standing doctrine in Missouri

2020Instead, litigants need only demonstrate that they have been directly subject to the authority of the agency.” NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 824 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2020Instead, litigants need only demonstrate that they have been directly subject to the authority of the agency.” NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 824 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2016"Closely related [to the concept of real parties in interest] is the doctrine of standing [which] requires that a party seeking relief have a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter of Inis suit and a threatened or actual injury.” Welch, 114 S.W.3d at 292 (citation omitted).

2010Welch v. Davis, 114 S.W.3d 285, 292 (Mo.App.

1986The rationale of the standing requirement is to assure that there is “a sufficient controversy between the parties [so] that the case will be adequately presented to the court.” Id. 707 .

1986Arguments similar to those of appellants that local government units are “mere arms of the state” with no independent right to attack statutes that affect them— have been expressly rejected in favor of a standing doctrine concerned primarily with “sufficient controversy between the parties” regarding matters which “directly affect them.” Ryder, 552 S.W.2d at 707 .

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2016However, as a threshold matter, we “have a duty to determine if a party has standing prior to addressing the substantive issues of the case. ■ For this reason, standing cannot be waived.” CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2016Indeed, “[arguments .. v, that local government units are ‘mere arms of the state’ with no independent right to attack statutes that affect them — have been expressly rejected in favor of a standing doctrine concerned primarily with sufficient controversy between the parties regarding matters. which directly affect them.” Arsenal Credit Union v. Giles, 715 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Mo. banc 1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2016However, as a threshold matter, we “have a duty to determine if a party has standing prior to addressing the substantive issues of the case. ■ For this reason, standing cannot be waived.” CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2016Relying on Simmons, however, the court found that, under limited circumstances, Missouri courts have “recognized a losing bidder’s standing to challenge the award of a public contract . . . where a public entity’s bidding procedure did not permit all bidders to compete on equal terms; or . . . where the lowest bid is rejected fraudulently, corruptly, capriciously, or without reason.” Id. at 830 (internal quotation omitted). 5 4 While the trial court acknowledged the holding in Simmons that unsuccessful bidders have standing under limited circumstances, it found the present case distinguishable

2015Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo.App.W.D.1994), as well as to prevent parties from “creating controversies in matters in which they are not involved and which do not directly affect them[.]” Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).

2015Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo.App.W.D.1994), as well as to prevent parties from “creating controversies in matters in which they are not involved and which do not directly affect them[.]” Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).

2014Only in select circumstances have our courts recognized a losing bidder’s standing to challenge the award of a public contract through the extraordinary writ of mandamus: (1) where a public entity’s bidding procedure did not permit all bidders to compete on equal terms; or (2) where the lowest bid is rejected “fraudulently, corruptly, capriciously or without reason.” Simmons, 409 S.W.3d at 546 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2014Only in select circumstances have our courts recognized a losing bidder’s standing to challenge the award of a public contract through the extraordinary writ of mandamus: (1) where a public entity’s bidding procedure did not permit all bidders to compete on equal terms; or (2) where the lowest bid is rejected “fraudulently, corruptly, capriciously or without reason.” Simmons, 409 S.W.3d at 546 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2013Accord, Harrison v. Monroe Cnty., 716 S.W.2d 263, 265-66 (Mo. banc 1986) (standing is “a component of the general requirement of justiciability” and is the state analogue to the federal “case or controversy” requirement). [A] primary objective of the standing doctrine is to assure that there is a sufficient controversy between the parties that the case will be adequately presented to the court.

2011For example, in Mull v. Alliance Mortgage Banking Corporation, the district court discussed Sixth Circuit holdings that required a named plaintiff to have an injury against each defendant, but explained'that this standing rule was subject to exceptions for conspiracy or concerted schemes and to “[instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.’ ” 219 F.Supp.2d 895, 908 (W.D.Tenn.2002) (quoting Thompson v. Bd. of Educ. of Romeo Cmty. Sch., 709 F.2d 1200, 1205 (6th Cir. 1983)).

2011For example, in Mull v. Alliance Mortgage Banking Corporation, the district court discussed Sixth Circuit holdings that required a named plaintiff to have an injury against each defendant, but explained'that this standing rule was subject to exceptions for conspiracy or concerted schemes and to “[instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.’ ” 219 F.Supp.2d 895, 908 (W.D.Tenn.2002) (quoting Thompson v. Bd. of Educ. of Romeo Cmty. Sch., 709 F.2d 1200, 1205 (6th Cir. 1983)).

2011The Mull Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ standing where the named plaintiffs failed to allege which, if any, of the defendant loan holders held their loans and no class had been certified. 219 F.Supp.2d at 909 .

2003See Shannon v. Hines, 21 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Mo.App.1999).