standing requirement in Rhode Island

2020Nonetheless, it has long - 16 - been part of our jurisprudence that “on rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.” Watson, 44 A.3d at 138 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992)); see Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 732 , 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (explaining that “because there was a substantial public interest in the adoption or rejection of a new constitution,” and due to other considerations, the Court would determine whether the constitutional convention exceeded

2020Nonetheless, it has long - 16 - been part of our jurisprudence that “on rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.” Watson, 44 A.3d at 138 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992)); see Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 732 , 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (explaining that “because there was a substantial public interest in the adoption or rejection of a new constitution,” and due to other considerations, the Court would determine whether the constitutional convention exceeded

2023“Injury in fact has been described as an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized * * * and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Haviland v. Simmons, 45 A.3d 1246, 1256 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997)).

2015“We have defined injury in fact as ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized * * * and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997)).

2020Nonetheless, it has long - 16 - been part of our jurisprudence that “on rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.” Watson, 44 A.3d at 138 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992)); see Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 732 , 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (explaining that “because there was a substantial public interest in the adoption or rejection of a new constitution,” and due to other considerations, the Court would determine whether the constitutional convention exceeded

2020Nonetheless, it has long - 16 - been part of our jurisprudence that “on rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.” Watson, 44 A.3d at 138 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992)); see Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 732 , 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (explaining that “because there was a substantial public interest in the adoption or rejection of a new constitution,” and due to other considerations, the Court would determine whether the constitutional convention exceeded

2023See Mruk, 82 A.3d at 535 ; Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 (“To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege ‘that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’”) (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22 , 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).

2023See Mruk, 82 A.3d at 535 ; Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 (“To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege ‘that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’”) (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22 , 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).

2023See Mruk, 82 A.3d at 535 ; Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 (“To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege ‘that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’”) (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22 , 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).

2023However, the mere allegation of a constitutional violation has never been the key factor that drives a conclusion that a plaintiff’s claims are justiciable; this Court’s standing doctrine requires that we have “a proper party [requesting] an adjudication of a particular issue * * *.” Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162, 1169 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 ).

1999Based upon the above considerations, and mindful that “[sjtanding is [simply] an access barrier that calls for the assessment of one’s credentials to bring suit,” Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce, 452 A.2d at 932 , we are satisfied that plaintiffs possess the requisite personal stake in the outcome of this controversy to satisfy the standing requirement.

1999The standing requirement enunciated in Burns v. Sundlun stated that a plaintiff has sufficient standing to sue if he or she alleges "an injury in fact resulting from the challenged statute." The court in Burns described the test for standing by stating that "the petitioner must still allege a personal stake in the controversy — his own injury in fact — before he will have standing to assert the broader claims of the public at large." Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114 , 116 (R.I. 1992) citing, Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce v. Public Utilities Commission, 452 A.2d 931 , 933 (R.I. 1982).

2008Dep't of Admin. , 787 A.2d 1179 , 1185 (R.I. 2002) citing Cummings v. Shorey , 761 A.2d 680 , 684 (R.I. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

2002This Court has held that the standing requirement is satisfied when “ ‘the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him [or her] injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’ ” Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I.2000) (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22 , 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).

2022See In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 19 A.3d 1226, 1229 (R.I. 2011) (mem.) (Flaherty, J., with whom Robinson, J. joins, dissenting).

2011Two members of this Court dissented on the existence of CLF’s substantial public interest and countered that "this is one of those 'rare occasions' when it would be appropriate to 'overlook!] the standing requirement.’ ’’ In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 19 A.3d 1226, 1229 (R.I.2011) (mem.). 27 .We commend both petitioners and respondents for the extraordinarily thorough legal reasoning and argumentation contained in their written and oral submissions to this Court.

2020While Carlson, which was decided by a divided three-judge panel, may seem to suggest otherwise when it comes to petitioning for access to grand jury records, Carlson, 837 F.3d at 759 (“That Carlson is a member of the public is sufficient for him to assert his ‘general right to inspect and copy judicial records.’”) (deletion and internal citation omitted), we disagree with that sweeping holding and note that the standing analysis in Carlson appears to have been colored by the fact that the petitioner was a historian writing a book about a long-ago - 15 - Chicago Tribune article that was the sub

2020While Carlson, which was decided by a divided three-judge panel, may seem to suggest otherwise when it comes to petitioning for access to grand jury records, Carlson, 837 F.3d at 759 (“That Carlson is a member of the public is sufficient for him to assert his ‘general right to inspect and copy judicial records.’”) (deletion and internal citation omitted), we disagree with that sweeping holding and note that the standing analysis in Carlson appears to have been colored by the fact that the petitioner was a historian writing a book about a long-ago - 15 - Chicago Tribune article that was the sub

2012In a frequently cited passage, the United States Supreme Court explained that to satisfy the standing requirement a complaining party must allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 .

2012In a frequently cited passage, the United States Supreme Court explained that to satisfy the standing requirement a complaining party must allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 .

1974The United States Supreme Court, in seeking to dispel the confusion regarding the doctrine of standing, completely rewrote the law in two 1970 decisions, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), and its companion case of Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 , 90 S.Ct. 832 , 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

1974The United States Supreme Court, in seeking to dispel the confusion regarding the doctrine of standing, completely rewrote the law in two 1970 decisions, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), and its companion case of Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 , 90 S.Ct. 832 , 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

2023However, the mere allegation of a constitutional violation has never been the key factor that drives a conclusion that a plaintiff’s claims are justiciable; this Court’s standing doctrine requires that we have “a proper party [requesting] an adjudication of a particular issue * * *.” Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162, 1169 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 ).

2023“Injury in fact has been described as an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized * * * and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Haviland v. Simmons, 45 A.3d 1246, 1256 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997)).

2023See Mruk, 82 A.3d at 535 ; Watson, 44 A.3d at 135 (“To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege ‘that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’”) (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22 , 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).

2015See In re Estate of Lewis, 411 So.2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. Dist. 16 Of note, although perhaps irrelevant to the current standing analysis, is that at the time the 1991 Will was first executed, the residue was to go to the Gabrielle Mee Revocable Trust and then to the Foundation.

2011We dissent from this order in part, namely with respect to CLF, because we are of the firm opinion that this is one of those “rare occasions” when it would be appropriate to “overlook[] the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case involving substantial public interest.” Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of Providence v. City Council of Providence, 660 A.2d 721, 726 (R.I.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I.1992); Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358 , 35

2010(Emphasis in original.)) The uncertainty and insecurity as to her employment and the terms governing its renewal present "a real and immediate threat" to the Plaintiff. 5 Id. ; see Baur v. Veneman , 352 F.3d 625 , 636 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff must "allege that he faces a direct risk of harm which rises above mere conjecture").