standing doctrine in Wyoming

2002Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo.1974).

1998Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo.1974).

2004Id. (quoting Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Wyo.2000)). [¶ 9] We generally do not relax the standing requirement in the context of an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, but require: 1.

2004Jolley, 2002 WY 7, ¶ 9 , 38 P.3d at 1077 .

2003The standing requirement is relaxed when a statute reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, [ 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)].

2003The standing requirement is relaxed when a statute reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, [ 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)].

2003The requirement is also relaxed when a statute is shown to be vague " 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all " Parker v. Levy, supra 94 S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)).

2003The requirement is also relaxed when a statute *1260 is shown to be vague "`not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" Parker v. Levy, supra 94 S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)).

2003The requirement is also relaxed when a statute *1260 is shown to be vague "`not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" Parker v. Levy, supra 94 S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)).

2003The requirement is also relaxed when a statute *1260 is shown to be vague "`not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" Parker v. Levy, supra 94 S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)).

2003The standing requirement is relaxed when a statute reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, [ 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)].

2003The standing requirement is relaxed when a statute reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, [ 461 U.S. 352 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)].

2022Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 9 , 79 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992). [¶9] “Standing focuses on a litigant being properly situated to assert an issue for judicial determination.” The Tavern, LLC, 2017 WY 56, ¶ 26 , 395 P.3d at 174 (citing Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 18 , 273 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wyo. 2012)).

2022Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 9 , 79 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992). [¶9] “Standing focuses on a litigant being properly situated to assert an issue for judicial determination.” The Tavern, LLC, 2017 WY 56, ¶ 26 , 395 P.3d at 174 (citing Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 18 , 273 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wyo. 2012)).

2018At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating." Williams v. City of Gillette , 2011 WY 6 , ¶ 6, 245 P.3d 362 , 364 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst) , 2010 WY 155 , ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961 , 965 (Wyo. 2010) ).

2018At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating." Williams v. City of Gillette , 2011 WY 6 , ¶ 6, 245 P.3d 362 , 364 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst) , 2010 WY 155 , ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961 , 965 (Wyo. 2010) ).

2018In Chapman v. Bevilacqua, 344 Ark. 262 , 42 S.W.3d 378 (2001), the court found that the plaintiff had standing to sue for allegedly improper disbursements of federal funds only to the extent that those' funds were derived from* taxpayer monies, as distinguished from fe'deral funds.

2018In Chapman v. Bevilacqua, 344 Ark. 262 , 42 S.W.3d 378 (2001), the court found that the plaintiff had standing to sue for allegedly improper disbursements of federal funds only to the extent that those' funds were derived from* taxpayer monies, as distinguished from fe'deral funds.

2018At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating." Williams v. City of Gillette , 2011 WY 6 , ¶ 6, 245 P.3d 362 , 364 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst) , 2010 WY 155 , ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961 , 965 (Wyo. 2010) ).

2018At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating." Williams v. City of Gillette , 2011 WY 6 , ¶ 6, 245 P.3d 362 , 364 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst) , 2010 WY 155 , ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961 , 965 (Wyo. 2010) ).

2018Alabama Policy Institute, 200 So.3d 495, 527 (Ala. 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584 , 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (20Í5), the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing because he had alleged an injury “peculiar to himself.” In Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2009), a case which Appellants cite for proposition that “citizen-taxpayer standing [is] recognized, requiring showing that the case is of ‘public significance,’ ” the Alaska Supreme Court, applying a standing test that is quite different than Wyoming’s, held that the appellants there lacked s

2018Alabama Policy Institute, 200 So.3d 495, 527 (Ala. 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584 , 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (20Í5), the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing because he had alleged an injury “peculiar to himself.” In Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2009), a case which Appellants cite for proposition that “citizen-taxpayer standing [is] recognized, requiring showing that the case is of ‘public significance,’ ” the Alaska Supreme Court, applying a standing test that is quite different than Wyoming’s, held that the appellants there lacked s

2018Alabama Policy Institute, 200 So.3d 495, 527 (Ala. 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584 , 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (20Í5), the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing because he had alleged an injury “peculiar to himself.” In Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2009), a case which Appellants cite for proposition that “citizen-taxpayer standing [is] recognized, requiring showing that the case is of ‘public significance,’ ” the Alaska Supreme Court, applying a standing test that is quite different than Wyoming’s, held that the appellants there lacked s

2018Alabama Policy Institute, 200 So.3d 495, 527 (Ala. 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584 , 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (20Í5), the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing because he had alleged an injury “peculiar to himself.” In Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2009), a case which Appellants cite for proposition that “citizen-taxpayer standing [is] recognized, requiring showing that the case is of ‘public significance,’ ” the Alaska Supreme Court, applying a standing test that is quite different than Wyoming’s, held that the appellants there lacked s

2012Redressibility [T31] Redressibility is the third element of the test for standing as set forth in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 .

2012Redressibility [T31] Redressibility is the third element of the test for standing as set forth in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 .

2011In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828 , 97 S.Ct. at 1498 . [¶ 8] In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 , 116 S.Ct. 2174 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Supreme Court revisited the holding in Bounds, and clarified that an inmate alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts must demonstrate an "actual injury.

2011In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828 , 97 S.Ct. at 1498 . [¶ 8] In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 , 116 S.Ct. 2174 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Supreme Court revisited the holding in Bounds, and clarified that an inmate alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts must demonstrate an "actual injury.

2011In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828 , 97 S.Ct. at 1498 . [¶ 8] In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 , 116 S.Ct. 2174 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Supreme Court revisited the holding in Bounds, and clarified that an inmate alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts must demonstrate an "actual injury.

2011In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828 , 97 S.Ct. at 1498 . [¶ 8] In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 , 116 S.Ct. 2174 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Supreme Court revisited the holding in Bounds, and clarified that an inmate alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts must demonstrate an "actual injury.

2007We discussed that doctrine at length in Joi-ley, where we wrote: The doctrine of great public interest or importance should be applied cautiously: The question of great public importance rests with this court, Kellner v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 127 Colo. 320 , 256 P.2d 887, 888 .

2007We discussed that doctrine at length in Joi-ley, where we wrote: The doctrine of great public interest or importance should be applied cautiously: The question of great public importance rests with this court, Kellner v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 127 Colo. 320 , 256 P.2d 887, 888 .

2007In Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 2005 OK 73 , 123 P.3d 21 (Okla.2005), the Oklahoma Supreme Court premised its "interested party" analysis upon the doctrine of standing.

2007In Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 2005 OK 73 , 123 P.3d 21 (Okla.2005), the Oklahoma Supreme Court premised its "interested party" analysis upon the doctrine of standing.