77 New Jersey opinions name it 4 courts 1882–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2025Pointing to Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 132 N.J. 109, 118-20 (1993), Manar argues David waived the statute of limitations defense. 2024See Williams v. Bell Telephone Lab., Inc., 132 N.J. 109, 119-20 (1993) (holding where a statute of limitations defense is included as an affirmative defense in a pleading but the defense was not raised until after the trial, the defense is effectively waived). | 6 | 10 |
Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.green2 sentences2023Upon restoration of an action, the initial filing date is the operative date for application of the statute of limitations. "[I]f a defendant could not raise the statute of limitations defense prior to dismissal of the complaint, it cannot do so at the time it is restored." Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J. 2002Upon compliance, however, the complaint would be restored without the break caused by the dismissal giving rise to a statute of limitations defense. [6] Id. at 268 , 558 A. 2d 851 . | 3 | 4 |
Wilson v. Wal-Mart Storesgreen2 sentences2022The doctrine is an equitable remedy that allows a plaintiff to "pursue a cause of action even after strict application of a statute of limitations would bar relief," Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 416 (2012), and it "provides that when an A-4168-19 22 individual experiences a 'continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases,'" Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 568 (2010) (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999)). 2019Under the doctrine, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until "a 'continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct . . . ceases.'" Roa, 200 N.J. at 566 (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999)). | 2 | 2 |
Roa v. Roagreen2 sentences2022The doctrine is an equitable remedy that allows a plaintiff to "pursue a cause of action even after strict application of a statute of limitations would bar relief," Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 416 (2012), and it "provides that when an A-4168-19 22 individual experiences a 'continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases,'" Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 568 (2010) (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999)). 2019As recognized in Cowell, a case involving claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the continuing violation doctrine is an equitable exception to the statute of limitations bar. 263 F.3d at 292; see also Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 566 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Estate of Kahngreen2 sentences1989The reason given is that "the action will ... revert to the pleadings in the status prevailing at the time of and just before the dismissal." Miller v. Estate of Kahn, 140 N.J. 1981Miller v. Estate of Kahn, 140 N.J.Super. 177, 182 (App.Div.1976). | 2 | 2 |
White v. Karlssongreen2 sentences2026That case involved a defendant who filed numerous affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, without any "possible basis in fact" and without conducting any discovery aimed to support a statute of limitations defense. 354 N.J. 2026In White, the defendant admitted "[s]he did not recognize the possibility of a statute-of-limitations defense until shortly before trial." Id. at 290 . | 1 | 4 |
Zaccardi v. Beckergreen2 sentences1998In Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 , 440 A.2d 1329 (1982), the Supreme Court, based upon the actions of both counsel, precluded defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 1998In Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 , 440 A.2d 1329 (1982), the Supreme Court, based upon the actions of both counsel, precluded defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 4 |
Rappeport v. Flitcroftgreen2 sentences2017Super. 385 , 387 n. 1 (App. Div. 2000) (finding that "a statute of limitations defense is sufficiently akin to failure to state a claim as to permit its disposition by way of a motion under [Rule] 4:6-2(e)" where the facts alleged in the complaint are not in dispute); Rappeport v. Flitcroft, 90 N.J. 2000See, e.g., O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 116 , 335 A. 2d 545 (1975); Rappeport v. Flitcroft, 90 N.J.Super. 578, 580-581 , 218 A. 2d 873 (App.Div.1966); Henry V. | 1 | 3 |
Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Centergreen2 sentences2026Citing Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center, 174 N.J. 1 (2002), the judge found plaintiff's claims based on Cosgrove's conduct from 2015 through July 2017 were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 2012See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 (2002) (recognizing exception to two-year statute of limitations applicable to hostile work environment claim in which employee demonstrates pattern of continuing violations); see also Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 431, 436-38 , 846 A.2d 596 (2004) (explaining that “[b]y definition, the continuing violation doctrine exposes a defendant to liability for acts that, standing alone, might have occurred outside the limitations period”). | 1 | 2 |
Mancini v. Township of Teaneckgreen2 sentences2021Laches "operates to bar a plaintiff from prosecuting all or part of an action based on acts occurring months or years earlier[.]" Mancini, 179 N.J. at 435 . "[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial [judge]." Id. at 436 (quoting Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1988)). 2021Laches "operates to bar a plaintiff from prosecuting all or part of an action based on acts occurring months or years earlier[.]" Mancini, 179 N.J. at 435 . "[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial [judge]." Id. at 436 (quoting Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1988)). | 1 | 2 |
Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Company (073248)green2 sentences2019And we do not agree that the Supreme Court's rejection of a statute of limitations defense to the Spill Act, Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co. , 220 N.J. 360 , 106 A.3d 1176 (2015), supports plaintiffs' position. 2019And we do not agree that the Supreme Court's rejection of a statute of limitations defense to the Spill Act, Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co. , 220 N.J. 360 , 106 A.3d 1176 (2015), supports plaintiffs' position. | 1 | 2 |
State v. United States Steel Corp.green2 sentences1978See State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 357-360 (1956); Annotation, "Promises to Settle or Perform as Estopping Reliance on Statute of Limitations," 44 A.L.R. 3d 482 , 488, 505-506 (1972); cf. Allen v. Evesham Tp. 1957It was decided to let the question of the validity of the statute of limitations defense in the custody case abide the outcome of State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341 (1956), where the identical issue was presented. | 1 | 2 |
Presslaff v. Robinsgreen1 sentence2026See Presslaff v. Robins, 168 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Millmangreen1 sentence2022The doctrine is an equitable remedy that allows a plaintiff to "pursue a cause of action even after strict application of a statute of limitations would bar relief," Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 416 (2012), and it "provides that when an A-4168-19 22 individual experiences a 'continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases,'" Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 568 (2010) (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Warren GARRETT, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee; Warren GARRETT, Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellantgreen1 sentence2021Laches "operates to bar a plaintiff from prosecuting all or part of an action based on acts occurring months or years earlier[.]" Mancini, 179 N.J. at 435 . "[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial [judge]." Id. at 436 (quoting Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Juzwiak v. Doegreen1 sentence2017We have treated claims alleging harassment as causes of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, Juzwiak v. Doe, 415 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Parete v. Mullygreen2 sentences2010See also Parete v. Mully, 316 N.J.Super. 100, 102-03 , 719 A. 2d 702 (App.Div.1998). 2010See also Parete v. Mully, 316 N.J.Super. 100, 102-03 , 719 A. 2d 702 (App.Div.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hartsfield v. Fantinigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Higa v. Mirikitanigreen | 1 | 1 |
| P.V.N. Acharya v. Carrollgreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'CONNOR v. Abraham Altusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. John Malasky, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Moors v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenshein v. Rosensheingreen | 1 | 1 |
| German v. Paulgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Muentnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prickett v. Allardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prickett v. Allardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tucker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trustgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. v. USM Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Redick v. Rohm & Haas Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lopez v. Swyer
green
2 sentences2010Typically, triggered by a defendant's motion for summary judgment or answer asserting a statute of limitations defense, the court will determine at a Lopez hearing prior to trial, when the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered that he or she had a cause of action. [6] Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 267 , 300 A. 2d 563 . 2010Typically, triggered by a defendant's motion for summary judgment or answer asserting a statute of limitations defense, the court will determine at a Lopez hearing prior to trial, when the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered that he or she had a cause of action. [6] Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 267 , 300 A. 2d 563 . | 3 | 1998–2019 |
Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Board of Education
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 104-05 . 1997Russo Farm,s, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 280 N.J.Super. 320, 327 , 655 A.2d 447 (App.Div.1995), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 144 N.J. 84 , 675 A.2d 1077 (1996). | 2 | 1997–2014 |
W v. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1998The Court accordingly considered whether DOT impliedly was obligated to “withhold a statute of limitations defense while its contractor cooperated in submitting a disputed claim to administrative review that DOT itself encouraged and subsequently controlled.” Id. at 560 , 562 A.2d 222 . 1998The Court accordingly considered whether DOT impliedly was obligated to “withhold a statute of limitations defense while its contractor cooperated in submitting a disputed claim to administrative review that DOT itself encouraged and subsequently controlled.” Id. at 560 , 562 A.2d 222 . | 2 | 1998–2005 |
Fernandi v. Strully
green
2 sentences1979Commencing with Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961), our Supreme Court has recognized the so-called "discovery" *337 rule exception to a strict statute of limitations defense. 1971Under the so-called "discovery rule" of Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961), for defendant to prevail on a statute of limitations defense it is not enough that a plaintiff knows of the injury for which claim is made as a residual of the purported offensive treatment, but he must know or have reason to know that such treatment was negligently administered. | 2 | 1971–1979 |
M'iver, Lessees v. Ragan
green
2 sentences1961In Veghte , Justice Magie quoted a meaningful sentence from an early opinion [ McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25 , 4 L.Ed. 175 ] by Chief Justice Marshall in a case involving what was claimed to be an inequitable result produced by a statute of limitations: "`If this difficulty be produced by the legislative power, the same power might provide a remedy, but courts cannot, on that account, insert in the statute of limitations an exception which the statute does not contain.'" ( 44 N.J.L., at p. 513 .) So it seems to me that, as a matter of broad principle, the majority has gone beyond the well estab 1961In Veghte , Justice Magie quoted a meaningful sentence from an early opinion [ McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25 , 4 L.Ed. 175 ] by Chief Justice Marshall in a case involving what was claimed to be an inequitable result produced by a statute of limitations: "`If this difficulty be produced by the legislative power, the same power might provide a remedy, but courts cannot, on that account, insert in the statute of limitations an exception which the statute does not contain.'" ( 44 N.J.L., at p. 513 .) So it seems to me that, as a matter of broad principle, the majority has gone beyond the well estab | 2 | 1882–1961 |
Shulas v. Estabrook
green
1 sentence2025The judge was required "to adequately explain, as required by R[ule] 1:7[-]4(a), why he permitted a voluntary dismissal . . . without imposing terms." Id. at 96 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
CKC CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Summit Bank
green
1 sentence2021Ass'n v. Summit Bank, 335 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co.
green
1 sentence2021Declining to follow the unpublished case plaintiffs provided, the motion judge cited 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144 (N.Y. 2002). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Price v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 528 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Freeman v. State
green
1 sentence2020Plaintiff contends "equitable tolling should be applied" because "a party should not be able to hide behind a statute of limitations defense when the lapse was due to the misconduct of the party asserting the defense," citing Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Pitney Bowes v. Baker Industries
green
2 sentences2015The Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a published decision. *369 In doing so, the panel acknowledged Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 277 N.J.Super. 484 , 649 A.2d 1325 (App. Div.1994), in which the Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-l.l’s ten-year statute of repose did not apply to bar a contribution action under the Spill Act, and that that reasoning had been applied in a 1999 unpublished decision to find a statute of limitations defense inapplicable to Spill Act contribution claims. 2015The Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a published decision. *369 In doing so, the panel acknowledged Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 277 N.J.Super. 484 , 649 A.2d 1325 (App. Div.1994), in which the Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-l.l’s ten-year statute of repose did not apply to bar a contribution action under the Spill Act, and that that reasoning had been applied in a 1999 unpublished decision to find a statute of limitations defense inapplicable to Spill Act contribution claims. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Montells v. Haynes
green
2 sentences2015Although, as defendants argue, past case law does provide some basis to argue for the application of a default statute of limitations when a statute is silent on such defenses, see, e.g., Montells, supra, 133 N.J. 282 , 627 A.2d 654 , here the Spill Act is not silent. 2015Although, as defendants argue, past case law does provide some basis to argue for the application of a default statute of limitations when a statute is silent on such defenses, see, e.g., Montells, supra, 133 N.J. 282 , 627 A.2d 654 , here the Spill Act is not silent. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.
red
2 sentences2010Id. at 657 , 127 S.Ct. at 2186 , 167 L.Ed. 2d at 1010 . 2010Id. at 657 , 127 S.Ct. at 2186 , 167 L.Ed. 2d at 1010 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Price v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Panzino v. Continental Can Company green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mancini v. Township of Teaneck neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| O'Loughlin v. National Community Bank green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Taha v. DePalma green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Konopka v. Foster green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Carroll green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Jones v. Jones green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Byrd v. Manning neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of NY green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bell v. Western Employer's Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Unkert v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Board of Education green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Stockton v. Gristedes Supermarkets, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sotomayor v. Allstate Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| LaBonte v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Beneficial Finance Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Feil v. Senisi green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Fees v. Trow green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. McMeekin green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.