standing test in Utah

2024See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1151 (a party who “is or is likely to be subject to prosecution” may show a “personal adverse impact” that could satisfy the traditional test for standing). 17 PPAU v. UTAH Opinion of the Court ¶54 PPAU likewise demonstrated that it could meet the causation and redressability prongs of the traditional standing test.

2019"The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a requirement that the plaintiff's injury be particularized," Society of Prof'l Journalists v. Bullock , 743 P.2d 1166 , 1170 (Utah 1987) (quotation simplified), as opposed to a generalized grievance that is "more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government," Jenkins , 675 P.2d at 1149 . ¶31 In an action seeking a declaratory judgment of a party's claimed water rights, the standing requirement is satisfied where there is "measurable evidence of a direct connection between the sources fro

2024And while “a plaintiff claiming standing under the traditional criteria does not need to prove causation to the same extent it will be required to prove it at trial,” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 32 , there is nothing in the district court’s ruling in this matter for us to review related to this prong of the traditional standing test.

2018If the plaintiff does not have standing under the first step, then we address the second and third steps of the inquiry, id. , referred to as the "alternative standing test." See Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board , 2006 UT 74 , ¶ 35, 148 P.3d 960 (following the Jenkins three-step inquiry and holding that even though Sierra Club failed to satisfy the traditional standing test, Sierra Club had standing "under the alternative standing test" as set forth under Jenkins ). ¶10 First, for traditional standing, Appellants must show that they were "adversely affected by governmental

2019"The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a requirement that the plaintiff's injury be particularized," Society of Prof'l Journalists v. Bullock , 743 P.2d 1166 , 1170 (Utah 1987) (quotation simplified), as opposed to a generalized grievance that is "more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government," Jenkins , 675 P.2d at 1149 . ¶31 In an action seeking a declaratory judgment of a party's claimed water rights, the standing requirement is satisfied where there is "measurable evidence of a direct connection between the sources fro

2018"The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a 'personal stake in the outcome' or a 'particularized injury,' the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to 'generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government.' " Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock , 743 P.2d 1166 , 1170 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted). ¶ 19 Haik contends that "[he] is a landowner in the

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 , 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) ("We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine....

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 , 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) ("We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine....

2013Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury require

2013Standing in the state courts is a judge-made doctrine and is used to refuse to determine the merits of a legal controversy irrespective of its correctness where the party advancing it is not properly situated to prosecute the action.” (footnotes omitted)). 10 Cite as: 2013 UT 18 Opinion of the Court est in the matter nor be a public official.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) (“We believe our doctrine of standing in Iowa is not so rigid that an excep- tion to the injury requirement could not be recognized for citizens who seek to resolve ce

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 , 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) ("We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine....

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (Ariz. 1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) (“We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine . . . .

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 , 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) ("We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine....

2013See, e.g., Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (Ariz. 1998); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1992); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 280 (Tenn. 2001) (“We are aware that some commentators have criticized adherence to the particularized injury requirement of the standing doctrine . . . .

2013The third step in the standing analysis applied in Mace was whether “the issues raised by the [complainant] are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to grant . . . standing.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting National Parks & Conservation Assʹn v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)). ¶23 Ten years after Mace, in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74 , 148 P.3d 960 , the Utah Supreme Court refined the standing test because the “treatment of standing principles ha[d] become somewhat convoluted, leading to occasional missteps in

2013The third step in the standing analysis applied in Mace was whether “the issues raised by the [complainant] are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to grant . . . standing.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting National Parks & Conservation Assʹn v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)). ¶23 Ten years after Mace, in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74 , 148 P.3d 960 , the Utah Supreme Court refined the standing test because the “treatment of standing principles ha[d] become somewhat convoluted, leading to occasional missteps in

2012See Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 (“To satisfy the basic requirements of the traditional standing test, a party must allege that he or she suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable to the conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2012See Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 (“To satisfy the basic requirements of the traditional standing test, a party must allege that he or she suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable to the conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013Thus, we consider Mother’s standing in light of the analogous situation in Mace, as refined by the standing test announced in Sierra Club. ¶24 We begin our traditional standing analysis by considering whether Mother has a “personal stake in the controversy.” See Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379 .

2013See id. at 1379 ; Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150 . ¶25 The same conclusion is appropriate under the traditional standing test here.

1987The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a requirement that the plaintiff's injury be “particularized.” The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a “personal stake in the outcome” or a “particularized injury,” the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to “generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government.” Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149 ; s

1987The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a requirement that the plaintiff's injury be "particularized." The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the outcome" or a "particularized injury," the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149 ; s

2024And in those situations, a claimant “has [statutory] standing only if he [or she] is within the class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 , 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, J., concurring); accord McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 48 ; cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (stating that whether a party has the requisite standing to assert “a statutory cause of action” is dependent on whether the interests of that petitioner “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked” (quotation simplified)). ¶28

2024And in those situations, a claimant “has [statutory] standing only if he [or she] is within the class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 , 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, J., concurring); accord McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 48 ; cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (stating that whether a party has the requisite standing to assert “a statutory cause of action” is dependent on whether the interests of that petitioner “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked” (quotation simplified)). ¶28

2024The standing analysis thus begins with statutory standing, with traditional standing only assessed “if statutory standing is present.” Grantsville City, 2024 UT App 126, ¶ 28 . 2 A. Associational Standing Under CLUDMA ¶12 Under CLUDMA, “an adversely affected party may” appeal the decisions of a land use authority “by alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the land use authority.” Utah Code § 17-27a-703(1).

2024For a more in-depth explanation of the traditional standing analysis, see Erda Community Ass’n v. Grantsville City, 2024 UT App 126 , ¶¶ 21–24. 3.

2013Comm’n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 9 , 214 P.3d 95 (finding that the plaintiff met a statutory standing requirement—which incorporated the traditional standing test—before commenting on its standing under the alternative standing test); Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ¶ 6 , 89 P.3d 171 (stating that plaintiffs failed to satisfy either the traditional or the alternative standing test). 20 See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ¶ 47 , 28 P.3d 669 (“Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights

2013Comm’n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 9 , 214 P.3d 95 (finding that the plaintiff met a statutory standing requirement—which incorporated the traditional standing test—before commenting on its standing under the alternative standing test); Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ¶ 6 , 89 P.3d 171 (stating that plaintiffs failed to satisfy either the traditional or the alternative standing test). 20 See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ¶ 47 , 28 P.3d 669 (“Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights

2004See Willden, 768 P.2d at 457 (“There is no question that Willden meets this standing test.

1996Cf. Provo City, 768 P.2d at 457 .

2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt

2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt

2024See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that statutory standing is required only “[i]f the plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim”); see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (engaging in only a statutory standing analysis because the claimants did not make any common-law or constitutional claims); Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (same). ¶33 Second, and relatedly, the traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute.

2024And in those situations, a claimant “has [statutory] standing only if he [or she] is within the class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 , 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, J., concurring); accord McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 48 ; cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (stating that whether a party has the requisite standing to assert “a statutory cause of action” is dependent on whether the interests of that petitioner “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked” (quotation simplified)). ¶28

2024See McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 48 (“If a plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim, the constitutional standing question arises if and only if the plaintiff 20220760-CA 14 2024 UT App 126 Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City has statutory standing.” (quotation simplified)); see also Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 41 (Lee, J., concurring) (“Constitutional standing is a backstop, in other words—a set of secondary requirements that are relevant only if the plaintiff can first show that the legislature has authorized him [or her] to file suit . . . .”). ¶29 Although our supreme court has not been entirely preci

2024And in those situations, a claimant “has [statutory] standing only if he [or she] is within the class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 , 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, J., concurring); accord McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 48 ; cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (stating that whether a party has the requisite standing to assert “a statutory cause of action” is dependent on whether the interests of that petitioner “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked” (quotation simplified)). ¶28