standing doctrine in Texas

2026See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 , 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993) (“Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court . . . .”).

2026The second element of the standing test, traceability, requires a causal connection—that the plaintiff’s alleged injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, . . . [not] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Simon v. E.

2023In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) “a real controversy between the parties,” that (2) “will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 662 .

2018The most fundamental weakness in the Appellants’ argument is that, in Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) “a real controversy between the parties,” that (2) “will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 , 39 Tex. 8 Sup. Ct. J. 1049 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446).

2026Absent standing, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit, “and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot be litigated or decided.” Id.; see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2026Accordingly, we will apply the standard of review used for jurisdictional challenges raised in a plea to the jurisdiction to analyze the standing challenge raised by Texas Right to Life in its TCPA motion to dismiss.4 See, e.g., Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (“Because standing is a component of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we consider [standing issues] as we would a plea to the jurisdiction.” (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 , 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001))).

2025“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) ‘a real controversy between the parties,’ that (2) ‘will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.’” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty.

2025“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) a real controversy between the parties, that (2) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Id. (cleaned up).

2026See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304 (explaining that the standing requirement derives from our Constitution’s provisions 12 “den[ying] the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract” and “provid[ing] court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him’” (first citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ; and then quoting TEX.

2026See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 , 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993) (“Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court . . . .”).

2026See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304 (explaining that the standing requirement derives from our Constitution’s provisions 12 “den[ying] the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract” and “provid[ing] court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him’” (first citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ; and then quoting TEX.

2023The standing requirement “derives from the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers among the departments of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the Open Courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him.’” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008).

2025Rather, “[i]n statutory standing cases, . . . the analysis is a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Texas Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.” Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 915 ; Marauder, 301 S.W.3d at 820 (“[t]he standing analysis begins and ends with 11 4819-9393-4558 MR366 the statute itself”); Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK- Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005,

2025Rather, “[i]n statutory standing cases, . . . the analysis is a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Texas Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.” Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 915 ; Marauder, 301 S.W.3d at 820 (“[t]he standing analysis begins and ends with the statute itself”); Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that,

2025Rather, “[i]n statutory standing cases, . . . the analysis is a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Texas Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.” Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 915 ; Marauder, 301 S.W.3d at 820 (“[t]he standing analysis begins and ends with 11 4819-9393-4558 MR366 the statute itself”); Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK- Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005,

2025Rather, “[i]n statutory standing cases, . . . the analysis is a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Texas Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.” Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 915 ; Marauder, 301 S.W.3d at 820 (“[t]he standing analysis begins and ends with the statute itself”); Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that,

2025"The standing requirement derives from the Texas Constitution's provision for separation of powers among the branches of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the [Constitution's] open courts provision, which provides court access only to a `person for an injury done him.'" Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018) (quoting TEX.

2024“The standing requirement derives from the Texas Constitution’s provision for separation of powers among the branches of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the open courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him.’” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018) (quoting TEX.

2026Standing “When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

2020“When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re 5 Guardianship of Bernsen, No. 13-17-00591-CV, 2019 WL 3721339 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re K.O.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th District] 2014, no pet.)).

2018“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted).

2015“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123-24 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Everett v. TK–Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)).

2024Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439 , 442-43 (Tex. 1998); cf. Trustgard Ins. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195 , 200 (4th Cir. 2019) (“That courts may not issue advisory opinions is one of the most long-standing and well-settled 17 The Taylors allege that the Developers lack standing to challenge the underlying merits of the easement-related declaration; they do not challenge the Developers’ standing to challenge the underlying merits of the plat-related declaration. 18 Even if the parties had not raised the issue, we could review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.

2015The standing inquiry “focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.1998).

2022“The standing inquiry ‘requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). i. Injury in Fact To show injury in fact, Ferrara had to demonstrate he was personally injured.

2018The United States Supreme Court has articulated the three elements of the standing test: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "lik

2025See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984) (“Standing consists of some interest peculiar to the person individually and not as a member of the general public. . . .

2025See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984).

2015“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” Everett v. TK–Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001).

2013“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (citing Sherry, 46 S.W.3d at 861 ).

2025Under the first element of the standing test, a plaintiff must normally “demonstrate that he or she possesses an interest in a conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury.” Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 178-79.

2012See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.2001) (noting that the justiciability doctrine of standing "is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit”). 31 .

2026Accordingly, we will apply the standard of review used for jurisdictional challenges raised in a plea to the jurisdiction to analyze the standing challenge raised by Texas Right to Life in its TCPA motion to dismiss.4 See, e.g., Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (“Because standing is a component of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we consider [standing issues] as we would a plea to the jurisdiction.” (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 , 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001))).

2022A standing inquiry “focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se.

2025This Court has repeatedly held that the right to complain about an illegal search and seizure Bluntson – 81 and invoke the statutory exclusionary remedy “is a privilege personal to the wronged or the injured party.” Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2011See City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell , 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); Werthmann v. City of Fort Worth , 121 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); City of San Antonio v. Hardee , 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

2011See City of San Antonio, 70 S.W.3d at 210 (Historically, a review of an individual party's standing to challenge annexation inquires whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area in question or simply complains of some violation of statutory procedure.); see also City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce, 33 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).

2024In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2024Absent standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit, “and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot be litigated or decided.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155 ; see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution.”).

2023A standing inquiry requires a careful examination of the allegations in the petition to determine whether the “particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

2022“The standing inquiry ‘requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). “[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff may ultimately not prevail on the merits of the lawsuit does not deprive the plaintiff of standing.” Farmers Tex. Cnty.

2021The doctrine of standing “identifies suits appropriate for judicial resolution.” Patel v. Tex. Dep’t. of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 77 (Tex. 2015).

2018“The standing doctrine identifies suits appropriate for judicial resolution” and ensures that there is a real controversy “that will be determined by the judicial declaration sought.” Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 77 .

2025See In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001) (reviewing applicable standing provisions in Texas Family Code to determine whether purported father had standing).

2022See In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also In re B.U.H., No. 13- 18-00622-CV, 2020 WL 7074358 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In the context of a SAPCR, standing is governed by the Texas Family Code, and ‘[t]he party seeking relief must allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used in the statute.’” (quoting In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120 , 5 124 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g))).

2020Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak, 52 S.W. 3d 704, 710 (Tex. 2001) (explaining “whether the named plaintiff is a proper class representative is not part of the standing inquiry”).

2014See Novak, 52 S.W.3d at 706 (plaintiff complaining of allegedly misleading letter soliciting donations did not have standing because he did not contribute money so he was not harmed); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 252 S.W.3d at 307 (plaintiffs lacked standing because allegations of risk of harm from alleged 4 Similarly, we note that “whether the named plaintiff is a proper class representative is not part of the standing inquiry,” Southwestern Bell Tel.

2025See McLane Champions, 671 S.W.3d at 913 (“[A] plaintiff does not lack standing simply because some other legal principle may prevent it from prevailing on the merits.”).

2024To possess standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) it suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.” McLane Champions, LLC, 671 S.W.3d at 912–13; see In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802 , 808 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012) (“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court