24 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phelps v. Wehr Constructors, Inc.green2 sentences2026Since Sanchez was not a party to the original action, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in KRS 413.140(1)(a) for false imprisonment was not tolled for his claims. -14- As concerns the claims against Cash, the relation back rule, CR 15.03, “preserves an amended complaint from a defendant’s statute of limitations defense by treating the amendment as if it had been filed at the time of the original pleading.” Phelps v. Wehr Constructors, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2004). 2019See Phelps v. Wehr Constructors, Inc. , 168 S.W.3d 395 (Ky. App. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLCgreen2 sentences2022Under tightly circumscribed “limited circumstances,” that doctrine “permits an untimely -10- amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint and to avoid a statute- of-limitations defense.” Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Ky. App. 2019). 2022(Emphasis added.) Thus, “under limited circumstances, CR 15.03 permits an untimely amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint and to avoid a statute-of-limitations defense.” Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2008In Harris v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 297, 307 (Ky.2006), this Court held that a party could be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense of KRS 395.278 to the party’s revival action when the party’s attorney failed to disclose that the party had died during the pendency of the lawsuit. 2008In Harris v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 297, 307 (Ky.2006), this Court held that a party could be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense of KRS 395.278 to the party's revival action when the party's attorney failed to disclose that the party had died during the pendency of the lawsuit. | 1 | 2 |
Hatton v. Mutual Health & Accident Ass'ngreen1 sentence2026See KRS 342.210 (“No limitation of time provided in this chapter shall run against any person who is mentally incompetent or who is a minor dependent so long as he has no committee, guardian or next friend, or other person authorized to claim compensation for him under KRS 342.160.”); Inland Gas Corp. v. Flint, 269 10 S.W.2d 239, 239 (Ky. 1954) (In a workers’ compensation case, “where an infant child is living with its mother, she becomes its next friend by operation of law for the purpose of prosecuting an action for recovery for the death of its father, and the statute of limitations is not | 1 | 1 |
Leiserson & Adler, Inc. v. Keamgreen1 sentence2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. City of Louisvillegreen2 sentences2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy 2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy | 1 | 1 |
McCracken County v. Mercantile Trust Co.green2 sentences2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy 2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy | 1 | 1 |
Heath v. Hazelipgreen2 sentences2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy 2024See Davis v. Davis, 4 Ky.Op. 602 (1870) (“the Legislature of the State may change, modify, 11 or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, rights perfected by the law before its modification, or repeal[]”); McCracken Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344 , 1 S.W. 585, 586 (1886) (“A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power[]”); Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595 , 29 S.W. 450, 451 (1895) (“The lawmaking branch of the government has no more power to destroy | 1 | 1 |
Underwood v. Underwoodgreen1 sentence2023See Underwood v. Underwood, 999 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. App. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Gerard C. Menichini, T/a Best Legal Services v. Lissa L. Grant Mellon Bank (East), Mellon Bank (East) National Associationgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (3d Cir.1993) (“Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of finality and negotiability.”); see also New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection v. Pace, 186 N.J. 123 , 892 A.2d 661, 662 (2006) (“[T]he time of discovery rule does not apply under the UCC”). | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection v. Pacegreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (3d Cir.1993) (“Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of finality and negotiability.”); see also New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection v. Pace, 186 N.J. 123 , 892 A.2d 661, 662 (2006) (“[T]he time of discovery rule does not apply under the UCC”). 2014See, e.g., Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (3d Cir.1993) (“Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of finality and negotiability.”); see also New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection v. Pace, 186 N.J. 123 , 892 A.2d 661, 662 (2006) (“[T]he time of discovery rule does not apply under the UCC”). | 1 | 1 |
Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratorygreen2 sentences2006ESTOPPEL A party may be estopped from using a statute of limitations defense, if there is “some act or conduct which in point of fact misleads or deceives the plaintiff and obstructs or prevents him from instituting [or protecting] his suit while he may do so.” Gailor, 990 S.W.2d at 608 (citing, Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, 831 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky.1992)). 2006ESTOPPEL A party may be estopped from using a statute of limitations defense, if there is "some act or conduct which in point of fact misleads or deceives the plaintiff and obstructs or prevents him from instituting [or protecting] his suit while he may do so." Gailor, 990 S.W.2d at 603 (citing, Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, 831 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Blairgreen2 sentences1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that "a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment." Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). 1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that “a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment.” Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.green2 sentences1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that "a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment." Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). 1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that “a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment.” Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Frankfort v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1998Further, the ALJ, relying on City of Frankfort v. Rogers, Ky.App., 765 S.W.2d 579 (1988), rejected the argument that the employer was estopped from employing a statute of limitations defense, due to its failure to comply with the notification requirements, as there was no evidence that the employer had acted in bad faith. 1992The AU found that after Highland was put on notice of claimant’s injury in October, 1985, Highland failed to perform its duties under KRS 342.038 to inform the Board of a work-related injury or under KRS 342.040 to notify the Board of its failure to make compensation payments, so that the Board was thereby precluded from performing its duty under KRS 342.040 to notify the claimant of his right to prosecute a claim. 1 For these reasons, the AU did not permit Highland to rely upon the Statute of Limitations defense to bar the claim, citing City of Frankfort v. Rogers, Ky.App., 765 S.W.2d 579 (19 | 3 | 1992–2016 |
cluster 794047
green
2 sentences2024Co., 445 F.3d 311 , 327 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of class certification under specific facts of case because individualized statute of limitations issues predominated over common issues but noting “we can easily foresee a situation where the defendant’s statute of limitations defense is so dependant [sic] upon facts applicable to the entire class . . . that individual hearings would not be necessary.”). 2024Co., 445 F.3d 311 , 327 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of class certification under specific facts of case because individualized statute of limitations issues predominated over common issues but noting “we can easily foresee a situation where the defendant’s statute of limitations defense is so dependant [sic] upon facts applicable to the entire class . . . that individual hearings would not be necessary.”). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
H.E. Neumann Co. v. Lee
green
2 sentences2021Id. 2003Neumann Co. v. Lee, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 917 (1998), this Court held that an employer’s failure to fulfill a statutory duty, even if bad faith is absent, will estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense. | 2 | 2003–2021 |
Conway v. Huff
green
1 sentence2023And, more damages were certain to occur: Farmer encouraged her to reach a settlement agreement with Lampley 3 We note that Kimmel asserted a statute of limitations defense in his answer to Wolfe’s February 14, 2018, complaint. 4 644 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1982). 5 as soon as possible because she “would lose in a trial and end up owing Ms. Lampley a significant amount of money.” Kimmel disputed Wolfe’s argument that her legal harm did not become irrevocable and nonspeculative until she settled with Lampley in July 2017. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Spaziano v. Florida
red
2 sentences2008In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), however, the Court held that that right did not extend to expired lesser-included offenses unless the defendant was willing to waive the statute of limitations defense. 2008In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), however, the Court held that that right did not extend to expired lesser-included offenses unless the defendant was willing to waive the statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Gailor v. Alsabi
green
2 sentences2006ESTOPPEL A party may be estopped from using a statute of limitations defense, if there is “some act or conduct which in point of fact misleads or deceives the plaintiff and obstructs or prevents him from instituting [or protecting] his suit while he may do so.” Gailor, 990 S.W.2d at 608 (citing, Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, 831 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky.1992)). 2006ESTOPPEL A party may be estopped from using a statute of limitations defense, if there is "some act or conduct which in point of fact misleads or deceives the plaintiff and obstructs or prevents him from instituting [or protecting] his suit while he may do so." Gailor, 990 S.W.2d at 603 (citing, Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, 831 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1992)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker
green
1 sentence1998The Board, relying on the more recent cases of Colt Management Co. v. Carter, Ky.App., 907 S.W.2d 169 (1995), and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, Ky.App., 883 S.W.2d 514 (1994), held that a showing of bad faith on the part of the employer was not required in order for the employer to be estopped from utilizing a statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Newberg v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1998Specifically, it maintains that the case of Newberg v. Hudson, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 384 (1992), sets forth the standard with regard to an employer who has never paid any voluntary benefits, and requires a showing of bad faith on the part of the employer before the employer is estopped from relying on a statute of limitations defense. 1998Therefore, the employer argues that the Court of Appeal erred by (1) relying on Carter, supra, and (2) misinterpreting the law of Newberg v. Hudson, supra, by holding that the employer had to show that it had acted in good faith before it was allowed to rely on a statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Colt Management Co. v. Carter
green
1 sentence1998The Board, relying on the more recent cases of Colt Management Co. v. Carter, Ky.App., 907 S.W.2d 169 (1995), and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, Ky.App., 883 S.W.2d 514 (1994), held that a showing of bad faith on the part of the employer was not required in order for the employer to be estopped from utilizing a statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Asher v. Howard
neutral
1 sentence1926Asher v. Howard, 122 Ky. 175 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Wright v. Gardner
neutral
1 sentence1923Appellants insist that parties to a controversy may by agreement waive the statute of limitations, under our practice, or by new or subsequent promise toll the running of the statutes and extend -the time in which the plaintiff may bring an action, and cites in support of this contention the case of Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454 , where it is said: “It may be proper to add that we do not mean by anything said herein to intimate that 'a promise to pay a debt by the debtor, after the same is barred by the, statute of limitations is not g’ood and enforcible.” They also cite the text in 25 Cyc., p | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Swinebroad v. Wood
neutral
1 sentence1917Yager’s Admr. &c. v. Bank of Kentucky, 125 Ky. 177 ; Swinebroad v. Wood, 123 Ky. 664 , and cases later decided. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Yager's Adm'r v. President of Bank of Kentucky
neutral
1 sentence1917Yager’s Admr. &c. v. Bank of Kentucky, 125 Ky. 177 ; Swinebroad v. Wood, 123 Ky. 664 , and cases later decided. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.