standing doctrine in Texas

2026“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Id. at 154 .

2026The first element of this three-part standing test requires the 14 plaintiff to plead facts that demonstrate that he is “personally injured . . . that he, himself (rather than a third party or the public at large), suffered the injury.” Id. at 155 (emphasis omitted).

2023In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) “a real controversy between the parties,” that (2) “will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 662 .

2018The most fundamental weakness in the Appellants’ argument is that, in Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) “a real controversy between the parties,” that (2) “will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 , 39 Tex. 8 Sup. Ct. J. 1049 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446).

2026Accordingly, we will apply the standard of review used for jurisdictional challenges raised in a plea to the jurisdiction to analyze the standing challenge raised by Texas Right to Life in its TCPA motion to dismiss.4 See, e.g., Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (“Because standing is a component of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we consider [standing issues] as we would a plea to the jurisdiction.” (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 , 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001))).

2026Absent standing, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit, “and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot be litigated or decided.” Id.; see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2025“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) a real controversy between the parties, that (2) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Id. (cleaned up).

2025“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) ‘a real controversy between the parties,’ that (2) ‘will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.’” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty.

2026See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 , 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993) (“Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court . . . .”).

2026See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304 (explaining that the standing requirement derives from our Constitution’s provisions 12 “den[ying] the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract” and “provid[ing] court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him’” (first citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ; and then quoting TEX.

2025Exch., 553 S.W.3d 689, 698 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pets. denied); Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 (“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (observing that, although standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit in both federal and state court, “the judge-made criteria regarding standing do not apply when the Texas Legislature has conferred standing through a statute.”).

2025Exch., 553 S.W.3d 689, 698 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pets. denied); Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 (“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (observing that, although standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit in both federal and state court, “the judge-made criteria regarding standing do not apply when the Texas Legislature has conferred standing through a statute.”).

2026See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304 (explaining that the standing requirement derives from our Constitution’s provisions 12 “den[ying] the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract” and “provid[ing] court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him’” (first citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ; and then quoting TEX.

2023The standing requirement “derives from the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers among the departments of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the Open Courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him.’” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008).

2025Exch., 553 S.W.3d 689, 698 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pets. denied); Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 (“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (observing that, although standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit in both federal and state court, “the judge-made criteria regarding standing do not apply when the Texas Legislature has conferred standing through a statute.”).

2025Exch., 553 S.W.3d 689, 698 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pets. denied); Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 (“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (observing that, although standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit in both federal and state court, “the judge-made criteria regarding standing do not apply when the Texas Legislature has conferred standing through a statute.”).

2025"The standing requirement derives from the Texas Constitution's provision for separation of powers among the branches of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the [Constitution's] open courts provision, which provides court access only to a `person for an injury done him.'" Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018) (quoting TEX.

2024“The standing requirement derives from the Texas Constitution’s provision for separation of powers among the branches of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the open courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him.’” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018) (quoting TEX.

2026Standing “When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

2020“When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re 5 Guardianship of Bernsen, No. 13-17-00591-CV, 2019 WL 3721339 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re K.O.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th District] 2014, no pet.)).

2018“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted).

2015“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123-24 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Everett v. TK–Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)).

2022“The standing inquiry ‘requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). i. Injury in Fact To show injury in fact, Ferrara had to demonstrate he was personally injured.

2007The standing requirement under Texas law stems from two limitations on subject matter jurisdiction: the separation of powers doctrine and the open courts provision, “which contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering an injury.” Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443-44 ; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (standing in federal law is essential and unchangeable requirement of case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of Constitution).

2024Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439 , 442–43 (Tex. 1998); cf. Trustgard Ins. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195 , 200 (4th Cir. 2019) (“That courts may not issue advisory opinions is one of the most long-standing and well-settled 17 The Taylors allege that the Developers lack standing to challenge the underlying merits of the easement-related declaration; they do not challenge the Developers’ standing to challenge the underlying merits of the plat-related declaration. 18 Even if the parties had not raised the issue, we could review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.

2015The standing inquiry “focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.1998).

2025See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984).

2025See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984).

2026Accordingly, we will apply the standard of review used for jurisdictional challenges raised in a plea to the jurisdiction to analyze the standing challenge raised by Texas Right to Life in its TCPA motion to dismiss.4 See, e.g., Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (“Because standing is a component of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we consider [standing issues] as we would a plea to the jurisdiction.” (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 , 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001))).

2022The standing inquiry “focuses on the question of who may bring an action” and “involves a threshold determination of whether a plaintiff has a sufficient ‘justiciable interest’ in the suit’s outcome to be entitled to a judicial determination.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se.

2025This Court has repeatedly held that the right to complain about an illegal search and seizure Bluntson – 81 and invoke the statutory exclusionary remedy “is a privilege personal to the wronged or the injured party.” Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2011See City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell , 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); Werthmann v. City of Fort Worth , 121 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); City of San Antonio v. Hardee , 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

2011See City of San Antonio, 70 S.W.3d at 210 (Historically, a review of an individual party's standing to challenge annexation inquires whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area in question or simply complains of some violation of statutory procedure.); see also City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce, 33 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).

2023A standing inquiry requires a careful examination of the allegations in the petition to determine whether the “particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

2022“The standing inquiry ‘requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). “[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff may ultimately not prevail on the merits of the lawsuit does not deprive the plaintiff of standing.” Farmers Tex. Cnty.

2015“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” Everett v. TK–Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001).

2013“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (citing Sherry, 46 S.W.3d at 861 ).

2021The doctrine of standing “identifies suits appropriate for judicial resolution.” Patel v. Tex. Dep’t. of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 77 (Tex. 2015).

2018“The standing doctrine identifies suits appropriate for judicial resolution” and ensures that there is a real controversy “that will be determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 77 .

2024Absent standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit, “and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot be litigated or decided.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155 ; see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2024In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2025Under the first element of the standing test, a plaintiff must normally “demonstrate that he or she possesses an interest in a conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury.” Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 178–79.

2012See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.2001) (noting that the justiciability doctrine of standing "is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit”). 31 .

2025See In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001) (reviewing applicable standing provisions in Texas Family Code to determine whether purported father had standing).

2022See In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also In re B.U.H., No. 13- 18-00622-CV, 2020 WL 7074358 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In the context of a SAPCR, standing is governed by the Texas Family Code, and ‘[t]he party seeking relief must allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used in the statute.’” (quoting In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120 , 5 124 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g))).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 practices which effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in [28] Zoning and Planning the town, which was adjacent to Rochester, Validity of regulations since, even though 9% of the corporation's Housing council, a not-for-profit New membership was composed of town residents, York corporation comprised of organizations prudential considerations strongly counseled interested in housing problems, was without against according such residents or the standing t

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 practices which effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in [28] Zoning and Planning the town, which was adjacent to Rochester, Validity of regulations since, even though 9% of the corporation's Housing council, a not-for-profit New membership was composed of town residents, York corporation comprised of organizations prudential considerations strongly counseled interested in housing problems, was without against according such residents or the standing t

2020Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak, 52 S.W. 3d 704, 710 (Tex. 2001) (explaining “whether the named plaintiff is a proper class representative is not part of the standing inquiry”).

2014See Novak, 52 S.W.3d at 706 (plaintiff complaining of allegedly misleading letter soliciting donations did not have standing because he did not contribute money so he was not harmed); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 252 S.W.3d at 307 (plaintiffs lacked standing because allegations of risk of harm from alleged 4 Similarly, we note that “whether the named plaintiff is a proper class representative is not part of the standing inquiry,” Southwestern Bell Tel.

2026“When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d at 12 .

2022“When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d at 12.