statute of limitations defense in Maine

2017Comm. of Lincolnville, 2003 ME 114, ¶¶ 11-12, 19 , 832 A.2d 782 (explaining that summary judgment on a statute of limitations defense is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the cause of' action accrued within the limitations period). ' B.

2017Comm. of Lincolnville, 2003 ME 114, ¶¶ 11-12, 19 , 832 A.2d 782 (explaining that summary judgment on a statute of limitations defense is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the cause of' action accrued within the limitations period). ' B.

2025Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1990) (recognizing that estoppel may be used to “bar the statute of limitations defense from being raised”).63 [¶136] Even when a rule of procedure could have provided a defendant with complete immunity, it does not give rise to a vested property right. 63 We recently held that even a criminal defendant can waive the statute-of-limitations defense, notwithstanding the rule that “the State generally has the burden to disprove a statutory defense that is generated by the evidence.” State v. Thistle, 2024 ME 6 , ¶ 15, 312 A.3d 1273 (citing 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2024)

1999See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Me.1996); Hanusek v. Southern Maine Medical Ctr., 584 A.2d 634 , 636 & n. 2 (Me.1990).

2017See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19 , 113 A.3d 583 . 11 As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 12 See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986) (holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were outside the l

2008Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 14 , 693 A.2d at 1141 (noting that the State was not required to prove that the alleged incidents giving rise to an unlawful sexual contact claim occurred on a specific date), and (2) the possible application of the statute of limitations to bar prosecution of the crime, State v. Thompson, 1997 ME 109 , ¶ 7, 695 A.2d 1174, 1177 .

2016We have explained that “[t]ime is not an element of unlawful sexual contact,” id., except to determine the age of the alleged victim at the time of the offense and to apply “the statute of limitations to bar prosecution of the crime,” State v. Standring, 2008 ME 188, ¶ 13 , 960 A.2d 1210 .

2008Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 14 , 693 A.2d at 1141 (noting that the State was not required to prove that the alleged incidents giving rise to an unlawful sexual contact claim occurred on a specific date), and (2) the possible application of the statute of limitations to bar prosecution of the crime, State v. Thompson, 1997 ME 109 , ¶ 7, 695 A.2d 1174, 1177 .

2026See Lowatchie, 569 A.2d at 201 n.1 (Hornby, J., dissenting).

2025Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1990) (recognizing that estoppel may be used to “bar the statute of limitations defense from being raised”).63 [¶136] Even when a rule of procedure could have provided a defendant with complete immunity, it does not give rise to a vested property right. 63 We recently held that even a criminal defendant can waive the statute-of-limitations defense, notwithstanding the rule that “the State generally has the burden to disprove a statutory defense that is generated by the evidence.” State v. Thistle, 2024 ME 6 , ¶ 15, 312 A.3d 1273 (citing 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2024)

2025Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1990) (recognizing that estoppel may be used to “bar the statute of limitations defense from being raised”).63 [¶136] Even when a rule of procedure could have provided a defendant with complete immunity, it does not give rise to a vested property right. 63 We recently held that even a criminal defendant can waive the statute-of-limitations defense, notwithstanding the rule that “the State generally has the burden to disprove a statutory defense that is generated by the evidence.” State v. Thistle, 2024 ME 6 , ¶ 15, 312 A.3d 1273 (citing 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2024)

2025Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1990) (recognizing that estoppel may be used to “bar the statute of limitations defense from being raised”).63 [¶136] Even when a rule of procedure could have provided a defendant with complete immunity, it does not give rise to a vested property right. 63 We recently held that even a criminal defendant can waive the statute-of-limitations defense, notwithstanding the rule that “the State generally has the burden to disprove a statutory defense that is generated by the evidence.” State v. Thistle, 2024 ME 6 , ¶ 15, 312 A.3d 1273 (citing 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2024)

2022The Cou;rt m,ay only consider events that occurred within the limitations period and relate to the pending complaint. 37 462 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.

2022See Cayer, 2016 ME 143 , ,r 16, 148 A.3d 707 ; Mongeau v. City ofMarlborough, 6 Although Defendants raise a statute of limitations defense as to the claims l'elated to the 2010 enforcement action,, U,e Court notes that the primary issues raised by Plaintiffs as to the 2010 enforcement action relates to the amended complaint filed after leave of Cowt granted on January 24, 2013 and actions at public meetings subsequent, all within the 6 year statute of limitations period.

2022See Cayer, 2016 ME 143 , ,r 16, 148 A.3d 707 ; Mongeau v. City ofMarlborough, 6 Although Defendants raise a statute of limitations defense as to the claims l'elated to the 2010 enforcement action,, U,e Court notes that the primary issues raised by Plaintiffs as to the 2010 enforcement action relates to the amended complaint filed after leave of Cowt granted on January 24, 2013 and actions at public meetings subsequent, all within the 6 year statute of limitations period.

2017See State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170 , 172 & n.2 (Me. 1995) (concluding that it was obvious error for the court to fail to instruct the jury on a partial statutory defense where the defendant did not assert— but also did not waive—the defense); cf. State v. Ford, 2013 ME 96, ¶¶ 11-17 , 17 n.5, 82 A.3d 75 (declining to reach the question of whether self-defense and voluntary intoxication defenses were generated by the evidence because, in any event, the defendant expressly waived the defenses). 9 .

2017See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19 , 113 A.3d 583 . 11 As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 12 See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986) (holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were outside the l

2017See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19 , 113 A.3d 583 . 11 As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 12 See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986) (holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were outside the l

2017See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19 , 113 A.3d 583 . 11 As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 12 See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986) (holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were outside the l

2016See Dowling v. Salewski, 2007 ME 78, ¶ 10 , 926 A.2d 193 .

2016See Dowling v. Salewski, 2007 ME 78, ¶ 10 , 926 A.2d 193 .

2015See Angell v. Hallee, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 11 , 36 A.3d 922 (“Once the defendant has successfully raised the statute of limitations defense, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would support the tolling [of the statute of limitations].”).

2015See Angell v. Hallee, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 11 , 36 A.3d 922 (“Once the defendant has successfully raised the statute of limitations defense, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would support the tolling [of the statute of limitations].”).

2012The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, while discussing the deadline imposed by the federal habeas corpus statute, "a statute of limitations defense . . . is not 'jurisdictional."' Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006).

2012See Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, ¶¶ 18-19 , 834 A.2d 131 (noting that the defense of laches is not subject to direct court review before arbitration).

2012See Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, ¶¶ 18-19 , 834 A.2d 131 (noting that the defense of laches is not subject to direct court review before arbitration).

2011See Dugan v. Martel, 588 A.2d 744 (JVIe. 1991) (estoppel may bar defendant from invoking a statute of limitations defense if defendant conducted himself in a manner that induced plaintiffs not to take timely action).