statute of limitations defense in North Carolina

2025“A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.” Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, 344 N.C. 133, 136 (1996).

2024This Rule further explains “[s]uch pleading shall contain a short and plain statement of any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved.” Id. “‘A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.’” Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 361 N.C. 137 , 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006) (emphasis supplied) (quoting H

2015“A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.” Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, 344 N.C. 133, 136 (1996) (citing Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 653 (1994)).

2005“A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.” Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 344 N.C. 133 , 472 S.E.2d 778 (1996) (citing Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 653 , 447 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1994)).

1984Equity will deny the right to assert the statute of limitations defense “when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which would amount to a breach of good faith.” Nowell v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579 , 108 S.E. 2d 889, 891 (1959).

1984Equity will deny the right to assert the statute of limitations defense “when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which would amount to a breach of good faith.” Nowell v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579 , 108 S.E. 2d 889, 891 (1959).

2013App. 448, 459-60 , 448 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1994) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith.”) (citation omitted), disc, review denied, 339 N.C. 736 , 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995).

2011“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith.” Bryant, 116 N.C.

2025A statute of limitations defense will not be applied when the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit “has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which would amount to a breach of good faith.” Duke Univ. v. Stainback, 320 N.C. 337, 341 (1987) (citation omitted).

2013See generally Duke Univ. v. Stainback, 320 N.C. 337 , 357 S.E.2d 690 (1987) (holding equitable estoppel bars a statute of limitations defense when the defendant’s attorney misled the plaintiff into delaying legal action); Friedland v. Gales, 131 N.C.

2023GOINS Opinion of the Court State v. Bell, 61 N.C. 76, 83 (1867) (holding, prior to amendment of N.C.

2023GOINS Opinion of the Court State v. Bell, 61 N.C. 76, 83 (1867) (holding, prior to amendment of N.C.

2023I, § 16; (2) the North Carolina Constitution nowhere describes a statute of limitations defense as a vested property right; (3) the cases relied upon by the majority did not anchor their vested rights and statute of limitations analyses to any constitutional provisions; and (4) at least two decisions from our Supreme Court recognize that retrospective laws are not per se prohibited by our State Constitution, see State v. — , 2 N.C. 28, 39-40 (1794) (upholding judgments against delinquent receivers of public money after hearing the Attorney General’s argument that “[s]ection 24 of our Bill of R

2023I, § 16; (2) the North Carolina Constitution nowhere describes a statute of limitations defense as a vested property right; (3) the cases relied upon by the majority did not anchor their vested rights and statute of limitations analyses to any constitutional provisions; and (4) at least two decisions from our Supreme Court recognize that retrospective laws are not per se prohibited by our State Constitution, see State v. — , 2 N.C. 28, 39-40 (1794) (upholding judgments against delinquent receivers of public money after hearing the Attorney General’s argument that “[s]ection 24 of our Bill of R

2023See Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163, 169 , 167 S.E. 691, 695 (1933); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 373 , 53 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Stereo Center v. Hodson, 39 N.C.

2023See Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163, 169 , 167 S.E. 691, 695 (1933); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 373 , 53 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Stereo Center v. Hodson, 39 N.C.

2023See Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163, 169 , 167 S.E. 691, 695 (1933); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 373 , 53 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Stereo Center v. Hodson, 39 N.C.

2023See Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163, 169 , 167 S.E. 691, 695 (1933); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 373 , 53 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Stereo Center v. Hodson, 39 N.C.

2023See Lester Brothers v. Insurance Co., 250 N.C. 565, 568 , 109 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1959) (noting that a plaintiff’s vested right to hold a defendant individually liable for business debts could not be extinguished by a later statute eliminating that individual liability because “[a] retrospective statute, affecting or changing vested rights, is founded on unconstitutional principles and consequently void” (citation omitted)).

2023See Lester Brothers v. Insurance Co., 250 N.C. 565, 568 , 109 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1959) (noting that a plaintiff’s vested right to hold a defendant individually liable for business debts could not be extinguished by a later statute eliminating that individual liability because “[a] retrospective statute, affecting or changing vested rights, is founded on unconstitutional principles and consequently void” (citation omitted)).

2023See Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.

2023See Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.

2023See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“[I]f the statute impacts neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, we employ the rational basis test.”).

2023See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“[I]f the statute impacts neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, we employ the rational basis test.”).

2020This Court recently analyzed the continuing wrong doctrine, noting that: With respect to the continuing wrong doctrine and its impact on a statute of limitations analysis, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently clarified that although the doctrine has sometimes been treated as an exception to the rules governing the operation of statutes of limitation, “such a description of the doctrine in question is a misnomer given that the ‘continuing wrong’ doctrine does nothing more than provide that the applicable limitations period starts anew in the event that an allegedly unlawful act is repeated

2019With respect to the continuing wrong doctrine and its impact on a statute of limitations analysis, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently clarified that although the doctrine has sometimes been treated as an exception to the rules governing the operation of statutes of limitation, “such a description of the doctrine in question is a misnomer given that the ‘continuing wrong’ doctrine does nothing more than provide that the applicable limitations period starts anew in the event that an allegedly unlawful act is repeated.” Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 371 N.C. 60, 70 , 813 S.

2020This Court has held: “A statute of limitations defense is properly asserted in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and is proper grounds for the trial court to find a complaint is without merit.”Kaleel Builders, Inc. v. Ashby, 161 N.C.

2020This Court has held: “A statute of limitations defense is properly asserted in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and is proper grounds for the trial court to find a complaint is without merit.”Kaleel Builders, Inc. v. Ashby, 161 N.C.

2017Once the defendant raises a statute of limitations defense, the burden of showing that the action was instituted within the prescribed period is on the plaintiff.' " Birtha v. Stonemor, N. Carolina, LLC , 220 N.C.App. 286 , 292, 727 S.E.2d 1 , 6-7 (2012) (quoting Horton v. Carolina Medicorp , 344 N.C. 133 , 136, 472 S.E.2d 778 , 780 (1996) ).

2017Once the defendant raises a statute of limitations defense, the burden of showing that the action was instituted within the prescribed period is on the plaintiff.' " Birtha v. Stonemor, N. Carolina, LLC , 220 N.C.App. 286 , 292, 727 S.E.2d 1 , 6-7 (2012) (quoting Horton v. Carolina Medicorp , 344 N.C. 133 , 136, 472 S.E.2d 778 , 780 (1996) ).

2016TaiDoc presents no North Carolina case in which the court has applied a “notice” or “discovery” rule to tortious interference or unjust enrichment claims, and this Court declines to do so now. {66} TaiDoc does not otherwise contest that its claims accrued before November 16, 2009, but nonetheless argues that either equitable estoppel or the continuing wrong doctrine should preclude application of the statute of limitations. {67} The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which may be invoked to bar a defendant from relying on a statute of limitations defense, “arises when an individual by his acts, r

2002"Although defendants' motion to amend was allowed by order ... defendants never filed an amendment to their answer to allege a statute of limitations defense." Id. at 486 , 435 S.E.2d at 796 .

2010Id.

1998App. 484 , 435 S.E.2d 793 (1993); Parker v. Thompson-Arthur Paving Co., 100 N.C.

2025Grp. v. Fisher, Clinard & Cornwell, PLLC, 211 N.C.

2013Grp. v. Fisher, Clinard & Cornwell, PLLC, 211 N.C.

2024This Rule further explains “[s]uch pleading shall contain a short and plain statement of any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved.” Id. “‘A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.’” Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 361 N.C. 137 , 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006) (emphasis supplied) (quoting H

2024This Rule further explains “[s]uch pleading shall contain a short and plain statement of any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved.” Id. “‘A statute of limitations defense may properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the claim.’” Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 361 N.C. 137 , 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006) (emphasis supplied) (quoting H

2018App. 674, 687 , 614 S.E.2d 542, 551 (2005) (“This Court has held that a trial court may consider a statute of limitations defense, though not raised in a motion to dismiss, when the non-movant has not been surprised and has full opportunity to argue and present evidence on the affirmative defense.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

2016This Court has held that a trial court may consider a statute of limitations defense, though not raised in a motion to dismiss, when "the non-movant has not been surprised and has full opportunity to argue and present evidence on the affirmative defense." Carlisle, 169 N.C.App. at 687 , 614 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Thurston v. United States, 810 F.2d 438 , 444 (4th Cir.1987), and quoting Johnson v. N.C.

2005This Court has held that a trial court may consider a statute of limitations defense, though not raised in a motion to dismiss, when “the non-movant ‘has not been surprised and has full opportunity to argue and present evidence’ on the affirmative defense.” Johnson v. North Carolina DOT, 107 N.C.

2005The Johnson Court held that the plaintiff had not been “surprised” “by the defendant’s reliance upon the statute of limitations defense because the trial court heard argument from both parties on the issue and “the record does not reflect that plaintiff, at any time during the proceeding, objected to [defendant’s] failure to specifically allege the statute of limitation in the motion.” Johnson, 107 N.C.

2013App. 448, 459-60 , 448 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1994) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith.”) (citation omitted), disc, review denied, 339 N.C. 736 , 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995).

1998App. 448, 459-60 , 448 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 736 , 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith. ”); Miller v. Talton, 112 N.C.

2013App. 448, 459-60 , 448 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1994) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith.”) (citation omitted), disc, review denied, 339 N.C. 736 , 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995).

1998App. 448, 459-60 , 448 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 736 , 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach of good faith. ”); Miller v. Talton, 112 N.C.