standing challenge in New York

2001This standing to challenge an administrative determination requires a “showing] that the administrative action will in fact have a harmful effect on the petitioner and that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected” (Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6, 9 , supra).

1993As a result, and inasmuch as our attention has been directed to no other applicable statute which confers standing in this situation, petitioners must satisfy the traditional two-part standing test, i.e., they must show "that the administrative action will in fact have a harmful effect on the petitioner and that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute” (Matter of Dairy lea Coop, v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6, 9 ; see, Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus.

1983Petitioner contends that respondent lacks standing to contest the constitutional issue, citing Matter of McConnell v Coveney ( 54 AD2d 769 ), because his interest is not of the type cognizable under the standing doctrine (Matter of Urban League of Rochester v County of Monroe, 49 NY2d 551 ; Boryszewski v Brydges, 37 NY2d 361 ).

1978In view of expansion in the doctrine of standing (see Boryszewski v Brydges, 37 NY2d 361 ), we disagree.

2019Footnote 4: For example, in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Butler ( 129 AD3d at 780 ), this Court held that a standing defense was waived where the pro se defendant asserted only a general denial of allegations contained in the complaint and failed to check a box for any of eight defenses listed on the court-issued form entitled "Verified Answer To Foreclosure Complaint" including the defense of "Lack of Standing to Sue: Plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it was not the legal owner of the Note and/or Mortgage at the time it commenced this foreclosure lawsuit." Footnote 5: Notably, i

2019Footnote 4: For example, in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Butler ( 129 AD3d at 780 ), this Court held that a standing defense was waived where the pro se defendant asserted only a general denial of allegations contained in the complaint and failed to check a box for any of eight defenses listed on the court-issued form entitled "Verified Answer To Foreclosure Complaint" including the defense of "Lack of Standing to Sue: Plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it was not the legal owner of the Note and/or Mortgage at the time it commenced this foreclosure lawsuit." Footnote 5: Notably, i

2014Finding standing under the situation presented here would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction (cf. Nnebe v Daus, 644 F3d 147, 157-158 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Stray from the Heart, Inc. v Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of N.Y., 83 AD3d 521 , 522 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 946 [2012]; Henry v Isaac, 228 AD2d 558, 559 [1996]).

2014Finding standing under the situation presented here would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction (cf. Nnebe v Daus, 644 F3d 147, 157-158 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Stray from the Heart, Inc. v Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of N.Y., 83 AD3d 521 , 522 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 946 [2012]; Henry v Isaac, 228 AD2d 558, 559 [1996]).

2014Finding standing under the situation presented here would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction (cf. Nnebe v Daus, 644 F3d 147, 157-158 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Stray from the Heart, Inc. v Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of N.Y., 83 AD3d 521 , 522 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 946 [2012]; Henry v Isaac, 228 AD2d 558, 559 [1996]).

2014Finding standing under the situation presented here would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction (cf. Nnebe v Daus, 644 F3d 147, 157-158 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Stray from the Heart, Inc. v Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of N.Y., 83 AD3d 521 , 522 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 946 [2012]; Henry v Isaac, 228 AD2d 558, 559 [1996]).

1985(Matter of Dairylea Coop, v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6 ; Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin, 36 NY2d 1 .) Here, plaintiff’s interest in the outcome of this controversy as a resident of Belle Harbor is sufficiently particular to permit him to request judicial intervention to test the constitutionality of the eruv.

1978Significantly, two recent cases involved associations (Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn, v Galvin, 36 NY2d 1 ; National Organization for Women v State Div. of Human Rights, 34 NY2d 416 ).

2021However, compared to those seeking a hearing to suppress evidence obtained through an unlawful arrest, the burden needed for a hearing to suppress evidence obtained through an alleged unlawful search is higher under Mendoza’s third criterion—the defendant’s access to information: “[I]t is after all the defendant alone who actually knows [the defendant’s] connection with the searched area” (Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429 [quoting Wesley, 73 NY2d at 358-359 ]).

1992Any "unfairness” that supports a defendant’s standing to challenge a statutory presumption of possession is not present in cases based on constructive possession resting outside the statutory presumption (People v Wesley, 73 NY2d 351, 361 ).

2019Footnote 4: For example, in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Butler ( 129 AD3d at 780 ), this Court held that a standing defense was waived where the pro se defendant asserted only a general denial of allegations contained in the complaint and failed to check a box for any of eight defenses listed on the court-issued form entitled "Verified Answer To Foreclosure Complaint" including the defense of "Lack of Standing to Sue: Plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it was not the legal owner of the Note and/or Mortgage at the time it commenced this foreclosure lawsuit." Footnote 5: Notably, i

2019Footnote 4: For example, in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Butler ( 129 AD3d at 780 ), this Court held that a standing defense was waived where the pro se defendant asserted only a general denial of allegations contained in the complaint and failed to check a box for any of eight defenses listed on the court-issued form entitled "Verified Answer To Foreclosure Complaint" including the defense of "Lack of Standing to Sue: Plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it was not the legal owner of the Note and/or Mortgage at the time it commenced this foreclosure lawsuit." Footnote 5: Notably, i

2019Defendant's claims regarding the assignment of the mortgage in 2010 are also unavailing, as only the consolidated note, and not the mortgage, is relevant to the standing analysis ( see Aurora , 25 NY3d at 361 ).

2019Defendant's claims regarding the assignment of the mortgage in 2010 are also unavailing, as only the consolidated note, and not the mortgage, is relevant to the standing analysis ( see Aurora , 25 NY3d at 361 ).

2014While the defense of standing is normally waived if not asserted (see Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239 ), there is nothing that prohibits defendant from moving to amend the answer under CPLR 3025 (b), especially where, as here, the defense is meritorious and there is no prejudice to the plaintiff (see Sharif, 89 AD3d at 724 ).

2010In both Mastropaolo and Delphonse , the defendants filed answers containing either counterclaims or affirmative defenses, without asserting a standing defense (see Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d at 240 ; Delphonse, 64 AD3d at 625 ).

2013Should Family Court determine that the grandparent has standing to seek visitation, the question then becomes whether such visitation is in the child’s best interests (see Matter of Couse v Couse, 72 AD3d at 1232 ; Matter of Kenyon v Kenyon, 251 AD2d at 763 ; see also Matter of Quinn v Heffler, 102 AD3d 876, 876 [2013]).

2013Should Family Court determine that the grandparent has standing to seek visitation, the question then becomes whether such visitation is in the child’s best interests (see Matter of Couse v Couse, 72 AD3d at 1232 ; Matter of Kenyon v Kenyon, 251 AD2d at 763 ; see also Matter of Quinn v Heffler, 102 AD3d 876, 876 [2013]).

2013Episcopal Church in U.S. ( 163 NY 417 [1900]) established that the Attorney General’s standing to challenge claimed abuses of trust funds is not necessarily exclusive.

2013Episcopal Church in U.S. ( 163 NY 417 [1900]) established that the Attorney General’s standing to challenge claimed abuses of trust funds is not necessarily exclusive.

2012Matter of Adinolfi, 90 AD3d at 36-37 [respondent publicly censured based on a public reprimand issued by the Second Circuit for misconduct involving, inter alia, numerous failures to submit timely briefs in support of petitions for review]; Matter of Cox, 89 AD3d 147 [2011] [respondent was publicly censured based upon a public reprimand and other sanctions imposed by the Second Circuit for disregarding a standing rule of a tribunal and the habitual violation of rules of procedure]).

2012Matter of Adinolfi, 90 AD3d at 36-37 [respondent publicly censured based on a public reprimand issued by the Second Circuit for misconduct involving, inter alia, numerous failures to submit timely briefs in support of petitions for review]; Matter of Cox, 89 AD3d 147 [2011] [respondent was publicly censured based upon a public reprimand and other sanctions imposed by the Second Circuit for disregarding a standing rule of a tribunal and the habitual violation of rules of procedure]).

2008The Court of Appeals in People v Millan (supra) recognized an exception to this standing requirement where the People charge the defendant with possession solely on the basis of the statutory presumption that allows a defendant to be convicted based on his or her mere presence in the automobile or room in which contraband is found (Penal Law §§ 220.25 [narcotics], 265.15 [weapons]).

1991The first is whether standing derived solely from the prosecution’s reliance upon a statutory presumption (see, People v Millan, 69 NY2d 514 ) confers a right to seek suppression of additional property which is not subject to the presumption but which is seized in the course of the same search.

2004It is of no interest to others that formalities have not been followed, so long as the purpose of subdivision 4 of section 137 is not frustrated.” In Matter of Gross v Hoblock ( 6 AD3d 933 [2004]), the Third Department recently addressed the issue of a candidate’s standing to challenge the minor party nomination of his opponent when the minor party failed to file a certificate of authorization as required under section 6-120 of the Election Law.

2004It is of no interest to others that formalities have not been followed, so long as the purpose of subdivision 4 of section 137 is not frustrated." In Matter of Gross v Hoblock ( 6 AD3d 933 [2004]), the Third Department recently addressed the issue of a candidate's standing to challenge the minor party nomination of his opponent when the minor party failed to file a certificate of authorization as required under section 6-120 of the Election Law.

1993The consequence of this concern for confining Millan is the creation of a new standing rule which depends not on a threshold determination of whether the person has been a victim of the unlawful police conduct (see, Jones v United States, 362 US 257, 261 ), but on a post hoc evaluation of the property the police have illegally discovered.

1988Turning, then, to the question presented, I begin with the fact that, in 1960, the Supreme Court adopted the so-called "automatic standing” rule, holding that a defendant must be accorded standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure of property in any case where possession of that property is an element of a crime with which he is charged, or where, at the time of the seizure, he was legitimately on the premises in which it was made (Jones v United States, 362 US 257 ).