statute of limitations defense in Utah

2018"To the extent that the statute of limitations analysis involves subsidiary factual determinations, we review those factual determinations using a clearly erroneous standard." Id. (quotation simplified).

2018Store does not claim that the circumstances of this case involve any sort of "misnomer," but it does assert that Insurance Company shares an "identity of interest" with Employee. ¶16 In order to prevail on such an argument, Store must establish both (1) that its "amended pleading allege[s] only claims that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading," and (2) that Insurance Company, as the party to be added by the amendment, "received (actual or constructive) notice that it would have been a proper party to the original p

2026See Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) (“The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318, ¶ 22 , 263 P.3d 540 (holding that “a statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional and that it can be waived” (cleaned up)); James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“In civil cases, a statute of limitations must be pleaded as an affirmative defense, or it is waived.” (cleaned up)). ¶28 Because we previously aff

2026See Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) (“The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318, ¶ 22 , 263 P.3d 540 (holding that “a statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional and that it can be waived” (cleaned up)); James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“In civil cases, a statute of limitations must be pleaded as an affirmative defense, or it is waived.” (cleaned up)). ¶28 Because we previously aff

2015This "calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109-10 , 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). $17 Jackson has not overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel's waiver, of the statute-of-limitations defense might be considered sound, trial strategy.

2015This "calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109-10 , 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). $17 Jackson has not overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel's waiver, of the statute-of-limitations defense might be considered sound, trial strategy.

2015Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 287 , 148, 239 P.3d 308 (quoting Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 854 , 140, 101 P.3d 371 ) (applying the identity-of-interest test to a plaintiff who sought to add an additional defendant).

2010Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354 , ¶40 P.3d 371; see also Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 906 (discussing the requirements for an amendment to relate back to the original pleading); Penrose, 2003 UT App 157, ¶9 , 71 P.3d 631 (discussing amendments that add parties).

2014However, "Itlo the extent that the statute of limitations analysis involves 'subsidiary factual determination[s], we review those factual determinations using 'a clearly erroneous standard.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ¶ 32 , 44 P.3d 742 ). {15 Two possible statutes apply to this dispute.

2014However, "Itlo the extent that the statute of limitations analysis involves 'subsidiary factual determination[s], we review those factual determinations using 'a clearly erroneous standard.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ¶ 32 , 44 P.3d 742 ). {15 Two possible statutes apply to this dispute.

2014Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354 , ¶40 P.3d 371; see also Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 906 (discussing the requirements for an amendment to relate back to the original pleading); Penrose, 2003 UT App 157, ¶9 , 71 P.3d 631 (discussing amendments that add parties).

2013Under these circumstances, D.M.'s complaint of unfair surprise that he was ultimately adjudicated for sexual abuse of a child is unavailing. 4 Cf. State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 44 , 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing "sandbagging" in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318, ¶¶ 28-34 , 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant's failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time-barred offense).

2013However, because we hold that the juvenile court had already amended Allegation III to charge (continued...) 20120085‐CA 4 2013 UT App 220 In re D.M. 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing “sandbagging” in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318 , ¶¶ 28–34, 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant’s failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time‐barred offense). ¶9 D.M. further argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the crime of sexual abuse of a child because the State did no

2026Instead, we need only articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel’s behavior.” Jackson v. State, 2015 UT App 217, ¶ 16 , 359 P.3d 659 (cleaned up). ¶14 Hart argues Counsel’s actions were deficient because Counsel “did not [forgo] raising the statute of limitations defense based on ‘a sound trial strategy.’” 7 He cites Counsel’s motion to arrest judgment wherein Counsel attributed the failure to move to dismiss the two charges earlier to “not catch[ing] the . . . argument prior to this case going before a jury.” “However, even where an omission is inadvertent and not due to a pu

2026Instead, we need only articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel’s behavior.” Jackson v. State, 2015 UT App 217, ¶ 16 , 359 P.3d 659 (cleaned up). ¶14 Hart argues Counsel’s actions were deficient because Counsel “did not [forgo] raising the statute of limitations defense based on ‘a sound trial strategy.’” 7 He cites Counsel’s motion to arrest judgment wherein Counsel attributed the failure to move to dismiss the two charges earlier to “not catch[ing] the . . . argument prior to this case going before a jury.” “However, even where an omission is inadvertent and not due to a pu

2026Faced with this reality, Counsel reasonably could have “consciously refrain[ed] from asserting a statute-of-limitations 20240525-CA 10 2026 UT App 40 State v. Hart defense to a charge with lesser penalties [because] the evidence [wa]s strong and the risk of conviction on a greater offense with higher penalties [wa]s likely.” Id. ¶26 Accordingly, we conclude Counsel’s failure to raise the statute of limitations defense against the harmful dealing charges was objectively reasonable and was, therefore, not deficient performance.

2026Faced with this reality, Counsel reasonably could have “consciously refrain[ed] from asserting a statute-of-limitations 20240525-CA 10 2026 UT App 40 State v. Hart defense to a charge with lesser penalties [because] the evidence [wa]s strong and the risk of conviction on a greater offense with higher penalties [wa]s likely.” Id. ¶26 Accordingly, we conclude Counsel’s failure to raise the statute of limitations defense against the harmful dealing charges was objectively reasonable and was, therefore, not deficient performance.

2025Rather, in its December 4, 2014 letter, the City acknowledged that “as of the date of [that] letter, [CBS’s] [s]ign ha[d] been demolished,” yet it told CBS in writing that it could “modify its application to either (a) bank the billboard credits for the now demolished [s]ign . . . or (b) request to relocate the [s]ign under Utah Code [section] 10-9a- 511(3)(c)(i).” Then in its December 18, 2014 letter, the City referenced the earlier letter and again wrote that if CBS “prefer[red] to modify its application to either bank its billboard credits . . . or request to relocate the sign under Utah Co

2024Their position is essentially that the district court, by awarding title of the Station to JMF based on a statute of limitations defense, allowed JMF to receive ownership __________________________________________________________ 53 See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, ¶ 51 , 1 P.3d 1095 (noting that “the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party”). 54 See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (declining to award attorney fees to a pro se litigant because it would “give[] rise to the danger of creat

2024Their position is essentially that the district court, by awarding title of the Station to JMF based on a statute of limitations defense, allowed JMF to receive ownership __________________________________________________________ 53 See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, ¶ 51 , 1 P.3d 1095 (noting that “the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party”). 54 See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (declining to award attorney fees to a pro se litigant because it would “give[] rise to the danger of creat

2024Their position is essentially that the district court, by awarding title of the Station to JMF based on a statute of limitations defense, allowed JMF to receive ownership __________________________________________________________ 53 See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, ¶ 51 , 1 P.3d 1095 (noting that “the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party”). 54 See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (declining to award attorney fees to a pro se litigant because it would “give[] rise to the danger of creat

2024Their position is essentially that the district court, by awarding title of the Station to JMF based on a statute of limitations defense, allowed JMF to receive ownership __________________________________________________________ 53 See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, ¶ 51 , 1 P.3d 1095 (noting that “the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party”). 54 See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996) (declining to award attorney fees to a pro se litigant because it would “give[] rise to the danger of creat

2023The court’s written ruling made no specific mention of Taylor’s desired “good faith” defense. 20200808-CA 32 2023 UT App 81 In re Harding Trust ¶73 In his appellate brief, Taylor does not engage with the trial court’s reasoning, and provides no specific response to the court’s conclusion that his motion was untimely and his delay was unjustified.

2021See Ghidotti v. Waldron, 2019 UT App 67, ¶ 8 , 442 P.3d 1237 (rules of civil procedure); Heughs Land, LLC v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App 202, ¶ 5 , 113 P.3d 1024 (ripeness).

2021See Ghidotti v. Waldron, 2019 UT App 67, ¶ 8 , 442 P.3d 1237 (rules of civil procedure); Heughs Land, LLC v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App 202, ¶ 5 , 113 P.3d 1024 (ripeness).

2021Compare Rice, 456 P.2d at 5 We do not, however, intend to undermine the important purposes served by statutes of limitations, which include ―preventing unfair litigation such as ‗surprise or ambush claims, fictitious and fraudulent claims, and stale claims.‘‖ Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ¶ 27 , 193 P.3d 86 (quoting Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, ¶ 22 , 993 P.2d 207 ). 8 Cite as: 2021 UT 34 Opinion for of the Court 163 , with Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 23 , 223 P.3d 1128 (stating that ―the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should

2021Compare Rice, 456 P.2d at 5 We do not, however, intend to undermine the important purposes served by statutes of limitations, which include ―preventing unfair litigation such as ‗surprise or ambush claims, fictitious and fraudulent claims, and stale claims.‘‖ Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ¶ 27 , 193 P.3d 86 (quoting Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, ¶ 22 , 993 P.2d 207 ). 8 Cite as: 2021 UT 34 Opinion for of the Court 163 , with Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 23 , 223 P.3d 1128 (stating that ―the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should

2021Compare Rice, 456 P.2d at 5 We do not, however, intend to undermine the important purposes served by statutes of limitations, which include ―preventing unfair litigation such as ‗surprise or ambush claims, fictitious and fraudulent claims, and stale claims.‘‖ Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ¶ 27 , 193 P.3d 86 (quoting Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, ¶ 22 , 993 P.2d 207 ). 8 Cite as: 2021 UT 34 Opinion for of the Court 163 , with Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 23 , 223 P.3d 1128 (stating that ―the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should