statute of limitations defense in New Mexico

2013Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 13 , 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 .

2013Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 13 , 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 .

2013“The [equitable estoppel] theory is premised on the notion that the one who has prevented the plaintiff from bringing suit within the statutory period should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense.” Tomlinson, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Cont’l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 115 N.M. 690, 697 , 858 P.2d 66, 73 (1993) (“Estoppel precludes one party from asserting a right when another party has relied to his detriment upon the acts or conduct of the first party and when asserting that right would prejudice the other who

2013“The [equitable estoppel] theory is premised on the notion that the one who has prevented the plaintiff from bringing suit within the statutory period should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense.” Tomlinson, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Cont’l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 115 N.M. 690, 697 , 858 P.2d 66, 73 (1993) (“Estoppel precludes one party from asserting a right when another party has relied to his detriment upon the acts or conduct of the first party and when asserting that right would prejudice the other who

2025Cf. Garcia v. Marquez, 1984-NMSC-074 , ¶ 22, 101 N.M. 427 , 684 P.2d 513 (discussing waiver generally); Chavez v. Kitsch, 1962-NMSC-122 , ¶¶ 7-13, 70 N.M. 439 , 374 P.2d 497 (holding a statute of limitations defense was waived without properly pleading it); Hagen v. Faherty, 2003-NMCA-060, ¶¶ 10-20 , 133 N.M. 605 , 66 P.3d 974 (estopping a party from asserting a properly pled statute of limitations defense); Trei v. AMTX Hotel Corp., 2014-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 14-17 , 336 P.3d 393 (discussing whether the defendant waived their personal jurisdiction defense based on the defendant’s subsequent actions in

2025Cf. Garcia v. Marquez, 1984-NMSC-074 , ¶ 22, 101 N.M. 427 , 684 P.2d 513 (discussing waiver generally); Chavez v. Kitsch, 1962-NMSC-122 , ¶¶ 7-13, 70 N.M. 439 , 374 P.2d 497 (holding a statute of limitations defense was waived without properly pleading it); Hagen v. Faherty, 2003-NMCA-060, ¶¶ 10-20 , 133 N.M. 605 , 66 P.3d 974 (estopping a party from asserting a properly pled statute of limitations defense); Trei v. AMTX Hotel Corp., 2014-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 14-17 , 336 P.3d 393 (discussing whether the defendant waived their personal jurisdiction defense based on the defendant’s subsequent actions in

2015See Totura & Co. v. Williams, 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000) 18 (allowing the amended complaint to relate back to the date the motion to amend was 17 1 filed in order to defeat the statute of limitations defense); Children’s Store, 580 A.2d 2 at 1210 (“The better rule is that the action is commenced when the plaintiff files the 3 motion to amend and the proposed complaint irrespective of when the court 4 [eventually] grants the motion to amend.”). 5 {31} The New York Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed that some form of 6 tolling was necessary but declined to adopt the “deeming” approach u

2015See Totura & Co. v. Williams, 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000) (allowing the amended complaint to relate back to the date the motion to amend was filed in order to defeat the statute of limitations defense); Children’s Store, 580 A.2d at 1210 (“The better rule is that the action is commenced when the plaintiff files the motion to amend and the proposed complaint irrespective of when the court [eventually] grants the motion to amend.”). {31} The New York Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed that some form of tolling was necessary but declined to adopt the “deeming” approach used in Florida, Ma

2026Expounding on this principle in Butler, this Court 13 held that a plaintiff must respond to a motion to dismiss on the ground that a claim 14 is time-barred “with general factual allegations that, if proved, would successfully 15 defeat the statute of limitations defense.” 2006-NMCA-084, ¶ 1 .

2023See Butler, 2006-NMCA-084, ¶ 1 (holding that a plaintiff must adequately plead, or argue in response to a motion to dismiss, the application of the discovery rule). {8} In Butler, we held that a plaintiff must respond to a motion to dismiss on the ground that a claim is time-barred “with general factual allegations that, if proved, would successfully defeat the statute of limitations defense.” Id.

2021Adopting the “waiver approach” to statutes of limitations in State v. Kerby, 2007-NMSC-014 , 141 N.M. 413 , 156 P.3d 704 , our Supreme Court held that criminal defendants may waive a statute of limitations defense but, as a matter of state law, may do so only if the defendant’s relinquishment of the defense comports with similar requirements: “[T]he statute of limitations is a substantive right that may only be waived by a defendant after consultation with counsel, and only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. ¶ 18; see also State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tenn. 19

2021Adopting the “waiver approach” to statutes of limitations in State v. Kerby, 2007-NMSC-014 , 141 N.M. 413 , 156 P.3d 704 , our Supreme Court held that criminal defendants may waive a statute of limitations defense but, as a matter of state law, may do so only if the defendant’s relinquishment of the defense comports with similar requirements: “[T]he statute of limitations is a substantive right that may only be waived by a defendant after consultation with counsel, and only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. ¶ 18; see also State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tenn. 19

2019“Under the theory of equitable estoppel, a party may be estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense if that party’s conduct has caused the plaintiff to refrain from filing an action until after the limitations period has expired.” Slusser, 2013-NMCA-073, ¶ 22 .

2016“The party must plead the circumstances giving rise to estoppel with particularity.” Id. ¶ 31. {23} Equitable estoppel prohibits a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense “ ‘if that party’s conduct has caused the plaintiff to refrain from filing an action until after the limitations period has expired.’ ” Slusser, 2013-NMCA-073, ¶ 22 (quoting In re Drummond, 1997-NMCA-094, ¶ 13 , 123 N.M. 727 , 945 P.2d 457 ).

2021Adopting the “waiver approach” to statutes of limitations in State v. Kerby, 2007-NMSC-014 , 141 N.M. 413 , 156 P.3d 704 , our Supreme Court held that criminal defendants may waive a statute of limitations defense but, as a matter of state law, may do so only if the defendant’s relinquishment of the defense comports with similar requirements: “[T]he statute of limitations is a substantive right that may only be waived by a defendant after consultation with counsel, and only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. ¶ 18; see also State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tenn. 19

2021See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[U]ncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions[.]”); id. at 782 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he risk of error or adverse result is inherent in every criminal proceeding[.]”); cf. Demers v. Gerety, 1978-NMCA-019 , ¶ 2, 92 N.M. 749 , 595 P.2d 387 (“Litigation is a slippery experience when appeals are reversed.

2021See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[U]ncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions[.]”); id. at 782 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he risk of error or adverse result is inherent in every criminal proceeding[.]”); cf. Demers v. Gerety, 1978-NMCA-019 , ¶ 2, 92 N.M. 749 , 595 P.2d 387 (“Litigation is a slippery experience when appeals are reversed.

2021Before allowing a defendant to divest himself of this protection, the court must be satisfied that the defendant himself, personally and not merely through his attorney, appreciates the nature of the right he is renouncing and is aware of the potential consequences of his decision.”), with State v. Leisure, 796 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]t would be jarringly inconsistent to allow [a] defendant the option of gambling on the jury’s sense of mitigation or mercy by submitting a [lesser included offense] instruction . . . and then having received such merciful decide to forgive the s

2019See Johnson v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 1999-NMCA-066, ¶ 22 , 127 N.M. 355 , 981 P.2d 288 (concluding that judicial estoppel did not apply when the party had not previously assumed a position regarding the relevant issue before the court).

2019See Johnson v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 1999-NMCA-066, ¶ 22 , 127 N.M. 355 , 981 P.2d 288 (concluding that judicial estoppel did not apply when the party had not previously assumed a position regarding the relevant issue before the court).

2015See Totura & Co. v. Williams, 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000) (allowing the amended complaint to relate back to the date the motion to amend was filed in order to defeat the statute of limitations defense); Children’s Store, 580 A.2d at 1210 (“The better rule is that the action is commenced when the plaintiff files the motion to amend and the proposed complaint irrespective of when the court [eventually] grants the motion to amend.”). {31} The New York Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed that some form of tolling was necessary but declined to adopt the “deeming” approach used in Florida, Ma

2015See Perez v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 83, 86 (N.Y. 1999).

2013When asserting an affirmative defense as grounds for summary judgment, the “[djefendant carrie[s] the burden of making a prima facie showing as to each element of the definition [of the defense].” Solorzano v. Bristow, 2004-NMCA-136, ¶ 15 , 136 N.M. 658 , 103 P.3d 582 (discussing the moving party’s burden in seeking summary judgment against the plaintiff on the affirmative defense of suicide); see Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 , 148 N.M. 713 , 242 P.3d 280 (stating that the moving party has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment).

2013When asserting an affirmative defense as grounds for summary judgment, the “[djefendant carrie[s] the burden of making a prima facie showing as to each element of the definition [of the defense].” Solorzano v. Bristow, 2004-NMCA-136, ¶ 15 , 136 N.M. 658 , 103 P.3d 582 (discussing the moving party’s burden in seeking summary judgment against the plaintiff on the affirmative defense of suicide); see Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 , 148 N.M. 713 , 242 P.3d 280 (stating that the moving party has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment).

2013See Taylor v. 16 Lovelace Clinic, 78 N.M. 460, 462-63 , 432 P.2d 816, 818-19 (1967) (affirming the 17 dismissal of a declaratory judgment action that was premised on a contract claim for 18 which the applicable statute of limitations had run).

2013See Taylor v. 16 Lovelace Clinic, 78 N.M. 460, 462-63 , 432 P.2d 816, 818-19 (1967) (affirming the 17 dismissal of a declaratory judgment action that was premised on a contract claim for 18 which the applicable statute of limitations had run).

2012See Padilla v. 18 Montano, 116 N.M. 398, 402 , 862 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that 19 a party’s reliance on an inapplicable statute with a statute of limitations provision was 7 1 sufficient to put the other party on notice that a statute of limitations defense would 2 be presented).

2012See Padilla v. 18 Montano, 116 N.M. 398, 402 , 862 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that 19 a party’s reliance on an inapplicable statute with a statute of limitations provision was 7 1 sufficient to put the other party on notice that a statute of limitations defense would 2 be presented).