standing doctrine in Michigan

2010Ill notion that federal courts may exercise power only “in the last resort, and as a necessity,” and only when adjudication is “consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” [Id. at 751-752, quoting Chicago & G T R Co v Wellman, 143 US 339, 345 ; 12 S Ct 400 ; 36 L Ed 176 (1892), and Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 97 ; 88 S Ct 1942 ; 20 L Ed 2d 947 (1968).] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349 ; 116 S Ct 2174 ; 135 L Ed 2d 606 (1996), stating that “the doctrine o

2010Ill notion that federal courts may exercise power only “in the last resort, and as a necessity,” and only when adjudication is “consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” [Id. at 751-752, quoting Chicago & G T R Co v Wellman, 143 US 339, 345 ; 12 S Ct 400 ; 36 L Ed 176 (1892), and Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 97 ; 88 S Ct 1942 ; 20 L Ed 2d 947 (1968).] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349 ; 116 S Ct 2174 ; 135 L Ed 2d 606 (1996), stating that “the doctrine o

2020“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ‘ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.’ ” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), quoting Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629, 633 ; 537 NW2d 436 (1995).

2020“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ‘ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.’ ” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), quoting Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629, 633 ; 537 NW2d 436 (1995).

2017The doctrine of ripeness is closely related to the standing doctrine in that it “focuses on the timing of the action.” Michigan Chiropractic Council v Commissioner of Office of Financial and Insurance Services, 475 Mich 363, 379 ; 716 NW2d 561 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Lansing Schools Educ Ass’n, 487 Mich 349 (2010).

2017The doctrine of ripeness is closely related to the standing doctrine in that it “focuses on the timing of the action.” Michigan Chiropractic Council v Commissioner of Office of Financial and Insurance Services, 475 Mich 363, 379 ; 716 NW2d 561 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Lansing Schools Educ Ass’n, 487 Mich 349 (2010).

2023Thus, the standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. [Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In Michigan, one has standing if “one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 42-43 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (quotation marks and citatio

2023Thus, the standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. [Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In Michigan, one has standing if “one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 42-43 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (quotation marks and citatio

2025“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68 ; 499 NW2d 743 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68 ; 499 NW2d 743 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2010The executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the courts to take upon themselves his duties.” This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking for this Court, he said: “By the judicial power of courts is generally understood the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.” [Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859) (emphasis added).] Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193 ; 18 NW 611 (1884), this Court explained: “The judi

2010The executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the courts to take upon themselves his duties.” This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking for this Court, he said: “By the judicial power of courts is generally understood the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.” [Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859) (emphasis added).] Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193 ; 18 NW 611 (1884), this Court explained: “The judi

2010The executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the courts to take upon themselves his duties.” This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking for this Court, he said: “By the judicial power of courts is generally understood the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.” [Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859) (emphasis added).] Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193 ; 18 NW 611 (1884), this Court explained: “The judi

2010The executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the courts to take upon themselves his duties.” This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking for this Court, he said: “By the judicial power of courts is generally understood the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.” [Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859) (emphasis added).] Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193 ; 18 NW 611 (1884), this Court explained: “The judi

2024In Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm’n, 475 Mich 286, 291-292 ; 715 NW2d 846 (2006), our Supreme Court explained how the “aggrieved party” requirement in MCR 7.203(A) is similar to the standing requirement: As we indicated in Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 612 ; 684 NW2d 800 (2004), citing Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 734 ; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), standing refers to the right of a party plaintiff initially to invoke the power of the court to adjudicate a claimed injury in fact.

2024In Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm’n, 475 Mich 286, 291-292 ; 715 NW2d 846 (2006), our Supreme Court explained how the “aggrieved party” requirement in MCR 7.203(A) is similar to the standing requirement: As we indicated in Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 612 ; 684 NW2d 800 (2004), citing Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 734 ; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), standing refers to the right of a party plaintiff initially to invoke the power of the court to adjudicate a claimed injury in fact.

2022“When a party’s standing is contested, the issue becomes whether the proper party is seeking adjudication, not whether the issue is justiciable.” Tennine Corp v Boardwalk Commercial, LLC, 315 Mich App 1, 7 ; 888 NW2d 267 (2016).

2020“When a party’s standing is contested, the issue becomes whether the proper party is seeking adjudication, not whether the issue is justiciable.” Tennine Corp v Boardwalk Commercial, LLC, 315 Mich App 1, 7 ; 888 NW2d 267 (2016).

2022Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich at 11-12 . 9 defendant was “not related to the victim by blood to the fourth degree.” Id.

2022Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich at 11-12 . 9 defendant was “not related to the victim by blood to the fourth degree.” Id.

2022See, e.g., Moutinho v Planning & Zoning Comm of Bridgeport, 278 Conn 660, 667-668; 899 A2d 26 (2006) (“It is clear . . . that a lessee may have a sufficient interest in leased property to be aggrieved by a zoning decision affecting that property.”); Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc v Bd of Zoning & Appeals of North Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 414-415 ; 508 NE2d 130 (1987) (explaining that “[a] leaseholder may . . . have the same standing to challenge municipal zoning action as the owner.”). 17 While local and regional figures vary, a 2019 study from the Michigan State Housing Development Authority found th

2022See, e.g., Moutinho v Planning & Zoning Comm of Bridgeport, 278 Conn 660, 667-668; 899 A2d 26 (2006) (“It is clear . . . that a lessee may have a sufficient interest in leased property to be aggrieved by a zoning decision affecting that property.”); Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc v Bd of Zoning & Appeals of North Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 414-415 ; 508 NE2d 130 (1987) (explaining that “[a] leaseholder may . . . have the same standing to challenge municipal zoning action as the owner.”). 17 While local and regional figures vary, a 2019 study from the Michigan State Housing Development Authority found th

2017This standing doctrine recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy. [Barclae v Zarb, 300 Mich App 455, 483 ; 834 NW2d 100 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).] MCR 2.202(B) governs a transfer of change in interest, stating, in relevant part, as follows: If there is a change or transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party in his or her original capacity, unless the court, on motion supported by affidavit, directs that the person to whom the in

2017This standing doctrine recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy. [Barclae v Zarb, 300 Mich App 455, 483 ; 834 NW2d 100 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).] MCR 2.202(B) governs a transfer of change in interest, stating, in relevant part, as follows: If there is a change or transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party in his or her original capacity, unless the court, on motion supported by affidavit, directs that the person to whom the in

2013IV STANDING GENERALLY Our Supreme Court has stated that [t]he purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to “ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Thus, the standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant “is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. ” [Lansing Sch Ed Ass ’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (citations omitted).] A prospective plaintiff lacks standing if he or she is not a real party in interest, because the “standing doctrin

2013IV STANDING GENERALLY Our Supreme Court has stated that [t]he purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to “ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Thus, the standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant “is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. ” [Lansing Sch Ed Ass ’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (citations omitted).] A prospective plaintiff lacks standing if he or she is not a real party in interest, because the “standing doctrin

2010In Nat’l Wildlife, I stated: While pretending to limit its “judicial power,” the majority’s application of Lee’s judicial standing test in this case actually expands the power of the judiciary at the expense of the Legislature by undermining the Legislature’s constitutional authority to enact laws . . . . [ 471 Mich at 654 (WEAVER, J., concurring).] 4 Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 639 (emphasis in original). 5 “[F]aux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” Federal Election Comm v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, 551 US 449 , 499 n 7; 127 S Ct 2652 ; 168 L Ed 2d 329 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurr

2010In Nat’l Wildlife, I stated: While pretending to limit its “judicial power,” the majority’s application of Lee’s judicial standing test in this case actually expands the power of the judiciary at the expense of the Legislature by undermining the Legislature’s constitutional authority to enact laws . . . . [ 471 Mich at 654 (WEAVER, J., concurring).] 4 Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 639 (emphasis in original). 5 “[F]aux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” Federal Election Comm v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, 551 US 449 , 499 n 7; 127 S Ct 2652 ; 168 L Ed 2d 329 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurr

2010In light of these considerations, we hold that Lee and its progeny should be overruled.18 17 See, e.g., Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 782 ; 104 S Ct 3315 ; 82 L Ed 2d 556 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting numerous academic commentaries to explain that “[m]ore than one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court’s standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for the Court’s view of the merits of the underlying claims.” Indeed, there is perhaps no better example of this then the dissenting opinion in this case, which, in order to apply the Lee standing test, also vo

2010In light of these considerations, we hold that Lee and its progeny should be overruled.18 17 See, e.g., Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 782 ; 104 S Ct 3315 ; 82 L Ed 2d 556 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting numerous academic commentaries to explain that “[m]ore than one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court’s standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for the Court’s view of the merits of the underlying claims.” Indeed, there is perhaps no better example of this then the dissenting opinion in this case, which, in order to apply the Lee standing test, also vo

2007Before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that the doctrine of standing “implement[s] the Framers’ concept of ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society’” so that “[s]tanding is thus properly regarded as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint.”25 He noted that “[s]eparation of powers is a zero-sum game” and the doctrine of standing “ensures that the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case or controversy,” and not fulfilling the responsibilities of the other branches.26 More recently, writing for the

2007Before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that the doctrine of standing “implement[s] the Framers’ concept of ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society’” so that “[s]tanding is thus properly regarded as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint.”25 He noted that “[s]eparation of powers is a zero-sum game” and the doctrine of standing “ensures that the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case or controversy,” and not fulfilling the responsibilities of the other branches.26 More recently, writing for the

2006The doctrine of standing requires “the existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” House Speaker v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554 ; 495 NW2d 539 (1993).

2006The doctrine of standing requires “the existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” House Speaker v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554 ; 495 NW2d 539 (1993).