statute of limitations defense in Illinois

2006Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 360 (1995).

2006Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 360 (1995).

2004People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds, Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99 .

2004People v. Wright, 189 Ill.2d 1, 10-11 , 243 Ill.Dec. 198 , 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds, Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 99 , 273 Ill.Dec. 560 , 789 N.E.2d 734 .

2020When a defendant raises a statute of limitations defense, a plaintiff in response must “provide enough facts to avoid application of the statute of limitations.” Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 2d 72, 84 (1995).

2016See Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 2d 72, 84 (1995). ¶ 43 The complaint in Richter II contained four counts.

2016App. 3d at 808 ; see Smith, 568 U.S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 720 (in a conspiracy case the Supreme Court treated the statute-of-limitations claim as an affirmative defense and “not an element of the conspiracy offense”); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted *** by the defendant in criminal cases [citation], and the form of the statute in Illinois, which appellant seeks to rely upon, makes it especially necessary that the claimed defense of it should be heard and decided by the courts of that state [citations

2015App. 3d at 808 ; see - 18 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140139 Smith, 568 U. S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 720 (in a conspiracy case the Supreme Court treated the statute-of-limitations claim as an affirmative defense and “not an element of the conspiracy offense”); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted *** by the defendant in criminal cases [citation], and the form of the statute in Illinois, which appellant seeks to rely upon, makes it especially necessary that the claimed defense of it should be hear

2016See Gatreaux v. DKW Enterprises, LLC, 2011 IL App (1st) 103482, ¶ 23 (appellate courts are bound to follow decisions of the supreme court and have no authority to overrule or modify them).

2015See Gatreaux v. DKW Enterprises, LLC, 2011 IL App (1st) 103482, ¶ 23 (appellate courts are bound to follow decisions of the supreme court and have no authority to overrule or modify them).

2016App. 3d at 808 ; see Smith, 568 U.S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 720 (in a conspiracy case the Supreme Court treated the statute-of-limitations claim as an affirmative defense and “not an element of the conspiracy offense”); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted *** by the defendant in criminal cases [citation], and the form of the statute in Illinois, which appellant seeks to rely upon, makes it especially necessary that the claimed defense of it should be heard and decided by the courts of that state [citations

2015App. 3d at 808 ; see - 18 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140139 Smith, 568 U. S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 720 (in a conspiracy case the Supreme Court treated the statute-of-limitations claim as an affirmative defense and “not an element of the conspiracy offense”); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted *** by the defendant in criminal cases [citation], and the form of the statute in Illinois, which appellant seeks to rely upon, makes it especially necessary that the claimed defense of it should be hear

2006Cf. Jackson Jordan, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 251-53 (applying principles of equitable estoppel to a statute of limitations defense in a legal malpractice case where “the client was lulled into a false sense of security by the firm’s soothing reassurances and advice”).

2006Cf. Jackson Jordan, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 251-53 (applying principles of equitable estoppel to a statute of limitations defense in a legal malpractice case -27- where Athe client was lulled into a false sense of security by the firm=s soothing reassurances and advice@).

2004It is well settled that a party will not be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense where a plaintiff fails to show that: “ ‘(1) defendant has made some misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact; (2) defendant had knowledge, either actual or implied, that the representations were untrue at the time they were made; (3) plaintiff was unaware of the untruth of the representations both at the time made and the time they were acted upon; (4) defendant either intended or expected his representations or conduct to be acted upon; (5) plaintiff did in fact rely upon

2001We cannot hold defendants equitably estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense where plaintiffs had the ability to learn through a simple and free process long before the limitations period ended that no case had been filed on their behalf. “ ‘A party claiming the benefit of an estoppel cannot shut his eyes to obvious facts, or neglect to seek information that is easily accessible, and then charge his ignorance to others.’ ” Nickels v. Reid, 277 Ill.

2022Under this doctrine, a party may estop another from raising the statute of limitations to bar a cause of action where: “(1) the other person misrepresented or concealed material facts; (2) the other person knew at the time he or she made the representations that they were untrue; (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know that the representations were untrue when they were made and when that party decided to act, or not, upon the representations; (4) the other person intended or reasonably expected that the party claiming estoppel would determine whether to act, or not, based upon the repres

2011DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006).

2018See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently -6- waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2017See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2018See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently -6- waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2017See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2018See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently -6- waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2017See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases for the proposition that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the statute of limitations, thus sanctioning a later indictment that, absent such a waiver, would be untimely); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purposes of a time bar are not offended by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defense by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997).

2017App. 3d at 897 , 682 N.E.2d at 1140 (quoting Hi-Lite Products Co. v. American Home Products Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1993)). ¶ 18 In this case, the trial court applied the statute of limitations to bar Sara’s claim regarding deficient payments occurring prior to May 26, 2010, i.e., five years prior to the date Sara filed her application to enforce the arbitration award.

2016App. 3d at 897 , 682 N.E.2d at 1140 (quoting Hi-Lite Products Co. v. American Home Products Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1993)). ¶ 18 In this case, the trial court applied the statute of limitations to bar Sara’s claim regarding deficient payments occurring prior to May 26, 2010, i.e., five years prior to the date Sara filed her application to enforce the arbitration award.

2015However, "[i]n conflict of laws cases, matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum [citation], while the law of the State with the most significant contacts controls 8 No. 1-13-2905 substantive matters." Boersma v. Amoco Oil Co., 276 Ill.

2015However, “[i]n conflict of laws cases, matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum [citation], while the law of the State with the most significant contacts controls substantive matters.” Boersma v. Amoco Oil Co., 276 Ill.

2015Dever v. Simmons, 292 Ill.

2015Dever v. Simmons, 292 Ill.

2024Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (1988). ¶ 14 As evidence that BNSF expressly waived its right to raise the statute of limitations defense, plaintiff points to the January 2022 unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss his complaint.

2019It noted that the termination letter was sent “well within the 4-year statute of limitation for construction-related claims, and about one year before the statute would [expire].” Finally, relying on our supreme court’s decision in Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150 (1989), the circuit court concluded that the Village did not establish a basis to estop defendants from raising a statute of limitations defense because the complaint did not allege (1) that any defendant misrepresented or concealed any material fact; (2) that any defendant knew of the falsity of any representation; or (3) reasonab

2024Plaintiff acknowledges that the three-year limitations period applied to his refiled FELA claim. ¶ 13 Plaintiff, however, contends that BNSF intentionally waived the statute of limitations defense when it did not oppose plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the action and reserve the right to refile within one year. “ ‘The right to invoke a statute-of-limitations defense can be expressly waived or waived by conduct inconsistent with an intent to enforce that right.’ ” Klancir, 2015 IL App (1st) 143437, ¶ 26 , quoting Hassebrock v. Ceja Corp., 2015 IL App (5th) 140037 , ¶ 38.

2015Defendant’s Alleged Misrepresentation ¶ 25 Plaintiff argues the misrepresentations or concealments in this case were (1) Defendant’s statements to the court before Plaintiff made the final decision to dismiss the case, and (2) Defendant’s “actions in agreeing to the language of the order before it was filed and its statements re-iterating that the dismissal was without any prejudice to Plaintiff.” Plaintiff argues this conduct by Defendant misled Plaintiff as to whether Defendant planned to assert a statute of limitations defense “despite its apparent agreement to waive it.” ¶ 26 “The right to