statute of limitations defense in Maryland

2020The Court of Appeals has suggested that the statute of limitations defense is distinct, because that defense does not “arise out of the wrongdoing itself” but rather “depends on litigation procedures transpiring after the wrongdoing has occurred.” Id. (quoting Valk, 317 Md. at 198 n.16).

2020The Court of Appeals has suggested that the statute of limitations defense is distinct, because that defense does not “arise out of the wrongdoing itself” but rather “depends on litigation procedures transpiring after the wrongdoing has occurred.” Id. (quoting Valk, 317 Md. at 198 n.16).

2003To this, the Court of Appeals has stated: “whether or not the plaintiffs failure to discover his cause of action was due to failure on his part to use due diligence, or to the fact that defendant so concealed the wrong that plaintiff was unable to discover it by the exercise of due diligence, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” Id. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (quoting O’Hara, supra, 305 Md. at 294-95 , 503 A.2d 1313 (citations and internal quotations omitted)); see also Doe v. Archdiocese of Wash., 114 Md.App. 169, 176 , 689 A.2d 634 (1997) (“When the viability of a statute of limitations

2003P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 98 , 756 A.2d 963 (2000)("Fraud perpetrated by an adverse party may ... serve to postpone the accrual date of a cause of action”); CJ § 5-203 (“If the knowledge of a cause of action is kept from a party by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered the fraud”). 18 .

2022The Court also took care to point out the same distinction in Spangler III. 449 Md. at 44 .25 Ms. Grier also argues that parent-child immunity is inapplicable in this case because, after Michaelangelo’s death, “there [was] no longer any parental right to be exercised.” However, in Smith v. Gross, the parental relationship between the father and the child ended when the child died as a result of the parent’s negligence.

2022The Court continued “[t]hus, the wrongful death statute’s requirement of an act ‘which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued’ barred the wrongful death claims in those instances.” Id. (quoting Smith, 319 Md. at 144 ).

2015Id. at 485-86 , 325 A.2d 592 .

2015Id. at 485-86 , 325 A.2d 592 .

2014In other words, the governmental plaintiff, in seeking to enforce a contract right or some right belonging to it in a proprietary sense, may be defeated by the statute of limitations, but as to rights belonging to the public and pertaining purely to governmental affairs, and in respect of which the political subdivision represents the public at large or the state, the exemption in favor of sovereignty applies, and the statute of limitations does not operate as a bar.” 260 Md. at 358-59 , 272 A.2d at 401 .

2014In other words, the governmental plaintiff, in seeking to enforce a contract right or some right belonging to it in a proprietary sense, may be defeated by the statute of limitations, but as to rights belonging to the public and pertaining purely to governmental affairs, and in respect of which the political subdivision represents the public at large or the state, the exemption in favor of sovereignty applies, and the statute of limitations does not operate as a bar.” 260 Md. at 358-59 , 272 A.2d at 401 .

2014In Gloyd v. Talbott, 221 Md. 179 , 156 A.2d 665 (1959), a taxpayer brought suit in equity, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers, seeking a declaratory decree that certain *589 payments of money from municipal funds to certain individuals were illegal and ultra vires.

2014In Gloyd v. Talbott, 221 Md. 179 , 156 A.2d 665 (1959), a taxpayer brought suit in equity, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers, seeking a declaratory decree that certain *589 payments of money from municipal funds to certain individuals were illegal and ultra vires.

2013Light & Power Co., 146 Md. 390 , 126 A. 105 (1924) (no privity of contract between decedent and manufacturer). 6 Those defenses are distinguishable from a statute of limitations defense, however, because, where those defenses apply, the decedent did not have a viable claim from the outset.

2013Light & Power Co., 146 Md. 390 , 126 A. 105 (1924) (no privity of contract between decedent and manufacturer). 6 Those defenses are distinguishable from a statute of limitations defense, however, because, where those defenses apply, the decedent did not have a viable claim from the outset.

2013See Cunninghame, 364 Md. at 300 , 772 A.2d 1188 (describing factors to be considered in order to determine whether a personal representative of an estate can be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense on a claim); Crane, 194 Md. at 50 , 69 A.2d 903 (holding that the supplier to a contractor was estopped from asserting that a homeowner violated the Mechanic’s Lien law by not paying the supplier for materials when the supplier told the homeowner to pay the contractor directly).

2013See Cunninghame, 364 Md. at 300 , 772 A.2d 1188 (describing factors to be considered in order to determine whether a personal representative of an estate can be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense on a claim); Crane, 194 Md. at 50 , 69 A.2d 903 (holding that the supplier to a contractor was estopped from asserting that a homeowner violated the Mechanic’s Lien law by not paying the supplier for materials when the supplier told the homeowner to pay the contractor directly).

2010Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code § 5 - 101 states: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues[.]” We have previously held that “The legislative policies] underlying statutes of limitation include the encouragement of promptness in instituting actions, the suppression of stale claims ... and most of all, the providing of the elements of fairness to defendants.” Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.App. 202, 206 , 422 A.2d 389 (1980).

2010Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code § 5 - 101 states: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues[.]” We have previously held that “The legislative policies] underlying statutes of limitation include the encouragement of promptness in instituting actions, the suppression of stale claims ... and most of all, the providing of the elements of fairness to defendants.” Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.App. 202, 206 , 422 A.2d 389 (1980).

2010Id. at 644 , 962 A.2d at 1067 .

2010Id. at 644 , 962 A.2d at 1067 .

2005As the Sheff Court recently explained, 382 Md. at 244 , 854 A.2d 1269 : Like any other issue that is fact-dependent, if there is any genuine dispute of material fact as to when the plaintiffs possessed that degree of knowledge, the issue is one for the trier of fact to resolve; summary judgment is inappropriate.

2005As the Sheff Court recently explained, 382 Md. at 244 , 854 A.2d 1269 : Like any other issue that is fact-dependent, if there is any genuine dispute of material fact as to when the plaintiffs possessed that degree of knowledge, the issue is one for the trier of fact to resolve; summary judgment is inappropriate.

2003DISCUSSION Statute of Limitations In Maryland, a three-year statute of limitations applies to legal malpractice actions pursuant to § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. (“C.J.”) Fairfax Savings, F.S.B. v. Weinberg & Green, 112 Md.App. 587, 612 , 685 A.2d 1189 (1996).

2003DISCUSSION Statute of Limitations In Maryland, a three-year statute of limitations applies to legal malpractice actions pursuant to § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. (“C.J.”) Fairfax Savings, F.S.B. v. Weinberg & Green, 112 Md.App. 587, 612 , 685 A.2d 1189 (1996).

1999A defendant can raise a statute of limitations defense by a Rule 2-322 motion; yet, because of the 1984 rule change, procedurally, the statute of limitations defense does not apply, and the “[pjroblems which might be caused by a lapse of time between filing and ultimate service are specifically handled by *655 Rule 2-507.” Reed, 62 Md.App. at 237 n. 1, 488 A.2d 1016 .

1999A defendant can raise a statute of limitations defense by a Rule 2-322 motion; yet, because of the 1984 rule change, procedurally, the statute of limitations defense does not apply, and the “[pjroblems which might be caused by a lapse of time between filing and ultimate service are specifically handled by *655 Rule 2-507.” Reed, 62 Md.App. at 237 n. 1, 488 A.2d 1016 .

1998As this Court found in Prande v. Bell, 105 Md.App. 636 , 660 A.2d 1055 (1995), I believe the circumstances surrounding this case generate a question of fact.

1998As this Court found in Prande v. Bell, 105 Md.App. 636 , 660 A.2d 1055 (1995), I believe the circumstances surrounding this case generate a question of fact.

1997Id.; O’Hara, 305 Md. at 299, 503 A.2d 1313 ; Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md.App. 646, 664 , 639 A.2d 147 (1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 (1995). “ ‘Depending upon the nature of the assertions being made with respect to the limitations plea, th[e] determination [of whether the action is barred] may be solely one of law, solely one of fact or one of law and fact.’ ” Lombardi, 108 Md.App. at 711 , 673 A.2d 762 (quoting Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981)). *179 II.

1997Id.; O’Hara, 305 Md. at 299, 503 A.2d 1313 ; Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md.App. 646, 664 , 639 A.2d 147 (1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 (1995). “ ‘Depending upon the nature of the assertions being made with respect to the limitations plea, th[e] determination [of whether the action is barred] may be solely one of law, solely one of fact or one of law and fact.’ ” Lombardi, 108 Md.App. at 711 , 673 A.2d 762 (quoting Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981)). *179 II.