The Friends have alleged recreational, aesthetic, and conservational injuries resulting from the anticipated (1) inability on their part to use the land conveyed to Kohler for recreation, (2) destruction of wildlife habitat, (3) impact of the golf course on remaining parkland, (4) increased traffic and noise, and (5) failure of the Department and the Board to follow the proper procedures when considering a conveyance of parkland. ¶26 “[T]he direct injury re 2020We conclude that the Friends have alleged sufficient facts in its Amended Petition to satisfy the first step of the standing analysis. ¶25 The Friends have alleged recreational, aesthetic, and conservational injuries resulting from the anticipated (1) inability on their part to use the land conveyed to Kohler for recreation, (2) destruction of wildlife habitat, (3) impact of the golf course on remaining parkland, (4) increased traffic and noise, and (5) failure of the Department and the Board to follow the proper procedures when considering a conveyance of parkland. ¶26 “[T]he direct injury re | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Mutual Service Casualty Insurance v. Koenigs green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Mendonca v. Department of Natural Resources green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Shovers v. Shovers green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Kiser v. Jungbacker green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan
green
2 sentences2011Comm'n of Wis., 164 Wis. 2d 489, 494-95 , 476 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the two-part standing test and concluding that MCI did not prove a legally protectable interest); Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 160 Wis. 2d 403, 410-11 , 466 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing Wisconsin's two-part test for standing); Mendonca v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 207, 209 , 376 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985) (employing the same two-part test for standing set out in this concurrence). 2011Comm'n of Wis., 164 Wis. 2d 489, 494-95 , 476 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the two-part standing test and concluding that MCI did not prove a legally protectable interest); Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 160 Wis. 2d 403, 410-11 , 466 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing Wisconsin's two-part test for standing); Mendonca v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 207, 209 , 376 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985) (employing the same two-part test for standing set out in this concurrence). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lake Country Racquet & Athletic Club, Inc. v. Village of Hartland green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Sandroni v. Waukesha County Board of Supervisors green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Ramirez neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Orta green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State ex rel. City of Sheboygan v. County Board of Supervisors neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Mutual Savings & Loan Ass'n green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Norquist v. Zeuske green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Guzy green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Guzy v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Howard green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wilder v. Miller green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hoyer v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Wyss v. State neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Leadbetter green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. United Military Supply, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Aqua-Tech, Inc. v. Como Lake Protection & Rehabilitation District green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Salvucci green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| County of Dane v. Department of Health & Social Services green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Joint School District v. State Appeal Board green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| School District No. 4 v. County School Committee of Burnett County neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.