standing rule in Georgia

2026“Organizational standing ... permits an organization to sue in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals.” Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp, 313 Ga. 375, 381-82 (1)(a) ( 870 SE2d 430 ) (2022) (overruled on other grounds by Republican Nat’l Comm., 321 Ga. at 780 (2)(b)).

2026“Organizational standing ... permits an organization to sue in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals.” Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp, 313 Ga. 375, 381-82 (1)(a) ( 870 SE2d 430 ) (2022) (overruled on other grounds by Republican Nat’l Comm., 321 Ga. at 780 (2)(b)).

2025See SCV, 315 Ga. at 63 (2) (c) (iii), 65 (2) (d) (i).

2023That said, I am not so sure our Supreme Court’s considerable expansion of this state’s standing doctrine 12 See 315 Ga. at 44-45 (2) 9a) (noting that “[s]tanding is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a plaintiff’s right to sue,” and that “[a] plaintiff with standing is necessary to invoke a court’s judicial power to resolve a dispute, and the power of Georgia courts—as with any power possessed by a branch of state government—is conferred by our state Constitution”); Black Voters Matter Fund, 313 Ga. at 380 (1) (same); Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 740 (3) (d) n.6 ( 783 SE2d 61

2026“Organizational standing ... permits an organization to sue in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals.” Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp, 313 Ga. 375, 381-82 (1)(a) ( 870 SE2d 430 ) (2022) (overruled on other grounds by Republican Nat’l Comm., 321 Ga. at 780 (2)(b)).

2025SCV, 315 13 See Eternal Vigilance, 321 Ga. at 777 (2) (a) (an organization has standing “in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 20 Ga. at 60-67 (c) (iii) - (d) (ii).

2026See also RNC, 321 Ga. at 775 (2);Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 640 (II)(A)(2).

2025Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 639 (II) (A) (1) (b) n.8; see Eternal Vigilance, 321 Ga. at 776-777 (2) (a) (the proper focus of an inquiry into standing is on “vindicating the legal rights 9 of the parties, rather than on addressing mere factual harms”).

2017It also found the Foundation was not entitled to mandamus relief. (a) The parties agree that the proper standard to apply when determining a party’s standing to challenge a rezoning decision is the “substantial interest-aggrieved citizen” test. 4 By this test, “there [are] two steps to standing: First,... a person claiming to be aggrieved must have a substantial interest in the zoning decision, and second, . . . this interest [must] be in danger of suffering some special damage or injury not common to all property owners similarly situated.” DeKalb County v. Wapensky, 253 Ga. 47, 48 (1) ( 315

2017It also found the Foundation was not entitled to mandamus relief. (a) The parties agree that the proper standard to apply when determining a party’s standing to challenge a rezoning decision is the “substantial interest-aggrieved citizen” test. 4 By this test, “there [are] two steps to standing: First,... a person claiming to be aggrieved must have a substantial interest in the zoning decision, and second, . . . this interest [must] be in danger of suffering some special damage or injury not common to all property owners similarly situated.” DeKalb County v. Wapensky, 253 Ga. 47, 48 (1) ( 315

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 92 (1); SCV, 315 Ga. at 54 n.13 (2) (c).

2025See also Floam, 319 Ga. at 94 (1). 8 2.

2019Credit Union v. Pinto, 297 Ga. App. 605, 606 ( 677 SE2d 789 ) (2009); see Lewis v. Van Anda, 282 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 653 SE2d 708 ) (2007) (“The timely assertion of a standing defense is necessary to prevent . . . [d]iscovery, a pretrial conference and order, and a fairly lengthy trial consum[ing] judicial as well as private resources unnecessarily, if [the] plaintiff had no capacity to pursue th[e] claim. [Standing] is primarily a threshold question and generally collateral to the real issues.” (punctuation omitted)). 13 (a) As to Beard’s motion to disqualify counsel of record from representin

2019Credit Union v. Pinto, 297 Ga. App. 605, 606 ( 677 SE2d 789 ) (2009); see Lewis v. Van Anda, 282 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 653 SE2d 708 ) (2007) (“The timely assertion of a standing defense is necessary to prevent . . . [d]iscovery, a pretrial conference and order, and a fairly lengthy trial consum[ing] judicial as well as private resources unnecessarily, if [the] plaintiff had no capacity to pursue th[e] claim. [Standing] is primarily a threshold question and generally collateral to the real issues.” (punctuation omitted)). 13 (a) As to Beard’s motion to disqualify counsel of record from representin

2019Cal. 2010) ("[A] defendant may establish standing by pointing to all evidence in the record, including the Government's evidence."); People v. Gonzalez , 68 N.Y.2d 950 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 86 , 502 N.E.2d 1001 , 1002 (1986) ("There is no requirement that a defendant testify in order to sustain his burden of proving standing ... , and evidence elicited during the People's direct case may be cited in support of a defendant's standing claim.").

2019Cal. 2010) ("[A] defendant may establish standing by pointing to all evidence in the record, including the Government's evidence."); People v. Gonzalez , 68 N.Y.2d 950 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 86 , 502 N.E.2d 1001 , 1002 (1986) ("There is no requirement that a defendant testify in order to sustain his burden of proving standing ... , and evidence elicited during the People's direct case may be cited in support of a defendant's standing claim.").

2017See also Brand v. Wilson, 252 Ga. 416, 417 (1) ( 314 SE2d 192 ) (1984) (“[T]he gauge for standing... is simply this: that a citizen must have a substantial interest, which must suffer substantial damage by reason of the contested zoning change.”).

2017As noted, a usufruct does not pass an estate in real property Those cases in which the Georgia appellate courts have found a zoning decision challenger to have a substantial interest in the zoning decision, which satisfies the first prong of the standing test, have all involved holders of vested or inchoate title to real property See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Wapensky, supra, 253 Ga. at 49 (1); Brand v. Wilson, supra, 252 Ga. at 417 (1); Hollberg v. Spalding County, supra, 281 Ga. App. at 773 (2) (a).

2025SCV, 315 13 See Eternal Vigilance, 321 Ga. at 777 (2) (a) (an organization has standing “in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 20 Ga. at 60-67 (c) (iii) - (d) (ii).

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 92 (1) (citing, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-355 (1884); Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886)).

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 92 (1) (citing, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-355 (1884); Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886)).

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 92 (1) (citing, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-355 (1884); Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886)).

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 92 (1) (citing, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-355 (1884); Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886)).

2025Gas Co., 214 Ga. at 175 (1) (“He must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both.” (emphasis added)).10 This rule was applied on 10 As we have noted before, when this standing rule has been applied in the context of constitutional challenges to statutes, we have required the plain- tiff to assert an individualized injury.

2025See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U. S. v. Tinsley Mill Vill., 249 Ga. 769, 771-772 (2) (294 SE2d 495) (1982) (condominium asso- ciation was not the real party in interest where “the rights sought to be en- forced are the right to recover for damages to property and the right to have 43 As the century marched on, this Court continued to apply the basic rule underlying our consistent rejection of attempts to assert the rights of third parties — that a plaintiff must assert her own rights to maintain an action — in other contexts.

2025See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U. S. v. Tinsley Mill Vill., 249 Ga. 769, 771-772 (2) (294 SE2d 495) (1982) (condominium asso- ciation was not the real party in interest where “the rights sought to be en- forced are the right to recover for damages to property and the right to have 43 As the century marched on, this Court continued to apply the basic rule underlying our consistent rejection of attempts to assert the rights of third parties — that a plaintiff must assert her own rights to maintain an action — in other contexts.

2024In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the threshold question is whether the defendant has “standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence.”38 Of course, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,39 a search warrant in Georgia may issue “only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.”40 And because Fourth 38 State v. Jackson, 243 Ga. App. 330, 330 ( 533 SE2d 433 ) (2000); see Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[D]emonstrating standing is a threshold burden for supp

2024In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the threshold question is whether the defendant has “standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence.”38 Of course, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,39 a search warrant in Georgia may issue “only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.”40 And because Fourth 38 State v. Jackson, 243 Ga. App. 330, 330 ( 533 SE2d 433 ) (2000); see Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[D]emonstrating standing is a threshold burden for supp

2024In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the threshold question is whether the defendant has “standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence.”38 Of course, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,39 a search warrant in Georgia may issue “only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.”40 And because Fourth 38 State v. Jackson, 243 Ga. App. 330, 330 ( 533 SE2d 433 ) (2000); see Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[D]emonstrating standing is a threshold burden for supp

2024In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the threshold question is whether the defendant has “standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence.”38 Of course, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,39 a search warrant in Georgia may issue “only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.”40 And because Fourth 38 State v. Jackson, 243 Ga. App. 330, 330 ( 533 SE2d 433 ) (2000); see Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[D]emonstrating standing is a threshold burden for supp

2023That said, I am not so sure our Supreme Court’s considerable expansion of this state’s standing doctrine 12 See 315 Ga. at 44-45 (2) 9a) (noting that “[s]tanding is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a plaintiff’s right to sue,” and that “[a] plaintiff with standing is necessary to invoke a court’s judicial power to resolve a dispute, and the power of Georgia courts—as with any power possessed by a branch of state government—is conferred by our state Constitution”); Black Voters Matter Fund, 313 Ga. at 380 (1) (same); Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 740 (3) (d) n.6 ( 783 SE2d 61

2023That said, I am not so sure our Supreme Court’s considerable expansion of this state’s standing doctrine 12 See 315 Ga. at 44-45 (2) 9a) (noting that “[s]tanding is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a plaintiff’s right to sue,” and that “[a] plaintiff with standing is necessary to invoke a court’s judicial power to resolve a dispute, and the power of Georgia courts—as with any power possessed by a branch of state government—is conferred by our state Constitution”); Black Voters Matter Fund, 313 Ga. at 380 (1) (same); Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 740 (3) (d) n.6 ( 783 SE2d 61

2023REV. 689, 694 (I) (B) (2004) (noting that “[t]he question of which parties may properly come to court to vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of standing”). 11 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 ( 95 SCt 2197 , 45 LE2d 343) (1975). 4 Power Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution to include a standing requirement of litigants.12 And rightly so.

2023REV. 689, 694 (I) (B) (2004) (noting that “[t]he question of which parties may properly come to court to vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of standing”). 11 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 ( 95 SCt 2197 , 45 LE2d 343) (1975). 4 Power Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution to include a standing requirement of litigants.12 And rightly so.

2022See Grace Bros., 264 Ga. at 819 (2); Phoenix Airline Svcs., 260 Ga. at 586 (1); Ga. Appreciation Property, 345 Ga. App. at 420; Crittenton, 312 Ga. App. at 524 (2); Dunn, 227 Ga. App. at 508 (1) (a); see also Division 1, above. 14 Knaack also highlights an August 16, 2018 e-mail exchange between her real estate agent and HP Georgia I’s real estate agent regarding the newly enacted Community Rules.

2022We have long held that taxpayers generally have standing to contest unlawful expenditures of public funds when they are “in danger of injury through loss of public funds or property.” Morris v. City Council of Augusta, 201 Ga. 666, 670 (1) (40 SE2d 710) (1946) (distinguishing cases not allowing such suits as lacking that danger); see also, e.g., Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 272 (3) (b) (ii) & n.13 (840 SE2d 423) (2020).

2022We have long held that taxpayers generally have standing to contest unlawful expenditures of public funds when they are “in danger of injury through loss of public funds or property.” Morris v. City Council of Augusta, 201 Ga. 666, 670 (1) (40 SE2d 710) (1946) (distinguishing cases not allowing such suits as lacking that danger); see also, e.g., Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 272 (3) (b) (ii) & n.13 (840 SE2d 423) (2020).

2022Under the 1945 and 1976 26The United States Supreme Court appears to have adopted a similar approach over a century ago: “Considerations of propriety, as well as long- established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.” Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (39 SCt 468, 63 LEd 979) (1919). 43 Constitutions, we consistently applied the same standing rule.

2022Under the 1945 and 1976 26The United States Supreme Court appears to have adopted a similar approach over a century ago: “Considerations of propriety, as well as long- established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.” Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (39 SCt 468, 63 LEd 979) (1919). 43 Constitutions, we consistently applied the same standing rule.

2022See Grace Bros., 264 Ga. at 819 (2); Phoenix Airline Svcs., 260 Ga. at 586 (1); Ga. Appreciation Property, 345 Ga. App. at 420; Crittenton, 312 Ga. App. at 524 (2); Dunn, 227 Ga. App. at 508 (1) (a); see also Division 1, above. 14 Knaack also highlights an August 16, 2018 e-mail exchange between her real estate agent and HP Georgia I’s real estate agent regarding the newly enacted Community Rules.

2022Thus, to maintain an action challenging the constitutionality of SB 9 on this basis, BVMF must establish standing to sue on the grounds asserted, which requires showing (1) an injury in fact (2) a causal connection between the injury and the alleged wrong, and (3) the likelihood that 11 Under federal standing law, a corporation may challenge a government regulation that causes it economic injury, see Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U. S. 45, 46 (91 SCt 158, 27 LE2d 179 (1970) (per curiam), and may also sue a government for injuring its constitutional rights, see Susan B.

2022Thus, to maintain an action challenging the constitutionality of SB 9 on this basis, BVMF must establish standing to sue on the grounds asserted, which requires showing (1) an injury in fact (2) a causal connection between the injury and the alleged wrong, and (3) the likelihood that 11 Under federal standing law, a corporation may challenge a government regulation that causes it economic injury, see Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U. S. 45, 46 (91 SCt 158, 27 LE2d 179 (1970) (per curiam), and may also sue a government for injuring its constitutional rights, see Susan B.

2022See, e.g., Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (658 SE2d 603) (2008); Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987); St.

2022See, e.g., Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (658 SE2d 603) (2008); Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987); St.

2022Membership Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 279 Ga. 22 (1) (608 SE2d 611) (2005).11 Organizational standing, as opposed to associational standing, does not depend on the standing of an organization’s members; instead, organizational standing permits an organization to sue in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals.

2022Membership Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 279 Ga. 22 (1) (608 SE2d 611) (2005).11 Organizational standing, as opposed to associational standing, does not depend on the standing of an organization’s members; instead, organizational standing permits an organization to sue in its own right if it meets the same standing test applicable to individuals.

2022See Grace Bros., 264 Ga. at 819 (2); Phoenix Airline Svcs., 260 Ga. at 586 (1); Ga. Appreciation Property, 345 Ga. App. at 420; Crittenton, 312 Ga. App. at 524 (2); Dunn, 227 Ga. App. at 508 (1) (a); see also Division 1, above. 14 Knaack also highlights an August 16, 2018 e-mail exchange between her real estate agent and HP Georgia I’s real estate agent regarding the newly enacted Community Rules.

2022See Grace Bros., 264 Ga. at 819 (2); Phoenix Airline Svcs., 260 Ga. at 586 (1); Ga. Appreciation Property, 345 Ga. App. at 420; Crittenton, 312 Ga. App. at 524 (2); Dunn, 227 Ga. App. at 508 (1) (a); see also Division 1, above. 14 Knaack also highlights an August 16, 2018 e-mail exchange between her real estate agent and HP Georgia I’s real estate agent regarding the newly enacted Community Rules.

2022See, e.g., Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (658 SE2d 603) (2008); Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987); St.

2022See, e.g., Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (658 SE2d 603) (2008); Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987); St.