16 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1933–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dagel v. City of Great Fallsgreen2 sentences2013Estoppel ¶35 Harrell argues that MFU should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to his wage claims, relying on Dagel v. Great Falls, 250 Mont. 224 , 819 P.2d 186 (1991). 2013Estoppel ¶35 Harrell argues that MFU should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to his wage claims, relying on Dagel v. Great Falls, 250 Mont. 224 , 819 P.2d 186 (1991). | 1 | 2 |
Elk Park Ranch, Inc. v. Park Countygreen2 sentences2024In order to prove equitable estoppel, a party must show: 1. the existence of conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or a concealment of a material fact; 2. these facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him; 3. the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by him; 4. the conduct must be done with the intention, or at least the expectation, that it will be acted 2024In order to prove equitable estoppel, a party must show: 1. the existence of conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or a concealment of a material fact; 2. these facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him; 3. the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by him; 4. the conduct must be done with the intention, or at least the expectation, that it will be acted | 1 | 1 |
CLOUD FOUNDATION, INC. v. Kempthornegreen1 sentence2021(Citing Cloud Found., Inc. v. Kempthorne, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Millsgreen1 sentence2012Mills, 305 P.2d at 65, 72 . ¶35 Johnson argues the present case is factually similar to Mills , *311 and we should thus follow the California appellate court’s holding. | 1 | 1 |
Gilberto Rivera, Nicholas Alberto, Luis Navarro, Jose Garcia, Hector Garcia, Pablo Galindo, Socorro Mendivil, Rogelio Casares v. Joe Anayagreen1 sentence2008P. 8(c), in Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing a *353 defendant to raise a statute of limitations defense for the first time on motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice). | 1 | 1 |
Vetsch v. Helena Transfer & Storage Co.green2 sentences1985See also Vetsch v. Helena Transport and Storage Co. (1969), 154 Mont. 106 , 460 P.2d 757 , (payment of medical bills does not dispense with the necessity of a claim for compensation by an injured worker). 1985See also Vetsch v. Helena Transport and Storage Co. (1969), 154 Mont. 106 , 460 P.2d 757 , (payment of medical bills does not dispense with the necessity of a claim for compensation by an injured worker). | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Softichgreen2 sentences1981See, Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Accident Board (1952), 126 Mont. 411 , 252 P.2d 1046 . *315 The court’s conclusion that the Department holds only investigatory power impliedly conflicts with our opinion in Burgess v. Softich (1975), 167 Mont. 70 , 535 P.2d 178 . 1981See, Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Accident Board (1952), 126 Mont. 411 , 252 P.2d 1046 . *315 The court’s conclusion that the Department holds only investigatory power impliedly conflicts with our opinion in Burgess v. Softich (1975), 167 Mont. 70 , 535 P.2d 178 . | 1 | 1 |
Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Accident Boardgreen2 sentences1981See, Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Accident Board (1952), 126 Mont. 411 , 252 P.2d 1046 . *315 The court’s conclusion that the Department holds only investigatory power impliedly conflicts with our opinion in Burgess v. Softich (1975), 167 Mont. 70 , 535 P.2d 178 . 1981See, Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Accident Board (1952), 126 Mont. 411 , 252 P.2d 1046 . *315 The court’s conclusion that the Department holds only investigatory power impliedly conflicts with our opinion in Burgess v. Softich (1975), 167 Mont. 70 , 535 P.2d 178 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nelson v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2024Nelson v. Nelson, 2002 MT 151, ¶ 9 , 310 Mont. 329 , 50 P.3d 139 . 3 ¶7 Hughes argues that the District Court erred when it determined that the statute of limitations was not tolled by either the self-concealing nature of her injuries or equitable estoppel. 2024Nelson v. Nelson, 2002 MT 151, ¶ 9 , 310 Mont. 329 , 50 P.3d 139 . 3 ¶7 Hughes argues that the District Court erred when it determined that the statute of limitations was not tolled by either the self-concealing nature of her injuries or equitable estoppel. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Haugen v. Kottas
green
2 sentences2012Limitations on Actions for Nuisance and Trespass ¶13 A nuisance action includes “all wrongs which have interfered with the rights of a citizen in the enjoyment of property.” Haugen v. Kottas, 2001 MT 274, ¶ 15 , 307 Mont. 301 , 37 P.3d 672 ; §27-30-101, MCA. 2012Limitations on Actions for Nuisance and Trespass ¶13 A nuisance action includes “all wrongs which have interfered with the rights of a citizen in the enjoyment of property.” Haugen v. Kottas, 2001 MT 274, ¶ 15 , 307 Mont. 301 , 37 P.3d 672 ; §27-30-101, MCA. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Gerard C. Menichini, T/a Best Legal Services v. Lissa L. Grant Mellon Bank (East), Mellon Bank (East) National Association
green
2 sentences2002Although the application of the discovery doctrine to a UCC conversion case is one of first impression in Montana, substantial consideration of the issue has occurred in other courts, with significant agreement. ¶21 In Menichini v. Grant (3rd Cir. 1993), 995 F.2d 1224 , the federal circuit court declined to apply the discovery doctrine to a UCC § 3-419 conversion case stating, “Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of fin 2002Although the application of the discovery doctrine to a UCC conversion case is one of first impression in Montana, substantial consideration of the issue has occurred in other courts, with significant agreement. ¶21 In Menichini v. Grant (3rd Cir. 1993), 995 F.2d 1224 , the federal circuit court declined to apply the discovery doctrine to a UCC § 3-419 conversion case stating, “Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of fin | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank
green
2 sentences2002Although the application of the discovery doctrine to a UCC conversion case is one of first impression in Montana, substantial consideration of the issue has occurred in other courts, with significant agreement. ¶21 In Menichini v. Grant (3rd Cir. 1993), 995 F.2d 1224 , the federal circuit court declined to apply the discovery doctrine to a UCC § 3-419 conversion case stating, “Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of fin 2002Although the application of the discovery doctrine to a UCC conversion case is one of first impression in Montana, substantial consideration of the issue has occurred in other courts, with significant agreement. ¶ 21 In Menichini v. Grant (3rd Cir.1993), 995 F.2d 1224 , the federal circuit court declined to apply the discovery doctrine to a UCC § 3-419 conversion case stating, "Where a party not engaging in fraudulent concealment asserts the statute of limitations defense, most courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to negotiable instruments, finding it inimical to UCC policies of fin | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated
green
2 sentences1995Equitable estoppel applies when the employer or the insurer “has taken some positive action which either prevents claimant from making a claim or leads him to reasonably believe he need not file ... a claim.” Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated (1973), 162 Mont. 469, 481 , 512 P.2d 1304, 1313 . “[T]he party... to be estopped [must] have knowledge that he is misleading the claimant and an intention to mislead the claimant to his detriment.” Ricks, 512 P.2d at 1313 . 1995Equitable estoppel applies when the employer or the insurer “has taken some positive action which either prevents claimant from making a claim or leads him to reasonably believe he need not file ... a claim.” Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated (1973), 162 Mont. 469, 481 , 512 P.2d 1304, 1313 . “[T]he party... to be estopped [must] have knowledge that he is misleading the claimant and an intention to mislead the claimant to his detriment.” Ricks, 512 P.2d at 1313 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
James H. Marx v. Go Publishing Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995The court then stated “[w]e discern no reason why the statute of limitations rule of the state should not apply to the federal proceedings.” Marx, 721 F.2d at 1273 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Perry
green
2 sentences1989State v. Perry (Mont. 1988), 758 P.2d 268 , 45 St.Rep. 1192 . *496 The above cited examples of legislative and judicial limitations illustrate that the law, for a variety of policy reasons, refuses to provide a cause of action, remedy and redress for every injury. 1989State v. Perry (Mont. 1988), [ 232 Mont. 456 ,] 758 P.2d 268 , 45 St.Rep. 1192 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Davis v. Jones
green
2 sentences1985In Davis v. Jones (Mont. 1983), [ 203 Mont. 464 ,] 661 P.2d 859 , 40 St.Rep. 570 , we held that the employer, Jones, was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations to bar claimant’s request for compensation. 1985In Davis v. Jones (Mont. 1983), [ 203 Mont. 464 ,] 661 P.2d 859 , 40 St.Rep. 570 , we held that the employer, Jones, was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations to bar claimant’s request for compensation. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In re Brugh
green
1 sentence1985In Davis v. Jones (Mont. 1983), [ 203 Mont. 464 ,] 661 P.2d 859 , 40 St.Rep. 570 , we held that the employer, Jones, was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations to bar claimant’s request for compensation. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Brion v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1970Although entry of a judgment on a claim partially barred by the statute of limitations is error (Brion v. Brown, 135 Mont. 356 , 340 P.2d 539 , and eases therein cited), where the •claim is divisible into separate items and such items as are barred can be segregated from those that are not, no reason appears why we cannot modify the judgment accordingly. 1970Although entry of a judgment on a claim partially barred by the statute of limitations is error (Brion v. Brown, 135 Mont. 356 , 340 P.2d 539 , and eases therein cited), where the •claim is divisible into separate items and such items as are barred can be segregated from those that are not, no reason appears why we cannot modify the judgment accordingly. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ewell v. Daggs
green
2 sentences1933Such was also true in the ease of Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 , 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408, 411, 27 L. 1933Such was also true in the ease of Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 , 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408, 411, 27 L. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Blakely v. Fort Lyon Canal Co.
neutral
1 sentence1933Lyon Canal Co., 31 Colo. 224 , 73 Pac. 249 ; Irvin v. Smith, 60 Wis. 175 , 18 N. W. 724 .) Richardson, holder of the title from the second mortgagee, had a right to invoke the statute of limitations and claim the benefits thereof, even though he was not primarily liable to pay the debt. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Irvin v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences1933Lyon Canal Co., 31 Colo. 224 , 73 Pac. 249 ; Irvin v. Smith, 60 Wis. 175 , 18 N. W. 724 .) Richardson, holder of the title from the second mortgagee, had a right to invoke the statute of limitations and claim the benefits thereof, even though he was not primarily liable to pay the debt. 1933Lyon Canal Co., 31 Colo. 224 , 73 Pac. 249 ; Irvin v. Smith, 60 Wis. 175 , 18 N. W. 724 .) Richardson, holder of the title from the second mortgagee, had a right to invoke the statute of limitations and claim the benefits thereof, even though he was not primarily liable to pay the debt. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ollivier v. City of Houston
green
1 sentence1933III, sec. 55, Constitution of Texas), and it does not cite its own decision in Ollivier v. City of Houston, 93 Tex. 201 , 54 S. W. 940 , 942, 943 (nor other Texas cases cited post), which involved a statute permitting a taxpayer to plead the statute of limitations in defense to an action instituted by the state for delinquent taxes, which, of course, included penalties under the laws of Texas. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ollivier v. City of Houston
green
1 sentence1933III, sec. 55, Constitution of Texas), and it does not cite its own decision in Ollivier v. City of Houston, 93 Tex. 201 , 54 S. W. 940 , 942, 943 (nor other Texas cases cited post), which involved a statute permitting a taxpayer to plead the statute of limitations in defense to an action instituted by the state for delinquent taxes, which, of course, included penalties under the laws of Texas. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.