standing analysis in Delaware

2025Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003). 64 Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991). 28 The standing inquiry under Delaware law differs from the standing inquiry under federal law.

2021Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000)). 19 Answering Br. at 35. 20 El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1256 (Del. 2016). 21 Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (citation omitted). 22 Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003). 11 restraint,” to “avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are mere intermeddlers.”23 “[S]tanding is properly a threshold question that the Court may not avoid.”24 The standing inquiry “has assumed special significance in the area of

2025Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003). 64 Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991). 28 The standing inquiry under Delaware law differs from the standing inquiry under federal law.

2021Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000)). 19 Answering Br. at 35. 20 El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1256 (Del. 2016). 21 Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (citation omitted). 22 Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003). 11 restraint,” to “avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are mere intermeddlers.”23 “[S]tanding is properly a threshold question that the Court may not avoid.”24 The standing inquiry “has assumed special significance in the area of

2025B. 21 D.I. 1. 22 D.I. 11. 23 D.I. 18. 24 D.I. 22. 25 See D.I. 25 (Plaintiffs’ Answer in Opposition) and 27 (Defendant’s Reply). 26 Constitution Party of Penn. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d.

2025B. 21 D.I. 1. 22 D.I. 11. 23 D.I. 18. 24 D.I. 22. 25 See D.I. 25 (Plaintiffs’ Answer in Opposition) and 27 (Defendant’s Reply). 26 Constitution Party of Penn. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d.

2023Although the Lewis Court went on to mention Rule 61(a)’s “in custody” requirement, the Court stated that Rule 61(a) “appears to create a standing bar,” 56 Lewis, 797 A.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). 57 State’s Supp.

2022If the collateral 39 Id. at 1201 (alteration and emphasis added) (citations omitted). 40 1993 WL 144874 . -10- consequences rule for mootness is to have any applicability at all, it must be available under Rule 35 as opposed to Rule 61.”41 (15) This Court reaffirmed that principle later in State v. Hinson.42 It concluded that “[a]ll courts in Delaware that have considered whether postconviction relief under Rule 61 is potentially available to a person who is not ‘in custody or subject to future custody’ for the challenged sentence have agreed that such relief under Rule 61 is not available.”43

2021However, a stockholder who is directly injured retains the right to bring an individual action for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder.39 “Such a claim is distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone.”40 In such individual suits, “the recovery or other relief flows directly to the stockholders, not to the corporation.”41 Classification of a particular claim as whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses standing to continue a derivative suit.” 477 A.2d at 1049 . 36 El Paso, 152 A.3d at 1256–57 (footnotes omitted). 37 Id. at 1257; see also Mor

2021Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000)). 19 Answering Br. at 35. 20 El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1256 (Del. 2016). 21 Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (citation omitted). 22 Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003). 11 restraint,” to “avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are mere intermeddlers.”23 “[S]tanding is properly a threshold question that the Court may not avoid.”24 The standing inquiry “has assumed special significance in the area of

2024The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing ‘is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.’); In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383 , 402 n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Article III standing, which, of course, is not subject to waiver.”).

2024Grant Co., 354 U.S. 629 , 633 (1953); see also Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc, 568 U.S. 85, 96 (2013) (“[T]he voluntary cessation standard requires the defendant to show that the challenged behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur . . . .”). 17 When, however, a defendant ceases engaging in the challenged conduct before a lawsuit is filed, the correct doctrine to be applied is standing, not mootness.75 For the reasons that follow, FSO did not prove standing to bring its declaratory judgment claim because it could not satisfy the first or third prongs of the standing analysis.76 The Superior C

2024Under the standing doctrine’s redressability prong, the relief sought must be capable of redressing the plaintiff’s injury or grievance.107 “To 105 See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189 . 106 FW/PBS, Inc, 493 U.S. at 230–31 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)) (“Although neither side raises the issue here, we are required to address the issue even if the courts below have not passed on it . . . and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us.

2023July 1, 2022) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (cleaned up)). 180 Id. 181 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)). 46 While the standing analysis pursuant to Delaware law is substantially similar to the analysis of Article III standing in federal court, Delaware is not bound by the federal rules of justiciability.182 Delaware’s standing requirement is applied for the purpose of “‘self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are ‘mere intermeddlers.’”183 Plaintiffs request that this C

2023July 1, 2022) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (cleaned up)). 180 Id. 181 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)). 46 While the standing analysis pursuant to Delaware law is substantially similar to the analysis of Article III standing in federal court, Delaware is not bound by the federal rules of justiciability.182 Delaware’s standing requirement is applied for the purpose of “‘self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are ‘mere intermeddlers.’”183 Plaintiffs request that this C

2023July 1, 2022) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (cleaned up)). 180 Id. 181 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)). 46 While the standing analysis pursuant to Delaware law is substantially similar to the analysis of Article III standing in federal court, Delaware is not bound by the federal rules of justiciability.182 Delaware’s standing requirement is applied for the purpose of “‘self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are ‘mere intermeddlers.’”183 Plaintiffs request that this C

2021However, a stockholder who is directly injured retains the right to bring an individual action for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder.39 “Such a claim is distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone.”40 In such individual suits, “the recovery or other relief flows directly to the stockholders, not to the corporation.”41 Classification of a particular claim as whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses standing to continue a derivative suit.” 477 A.2d at 1049 . 36 El Paso, 152 A.3d at 1256–57 (footnotes omitted). 37 Id. at 1257; see also Mor

2019A person’s standing to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment “depends not on a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 454 (1967).

2018Aug. 15, 2011) (noting that movant did not overcome the standing bar because he could not “demonstrate specifically a right lost or disability or burden imposed by reason of the instant conviction” despite his claimed risk of deportation). 37 Ayers v. Siate, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002); Maxion v. Siaie, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996).

2018Aug. 15, 2011) (noting that movant did not overcome the standing bar because he could not “demonstrate specifically a right lost or disability or burden imposed by reason of the instant conviction” despite his claimed risk of deportation). 37 Ayers v. Siate, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002); Maxion v. Siaie, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996).

2017C. § 2118B and has a private right of action to sue for unpaid/underpaid bills.32 At oral argument, USAA did not address Sa)nmons or respond to WPRC’s 27 See In re Hya'rogen Peroxia'e Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 28 Ia'. at 316 (internal citations omitted); see also Dakes, 564 U.S. at 351 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff s underlying claim.”). 29 lt appears that USAA is launching a standing challenge here, although it does not explicitly characterize it as such. 30 USAA’s Opp’n

2017C. § 2118B and has a private right of action to sue for unpaid/underpaid bills.32 At oral argument, USAA did not address Sa)nmons or respond to WPRC’s 27 See In re Hya'rogen Peroxia'e Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 28 Ia'. at 316 (internal citations omitted); see also Dakes, 564 U.S. at 351 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff s underlying claim.”). 29 lt appears that USAA is launching a standing challenge here, although it does not explicitly characterize it as such. 30 USAA’s Opp’n

2017Accordingly, we express no view with respect to the Master’s standing analysis. (6) “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.”13 The Court must “determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 (7) In In re Hobson’s Estate,15 the Court of Chancery described the rule of ademption, which provides: When the specified item has been conveyed or lost prior to death or its identity has been so subs

2017Accordingly, we express no view with respect to the Master’s standing analysis. (6) “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.”13 The Court must “determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 (7) In In re Hobson’s Estate,15 the Court of Chancery described the rule of ademption, which provides: When the specified item has been conveyed or lost prior to death or its identity has been so subs