standing requirement in New Jersey

2020The Court stated, however, that its "decisions did not address the standing requirement in cases in which a defendant clearly had abandoned or relinquished his [or her] possessory interest in the property being seized or in which his [or A-2744-19T3 11 her] participatory interest in that property had become very remote or attenuated at the time of the seizure." Ibid. (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1997)).

2020Ibid.8 The Court noted that despite the "broad standing rule" established by Alston and Mollica, neither "address[ed] the standing requirement in cases in which a defendant clearly had abandoned or relinquished his possessory interest in the property being seized[,] or in which his participatory interest in that property had become very remote or attenuated at the time of the seizure." Ibid. (emphasis added); see also Curry, 109 N.J. at 10 (noting "the nexus between the [seized] property and the individual defendants [may] become[] so attenuated as to eliminate standing").

1997Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107, 275 A.2d 433 (1971); In re Tp. of Howell, 254 N.J.Super. 411, 416 , 603 A.2d 959 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 , 606 A.2d 362 (1991). [T]he essential purposes of the standing doctrine in New Jersey____are to assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate.

1997Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107, 275 A.2d 433 (1971); In re Tp. of Howell, 254 N.J.Super. 411, 416 , 603 A.2d 959 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 , 606 A.2d 362 (1991). [T]he essential purposes of the standing doctrine in New Jersey____are to assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate.

1985Schiller anticipated the standing rule of Tierney (citing Oswald), in a footnote, stating: “The complainant must be a relative, creditor, or perhaps have a relationship founded upon contract, trust or confidence but a stranger may not.” 148 N.J.Super. at 179, n. 3 .

1985Schiller anticipated the standing rule of Tierney (citing Oswald ), in a footnote, stating: "The complainant must be a relative, creditor, or perhaps have a relationship founded upon contract, trust or confidence but a stranger may not." 148 N.J.

2006The attrition in CBTR's membership since the filing of the suit is immaterial to the issue of standing, since a change in the membership after the filing of suit does not affect standing at the time the suit was brought, but it highlights the reasoning behind the Legislature's imposition of a seven-member threshold. "[T]he essential purposes of the standing doctrine in New Jersey ... are to assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate ... to generate confidence in the ability of the judicial process to get to the truth of the matter and in the integ

2006The attrition in CBTR's membership since the filing of the suit is immaterial to the issue of standing, since a change in the membership after the filing of suit does not affect standing at the time the suit was brought, but it highlights the reasoning behind the Legislature's imposition of a seven-member threshold. "[T]he essential purposes of the standing doctrine in New Jersey ... are to assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate ... to generate confidence in the ability of the judicial process to get to the truth of the matter and in the integ

2024In Thiedemann v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005), our Supreme Court instructed that, under the CFA, "a private plaintiff must produce evidence from which a factfinder could find or infer that the plaintiff suffered an actual loss." (Emphasis added).

2006In support of its argument that a class action asserting a Consumer Fraud Act violation may be maintained only if the complaint alleges that not only the putative class representative but also all other class members suffered "ascertainable loss," U.S. Life relies upon Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 183 N.J. 234, 251-54 , 872 A. 2d 783 (2005); Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 253-54 , 801 A. 2d 281 ; and N.J.

2020The Court stated, however, that its "decisions did not address the standing requirement in cases in which a defendant clearly had abandoned or relinquished his [or her] possessory interest in the property being seized or in which his [or A-2744-19T3 11 her] participatory interest in that property had become very remote or attenuated at the time of the seizure." Ibid. (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1997)).

2020In State v. Bruns, police conducted a motor vehicle stop, arrested the driver on an outstanding warrant, conducted a search of the passenger compartment after removing Evans, a passenger, and "found a [toy] gun and a large knife under the front passenger seat." 172 N.J. 40, 44 (2002).

2025"Addressing the standing inquiry" at the outset of a case is "crucial because the answer determines whether the court has 'power to hear the case.'" Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403, 430 (2018) (citing Watkins, 124 N.J. at 418 ).

2025In re Riverview Dev., LLC, 411 N.J.

2020Ibid.8 The Court noted that despite the "broad standing rule" established by Alston and Mollica, neither "address[ed] the standing requirement in cases in which a defendant clearly had abandoned or relinquished his possessory interest in the property being seized[,] or in which his participatory interest in that property had become very remote or attenuated at the time of the seizure." Ibid. (emphasis added); see also Curry, 109 N.J. at 10 (noting "the nexus between the [seized] property and the individual defendants [may] become[] so attenuated as to eliminate standing").

2019See, e.g. , Allen , 106 F.3d at 699 (finding that, while the third-party intervention doctrine did not apply, termination of Allen's guest status eliminated any expectation of privacy he had in his motel room).

2018Super. 214 , 224-25, 27 A.3d 1229 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff must have standing at the time of filing a complaint); see also Davis v. FEC , 554 U.S. 724 , 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) ("While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.").

2018Super. 214 , 224-25, 27 A.3d 1229 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff must have standing at the time of filing a complaint); see also Davis v. FEC , 554 U.S. 724 , 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) ("While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.").

2018The interest "must be based on a right which belongs to the proposed intervenor rather than to an existing party in the suit .") (emphasis added), and Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union , 440 F.2d 124 , 132 (8th Cir. 1971) ("Intervention as of right presupposes that the applicant has a right to maintain a *290 claim for the relief sought"), with United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. , 559 F.2d 509 , 521 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A party seeking to intervene pursuant to [Fed.

2018City Bd. of Educ. , 260 F.3d 123 , 131 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]here a proposed intervenor's interests are otherwise unrepresented in an action, the standard for intervention is no more burdensome than the standing requirement."), Wade v. Goldschmidt , 673 F.2d 182 , 185 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982) (A proposed intervenor must demonstrate a direct, significant and legally protectable interest in the property at issue in the law suit.

2018The interest "must be based on a right which belongs to the proposed intervenor rather than to an existing party in the suit .") (emphasis added), and Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union , 440 F.2d 124 , 132 (8th Cir. 1971) ("Intervention as of right presupposes that the applicant has a right to maintain a *290 claim for the relief sought"), with United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. , 559 F.2d 509 , 521 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A party seeking to intervene pursuant to [Fed.

2013In Rakas , the Supreme Court dispensed with a separate standing inquiry and adopted the “legitimate expectation of privacy” analysis set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 587-88 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), to determine the extent of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

2013In Rakas , the Supreme Court dispensed with a separate standing inquiry and adopted the “legitimate expectation of privacy” analysis set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 587-88 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), to determine the extent of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

2013Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at 138-39, 143 , 99 S.Ct. at 428, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 398, 401 .

2013Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at 138-39, 143 , 99 S.Ct. at 428, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 398, 401 .

2006In a class action, only the putative class representative is required to satisfy any applicable standing requirement. "[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any individual showing of standing [in order to obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses on whether the plaintiff is properly before the court, not whether . . . absent class members are properly before the court." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 395 , 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2201 , 135 L.Ed. 2d 606, 646 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 2.07 (3d ed. 1

2006In a class action, only the putative class representative is required to satisfy any applicable standing requirement. "[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any individual showing of standing [in order to obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses on whether the plaintiff is properly before the court, not whether . . . absent class members are properly before the court." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 395 , 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2201 , 135 L.Ed. 2d 606, 646 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 2.07 (3d ed. 1