standing requirement in Alaska

1976In Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), we noted that “[i]n the past . . . this court has departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement.” Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 24 In our recent decision of Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we described this requirement in terms of “injury-in-fact,” and explained that its purpose is to assure the adversity which is fundamental

1976In Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), we noted that "[i]n the past ... this court has departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement." Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. [24] In our recent decision of Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we described this requirement in terms of "injury-in-fact," and explained that its purpose is to assure the adversity which is fundamental

1984In Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), we noted that “[i]n the past ... this court has departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement.” Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

1983In Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), we noted that “[i]n the past ... this court has departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement.” Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

2004See, eg., Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987) ("We have 'departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement,' adopting instead an approach "favoring increased accessibility to judicial forums.' ") (internal citations omitted). 24 .

1988The test for standing previously set forth by this court is broad: "[A]ll that is necessary is a `sufficient personal stake in the controversy to guarantee "the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings."'" [1] The court has "departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement ... adopting instead an approach `favoring increased accessibility to judicial forums.'" Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987) (citations omitted).

2013They are clearly distinguishable from the present case and do not answer the question whether a debtor-in-possession has an interest in bringing a veil-piercing claim against itself to recover the assets of an alleged alter ego. 23 Keller, 205 P.3d at 304-05 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 24 Slip Op. at 13. 25 210 P.3d 1213 , 1219 (Alaska 2009). 26 205 P.3d at 305 . 27 21 P.3d 357 , 359 (Alaska 2001). -41- 6811 Instead of relying on Alaska law, the court cites federal cases for support, many of which interpret California law.28 But although precedent from other jurisdictions

2013They are clearly distinguishable from the present case and do not answer the question whether a debtor-in-possession has an interest in bringing a veil-piercing claim against itself to recover the assets of an alleged alter ego. 23 Keller, 205 P.3d at 304-05 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 24 Slip Op. at 13. 25 210 P.3d 1213 , 1219 (Alaska 2009). 26 205 P.3d at 305 . 27 21 P.3d 357 , 359 (Alaska 2001). -41- 6811 Instead of relying on Alaska law, the court cites federal cases for support, many of which interpret California law.28 But although precedent from other jurisdictions

1983Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975); see also Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 584 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1978) (adversity is the essence of the requirement of standing); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) (the only relevant inquiry in determining the question of standing is adversity).

1983In our recent decision of Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we described this requirement in terms of "injury-in-fact," and explained that its purpose is to assure the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings. 553 P.2d at 23 (footnotes omitted).

2022Chignik Lagoon’s status as an intervenor is not enough to establish standing for the duration of the case regardless of the disposition of 40 Triem v. Kake Tribal Corp., 513 P.3d 994 , 996-97 (Alaska 2022) (quoting Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Alaska 2009)). 41 42 U.S.C. § 673 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (requiring states to enter into adoption assistance agreements providing for payments with certain children’s adoptive parents); id. § 675a(a)(2)(B) (requiring states to implement procedures to ensure that courts at permanency hearings “[m]ake a judicial determinati

2013They are clearly distinguishable from the present case and do not answer the question whether a debtor-in-possession has an interest in bringing a veil-piercing claim against itself to recover the assets of an alleged alter ego. 23 Keller, 205 P.3d at 304-05 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 24 Slip Op. at 13. 25 210 P.3d 1213 , 1219 (Alaska 2009). 26 205 P.3d at 305 . 27 21 P.3d 357 , 359 (Alaska 2001). -41- 6811 Instead of relying on Alaska law, the court cites federal cases for support, many of which interpret California law.28 But although precedent from other jurisdictions

1995See Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. University of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1096-98 (Alaska 1988) (whether there is a genuine adversity so as to meet the standing requirement, is reviewed de novo as part of the doctrine of judicial restraint). .

1995See Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. University of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1096-98 (Alaska 1988) (whether there is a genuine adversity so as to meet the standing requirement, is reviewed de novo as part of the doctrine of judicial restraint). [4] Moreover, it is well-settled in this state that, as the Robertsons' liability insurer, Allstate was not a proper party defendant at trial.

2024IV, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law.”); Myers, 891 P.2d at 203 (“In discussing the standing requirement, [we have] stated that an Alaska court has no subject matter jurisdiction unless the lawsuit before it presents an actual controversy involving a genuine relationship of adversity between the parties.”). 21 See Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 865 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1993); Griswold 2011, 252 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 2011); Griswold 2019, 440 P.3d 248, 252 (Alaska 2019). 22 See 865 P.2d at 743 (analyzing former Fairbanks North Star Bo

2024IV, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law.”); Myers, 891 P.2d at 203 (“In discussing the standing requirement, [we have] stated that an Alaska court has no subject matter jurisdiction unless the lawsuit before it presents an actual controversy involving a genuine relationship of adversity between the parties.”). 21 See Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 865 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1993); Griswold 2011, 252 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 2011); Griswold 2019, 440 P.3d 248, 252 (Alaska 2019). 22 See 865 P.2d at 743 (analyzing former Fairbanks North Star Bo

2024IV, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law.”); Myers, 891 P.2d at 203 (“In discussing the standing requirement, [we have] stated that an Alaska court has no subject matter jurisdiction unless the lawsuit before it presents an actual controversy involving a genuine relationship of adversity between the parties.”). 21 See Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 865 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1993); Griswold 2011, 252 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 2011); Griswold 2019, 440 P.3d 248, 252 (Alaska 2019). 22 See 865 P.2d at 743 (analyzing former Fairbanks North Star Bo

2024IV, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law.”); Myers, 891 P.2d at 203 (“In discussing the standing requirement, [we have] stated that an Alaska court has no subject matter jurisdiction unless the lawsuit before it presents an actual controversy involving a genuine relationship of adversity between the parties.”). 21 See Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 865 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1993); Griswold 2011, 252 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 2011); Griswold 2019, 440 P.3d 248, 252 (Alaska 2019). 22 See 865 P.2d at 743 (analyzing former Fairbanks North Star Bo

2024IV, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law.”); Myers, 891 P.2d at 203 (“In discussing the standing requirement, [we have] stated that an Alaska court has no subject matter jurisdiction unless the lawsuit before it presents an actual controversy involving a genuine relationship of adversity between the parties.”). 21 See Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 865 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1993); Griswold 2011, 252 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 2011); Griswold 2019, 440 P.3d 248, 252 (Alaska 2019). 22 See 865 P.2d at 743 (analyzing former Fairbanks North Star Bo

2021Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2011). -7- 7514 it is reasonable.”16 But when the agency’s specialized knowledge and experience are not particularly relevant to the issue at hand, we substitute our own judgment.17 The State argues the reasonable basis standard of review should apply here because an ORRI holder’s standing to challenge a unitization decision is intertwined with the management of Alaska’s oil and gas resources.

1995Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649, 651 (Alaska 1981) (direct actions against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer are not permitted in Alaska). [5] Allstate argues that defense counsel's adversarial posture could not cure the lack of adversity in this case because counsel had no control over the manner in which the Robertsons would color the facts.

1983Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975); see also Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 584 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1978) (adversity is the essence of the requirement of standing); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) (the only relevant inquiry in determining the question of standing is adversity).

1983In Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 692 (Alaska 1966), this court, after reviewing the provisions of Alaska’s constitution concerning reapportionment, stated: It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Governor, with the assistance of the Reapportionment Board, must reapportion representation in the House of Representatives on a method of equal proportions, every ten years; that he must explain any deviation from the reapportionment plan submitted to him by the Board and that any qualified voter can invoke the power of the courts to compel him to reapportion or to correct any error made by

1983The superior court found that "The plaintiff is a citizen and voter of the United States and the State of Alaska and is entitled to vote for members of the House of Representatives and the Senate of the State of Alaska." [11] The Governor cites the rule of construction that constitutions should be read, whenever possible, in harmony with the common law, and argues that the language of Article VI, section 11 should be interpreted as supplementing rather than repealing the traditional standing requirement. [12] In Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 692 (Alaska 1966), this court, after reviewing the pr

1983Nevertheless, two previous decisions concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule, Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Alaska 1983), and State v. Sears, 553 P.2d at 912 , provide some guidance.

1983Nevertheless, two previous decisions concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule, Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Alaska 1983), and State v. Sears, 553 P.2d at 912 , provide some guidance.