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14 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1931–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bill Duncan & a. v. State of New Hampshire & a.green2 sentences2021Discussion The doctrine of standing “limits the judicial role, consistent with a system of separated powers, to addressing those matters that are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 643 (2014) (quotation omitted); see Susan B. 2017See Duncan , 166 N.H. at 645 , 102 A.3d 913 . | 2 | 2 |
Maryland v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2011See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 739 (observing that individual consumers were unlikely to litigate the validity of a tax when the amounts paid to each consumer are likely to be relatively small); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241 (“That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies, requires no argument.”). 2011See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 739 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 (observing that individual consumers were unlikely to litigate the validity of a tax when the amounts paid to each consumer are likely to be relatively small); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241 , 21 S.Ct. 331 ("That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies, requires no argument."). | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. Illinois & the Sanitary Districtgreen2 sentences2011See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 739 (observing that individual consumers were unlikely to litigate the validity of a tax when the amounts paid to each consumer are likely to be relatively small); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241 (“That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies, requires no argument.”). 2011See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 739 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 (observing that individual consumers were unlikely to litigate the validity of a tax when the amounts paid to each consumer are likely to be relatively small); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241 , 21 S.Ct. 331 ("That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies, requires no argument."). | 1 | 2 |
Jeremy Olson & a. v. Town of Graftongreen1 sentence2024See Olson v. Town of Grafton, 168 N.H. 563, 566 (2016) (concluding that “[a]lthough any issues the plaintiffs raised in the trial court with regard to the March 2015 annual meeting are now moot, Olson’s appeal is not moot because it presents legal issues that are of pressing public interest and are capable of repetition yet evading review” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development, Inc. & Agreen1 sentence2023It focuses only on ‘whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))); see also Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Dev., 168 N.H. 377, 381 (2015) (noting that “standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”). | 1 | 1 |
Warth v. Seldinred1 sentence2023It focuses only on ‘whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))); see also Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Dev., 168 N.H. 377, 381 (2015) (noting that “standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”). | 1 | 1 |
City of Hope National Medical Center v. Healthplus, Inc.green1 sentence2023Medical Ctr. v. Healthplus Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The standing inquiry does not focus on the merits of the dispute. | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. Pershing, LLCgreen1 sentence2020See Katz, 672 F.3d at 72 ; cf., e.g., Birch Broad., 161 N.H. at 199-200 (inquiring further where a plaintiff had assigned its rights under the contract that was allegedly breached); Sunapee Difference v. State of N.H., 164 N.H. 778, 783, 788 (2013) (inquiring further in order to hold lessee- assignor “contractually retained a [concrete and] sufficient interest in the outcome of the reformation claim to grant it standing to sue”). | 1 | 1 |
Sunapee Difference, LLC v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Katz, 672 F.3d at 72 ; cf., e.g., Birch Broad., 161 N.H. at 199-200 (inquiring further where a plaintiff had assigned its rights under the contract that was allegedly breached); Sunapee Difference v. State of N.H., 164 N.H. 778, 783, 788 (2013) (inquiring further in order to hold lessee- assignor “contractually retained a [concrete and] sufficient interest in the outcome of the reformation claim to grant it standing to sue”). | 1 | 1 |
Birch Broadcasting, Inc. v. Capitol Broadcasting Corp.green1 sentence2020See Katz, 672 F.3d at 72 ; cf., e.g., Birch Broad., 161 N.H. at 199-200 (inquiring further where a plaintiff had assigned its rights under the contract that was allegedly breached); Sunapee Difference v. State of N.H., 164 N.H. 778, 783, 788 (2013) (inquiring further in order to hold lessee- assignor “contractually retained a [concrete and] sufficient interest in the outcome of the reformation claim to grant it standing to sue”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gubitosigreen1 sentence2016“The threshold question as to the determination of a party’s standing to challenge the introduction of evidence by means of a motion to suppress is whether any rights of the moving party were violated.” State v. Gubitosi, 152 N.H. 673, 680 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hess Corp.green1 sentence2015See Hess, 161 N.H. at 431-32. | 1 | 1 |
Hollingsworth v. Perrygreen2 sentences2014The doctrine of standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (quotation omitted). 2014“In light of this overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of an important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and efficiency.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Flynngreen1 sentence2005State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 466 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paigegreen2 sentences1997See State v. Paige, 136 N.H. 208, 210 , 612 A.2d 1331, 1332 (1992). 1997See State v. Paige, 136 N.H. 208, 210 , 612 A.2d 1331, 1332 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beaulieugreen2 sentences1983See State v. Beaulieu, 119 N.H. 400, 404 , 402 A.2d 178, 181 (1979); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693 , 336 A.2d 497 , 498 (1976). 1983See State v. Beaulieu, 119 N.H. 400, 404 , 402 A.2d 178, 181 (1979); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693 , 336 A.2d 497 , 498 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ruelke
green
1 sentence1983See State v. Beaulieu, 119 N.H. 400, 404 , 402 A.2d 178, 181 (1979); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693 , 336 A.2d 497 , 498 (1976). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Mahoney v. Dore
green
2 sentences1931In discussing the defence of assumption of risk the court expressed a limitation of it in this language: “One cannot be said, as a matter of law, to assume a risk voluntarily, though he knows the danger and appreciates the risk, if at the time he was acting 'under such an exigency, or such an urgent call of duty, or such constraint of any kind, as in reference to the danger deprives his act of its voluntary character’ (Mahoney v. Dore, supra, [ 155 Mass. 513 ]) . . .” And it was held to be for the jury to say if “the plaintiff, knowing the defendants’ neglect of duty, fully appreciated the dan 1931In discussing the defence of assumption of risk the court expressed a limitation of it in this language: “One cannot be said, as a matter of law, to assume a risk voluntarily, though he knows the danger and appreciates the risk, if at the time he was acting 'under such an exigency, or such an urgent call of duty, or such constraint of any kind, as in reference to the danger deprives his act of its voluntary character’ (Mahoney v. Dore, supra, [ 155 Mass. 513 ]) . . .” And it was held to be for the jury to say if “the plaintiff, knowing the defendants’ neglect of duty, fully appreciated the dan | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.