standing inquiry in Tennessee

2022The standing inquiry “requires a ‘careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

2017Ed. 2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

2026In sum, then, the standing doctrine ensures that the plaintiff “has alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant a judicial resolution of the dispute.” City of Brentwood v. Metro Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49 , 55– 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2017Ed. 2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

2020See Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 31 (“A statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus relief is that the petitioner must be ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty’ by the challenged convictions.”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29 - -3- 21-107(b) (2006).

2014See Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 31 (“A statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus relief is that the petitioner must be ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty’ by the challenged convictions.”); see also T.C.A. § 29- 21-107(b).

2022The standing inquiry “requires a ‘careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

2016However, because a party‟s standing may hinge on the nature of its claims, a standing inquiry requires a “careful judicial examination of the complaint‟s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 , 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

2017Grounded upon “concern about the proper—and properly limited— role of the courts in a democratic society,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 , the doctrine of standing precludes courts from adjudicating “an action at the instance of one whose rights have not been invaded or infringed.” Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 30, 2001).

2010Judge LaFevor. 33 Apparently, the trial court construed this count in the complaint as a request for declaratory relief, considering Counts I-IV along with Count VI. -29- The doctrine of standing is “a judge-made doctrine based on the idea that ‘[a] court may and properly should refuse to entertain an action at the instance of one whose rights have not been invaded or infringed.’ ” Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 766-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 59 A M.

2026Both sides respond by saying that the answer is “no” because the complaint carefully avoids challenging the constitutionality of a statute or executive order. -3- The three-part standing test for public rights claims “requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) is capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.at *18. “[A] plaintiff must show an injury that is ‘distinct and palpable.’” Id. (quoting City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98 (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tenn. 2006))).

2017Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619-20 (Tenn. 2006); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

2016As explained by the Mayhew Court: In Tennessee, the standing doctrine requires that the person challenging the constitutionality of a statute “must show that he personally has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury ... and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Parks v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tenn. Ct. App.1980).

2001In Tennessee, the standing doctrine requires that the person challenging the constitutionality of a statute “must show that he personally has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury ... and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Parks v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980).

2014Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Petty v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 91 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2011Petty v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 91 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2016Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

2016Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

2024SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

2010Browning Ferris Ind. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

2016Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

2008Because a party’s standing may hinge on the nature of its claims, a standing inquiry requires an “examination of the complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 , 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).

2026Both sides respond by saying that the answer is “no” because the complaint carefully avoids challenging the constitutionality of a statute or executive order. -3- The three-part standing test for public rights claims “requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) is capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.at *18. “[A] plaintiff must show an injury that is ‘distinct and palpable.’” Id. (quoting City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98 (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tenn. 2006))).

2017Again, in the standing analysis, “the causation element is not onerous.” Hargett, 414 S.W.3d at 98 .

2014A party’s standing may hinge on the nature of the claims, so the standing inquiry requires us to engage in “a careful judicial examination” of the claims in order “‘to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff[s] [were] entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Cox, 196 S.W.3d at 758 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 , 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).

2013Because the determination of whether a party has standing may “hinge on the nature of its claims,” however, “a standing inquiry requires a ‘careful judicial examination of the complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 , 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).

2026The injury also must be “actual or imminent.” Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 283 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

2017When the Second Amended Complaint was filed, the pipelines had already been installed but were not yet in operation.6 However, as we said before, the standing analysis requires an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, but not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).

2026In sum, then, the standing doctrine ensures that the plaintiff “has alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant a judicial resolution of the dispute.” City of Brentwood v. Metro Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49 , 55– 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2024SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

2006Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir.1989); National Fed’n of Fed.

1992Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 765 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir.1989); National Fed’n of Fed.

2001While our case law does recognize a “great public *281 interest” exception to the doctrine of mootness, Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102,105 (Tenn.1972), no comparable legal theory may be found that grants legal standing where none existed in the first instance, cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

2001While our case law does recognize a “great public interest” exception to the doctrine of mootness, Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1972), no comparable legal theory may be found that grants legal standing where none existed in the first instance, cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

2001However, except with regard to the Office of the Attorney General, see State v. Heath, 806 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990), the courts of this state have yet to recognize a general “public rights” exception to the standing requirement, and we decline to do so in this case.

2001However, except with regard to the Office of the Attorney General, see State v. Heath, 806 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), the courts of this state have yet to recognize a general “public rights” exception to the standing requirement, and we decline to do so in this case.

2018Even so, the standing inquiry “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Id.

2017Even so, the standing inquiry “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Id.

2010In United States v. Haydel, the United States Court of A ppeals for the Fifth Circu it articulated a seven-factor analysis applicable to the standing inquiry. 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981).

1991In United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1981), the United States Court of Appeals listed seven factors applicable to the standing inquiry: (1) property ownership; (2) whether the defendant has a posses-sory interest in the thing seized; (3) whether the defendant has a posses-sory interest in the place searched; (4) whether he has a right to exclude others from that place; (5) whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free from governmental invasion; (6) whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; and (7) whether he was legitimately

2003Thus, since that statute was enacted, a smaller municipality has “the same standing to challenge annexation that [has] theretofore [been] granted to owners of property in the territory to be annexed, no more no less.” City of Watauga, 589 S.W.2d at 906 .

1987City of Watauga v. City of Johnson City, 589 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tenn.1979).

1997The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be violated . . . .” Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly provides “[t]hat the people shall be secure . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” In the context of these particular 5 We note that, while the appellant contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the appellant does not contest the trial court’s narrow conclusion that he lacked any legitimate expectation of priva

1997The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be violated . . . .” Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly provides “[t]hat the people shall be secure . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” In the context of these particular 5 We note that, while the appellant contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the appellant does not contest the trial court’s narrow conclusion that he lacked any legitimate expectation of priva

2026Gov’t of Nashville v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Nashville, 477 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tenn. 2015). -5- Appellants contend that the sole focus of the standing inquiry in this case should be on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed.

2022We disagree. “‘[U]nder no circumstances ... does the overbreadth doctrine relieve a plaintiff of its burden to show constitutional standing.” Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws v. Slatery, No. M2020-01292- COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4621249 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2021) (quoting Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also Birmingham v. Nessel, No. 21-1297, 2021 WL 5712150 , at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine provides “an exception to only prudential standing requirements, not constitutional standing requirem

2020“For an assignment to be valid, it ‘must contain clear evidence of the intent to transfer rights, must describe the subject matter of the assignment, must be clear and unequivocal, and must be noticed to the obligor.’” Id. (quoting 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments 4 Mr. Hight did not raise any issue, in the trial court or on appeal, regarding the defendants’ standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. -7- § 82). “[T]he intent of the assignor to transfer the right must be ‘manifest.’” Id. (quoting Collier v. Greenbrier Developers, LLC, 358 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)).

2020State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tenn. Crim.

2020Further, Ms. Gibbs failed to raise the issue of standing in the trial court, and the issue “may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” In re Estate of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 148 (Tenn. 2013).