standing requirement in Indiana

2024The standing requirement “mandates that courts act in real cases, and eschew action when called upon to engage only in abstract speculation.” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995).

2023The standing requirement “mandates that courts act in real cases, and eschew action when called upon to engage only in abstract speculation.” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995).

2023“The standing requirement is a limit on the court’s jurisdiction which restrains the judiciary to resolving real controversies in which the complaining party has a demonstrable injury.” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990)).

2017“The standing requirement is a limit on the court’s jurisdiction which restrains the judiciary to resolving real controversies in which the complaining party has a demonstrable injury.” Id. (quoting Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990)).

2015The reasonableness of an officer’s conduct depends on a “balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Lichtfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). [16] When analyzing claims under the Indiana Constitution, Indiana courts have retained a standing requirement, according to which “a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the

2014Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, however, imposes a standing requirement, in which “a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized.” Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 1996).

2007To establish standing, the plaintiff must “ ‘demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue.’ ” Shourek, 621 N.E.2d at 1109 (quoting Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985)).

2004Second, the judicial doctrine of standing required that "in order to invoke a court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue." Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985).

2013Id.

2006Scott v. Randle, 736 N.E.2d 308, 315 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. denied.

1998The standing doctrine is designed to assure that litigants actively and vigorously pursue their claims. *188 Holiday v. Kinslow, 659 N.E.2d 647, 650 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

1997The standing doctrine is designed to assure that litigants actively and vigorously pursue their claims, Holiday v. Kinslow, 659 N.E.2d 647 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), and to prevent the filing of meritless and frivolous lawsuits.

1997Board of Trustees of the Town (Now City) of New Haven v. City of Fort Wayne, 268 Ind. 415 , 375 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (1978) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners, 261 Ind. 635 , 308 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1974)), The standing requirement assures that a claim will be actively and vigorously pm-sued.

1997Board of Trustees of the Town (Now City) of New Haven v. City of Fort Wayne, 268 Ind. 415 , 375 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (1978) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners, 261 Ind. 635 , 308 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1974)), The standing requirement assures that a claim will be actively and vigorously pm-sued.

2015Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

2003Id. at 1044 .

2016Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

2015“Like the real-party-in- interest requirement, the point of the standing requirement is to insure that the party before the court has a substantive right to enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation.” Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

2013Jones v. Sullivan, 703 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

2001Jones v. Sullivan, 703 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

2005On the other hand, analysis under the Indiana Constitution has retained a standing requirement in which 'a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized.' Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996); see also Smith v. State, 744 N.B.2d 437, 440 (Ind.2001); Mays v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2002On the other hand, analysis under the Indiana Constitution has retained a standing requirement in which "a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized." Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996); see also Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind.2001); Mays v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2004Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind.2003); see also City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.2003); Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind.2003).

2003Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind.2003).

2009Bd. of Commrs. of Howard County v. Kokomo City Plan Commn., 263 Ind. 282, 286 , 330 N.E.2d 92, 96 (1975).

1976Although Indiana’s rules governing a party’s standing to sue are not without uncertainty, our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that “[i]n Indiana the standing requirement is stated in terms of the requirement of a party to show injury. . . .” Board of Com’rs v. Kokomo City Plan Com’n (1975), 263 Ind. 282 , 330 N.E.2d 92, 96 .

1978Standing The Supreme Court of the United States determined in Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257 , that an individual’s standing to challenge a search and seizure may be predicted on one of two bases: (1) standing exists where possession is an essential element of the offense charged, or (2) where the individual has a possessory or proprietary interest in the premises. 362 U.S. at 263 .

1978Standing The Supreme Court of the United States determined in Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257 , that an individual’s standing to challenge a search and seizure may be predicted on one of two bases: (1) standing exists where possession is an essential element of the offense charged, or (2) where the individual has a possessory or proprietary interest in the premises. 362 U.S. at 263 .

1978Id. at 798.

1978Id. at 798.

2025Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met when the plaintiff shows that he “has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“The standing requirement assures that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested, as plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the litigation’s outcome in addition to showing that they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a resul

2025Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met when the plaintiff shows that he “has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“The standing requirement assures that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested, as plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the litigation’s outcome in addition to showing that they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a resul

2018Further, as a matter of jurisprudence, "we do not decide cases upon constitutional grounds when they can be decided upon other grounds." Superior Const. Co. v. Carr , 564 N.E.2d 281 , 284 (Ind. 1990). [15] " 'The doctrine of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the Court's power.' " Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ. v. Eisenstein , 87 N.E.3d 481 , 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Barnette v. U.S. Architects, LLP , 15 N.E.3d 1 , 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh'g denied ). " 'The standing requirement restrains the judiciary to resolving only those cases an

2018Further, as a matter of jurisprudence, "we do not decide cases upon constitutional grounds when they can be decided upon other grounds." Superior Const. Co. v. Carr , 564 N.E.2d 281 , 284 (Ind. 1990). [15] " 'The doctrine of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the Court's power.' " Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ. v. Eisenstein , 87 N.E.3d 481 , 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Barnette v. U.S. Architects, LLP , 15 N.E.3d 1 , 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh'g denied ). " 'The standing requirement restrains the judiciary to resolving only those cases an

2017“The standing requirement is a limit on the court’s jurisdiction which restrains the judiciary to resolving real controversies in which the complaining party has a demonstrable injury.” Id. (quoting Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990)).

2011Midwest argues that the trial court improperly granted the motions for judgment on the pleadings because Midwest does have standing to pursue its claims. “ ‘The judicial doctrine of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the court’s *903 power.’ ” Nat’l Wine & Spirits Corp. v. Ind. Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n, 945 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Hauer v. BRDD of Ind., Inc., 654 N.E.2d 816, 317 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (1996)), trans. dismissed. “ ‘The standing requirement is a limit on the court’s jurisdiction which restrains the judici

2017Accordingly, our supreme court has stated that “the standing requirement for judicial review is essentially congruent with the ‘aggrieved or adversely affected’ requirement for administrative review.” Id.

2011As for review of administrative decisions, “[jjudicial review is available only to those who have standing, who have exhausted administrative remedies, who have timely pursued review, and who have met any other requirements established by law.” Indiana Ass’n of Beverage Retailers, Inc. v. Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n, 836 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind.2005).

2016Our supreme court rejected this claim, stating the City of Gary met the standing requirement because it alleged “it was financially injured through the sale and use of negligently distributed firearms and by alleging a nuisance within its borders caused by the defendants.” King, 801 N.E.2d at 1248 .

2004Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind.2003); see also City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.2003); Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind.2003).

2008Hibler, 744 N.E.2d at 1023 .

2004See also Hibler, 744 N.E.2d at 1023 ("Although the Indiana constitution contains no "case or controversy" requirement, the federal limits on justiciability are instructive, because the standing requirement under both federal and state constitutional law fulfills the same purpose: ensuring that the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."). 5 .

2000Id.

1997Darlage v. Drummond, 576 N.E.2d 1303, 1308 (Ind.App.1991).

2025However, we need not analyze these factors because the Employees have failed to show they have an expectation of privacy in PNC’s records. [16] In United States v. Miller, Miller was indicted for tax evasion and prior to his trial, the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau subpoenaed documents from two banks at which Miller held accounts. 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976).