statute of limitations defense in District of Columbia

2019While the distinction can have practical implications—courts may apply plain error review to forfeited arguments, for example, see id. at 733–34, while wholly declining to address arguments a party has waived, see id. at 732–34—it is of no consequence here, as we ultimately conclude that Mr. Massey timely asserted the defense in his initial motion. 7 instance as an affirmative defense, not in belated response to a prior pleading. 5 Even if we were inclined to apply the waiver doctrine when a party failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense in an earlier affirmative motion, we have previo

2019We are not persuaded that under the circumstances of this case Mr. Massey waived or forfeited 4 his statute-of-limitations *152 argument where he presented it in the first instance as an affirmative defense, not in belated response to a prior pleading. 5 Even if we were inclined to apply the waiver doctrine when a party failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense in an earlier affirmative motion, we have previously stated that the requirement to timely assert the defense of statute of limitations must not be "narrowly construed" as "[t]he trend in both this court and the federal courts ..

2018See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp. , 749 A.2d 724 , 734 (D.C. 2000) (holding that the defendant did not waive a statute of limitations defense by not including it in its motion to dismiss).

2018Thus, we reject Ms. Johnson‟s contention that the CRB should have afforded her an opportunity to present evidence before the CRB decided there had been no waiver. 15 See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 734 (D.C. 2000) (holding that the defendant did not waive a statute of limitations defense by not including it in its motion to dismiss). 14 untimely.

2025We assumed – but did not decide – that if the trial court had authority to raise the statute of limitations defense sua sponte, “it should not do so unless, at a minimum, the expiration of the statute ‘is clear from the face of [the] complaint.’” Id. (quoting Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993)).

2010There is no indication that appellants asserted a statute of limitations defense, see Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C.1993) (“[T]he statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which, under [Super.

2007Thus, “[a]lthough the decision is a matter of trial court discretion, the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits creates a ‘virtual presumption’ that a court should grant leave to amend [an answer] where no good reason appears to the contrary.” Bennett, supra, 434 A.2d at 478-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tinker, supra, 691 A.2d at 60 (“[U]nless there is prejudice to the opposing party, the rules of procedure cannot bar a defendant from raising the defense of statute of limitations even after the filing of its answer.” (Citing Whitener, supra, 505 A.2

2007Thus, “[a]lthough the decision is a matter of trial court discretion, the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits creates a ‘virtual presumption’ that a court should grant leave to amend [an answer] where no good reason appears to the contrary.” Bennett, supra, 434 A.2d at 478-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tinker, supra, 691 A.2d at 60 (“[U]nless there is prejudice to the opposing party, the rules of procedure cannot bar a defendant from raising the defense of statute of limitations even after the filing of its answer.” (Citing Whitener, supra, 505 A.2

2025Because there was some question as to whether the limitations period had been tolled by a partial payment on a debt, we reversed the order of dismissal as the expiration of the statute of limitations was “by no means clear” on the face of the complaint and the plaintiff “should at least be permitted to litigate it ‘when and if that defense is asserted . . . .’” Id. (quoting Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1987)). 8 We hew to the general rule that ordinarily trial courts should not raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte; it is for the defendant to do so.

1998See id. at 105 ("If a defendant fails to assert the statute of limitations defense, the district court ordinarily should not raise it sua sponte.") (quoting Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir.1987)).

2019Cf. Mayo, 508 A.2d at 115, 117 (finding waiver where party failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense in response to a claim for support arrears) (emphasis added).

2019Cf. Mayo , 508 A.2d at 115, 117 (finding waiver where party failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense in response to a claim for support arrears) (emphasis added).

2019“We review the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s waiver claim for abuse 3 To the extent that Ms. Pope Massey argues in a footnote that Mr. Massey’s child support payments continued to accrue indefinitely because the divorce decree “does not limit the period during which the payments shall be made,” this contention is foreclosed by our holding in Butler. 6 of discretion.” Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356, 361 (D.C. 2012).

2019"We review the trial court's rejection of appellant's waiver claim for abuse of discretion." Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia , 40 A.3d 356 , 361 (D.C. 2012).

2025We assumed – but did not decide – that if the trial court had authority to raise the statute of limitations defense sua sponte, “it should not do so unless, at a minimum, the expiration of the statute ‘is clear from the face of [the] complaint.’” Id. (quoting Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993)).

2025Because there was some question as to whether the limitations period had been tolled by a partial payment on a debt, we reversed the order of dismissal as the expiration of the statute of limitations was “by no means clear” on the face of the complaint and the plaintiff “should at least be permitted to litigate it ‘when and if that defense is asserted . . . .’” Id. (quoting Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1987)). 8 We hew to the general rule that ordinarily trial courts should not raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte; it is for the defendant to do so.

2022A statute of limitations defense, once waived (expressly or by nonassertion), may not be raised by a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment or for the first time on appeal.” (internal citations omitted)); accord In re Spinner, 717 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C. 1998).

2019Ms. Pope Massey also argues that Mr. Massey is precluded from relitigating the claims based on his children having reached the age of majority and Mr. Massey himself having insufficient funds, but those are neither claims Mr. Massey made in his motion to (continued…) 9 claim, including any issue that either was or might have been raised in the first proceeding.” Crane v. Crane, 614 A.2d 935, 938 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Rhema Christian Ctr. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189 , 192–193 (D.C. 1986)).

2009Cf Finch, 894 A.2d at 422 (concluding that a grace period of at least 90 days would be a reasonable period for adjusting to a new 90-day limitations period).

2008Cf. Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1306 (3d Cir.1995) (“We emphasize that the running of the statute of limitations does not require the district court to extend time for service of process”) (construing the somewhat differently-worded federal Rule 4(m)).

2007Thus, “[a]lthough the decision is a matter of trial court discretion, the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits creates a ‘virtual presumption’ that a court should grant leave to amend [an answer] where no good reason appears to the contrary.” Bennett, supra, 434 A.2d at 478-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tinker, supra, 691 A.2d at 60 (“[U]nless there is prejudice to the opposing party, the rules of procedure cannot bar a defendant from raising the defense of statute of limitations even after the filing of its answer.” (Citing Whitener, supra, 505 A.2

2007Thus, “[a]lthough the decision is a matter of trial court discretion, the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits creates a ‘virtual presumption’ that a court should grant leave to amend [an answer] where no good reason appears to the contrary.” Bennett, supra, 434 A.2d at 478-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tinker, supra, 691 A.2d at 60 (“[U]nless there is prejudice to the opposing party, the rules of procedure cannot bar a defendant from raising the defense of statute of limitations even after the filing of its answer.” (Citing Whitener, supra, 505 A.2

2000Although there are situations in which a court may preclude a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when to allow the defense would be prejudicial to the plaintiff, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C.1997) ( holding it was “incumbent on [plaintiff] to make a showing of prejudice resulting from the [defendant’s] failure to raise the defense earlier”); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.Supp. 283, 285 (D.D.C.1995) (“substantial prejudice” would adhere to plaintiff which had incurred substantial legal costs in conducting discovery and preparing for t

2000Although there are situations in which a court may preclude a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when to allow the defense would be prejudicial to the plaintiff, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C.1997) ( holding it was “incumbent on [plaintiff] to make a showing of prejudice resulting from the [defendant’s] failure to raise the defense earlier”); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.Supp. 283, 285 (D.D.C.1995) (“substantial prejudice” would adhere to plaintiff which had incurred substantial legal costs in conducting discovery and preparing for t

2000We turn, therefore, to appellees’ argument that, even if ESS has standing to bring claims under the DCHRA, the trial court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals of those claims should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the DCHRA claims are time-barred by the Act’s statute of limitations. 14 The trial court did not rule on this alternative ground for dismissal because the statute of limitations defense was not raised in appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, but rather in their answer to the complaint. 15 “What constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law; the actual date of accrual, h

1999Cf. Guevara v. Reed, 598 A.2d 1157, 1160 (D.C.1991) (noting that availability of alternative forum is a requirement before case is dismissed for forum non conveniens ). [2] Even though it may have been proper for the trial court to have engaged in a fairly rough appraisal of Ms. Killingham's claim at the time it permitted the late amendment and determined that any loss to Ms. Killingham would be de minimis, that is not the issue before us.

1999Cf. Guevara v. Reed, 598 A.2d 1157, 1160 (D.C. 1991) (noting that availability of alternative forum is a requirement before case is dismissed for forum non conveniens ). .

1999See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 728 A.2d 70 , 75 n. 1 (D.C.1999); District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338 , 1346 n. 18 (D.C. 1995). [1] The trial court could have ensured that Ms. Killingham would have been able to file her complaint by conditioning the landlord's amendment on waiver of a statute of limitations defense, akin to the procedure used when a case is dismissed for forum non conveniens.

1998Plaintiffs and their counsel should have known there was no valid defamation claim before the filing of the first complaint.”), and McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F.Supp. 835, 838 (D.Utah 1989) ("The court concludes a reasonable inquiry into the law would have shown [plaintiff's] claim was time-barred and the statute of limitations is constitutionally sound.”), with Poag v. Humane Soc’y of Lawton, 907 F.Supp. 1487, 1489 (W.D.Okla.1995) (noting that plaintiff not only failed to consult the statute of limitations before filing claim, but also did not withdraw the complaint or respond to the s

1998Co. of Hartford, 100 F.3d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir.1996) (awarding Rule 11 sanctions after noting that law "has long been settled” as to the applicable limitations period and that all claims were barred “when [plaintiff] brought suit, as [defendant's] counsel pointed out several times before and after [plaintiff] filed the action”). 5 .

1998Plaintiffs and their counsel should have known there was no valid defamation claim before the filing of the first complaint.”), and McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F.Supp. 835, 838 (D.Utah 1989) ("The court concludes a reasonable inquiry into the law would have shown [plaintiff's] claim was time-barred and the statute of limitations is constitutionally sound.”), with Poag v. Humane Soc’y of Lawton, 907 F.Supp. 1487, 1489 (W.D.Okla.1995) (noting that plaintiff not only failed to consult the statute of limitations before filing claim, but also did not withdraw the complaint or respond to the s

1997Co. v. Petersen, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866 , 865 P.2d 957, 961 (1993) (noting the Idaho legislature has specifically barred the rule); Witt v. Jones & Jones Law Offices, P.C., 269 Ill.App.3d 540 , 206 Ill.Dec. 891, 894 , 646 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1995) (failing to find a case adopting the rule in Illinois and noting the Illinois Supreme Court’s rejection of the continuing course of treatment doctrine “suggests the court is not ready to adopt a continuous representation rule” for legal malpractice claims); Zero Mfg.

1997Co. v. Petersen, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866 , 865 P.2d 957, 961 (1993) (noting the Idaho legislature has specifically barred the rule); Witt v. Jones & Jones Law Offices, P.C., 269 Ill.App.3d 540 , 206 Ill.Dec. 891, 894 , 646 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1995) (failing to find a case adopting the rule in Illinois and noting the Illinois Supreme Court’s rejection of the continuing course of treatment doctrine “suggests the court is not ready to adopt a continuous representation rule” for legal malpractice claims); Zero Mfg.