standing doctrine in Virginia

2025See also Morgan v. Bd. of Supervisors, 302 Va. 46 , 59 (2023) (noting that “the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’” (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216 , 221-22 (2020))).

2025The standing doctrine “‘is a preliminary jurisdictional issue having no relation to the substantive merits of an action,’” and which “asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at 58-59 (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216 , 221-22 (2020)).

2026See Howell v. McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320, 331 (2016) (finding the parties’ “battery of federal citations addressing the standing doctrine” inapposite in a case “brought by Virginia citizens against the Governor of Virginia and other state officials in the Supreme Court of Virginia, alleging violations of the Constitution of Virginia”); Hawkins v. Grese, 68 Va. App. 462, 480 (2018) (“The Commonwealth’s third party standing exceptions are much narrower than those found in the federal system.”). - 17 - derivative standing to prosecute both claims.

2026See Howell v. McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320, 331 (2016) (finding the parties’ “battery of federal citations addressing the standing doctrine” inapposite in a case “brought by Virginia citizens against the Governor of Virginia and other state officials in the Supreme Court of Virginia, alleging violations of the Constitution of Virginia”); Hawkins v. Grese, 68 Va. App. 462, 480 (2018) (“The Commonwealth’s third party standing exceptions are much narrower than those found in the federal system.”). - 17 - derivative standing to prosecute both claims.

2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al

2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al

2026DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 350 -51 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).

2026DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 350 -51 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).

2026See Howell v. McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320, 331 (2016) (finding the parties’ “battery of federal citations addressing the standing doctrine” inapposite in a case “brought by Virginia citizens against the Governor of Virginia and other state officials in the Supreme Court of Virginia, alleging violations of the Constitution of Virginia”); Hawkins v. Grese, 68 Va. App. 462, 480 (2018) (“The Commonwealth’s third party standing exceptions are much narrower than those found in the federal system.”). - 17 - derivative standing to prosecute both claims.

2026See Howell v. McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320, 331 (2016) (finding the parties’ “battery of federal citations addressing the standing doctrine” inapposite in a case “brought by Virginia citizens against the Governor of Virginia and other state officials in the Supreme Court of Virginia, alleging violations of the Constitution of Virginia”); Hawkins v. Grese, 68 Va. App. 462, 480 (2018) (“The Commonwealth’s third party standing exceptions are much narrower than those found in the federal system.”). - 17 - derivative standing to prosecute both claims.

2024In its reversal of the circuit court’s decision that the plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court reiterated that the actual controversy requirement protects courts from issuing advisory opinions—an essential concern of the standing doctrine—and cautioned courts to avoid “conflat[ing] the threshold standing inquiry with the merits of [a litigant’s] claim.” Id. at ___ (second alteration in original) (quoting Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2009)). 7 See discussion infra Section I.C. 8 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has enjoined PRA from collecting the ty

2024In its reversal of the circuit court’s decision that the plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court reiterated that the actual controversy requirement protects courts from issuing advisory opinions—an essential concern of the standing doctrine—and cautioned courts to avoid “conflat[ing] the threshold standing inquiry with the merits of [a litigant’s] claim.” Id. at ___ (second alteration in original) (quoting Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2009)). 7 See discussion infra Section I.C. 8 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has enjoined PRA from collecting the ty

2016Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 , 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 10 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of 11 separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a 12 litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public 13 officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties. 14 See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. 15 Ro

2016Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 , 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 10 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of 11 separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a 12 litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public 13 officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties. 14 See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. 15 Ro

2025See, e.g., Seymour, 301 Va. at 168 (explaining that the allegations by the landowners in Friends of the Rappahannock were “speculative” because they “asserted that the operation of the sand and gravel mine may result in the alleged forms of harm,” while the standing test requires a litigant to allege injury or “potential injury not shared by the general public” (emphases in original) (quoting Friends of the Rappahannock, 286 Va. at 42-43, 49)).

2025Assuming without deciding that the landowners had met the first prong of the standing test, the Supreme Court held that the landowners had not sufficiently alleged that they would suffer a particularized harm and had instead “presented conclusory allegations as to possible harms” without a “factual background upon which an inference can be drawn that Black Marsh’s [the constructing party’s] particular use of the property would produce such harms.” Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).6 Guided by these principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Morgan and in Friends of the Rappahannock in handl

2016Owners Ass'n , 273 Va. 107 , 120, 639 S.E.2d 257 , 265 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties.

2016Owners Ass'n , 273 Va. 107 , 120, 639 S.E.2d 257 , 265 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties.

2013As the majority recognizes, rendering a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual controversy constitutes an advisory opinion. 1 And, while this Court has said that it 1 The term "advisory opinion" is defined as "[a] nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter submitted for that purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (9th ed. 2009). 25 " 'will not entertain a standing challenge made for the first time on appeal, the Court will consider, sua sponte, whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the Court does not have the power to render a judgme

2013As the majority recognizes, rendering a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual controversy constitutes an advisory opinion. 1 And, while this Court has said that it 1 The term "advisory opinion" is defined as "[a] nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter submitted for that purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (9th ed. 2009). 25 " 'will not entertain a standing challenge made for the first time on appeal, the Court will consider, sua sponte, whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the Court does not have the power to render a judgme

2023“If the standing analysis simply tracked this decisional sequence on the merits, it could create an absurdity: A court would never be able to decide the merits of a claim against a claimant because that would mean the court never had jurisdiction to address the merits in the first place.” Id. at ___.

2017Thus, under the standing standard established by the Supreme Court in Clark, Clair is not a person “aggrieved” by the VMRC’s decision to grant the Porter and Drewer leases because the burden imposed is not “different from that suffered by the public generally.” See id.

2013On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 3 Although appellant asserts, as did the trial court, that the issue is standing, this Court has previously noted that, [a]lthough many courts “characterize this as a question of ‘standing,’ the Supreme Court expressly rejected a

2004Although many courts "characterize this as a question of 'standing,' the Supreme Court expressly rejected a standing analysis in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).” Gordon, 168 F.3d at 1225 n. 2.

2025Moreover, this “actual-controversy requirement protects a court from issuing an ‘advisory opinion’—which is an essential concern of both the standing doctrine and the Declaratory Judgment Act.” Morgan v. Bd. of Supervisors of Hanover Cnty., 302 Va. 46 , 67 (2023) (first quoting Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020); and then citing Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103-04 (1998)).

2023An actual-controversy requirement protects a court from issuing an “advisory opinion” — which is an essential concern of both the standing doctrine, Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103-04 (1998).

2025See, e.g., Seymour, 301 Va. at 168 (explaining that the allegations by the landowners in Friends of the Rappahannock were “speculative” because they “asserted that the operation of the sand and gravel mine may result in the alleged forms of harm,” while the standing test requires a litigant to allege injury or “potential injury not shared by the general public” (emphases in original) (quoting Friends of the Rappahannock, 286 Va. at 42-43, 49)).

2023And while “[t]he standing question thus bears close affinity to questions of ripeness,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10, and gives no quarter to “speculative allegations of harm,” Seymour, 301 Va. at ___, 873 S.E.2d at 80, these concepts are not strictly synonymous.

2024Indeed, “the standing requirement thwarts ‘efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open forum for the - 11 - resolution of political or ideological disputes about the performance of government.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).

2023As Justice Lewis Powell aptly observed, the standing requirement thwarts “efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the performance of government.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).

2016See Goldman v. Landsidle , 262 Va. 364 , 370, 552 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (2001) ; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540 , 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (noting that federal standing doctrine "confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role").

2016Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 , 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 10 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of 11 separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a 12 litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public 13 officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties. 14 See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. 15 Ro

2022And although exceptions to the standing rule exist, see id., none are present here.

2022And although exceptions to the standing rule exist, see id., none are present here.

2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al

2024“Instead,” the Court noted, “as ‘a preliminary jurisdictional issue,’ the standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary, 299 Va. at 221-22); see also McClary, 299 Va. at 222 (noting the “personal stake” requirement and that “[t]ypically, to establish standing a plaintiff must allege a particularized injury that is separate from the public at large”).21 Considering the “personal-stake factors” germane to the specific context before it, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he homeowners’ factual al

2024In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court availed itself of the opportunity to engage in a thorough discussion of the fundamental distinction between standing and decision on the merits, noting that the standing requirement “can be satisfied without the necessity of asserting a plausibly successful claim on the merits” and that “‘standing . . . is a preliminary jurisdictional issue having no relation to the substantive merits of an action.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216 , 221 (2020)).

2024In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court availed itself of the opportunity to engage in a thorough discussion of the fundamental distinction between standing and decision on the merits, noting that the standing requirement “can be satisfied without the necessity of asserting a plausibly successful claim on the merits” and that “‘standing . . . is a preliminary jurisdictional issue having no relation to the substantive merits of an action.’” Id. at ___ (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216 , 221 (2020)).

2025Moreover, this “actual-controversy requirement protects a court from issuing an ‘advisory opinion’—which is an essential concern of both the standing doctrine and the Declaratory Judgment Act.” Morgan v. Bd. of Supervisors of Hanover Cnty., 302 Va. 46 , 67 (2023) (first quoting Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020); and then citing Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103-04 (1998)).

2023An actual-controversy requirement protects a court from issuing an “advisory opinion” — which is an essential concern of both the standing doctrine, Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103-04 (1998).

2025Just as “general distress over a general policy does not alone allege injury sufficient for standing,” Lafferty, 293 Va. at 362 , “[t]he emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 , 107 n.8 (1983) (“It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.”).

2023Though not without its “peculiar relationship” exceptions, see, e.g., Lafferty v. School Bd. of Fairfax Cnty., 293 Va. 354, 363 (2017) (citation omitted), we have 8 applied this general rule to challenges of local zoning decisions.

2013As the majority recognizes, rendering a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual controversy constitutes an advisory opinion. 1 And, while this Court has said that it 1 The term "advisory opinion" is defined as "[a] nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter submitted for that purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (9th ed. 2009). 25 " 'will not entertain a standing challenge made for the first time on appeal, the Court will consider, sua sponte, whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the Court does not have the power to render a judgme

2013As the majority recognizes, rendering a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual controversy constitutes an advisory opinion. 1 And, while this Court has said that it 1 The term "advisory opinion" is defined as "[a] nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter submitted for that purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (9th ed. 2009). 25 " 'will not entertain a standing challenge made for the first time on appeal, the Court will consider, sua sponte, whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the Court does not have the power to render a judgme

2013On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 3 Although appellant asserts, as did the trial court, that the issue is standing, this Court has previously noted that, [a]lthough many courts “characterize this as a question of ‘standing,’ the Supreme Court expressly rejected a

2013On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 3 Although appellant asserts, as did the trial court, that the issue is standing, this Court has previously noted that, [a]lthough many courts “characterize this as a question of ‘standing,’ the Supreme Court expressly rejected a