standing requirement in Arizona

2024Opinion of the Court otherwise” as no other plaintiff emerged in six years since the law’s enactment8 (citation omitted)). ¶70 In the alternative, Plaintiffs ask us to waive the standing requirement because this case presents “exceptional circumstances” and involves “issues of great public importance that are likely to recur.” See Sears, 192 Ariz. at 71, ¶ 25 .

2008The paucity of eases in which [courts] have waived the standing requirement demonstrates both [the courts’] reluctance to do so and the narrowness of this exception.” Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 71, ¶ 25 , 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998).

2025Cf. Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 , 525 ¶ 20 (2003) (“Without the standing requirement, the judicial branch would be too easily coerced into resolving political disputes between the executive and legislative branches, an arena in which courts are naturally reluctant to intrude.”); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 819–20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”). ¶55 Here, the majority grants

2025See Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 20 (“Without the standing requirement, the judicial branch would be too easily coerced into resolving political disputes between the executive and legislative branches, an arena in which courts are naturally reluctant to intrude.”). ¶19 Although the concept of standing relates to the authority to sue, the inquiries are legally distinct.

2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120 , 123 S.Ct. at 2197 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 158 (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶ 19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challen

2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120 , 123 S.Ct. at 2197 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 158 (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶ 19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challen

1998The paucity of eases in which we have waived the standing requirement demonstrates both our reluctance to do so and the narrowness of this exception. ¶ 26 In Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3 , 833 P.2d 20 (1992), we accepted jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of “potential standing issues.” In that case, the President of the State Senate brought a special action challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s use of the line item veto.

1998The paucity of eases in which we have waived the standing requirement demonstrates both our reluctance to do so and the narrowness of this exception. ¶ 26 In Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3 , 833 P.2d 20 (1992), we accepted jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of “potential standing issues.” In that case, the President of the State Senate brought a special action challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s use of the line item veto.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2025Cf. Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 , 525 ¶ 20 (2003) (“Without the standing requirement, the judicial branch would be too easily coerced into resolving political disputes between the executive and legislative branches, an arena in which courts are naturally reluctant to intrude.”); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 819–20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”). ¶55 Here, the majority grants

2003See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (“[0]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”). 1.

2025We therefore agree with the State that Martinez does not have standing to challenge A.R.S. § 13-2923 on grounds of vagueness or overbreadth “because his conduct was not constitutionally protected and fell within the statute’s legitimate scope.” ¶27 “A narrow exception to the traditional standing rule . . . is recognized in First Amendment cases.” Brown, 207 Ariz. at 237, ¶ 18 (cleaned up).

2025And the exception is inapplicable if the statute “‘regulates conduct as well as speech.’” See id. at 238, ¶ 22 (holding that defendant lacked standing to raise constitutional challenge to harassment statute, the court found “the narrow exception to the standing requirement inapplicable” because the statute “‘regulates conduct as well as speech’” (quotation omitted)). ¶28 Martinez identifies no “deterrent effect” that Section 13– 2923(A)(1)(b)(i) purportedly has on constitutionally protected speech, and we perceive none.

2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120 , 123 S.Ct. at 2197 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 158 (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶ 19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challen

2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120 , 123 S.Ct. at 2197 , 156 L.Ed.2d at 158 (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶ 19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challen

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 5 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 5 ; see also Franzi v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 556, 563 , 679 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1984); Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 145 n. 3, 781 P.2d at 623 n. 3.

2004Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 5 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 5 ; see also Franzi v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 556, 563 , 679 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1984); Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 145 n. 3, 781 P.2d at 623 n. 3.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2004See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 181 Ariz. 69, 73 , 887 P.2d 599, 603 (App.1994); Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. at 724 , 558 P.2d at 752 (“One whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of a statute may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 463, ¶ 5 ; State v. Proctor, 196 Ariz. 557, ¶26 , 2 P.3d 647, ¶ 26 (App.1998). ¶ 18 A “narrow exception” to the traditional standing rule, however, is recognized in First Amendment cases.

2020Ariz. 2017), 4 Pegeese suggests the child molestation 3 Although we recognize a narrow exception to the standing requirement in the First Amendment arena, see State v. Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, 32, ¶ 5 (1999), Pegeese cannot avail himself of this exception because the child molestation statute criminalizes non-expressive, constitutionally unprotected conduct: sexual contact with a minor, see State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 238, ¶ 22 (App. 2004). 4 This decision was vacated by May v. Ryan, 807 F. App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2020). 3 STATE v. PEGEESE Decision of the Court statute threatens constitutionally p

2020Ariz. 2017), 4 Pegeese suggests the child molestation 3 Although we recognize a narrow exception to the standing requirement in the First Amendment arena, see State v. Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, 32, ¶ 5 (1999), Pegeese cannot avail himself of this exception because the child molestation statute criminalizes non-expressive, constitutionally unprotected conduct: sexual contact with a minor, see State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 238, ¶ 22 (App. 2004). 4 This decision was vacated by May v. Ryan, 807 F. App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2020). 3 STATE v. PEGEESE Decision of the Court statute threatens constitutionally p

2004Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 5 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 5 ; see also Franzi v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 556, 563 , 679 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1984); Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 145 n. 3, 781 P.2d at 623 n. 3.

2004Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶ 5 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶ 5 ; see also Franzi v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 556, 563 , 679 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1984); Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 145 n. 3, 781 P.2d at 623 n. 3.

2003ARC America, 490 U.S. at 98 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1661 . [12] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, in which the Court proceeded with a standing analysis only after holding that a health care plan subscriber suffered an antitrust injury at the hands of her insurance company. 457 U.S. 465, 483-84 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that insurer's practice of reimbursing members for psychiatrist treatment but not psychologist treatment constituted an antitrust violation in which members were directly injured because they were unable to obtain their treatm

2003ARC America, 490 U.S. at 98 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1661 . [12] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, in which the Court proceeded with a standing analysis only after holding that a health care plan subscriber suffered an antitrust injury at the hands of her insurance company. 457 U.S. 465, 483-84 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that insurer's practice of reimbursing members for psychiatrist treatment but not psychologist treatment constituted an antitrust violation in which members were directly injured because they were unable to obtain their treatm

2026See State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., 133 Ariz. 99 , 101 n.2 (1982).

2024“Waiver of the standing requirement is the exception, not the rule.” Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193, 196, ¶ 16 (2005) (dismissing claims based on lack of standing when issue was not raised).

2023See In re O.M., 525 P.3d 286 , 287–289 ¶¶ 2, 8–10 (Ariz. App. 2023) (“[O]nce the juvenile court has terminated a person’s parental rights, that person lacks standing to challenge the child’s placement.”).

2020See Aegis of Ariz., LLC v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557 , 562, ¶ 16 (App. 2003).

2020Moreover, Holle addresses Pegeese’s hypothetical fears: “[I]f a prosecution actually were to result from such innocent behavior [parenting or caregiving tasks] (no such case has been cited), an ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge would likely have merit in light of parents’ fundamental, constitutional right to manage and care for their children.” 240 Ariz. at 310-11, ¶ 49 . 5 And Pegeese does not claim, nor does the evidence show, he was improperly prosecuted for an innocent caregiving act that would permit him to assert an “as applied” constitutional challenge.

2018In any event, to the extent the continuous ownership requirement would apply to a corporate dissolution, this Court merely applied an exception to the standing rule, not applicable here, where the plaintiff’s “loss of ownership ‘is the result of corporate action in which the holder did not acquiesce.’” Workman, 240 Ariz. at 604, ¶ 21 .

2013See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, at 147 (2012) (explaining what the authors label the “series-qualifier” canon on interpretation: “When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.”); Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585 , 121 P.3d 82, 86, ¶ 9 (2005) (referring to this corollary as the “comma exception” to the last antecedent rule). ¶ 19 We recognize that our task of interpreting the text of A.R.S. § 9-462.06(K)

2011The Nations filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. ¶ 9 The trial court granted partial judgment in favor of Defendants and concluded that: (1) with respect to administrative review of applications such as the Prescott Proposal, AR.S. § 45-578.B limits the pool of potential objectors to residents of the active management area (AMA) where the water is to be used; (2) this limitation does not run afoul of constitutional notions of due process or equal protection because (a) there is a rational basis for having such a limitation in the statute, and (b) plaintiffs have adequate, alternat

2011The Nations filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. ¶ 9 The trial court granted partial judgment in favor of Defendants and concluded that: (1) with respect to administrative review of applications such as the Prescott Proposal, AR.S. § 45-578.B limits the pool of potential objectors to residents of the active management area (AMA) where the water is to be used; (2) this limitation does not run afoul of constitutional notions of due process or equal protection because (a) there is a rational basis for having such a limitation in the statute, and (b) plaintiffs have adequate, alternat

2011The Nations filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. ¶ 9 The trial court granted partial judgment in favor of Defendants and concluded that: (1) with respect to administrative review of applications such as the Prescott Proposal, AR.S. § 45-578.B limits the pool of potential objectors to residents of the active management area (AMA) where the water is to be used; (2) this limitation does not run afoul of constitutional notions of due process or equal protection because (a) there is a rational basis for having such a limitation in the statute, and (b) plaintiffs have adequate, alternat

2011The Nations filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. ¶ 9 The trial court granted partial judgment in favor of Defendants and concluded that: (1) with respect to administrative review of applications such as the Prescott Proposal, AR.S. § 45-578.B limits the pool of potential objectors to residents of the active management area (AMA) where the water is to be used; (2) this limitation does not run afoul of constitutional notions of due process or equal protection because (a) there is a rational basis for having such a limitation in the statute, and (b) plaintiffs have adequate, alternat