standing inquiry in Colorado

2026Therefore, the County must only satisfy the standing factors enumerated in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 1977). ¶9 In a detailed written order, the district court concluded that “[p]olitical subdivisions do not have any rights under the federal constitution,” Adams Cnty., ¶ 57, and therefore have no standing to assert federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause.

2015Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855 (citing Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). 157 We have characterized the "legally protected interest" requirement as a "prudential rule of standing based on judicial self-restraint." Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1982); see also Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 10 , 338 P.3d 1002, 1007 (stating that the legally protected interest prong of the standing inquiry "promotes judicial self-restraint").

2025No. 1 in City & Cnty. of Denver , 2019 CO 40, ¶ 21 , 442 P.3d 81, 85-86 , and is "a threshold issue that must be satisfied in order to decide a case on the merits," Ainscough v. Owens , 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004). 7 ¶11 "When a plaintiff brings a claim under a statute, the standing inquiry turns on whether the statutory provision 'can properly be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.'" Vickery v. Evelyn V.

2024Thus, to show a legally protected interest, the plaintiff must have “a claim for relief under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation.” Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; see also Weld Cnty., ¶ 11 (“To be legally protected, an interest must derive from the ‘constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation.’”) (citation omitted). ¶ 12 At bottom, “the standing requirement distinguishes ‘those particularly injured by . . . government action,’ who may present their controversy for resolution by the courts, from members of the general public, whose interests ar

2018The legally protected interest requirement-the prudential aspect of the standing inquiry-recognizes that "parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights." City of Greenwood Vill. , 3 P.3d at 437 .

2011Generally speaking, this prong of the standing test requires "'a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts'" Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo.2000)).

2026Ass’n, 857 P.2d at 511 (“[W]hether the injury resulted from the alleged action of the defendant is not part of the inquiry on standing . . . .”); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]hat the prudential requirement of the standing rule has been satisfied is based on the plaintiffs’ allegations and is not equivalent to a holding on the merits . . . .” (emphasis added)).

2015Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855 (citing Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). 157 We have characterized the "legally protected interest" requirement as a "prudential rule of standing based on judicial self-restraint." Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1982); see also Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 10 , 338 P.3d 1002, 1007 (stating that the legally protected interest prong of the standing inquiry "promotes judicial self-restraint").

2025Trumble Living Tr. , 277 P.3d 864, 868 (Colo.App. 2011) (quoting Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp. , 50 P.3d 929, 932 (Colo.App. 2002)).

2011When a plaintiff brings a claim under a statute, the standing inquiry turns on whether the statutory provision "can properly be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929, 932 (Colo.App.2002).

2017Instead, the injury prong of the standing 7 analysis requires a “concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.” Id. (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ). ¶ 23 “Whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury was to a legally protected interest ‘is a question of whether the plaintiff has a claim for relief under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation.’” Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 246 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ). ¶ 24 When, as here, an appellant brings a claim under a statute, the standing inquiry

2016If they show that the government action violated a constitutional provision, “such an averment satisfies the two-step standing analysis.” Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 247 (Colo. 2008). 4.Organizational Standing ¶ 29 An organization may also have standing to raise constitutional claims on behalf of its members.

2025Trumble Living Tr. , 277 P.3d 864, 868 (Colo.App. 2011) (quoting Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp. , 50 P.3d 929, 932 (Colo.App. 2002)).

2024Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864, 868 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929, 932 (Colo.App.2002)).

1988In our view, the individual plaintiffs have alleged “a distinct and palpable injury’ to themselves, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), and meet the standing requirement under U.S. Const, art.

1988In our view, the individual plaintiffs have alleged “a distinct and palpable injury’ to themselves, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), and meet the standing requirement under U.S. Const, art.

2026But as the supreme court has made clear, the legislature’s “grant of the right to seek judicial review is not in itself dispositive of the standing inquiry.” Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1324 (Colo. 1989).

2002Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 13283 (Colo.1989)(citing Colo. Gen.

2019"So slight was the standing burden," the trial court noted, that "the inquiry had been said to 'collapse' the two-part standing inquiry into a single-question issue of whether the plaintiff-taxpayer has averred a violation of a specific constitutional provision." But the trial court acknowledged that more recently, in Hickenlooper v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. , we articulated a limit on that broad conceptualization of taxpayer standing, holding that "to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, ... the plaintiff must demonstrate a clear nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the

2019"So slight was the standing burden," the trial court noted, that "the inquiry had been said to 'collapse' the two-part standing inquiry into a single-question issue of whether the plaintiff-taxpayer has averred a violation of a specific constitutional provision." But the trial court acknowledged that more recently, in Hickenlooper v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. , we articulated a limit on that broad conceptualization of taxpayer standing, holding that "to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, ... the plaintiff must demonstrate a clear nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the

1994We need not address the standing issue since, in People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599 , 601 n. 2 (Colo.1990), we determined that the Colorado doctrine of standing for overbreadth challenges is substantially similar to the inquiry into the statute's overbreadth, and that the standing doctrine has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine. [9] Janousek presents several factual scenarios to illustrate the overbreadth of this statute: a political advertising campaign designed to influence the state legislature on public policy such as gun control could be labeled deceitful by a prosecutor; an

1994In declining to address the issue of standing in People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo.1994), we said: *727 We need not address the standing issue since, in People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 601 n. 2 (Colo.1990), we determined that the Colorado doctrine of standing for over-breadth challenges is substantially similar to the inquiry into the statute’s over-breadth, and that the standing doctrine has become more complex than the over-breadth doctrine.

1989However, we have also applied this general analysis to evaluate a private litigant's standing to challenge an administrative agency decision, Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 620 P.2d at 1055-56 , the state legislature's standing to seek review of the governor’s decision to transfer funds from the executive departments for which the funds were appropriated to other executive departments, Lamm, 700 P.2d at 515-16 , and a state administrative agency’s standing to challenge the decision of another state administrative agency, Personnel Board, 722 P.2d at 1017 .

1989See generally Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 620 P.2d at 1058-59 . *654 We are satisfied that the judgment of dismissal adversely affected a legally protected interest of O'Bryant so as to satisfy the second prong of the standing requirement.

2017Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864, 868 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929, 932 (Colo. App. 2002)). ¶ 25 There are three factors to consider when determining whether a statute confers standing to a particular plaintiff: “(1) whether the statute specifically creates such a right in the plaintiff; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create or deny such a right; and (3) whether it is consistent with the statutory scheme to imply such a right.” First Comp Ins., 252 P.3d at 1223 (quoting 8 Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747, 752 (Colo. Ap

2017An injury in fact must be “direct and palpable,” not speculative and remote, Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747, 752 (Colo. App. 2002), or incidental to the judgment, see Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977).

2014Comm’n, 778 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1989) (“[T]he injury-in-fact element of standing does not require that a party undergo actual injury, as long as the party can demonstrate that the administrative action ‘threatens to cause’ an injury-in-fact.”). ¶ 17 The second prong of the standing test asks whether the plaintiffs alleged injury is to a legally protected interest.

2010O’Bryant v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 778 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1989); accord Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

2007See Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., supra, 829 P.2d at 1289 (the standing inquiry is "inextricably tied to the merits of the case").

2007See Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., supra, 829 P.2d at 1289 (the standing inquiry is "inextricably tied to the merits of the case").

1998In addition to the two-part standing test set out in Wimberly , prudential considerations follow the “general rule that counties do not have standing to obtain judicial review of a decision of a superior state agency.” Id. (citing Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 519 , 565 P.2d 538, 544 (1977)).

1998In addition to the two-part standing test set out in Wimberly , prudential considerations follow the "general rule that counties do not have standing to obtain judicial review of a decision of a superior state agency." Id. (citing Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 519 , 565 P.2d 538, 544 (1977)).

2011Our supreme court has said that a plaintiff-taxpayer has standing when he "'argues that a governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional' " and that "when a plaintiff-taxpayer alleges that a government action violates a specific constitutional provision ..., such an averment satisfies the two-step standing analysis." Id. at 246, 247 (quoting in part Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; and citing Dodge v. Dep't of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 382-83, 600 P.2d 70 , 72 (1979)).

2011Our supreme court has said that a plaintiff-taxpayer has standing when he "'argues that a governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional' " and that "when a plaintiff-taxpayer alleges that a government action violates a specific constitutional provision ..., such an averment satisfies the two-step standing analysis." Id. at 246, 247 (quoting in part Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; and citing Dodge v. Dep't of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 382-83, 600 P.2d 70 , 72 (1979)).

1986However, where a subordinate state agency seeks judicial review of an adverse decision of a superior state agency, we have applied the standing analysis set forth in Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107 , 550 P.2d 864 (1976).

1986However, where a subordinate state agency seeks judicial review of an adverse decision of a superior state agency, we have applied the standing analysis set forth in Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107 , 550 P.2d 864 (1976).

2006Bowen/Edwards, supra, 830 P.2d at 1054 n. 5 Therefore, in determining whether the County Regulations are in operational conflict with state statute or regulation, we will construe the County Regulations, if possible, so as to harmonize them with the applicable state statutes or regulations.

1993“What is required for purposes of satisfying the standing requirement is that the plaintiff demonstrate that there is an existing legal controver *948 sy[,] ... not a mere possibility of a future legal dispute over some issue.” Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d at 1053 .

1992See State v. Colorado State Personnel Board, 722 P.2d 1012 (Colo.1986).

1989However, we have also applied this general analysis to evaluate a private litigant's standing to challenge an administrative agency decision, Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 620 P.2d at 1055-56 , the state legislature's standing to seek review of the governor’s decision to transfer funds from the executive departments for which the funds were appropriated to other executive departments, Lamm, 700 P.2d at 515-16 , and a state administrative agency’s standing to challenge the decision of another state administrative agency, Personnel Board, 722 P.2d at 1017 .

2026Ass’n, 857 P.2d at 511 (“[W]hether the injury resulted from the alleged action of the defendant is not part of the inquiry on standing . . . .”); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]hat the prudential requirement of the standing rule has been satisfied is based on the plaintiffs’ allegations and is not equivalent to a holding on the merits . . . .” (emphasis added)).

2024Comm’rs v. City of Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981); see also Snyder v. City Council, 531 P.2d 643, 644 (Colo. App. 1974) (“[L]andowners within a municipality who are aggrieved by the zoning of property adjacent to or near their own property have standing to seek judicial review 6 of the actions of zoning authorities alleged to be arbitrary and capricious.”).3 ¶ 16 But the “two prongs of the standing test do not exist independently of one another” — the plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact to a legally protected interest.” Roane v. Elizabeth Sch.

2024Comm’rs v. City of Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981); see also Snyder v. City Council, 531 P.2d 643, 644 (Colo. App. 1974) (“[L]andowners within a municipality who are aggrieved by the zoning of property adjacent to or near their own property have standing to seek judicial review 6 of the actions of zoning authorities alleged to be arbitrary and capricious.”).3 ¶ 16 But the “two prongs of the standing test do not exist independently of one another” — the plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact to a legally protected interest.” Roane v. Elizabeth Sch.

2020Hickenlooper, ¶ 12; accord Hotaling, 275 P.3d at 727 .

2018See, e.g. , People v. Brothers , 2013 CO 31 , ¶¶ 8-13, 308 P.3d 1213 , 1215-16 (resolving the defense's challenge to the district attorney's motion to quash their subpoenas without application of the standing test applied in Wimberly and Ainscough ); People v. Spykstra , 234 P.3d 662 , 666-67 (Colo. 2010) (same).

2018See, e.g. , People v. Brothers , 2013 CO 31 , ¶¶ 8-13, 308 P.3d 1213 , 1215-16 (resolving the defense's challenge to the district attorney's motion to quash their subpoenas without application of the standing test applied in Wimberly and Ainscough ); People v. Spykstra , 234 P.3d 662 , 666-67 (Colo. 2010) (same).