48 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Longhibler v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. 2012) (statute of limitations waived where not pleaded by defendant as an affirmative defense); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Mo. 2012) (noting that “[a] defendant who does not raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court waives the right to assert that defense”; citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. 1992)); Williams v. City of Kansas City, 641 S.W.3d 302 , 329 n. 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (en banc) (holding that “‘the timely filing requirement [for administrative complaints under § 213.075.1] is subject to th 2016Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 910-11 (Mo. banc 1992) (in which our supreme court ruled that a statute-of-limitations defense, which is non-jurisdictional, raised in a post-conviction motion to set aside a sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain had been waived by the defendant’s guilty plea; as an affirmative defense, it must be raised at the earliest opportunity or, at the latest, before conviction or plea)). | 4 | 4 |
Bateman v. Platte Countygreen2 sentences2024See Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. 2012) (statute of limitations waived where not pleaded by defendant as an affirmative defense); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Mo. 2012) (noting that “[a] defendant who does not raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court waives the right to assert that defense”; citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. 1992)); Williams v. City of Kansas City, 641 S.W.3d 302 , 329 n. 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (en banc) (holding that “‘the timely filing requirement [for administrative complaints under § 213.075.1] is subject to th 2017Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. banc 2012). | 2 | 2 |
Dorris v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. 2012) (statute of limitations waived where not pleaded by defendant as an affirmative defense); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Mo. 2012) (noting that “[a] defendant who does not raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court waives the right to assert that defense”; citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. 1992)); Williams v. City of Kansas City, 641 S.W.3d 302 , 329 n. 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (en banc) (holding that “‘the timely filing requirement [for administrative complaints under § 213.075.1] is subject to th 2016Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 910-11 (Mo. banc 1992) (in which our supreme court ruled that a statute-of-limitations defense, which is non-jurisdictional, raised in a post-conviction motion to set aside a sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain had been waived by the defendant’s guilty plea; as an affirmative defense, it must be raised at the earliest opportunity or, at the latest, before conviction or plea)). | 2 | 2 |
Weiss v. Rojanasathitgreen2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. . | 1 | 3 |
Reynolds v. Carter Countygreen2 sentences2012In Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257, 261 (1914), this Court held that one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations “must plead the very provision on which he depends.’ ” Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.1974); see also Reynolds v. Carter County, 323 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo.App.2010); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buie, 758 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App.1988). 2011“The trial court ha[s] no obligation to rule on a defense that was not raised.” Reynolds, 323 S.W.3d at 452 . | 1 | 2 |
Bauldin v. Barton County Mutual Ins. Co.green2 sentences1993Co., 666 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Mo.App.1984) referring to § 380.830 R.S.Mo. the predecessor to § 380.551, R.S.Mo.1986, where the plaintiff could assert a waiver by producing a written instrument from the mutual company which, “specifically waived the statute of limitations defense.” In this case, the parties have produced the written document showing Volini waived the defense with the approval of the insurance company. 1992Co., 666 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.App.1984), the court affirmed an order which permitted insurer to raise a statute of limitations defense because § 380.551 RSMo 1986 (formerly § 380.830) requires a defense to be expressly waived in writing. | 1 | 2 |
Rebecca J. Davison v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.green1 sentence2025Davison v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 449 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schnakenberggreen1 sentence2024See Bateman v. Platte Cnty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. 2012) (statute of limitations waived where not pleaded by defendant as an affirmative defense); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Mo. 2012) (noting that “[a] defendant who does not raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court waives the right to assert that defense”; citing Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. 1992)); Williams v. City of Kansas City, 641 S.W.3d 302 , 329 n. 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (en banc) (holding that “‘the timely filing requirement [for administrative complaints under § 213.075.1] is subject to th | 1 | 1 |
Sheehan v. Sheehangreen1 sentence2022Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. banc. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Empiregas, Inc. of Palmyra v. Zinngreen2 sentences2020“The doctrine of laches is the equitable counterpart of the statute of limitations defense.” Empiregas, Inc. of Palmyra v. Zinn, 833 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). 2020“Its purpose is to avoid unfairness which can result from the prosecution of stale claims.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Hall-Bouldin v. Bouldingreen1 sentence2020See Hall- Bouldin v. Bouldin, 497 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (applying the statute of limitations claim to a claim for equitable relief that was based on the underlying claim of fraud). | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Amanda N. Bazellgreen2 sentences2020In his two separate claims, Barber argues that the court erred in denying his motion because plea counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to both advise Barber of the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263 (Mo. banc 2016), and use Bazell to raise a statute-of-limitations defense to the original charge of stealing; and (2) failing to object to the State’s filing of an amended information charging him with receiving stolen property in that the limitations period for that offense had expired and was not tolled by the original charge. 2020Bazell, 497 S.W.3d at 267 , 267 n.4 (holding that the defendant’s offenses “cannot be enhanced to felonies by the terms of section 570.030.3” (emphasis added) and refusing to alter her felony stealing convictions to misdemeanors because she had not requested that relief below). 6 I do not believe that counsel can be deemed ineffective for failing to rely on Bazell, alone, to support a statute-of-limitations defense because, at the time the State filed the charge, stealing under the facts in Barber’s case was considered a class C felony, and Bazell did not address the applicable statute of limi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scottgreen1 sentence2019See Scott, 437 U.S. at 99 (holding that where a defendant prevails on a midtrial motion to dismiss on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence, it is not improper to terminate the proceedings on those grounds, and "a defendant [who] prevails on such a motion [] [takes] the risk that an appellate court will reverse the trial court" requiring a new trial). | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri ex rel. Bob T. Beisly II, Relator v. The Honorable Timothy Perigogreen1 sentence2019Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Mo. banc 2015) (holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented a defendant from applying a statute of limitations defense under § 537.100 for actions fraudulently concealed). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. School District of Claytongreen1 sentence2017Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Mo. banc 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. BIEGELgreen2 sentences2016Id. 2016A recent example from the court of appeals is Lewis v. Biegel, 364 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Mo.App.2012), In Lewis , the court held that a defendant who failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense in her motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence failed to preserve the issue for a motion for JNOV and appeal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moselygreen2 sentences2016No lesser-included offense instruction was given to the jury other than the mistaken verdict director noted above. 10 The verdict and sentence on count VII, which had been charged as a class A felony, were recorded as class A felony and twenty-four years, respectively. 11 *229 As Mr. Webber concedes, “[t]he failure of a defendant to raise a statute of limitations defense results in the waiver of that defense, and a defendant ‘is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.’ ” (citing State v. Cotton, 295 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). 2016The Eastern District noted in Cotton that this requirement is supported by “sound reasoning.” Id. at 491 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grahamgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., State v. Graham, 149 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (considering whether trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss based on running of limitations period, court reverses ruling). | 1 | 1 |
Arbutina v. Bahuleyangreen2 sentences2015Id 3 Several states have cited Glus’ equitable estoppel principles to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in wrongful death actions when that defendant has committed fraud to conceal his or her actions. 4 See Arbutina v. Bahuleyan, 75 A.D.2d 84, 86 , 428 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1980) (acknowledging the well-recognized legal principle- that, when a defendant, by a deception, has caused a plaintiff to delay suit on a known cause of action until the statute of limitations has run, the courts will apply the doctrine of estoppel to prevent an inequitable use 2015Id 3 Several states have cited Glus’ equitable estoppel principles to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in wrongful death actions when that defendant has committed fraud to conceal his or her actions. 4 See Arbutina v. Bahuleyan, 75 A.D.2d 84, 86 , 428 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1980) (acknowledging the well-recognized legal principle- that, when a defendant, by a deception, has caused a plaintiff to delay suit on a known cause of action until the statute of limitations has run, the courts will apply the doctrine of estoppel to prevent an inequitable use | 1 | 1 |
Knisely v. Leathegreen2 sentences2012In Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257, 261 (1914), this Court held that one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations “must plead the very provision on which he depends.’ ” Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.1974); see also Reynolds v. Carter County, 323 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo.App.2010); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buie, 758 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App.1988). 2012In Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257, 261 (1914), this Court held that one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations “must plead the very provision on which he depends.’ ” Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.1974); see also Reynolds v. Carter County, 323 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo.App.2010); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buie, 758 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buiegreen1 sentence2012In Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257, 261 (1914), this Court held that one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations “must plead the very provision on which he depends.’ ” Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.1974); see also Reynolds v. Carter County, 323 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo.App.2010); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buie, 758 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlockgreen1 sentence2012In Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257, 261 (1914), this Court held that one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations “must plead the very provision on which he depends.’ ” Modine Manufacturing Company v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.1974); see also Reynolds v. Carter County, 323 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo.App.2010); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Buie, 758 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Robert E. Askins v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Charles T. Walsh and Bowe, Walsh & Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jack B. Karlingreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James R. Gallup, United States of America v. Darryl E. Dukegreen1 sentence2009United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-3 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir.1991); People v. Williams, 79 Ill.App.3d 806 , 35 Ill.Dec. 63 , 398 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1979); see also, Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C.Cir.1958). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Louis A. Arkygreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2009United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-3 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir.1991); People v. Williams, 79 Ill.App.3d 806 , 35 Ill.Dec. 63 , 398 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1979); see also, Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C.Cir.1958). 2009United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-3 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir.1991); People v. Williams, 79 Ill.App.3d 806 , 35 Ill.Dec. 63 , 398 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1979); see also, Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C.Cir.1958). | 1 | 1 |
| Natalini v. Littlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'GRADY v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mason v. Gerin Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Vee Jay Cementgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Centerre Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Distributors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Heintz v. Swimmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Humane Society v. Boshersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Leisuregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Snow v. Hicks Bros. Chevrolet, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Elmore v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beck v. Pillagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Passleyred1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Passley, 389 S.W.3d 180, 184 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012), abrogated by Bazell, 497 S.W.3d at 267 n.3. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rose v. City of Riverside
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2006The court concluded that “[i]t would be an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow the respondent to amend its answer to include a statute of limitations defense” where the plaintiffs were “well aware the defense existed.” Id. | 4 | 1997–2015 |
Dice v. Darling
green
1 sentence2024MAWC and Travelers also rely on Dice, 974 S.W.2d at 645 , a paternity case, in which appellants claimed respondent had waived the statute of limitations defense by submitting to a blood test, The Court disagreed and found that the trial court did not err in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss because appellants did not point to anything in the record, including the blood test, which showed a clear, unequivocal waiver of the defense. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Keehn v. Ruzicka Electric & Sons, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 389 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Davis v. Laclede Gas Co.
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Medicine Shoppe International, Inc. v. Director of Revenue
green
1 sentence2015Id. 3 Several states have cited Glus’ equitable estoppel principles to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in wrongful death actions when that defendant has committed fraud to conceal his or her actions. 4 See Arbutina v. Bahuleyan, 75 A.D.2d 84, 86 (1980) (acknowledging the well-recognized legal principle that, when a defendant, by a deception, has caused a plaintiff to delay suit 3 Judge Russell’s dissenting opinion cites Weiss as an example of this Court’s judicial restraint in strictly construing a statute of limitations by deferring to t | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Cook green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Larry K. Billings v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Department of Social Services v. Clarence Nursing Home District green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ostermueller v. Potter green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Killian v. J & J INSTALLERS, INC. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Southern Cross Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Becker green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.