standing doctrine in Connecticut

2013“The doctrine of mootness is rooted in the same policy interests as the doctrine of standing, namely, to assure the vigorous presentation of arguments concerning the matter at issue.” State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 204 , 802 A.2d 74 (2002).

2013“The doctrine of mootness is rooted in the same policy interests as the doctrine of standing, namely, to assure the vigorous presentation of arguments concerning the matter at issue.” State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 204 , 802 A.2d 74 (2002).

2014A central tenet of the standing requirement is to ensure that ‘‘judicial deci- sions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 571 , 651 A.2d 1246 (1995).

2014A central tenet of the standing requirement is to ensure that ‘‘judicial deci- sions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 571 , 651 A.2d 1246 (1995).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

1995The standing requirement is “designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 649 , 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320 , 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

2022Reming- ton Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L.

2022Reming- ton Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L.

2022Reming- ton Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L.

2022Reming- ton Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L.

2022This holding is counterintuitive because the standing doctrine exists, as the majority correctly states, to ensure that a litigant has a ‘‘ ‘real interest,’ ’’ as opposed to merely a ‘‘ ‘general interest,’ ’’ in the subject matter of the controversy. ‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions [that] may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Empha- sis added; internal quotation marks omi

2022This holding is counterintuitive because the standing doctrine exists, as the majority correctly states, to ensure that a litigant has a ‘‘ ‘real interest,’ ’’ as opposed to merely a ‘‘ ‘general interest,’ ’’ in the subject matter of the controversy. ‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions [that] may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Empha- sis added; internal quotation marks omi

2021I The petitioner claims that Sobol rendered deficient performance when he litigated the petitioner’s motion to suppress by (1) failing to inform the petitioner of his right to testify, (2) limiting the evidence presented regarding the petitioner’s standing to challenge the con- stitutionality of the search, (3) utilizing a three-pronged approach that was not a reasonable strategic basis for his decisions, and (4) relying on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L.

2021I The petitioner claims that Sobol rendered deficient performance when he litigated the petitioner’s motion to suppress by (1) failing to inform the petitioner of his right to testify, (2) limiting the evidence presented regarding the petitioner’s standing to challenge the con- stitutionality of the search, (3) utilizing a three-pronged approach that was not a reasonable strategic basis for his decisions, and (4) relying on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L.

2019What is clear is that none of the rationales that underlie the standing doctrine, either generally or in the specific context of unfair trade practice litigation, supports the denial of standing to the plaintiffs in this case. ‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticable interests and that judicial deci- sions [that] may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slimp v. Dept. of Liquor Control,

2019What is clear is that none of the rationales that underlie the standing doctrine, either generally or in the specific context of unfair trade practice litigation, supports the denial of standing to the plaintiffs in this case. ‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticable interests and that judicial deci- sions [that] may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slimp v. Dept. of Liquor Control,

2019As we explained in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., supra, 258 Conn. 313 , there are several reasons why standing traditionally has been restricted to those parties directly injured by a defendant’s con- duct: ‘‘First, the more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine the amount of [the] plaintiff’s damages attributable to the wrongdoing as opposed to other, independent factors.

2002Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 373 , 780 A.2d 98 (2001).

2012After concluding that the association had not satisfied this foundational, or threshold, element, the court determined that, "[e]ven if this foundational element had been met by testimony of the association's general contractor members that they would have bid, but for the [PLA] specification, the association still cannot prevail under the second part of the standing test." Id., at 186-87 , 740 A.2d 813 . *201 With respect to the second part of the test, the association had claimed that the PLA requirement "arbitrarily and anticompetitively limit[ed] access to the bidding process" because it "

2012After concluding that the association had not satisfied this foundational, or threshold, element, the court determined that, "[e]ven if this foundational element had been met by testimony of the association's general contractor members that they would have bid, but for the [PLA] specification, the association still cannot prevail under the second part of the standing test." Id., at 186-87 , 740 A.2d 813 . *201 With respect to the second part of the test, the association had claimed that the PLA requirement "arbitrarily and anticompetitively limit[ed] access to the bidding process" because it "

2010Thus, “[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 , 116 S. Ct. 2174 , 135 L.

2010For example, in Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. 343 , the United States Supreme Court considered the standing requirement in the context of a prisoner’s fundamental right of access to courts pursuant to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 , 97 S. Ct. 1491 , 52 L.

2010For example, in Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. 343 , the United States Supreme Court considered the standing requirement in the context of a prisoner’s fundamental right of access to courts pursuant to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 , 97 S. Ct. 1491 , 52 L.

2010For example, in Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. 343 , the United States Supreme Court considered the standing requirement in the context of a prisoner’s fundamental right of access to courts pursuant to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 , 97 S. Ct. 1491 , 52 L.

2000Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District , 205 Conn. 290 , 294 (1987).

2000Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290 , 294 (1987).

1997Standing The defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing to seek visitation with the minor child pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59 . 6 The defendant relies upon the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 (1996).

1997Standing The defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing to seek visitation with the minor child pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59 . 6 The defendant relies upon the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 , ___ A.2d ___ (1996).

1991Furthermore, Worrell did not abandon the traditional standing requirement that a party bringing suit must “demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of [a controversy] that can be distinguished from the interest of the general public . . . .” CBIAI, supra. Worrell broke new ground only to the extent that it overruled an earlier precedent holding that an association was without standing to bring suit on behalf of its members “unless it has a right, in itself, in the subject matter of the controversy which a decree will affect”; Connecticut Society of Architects, Inc. v. Bank Building &

1991Furthermore, Worrell did not abandon the traditional standing requirement that a party bringing suit must “demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of [a controversy] that can be distinguished from the interest of the general public . . . .” CBIAI, supra. Worrell broke new ground only to the extent that it overruled an earlier precedent holding that an association was without standing to bring suit on behalf of its members “unless it has a right, in itself, in the subject matter of the controversy which a decree will affect”; Connecticut Society of Architects, Inc. v. Bank Building &

2024Second, the person or persons who prose- cute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 553 , 698 A.2d 245 (1997); see also Fischer v. People’s United Bank, N.A., 216 Conn. App. 426 , 440, 285 A.3d 421 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 904 , 287 A.3d 136 (2023). ‘‘To demonstrate authority to sue . . . it is not enough for a party merely to show a colorable claim to such authority.

2024Second, the person or persons who prose- cute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 553 , 698 A.2d 245 (1997); see also Fischer v. People’s United Bank, N.A., 216 Conn. App. 426 , 440, 285 A.3d 421 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 904 , 287 A.3d 136 (2023). ‘‘To demonstrate authority to sue . . . it is not enough for a party merely to show a colorable claim to such authority.

2021Ed. 2d 663 (1962), in lieu of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2021Ed. 2d 663 (1962), in lieu of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2019In addressing the defendant’s standing claim, the plaintiff directs our attention to this court’s decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cornelius, 170 Conn. App. 104, 107 , 154 A.3d 79 , cert. denied, 325 Conn. 922 , 159 A.3d 1171 (2017), stating that this court ‘‘dealt with a similar jurisdictional issue as raised in Thompson but found that the facts in that case were able to estab- lish [the] plaintiff’s standing through the trial court record . . . .’’ The plaintiff appears to cite Cornelius in an attempt to demonstrate that the record in the present case is adequate for our revie

2019In addressing the defendant’s standing claim, the plaintiff directs our attention to this court’s decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cornelius, 170 Conn. App. 104, 107 , 154 A.3d 79 , cert. denied, 325 Conn. 922 , 159 A.3d 1171 (2017), stating that this court ‘‘dealt with a similar jurisdictional issue as raised in Thompson but found that the facts in that case were able to estab- lish [the] plaintiff’s standing through the trial court record . . . .’’ The plaintiff appears to cite Cornelius in an attempt to demonstrate that the record in the present case is adequate for our revie

2019In addressing the defendant’s standing claim, the plaintiff directs our attention to this court’s decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cornelius, 170 Conn. App. 104, 107 , 154 A.3d 79 , cert. denied, 325 Conn. 922 , 159 A.3d 1171 (2017), stating that this court ‘‘dealt with a similar jurisdictional issue as raised in Thompson but found that the facts in that case were able to estab- lish [the] plaintiff’s standing through the trial court record . . . .’’ The plaintiff appears to cite Cornelius in an attempt to demonstrate that the record in the present case is adequate for our revie

2019In addressing the defendant’s standing claim, the plaintiff directs our attention to this court’s decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cornelius, 170 Conn. App. 104, 107 , 154 A.3d 79 , cert. denied, 325 Conn. 922 , 159 A.3d 1171 (2017), stating that this court ‘‘dealt with a similar jurisdictional issue as raised in Thompson but found that the facts in that case were able to estab- lish [the] plaintiff’s standing through the trial court record . . . .’’ The plaintiff appears to cite Cornelius in an attempt to demonstrate that the record in the present case is adequate for our revie