statute of limitations defense in Virginia

2024Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 547 (1989) (same); Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 85 (1980) (same).10 “Two such extraordinary circumstances that have 10 The elements of equitable estoppel must be proven “by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.” Boykins, 221 Va. at 86 .

2024Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 547 (1989) (same); Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 85 (1980) (same).10 “Two such extraordinary circumstances that have 10 The elements of equitable estoppel must be proven “by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.” Boykins, 221 Va. at 86 .

2025See Code § 8.01-235; Jones v. Jones, 249 Va. 565, 571-72 (1995).

2025See Code § 8.01-235; Jones v. Jones, 249 Va. 565, 571-72 (1995).

2024Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 547 (1989) (same); Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 85 (1980) (same).10 “Two such extraordinary circumstances that have 10 The elements of equitable estoppel must be proven “by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.” Boykins, 221 Va. at 86 .

2003Accord Luddeke, 239 Va. at 208 (affirming a circuit court’s denial of an equitable estoppel claim where the only evidence before the trial court tending to show that the respondents had lulled the complainants into inaction was plaintiffs testimony that defendant’s agent led plaintiff to believe that defendant was “working on taking care of the problem” and that “very likely ... they would replace the system.”), and Westminster Invest Corp. v. Lamps Unltd., 237 Va. 543 , 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989) (evidence that landlord gave “continued assurances that it would take appropriate measures” to correct

2004While this lack of clarity could present an obstacle to our analysis had more than two years passed since the treatment at issue, see Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 316-17 , 455 S.E.2d 9, 12-13 (1995), it does not appear to be an issue for purposes of the statute of limitations analysis since the time period between the treatment and death was less than two years.

2004While this lack of clarity could present an obstacle to our analysis had more than two years passed since the treatment at issue, see Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 316-17 , 455 S.E.2d 9, 12-13 (1995), it does not appear to be an issue for purposes of the statute of limitations analysis since the time period between the treatment and death was less than two years.

2002Furthermore, an "employer is not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense merely because it voluntarily paid (1) medical bills, (2) wages, or (3) benefits." Strong v. Old Dominion Power Co., 35 Va. App. 119, 125 , 543 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2001) (citations omitted).

2002Furthermore, an "employer is not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense merely because it voluntarily paid (1) medical bills, (2) wages, or (3) benefits." Strong v. Old Dominion Power Co., 35 Va. App. 119, 125 , 543 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2001) (citations omitted).

2024The statute-of-limitations bar is “absolute . . . unless under certain extraordinary circumstances . . . the positive and plain requirements of an equitable estoppel preclude its application.” Brunswick Land Corp. v. Perkinson, 153 Va. 603, 608 (1930); see also Westminster Inv.

1995Also see Brunswick Corp. v. Perkinson, 153 Va. 603 (1930): “In order that the time during which a former action while pending may be available in repelling the statute in a subsequent case between die parties, if accordingly appears that die cause of action in die two cases must be substantially identical.” Brunswick at 611, upholding a statute of limitations bar where the cause of action was held to be different Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902 (W.D.

2019In Espinola, we noted that [a] claimant can meet the statutory standard either “by establishing actual causation or aggravation of the disease or by showing that employer is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense if [appellant] provides unequivocal evidence that she refrained from filing . . . because employer misrepresented or concealed material facts,” and 3) when the doctrine of “imposition” applies, which “requires a threshold showing of unfairness: ‘[t]he doctrine focuses on an employer’s or the [C]ommission’s use of superior knowledge of or experience with the Workers

2007With specific regard to estoppel, “the employer is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense if the claimant provides unequivocal evidence that she refrained from filing a claim because employer misrepresented or concealed material facts.” Tuck, 47 Va. App. at 284 , 623 S.E.2d at 437 (citations omitted).

2007Prior to the time that the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a statute of limitations defense is not a bar to a plea of recoupment, Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. at 79-80, 540 S.E.2d at 497-98 . the Court held that “a defense of recoupment is not barred by the. statute of limitations so long as the main action out of which the claim arose is timely.” City of Richmond, 205 Va. at 926 , 140 S.E.2d at 688 (emphasis added).

2004With this background, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that “a plea of recoupment under Code § 8.01-422 is not subject to a statute of limitations defense.” Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 80 , 540 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2001).

2025Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)).

2025The district court explained that “dismissal of the complaint because of a statute of limitations defense is ‘rare,’ and it should only occur if the time bar ‘clearly appears on the face of the complaint.’” Id. at *14 (first quoting Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007); and then quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R.

2024Corp., II, 276 Va. 108, 116-17 (2008) (“The purpose of a plea in bar is to ‘reduc[e litigation] to a distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.’” (alteration in original) 9 “A final order or decree for the purposes of Rule 1:1 ‘is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated . . . and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order.’” Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 538 (2018) (quoting de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 436-37 (2009)).

2024Corp., II, 276 Va. 108, 116-17 (2008) (“The purpose of a plea in bar is to ‘reduc[e litigation] to a distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.’” (alteration in original) 9 “A final order or decree for the purposes of Rule 1:1 ‘is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated . . . and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order.’” Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 538 (2018) (quoting de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 436-37 (2009)).

2024When misjoinder occurs, the proper party cannot “be substituted for [the improper party] under the concept of correcting a misnomer.” Id. at 559 (quoting Swann v. Marks, 252 Va. 181, 184 (1996)).

2024Corp., II, 276 Va. 108, 116-17 (2008) (“The purpose of a plea in bar is to ‘reduc[e litigation] to a distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.’” (alteration in original) 9 “A final order or decree for the purposes of Rule 1:1 ‘is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated . . . and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order.’” Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 538 (2018) (quoting de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 436-37 (2009)).

2023But as noted earlier, see supra at 8, courts must not “conflate the threshold standing inquiry with the merits of [a litigant’s] claim.” Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2009).

2021“Consequently, our review is limited to a determination whether the commission’s interpretation of its own rule was reasonable.” Classic Floors, Inc. v. Guy, 9 Va. App. 90, 93 (1989). - 10 - Here, the Workers’ Compensation Commission concluded: In its written statement on review, the Pharmacy argues the defendant did not comply with the notice requirements of Section 65.2-605.1(B), and was therefore barred from asserting a Statute of Limitations defense.

2017See generally Haywood v. Massie , 188 Va. 176 , 182, 49 S.E.2d 281 , 284 (1948) ("Generally speaking, there is a distinction between a nuisance and a trespass, although many things are sometimes called nuisances which are mere trespasses, and it has been said that an action for a nuisance which violates a property right incident to the ownership of land is in the nature of one for trespass to realty." (citation omitted)).

2017See generally Haywood v. Massie , 188 Va. 176 , 182, 49 S.E.2d 281 , 284 (1948) ("Generally speaking, there is a distinction between a nuisance and a trespass, although many things are sometimes called nuisances which are mere trespasses, and it has been said that an action for a nuisance which violates a property right incident to the ownership of land is in the nature of one for trespass to realty." (citation omitted)).

2015We find that applying the statute of limitations bar would not be in accord with the “humane and beneficent purposes of the act.” Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 336 , 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938).

2015We find that applying the statute of limitations bar would not be in accord with the “humane and beneficent purposes of the act.” Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 336 , 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938).

2014The problem with this argument is that a statute of limitations defense may be waived "before or after expiration of 10 the prescribed time limit." Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1943); see United States v. Hitachi America, Ltd., 172 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed.

2014The problem with this argument is that a statute of limitations defense may be waived "before or after expiration of 10 the prescribed time limit." Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1943); see United States v. Hitachi America, Ltd., 172 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed.