statute of limitations defense in Iowa

2025“Our review of the court’s ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for correction of errors of law.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).

2022Sanders only appeals the court’s ruling that his ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim is barred by the statute of limitations.1 “Our review of the court's ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for correction of errors of law.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).

2020Standard of Review “Our review of the court’s ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for correction of errors of law.” Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003)).

2020“Our review of the court’s ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for correction of errors of law.” Phuoc Thanh Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183,186 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003)).

2026That said, our supreme court has required only that the defense “must be affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa R.

2014But, the State failed to timely assert the statute of limitations defense and therefore waived it. 3 Discussing the limitations defense in a postconviction-relief proceeding, our supreme court has restated the general rule that the “defense must be affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989) (citing Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970)).

2026A statute of limitations defense “is primarily an affirmative defense to be specially asserted in a separate division of the responsive pleading to the claim for relief.” Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970).

2016A statute of limitations defense “is primarily an affirmative defense to be specially asserted in a separate division of the responsive pleading to the claim for relief.” Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970).

2018Rather, it estops a defendant from raising a statute-of-limitations defense "when it would be inequitable to permit the defendant to do so." Id.

2016See Estate of Anderson v. Iowa Dermatology Clinic, P.C., 819 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Iowa 2012) (concluding a plaintiff filed an action beyond the statute of repose); Christy, 692 N.W.2d at 703–04 (concluding the doctrine of fraudulent concealment estopped a defendant from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense, but noting the discovery rule is a separate question from fraudulent concealment). 14 Rathje, we concluded the limitations period under section 614.1(9)(a) commences “upon actual or imputed knowledge of both the injury and its cause in fact.” Rathje, 745 N.W.2d at 461 .

2020“The party pleading an exception to the normal limitations period has the burden to plead and prove the exceptions.” Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1983); see also Skadburg v. Gately, 911 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Iowa 2018) (“Although [defendant] has the burden of establishing the statute-of- limitations defense, [plaintiff], as the party attempting to avoid the limitations period, has the burden of demonstrating any exception.”).

2019Skadburg, 911 N.W.2d at 798 (altered for readability) (quoting Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 702 (Iowa 2005)).

2018See Neylan v. Moser , 400 N.W.2d 538 , 541 (Iowa 1987).

1989Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1987).

2017See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 942 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993).

2017See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 942 (5th Cir. 1993); United State v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993).

2017See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 942 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993).

2017See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 942 (5th Cir. 1993); United State v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993).

2017The pretrial motion raising a statute of limitations defense is thus “the functional equivalent to a motion for summary judgment in the civil context.” People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511, 522 (Ct. App. 1997).

2017The pretrial motion raising a statute of limitations defense is thus “the functional equivalent to a motion for summary judgment in the civil context.” People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511, 522 (Ct. App. 1997).

2016See Estate of Anderson v. Iowa Dermatology Clinic, P.L.C., 819 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Iowa 2012) (concluding a plaintiff filed an action beyond the statute of repose); Christy, 692 N.W.2d at 703-04 (concluding the doctrine of fraudulent concealment es-topped a defendant from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense, but noting the discovery rule is a separate question from fraudulent concealment).

2016See Estate of Anderson v. Iowa Dermatology Clinic, P.C., 819 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Iowa 2012) (concluding a plaintiff filed an action beyond the statute of repose); Christy, 692 N.W.2d at 703–04 (concluding the doctrine of fraudulent concealment estopped a defendant from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense, but noting the discovery rule is a separate question from fraudulent concealment). 14 Rathje, we concluded the limitations period under section 614.1(9)(a) commences “upon actual or imputed knowledge of both the injury and its cause in fact.” Rathje, 745 N.W.2d at 461 .

2020Id.

2014Similarly, in Floyd v. Quaker Oats, 646 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 2002), the court rejected the employer’s argument that cumulative injury was a “distinct and discrete disability solely attributable to work activities over time, as opposed to an aggravation of a preexisting injury from an identified traumatic event.” The court decided when an earlier traumatic injury had not been compensated because the petition was dismissed in the face of a statute of limitations defense by the employer, the claimant could recover by way of a cumulative-injury claim for any functional disability shown to have oc

2024Mayorga, 2024 WL 1295965 , at *2–3. 1 We recognize Ruiz’s window of time to file a new PCR action has passed, but “we decline to remand claims of ineffective assistance of [PCR] counsel raised for the first time on appeal.” Goode, 920 N.W.2d at 527 ; see also Karns v. State, No. 21-0758, 2022 WL 2348144 , at *4 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (relying on Goode and refusing to remand for new PCR trial even though the applicant’s “window to file a new PCR action may be closed”). 5 Further, Ruiz concedes in his appellate brief that his requested path still requires a “record . . . adequate to w

2023Thongvanh v. State, 938 N.W.2d 2 , 8 (Iowa 2020); see also Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018) (“Generally, an appeal from a denial of an application for [PCR] is reviewed for correction of errors at law.” (citation omitted)).

2017People v. Le, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 , 880 (Ct. App. 2000).

2017People v. Le, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 , 880 (Ct. App. 2000).

2008In addition, the court in Bressler stated that summary judgment based on inquiry notice with respect to a statute-of-limitations defense was inappropriate where the plaintiffs should not have known that “the cradle swing was defective and unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 380-81.

2008In addition, the court in Bressler stated that summary judgment based on inquiry notice with respect to a statute-of-limitations defense was inappropriate where the plaintiffs should not have known that “the cradle swing was defective and unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 380–81.

2024See Smith, 260 N.W.2d at 853 .

2024Id.; see also State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Minn. 2001) (giving a judgment entered after grant of motion to dismiss preclusive effect and rejecting argument that it was not on the merits because motion had been based on a statute-of- limitations defense).

2023Because the statute of limitations defense was not raised by the State, the district court erred by raising it sua sponte.”). 3 appeal for correction of errors at law, see Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011), and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the PCR application.

2023In 2018, our supreme court overruled existing caselaw and “allow[ed] defendants to attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim actual innocence” and “adopt[ed] a freestanding claim of actual innocence that applicants may bring under our postconviction-relief statute.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 781, 790 .

2020“When summary [disposition] is granted in a postconviction relief action, we examine the record to determine if a genuine issue of fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Bugley v. State, 596 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Iowa 1999).

2020“The party pleading an exception to the normal limitations period has the burden to plead and prove the exceptions.” Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1983); see also Skadburg v. Gately, 911 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Iowa 2018) (“Although [defendant] has the burden of establishing the statute-of- limitations defense, [plaintiff], as the party attempting to avoid the limitations period, has the burden of demonstrating any exception.”).

2020We will address the discovery rule and equitable estoppel separately. 3Courts applying federal notice pleading standards recognize that although “complaints need not anticipate or meet potential affirmative defenses,” dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate when the plaintiff’s “allegations show that there is an airtight defense [such that he] has pleaded himself out of court.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012). 14 1.

2020See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002); Johnson v. State, No.19-1098, 2020 WL 4497069 , at *2 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020). 3 The State conceded Williams was not one of the persons who entered and robbed the establishments.

2019See Grant v. Cedar Falls Oil Co., 480 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Iowa 1992). 7 law for commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

2017See Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002).

2017See Nguyen, 878 N.W.2d at 751 (discussing the statute of limitations for PCR actions set forth in Iowa Code section 822.3).