statute of limitations defense in Florida

2002In Tucker v. State, 459 So.2d 306, 309 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court explained that the statute of limitations defense can be waived when the trial: court [is] satisfied that the defendant himself, personally and not merely through his attorney, appreciates the nature of the right he is renouncing and is aware of the potential consequences of his decision.

1999See Eaddy v. State, 638 So.2d 22 (Fla.1994) (a defendant’s mere request for jury instructions on time-barred lesser included offenses is not an effective waiver of the statute of limitations defense); Tucker v. State, 459 So.2d 306 (Fla.1984) (same).

2017Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001).

2007See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001) (recognizing equitable estoppel as a bar to a statute of limitations defense).

2016If courts were to find that “creeping diseases” “manifest” at first sign of “symptoms,” such policy would be disserved, as the statute of limitations would bar plaintiffs from pursuing fruitful causes of action before the plaintiff even knows enough “to commence a non-frivolous tort lawsuit.” Frazier [v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 89 So.3d 937, 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ].

2016If courts were to find that “creeping diseases” “manifest” at first sign of “symptoms,” such policy would be disserved, as the statute of limitations would bar plaintiffs from pursuing fruitful causes of action before the plaintiff even knows enough “to commence a non-frivolous tort lawsuit.” Frazier [v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 89 So. 3d 937, 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)].

2005Baptist Hosp. of Miami Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation that misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations."); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period."); Jaszay v. H.B.

2002See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations.”); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.”); Jaszay v. H.B.

2005Baptist Hosp. of Miami Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation that misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations."); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period."); Jaszay v. H.B.

2002See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations.”); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.”); Jaszay v. H.B.

2005Corp., 598 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (estopping a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it had stipulated to a sixty-day extension of the presuit screening period); Glantzis v. State Auto.

2005Corp., 598 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("The appellee is estopped from asserting the limitations defense because it stipulated to the sixty-day extension of the pre-suit screening period."); Glantzis v. State Auto.

2016See, e.g., Brown, 175 So.3d at 834 (applying Singleton to a statute of limitations defense); Evergrene Partners, Inc,, 143 So.3d at 955, 956 (same); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bartram, 140 So.3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), review granted, 160 So.3d 892 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2014) (“Based on Singleton, a default occurring after a failed foreclosure attempt creates a new cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, even where acceleration had been triggered and the first case was dismissed on its merits.

2016See, e.g., Brown, 175 So. 3d at 834 (applying Singleton to a statute of limitations defense); Evergrene Partners, Inc., 143 So. 3d at 955, 956 (same); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), review granted, 160 So. 3d 892 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2014) (“Based on Singleton, a default occurring after a failed foreclosure attempt creates a new cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, even where acceleration had been triggered and the first case was dismissed on its merits.

2016See also Gren, 133 So.3d at 1068 (stating that “factual issues ... including the timeliness in initiating the arbitration proceeding, belonged to the arbitrator”); Cooper v. Fine, 705 So.2d 131, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (finding that “whether conditions precedent to arbitration were fulfilled ... is a question for the arbitrator”); O’Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So.2d at 188 (holding that a statute of limitations defense was to be decided by the arbitrator).

2007Partners, Ltd., 944 So.2d 181, 188 (Fla.2006) (holding that a statute of limitations defense was to be decided by the arbitrator).

2013Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633-34 , 100 S.Ct. 2382 , 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 , 93 S.Ct. 1993 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Eaddy v. State, 638 So.2d 22, 25 (Fla.1994) (recognizing that this “Hob-son’s choice” creates enhanced risk of conviction for defendant and holding that, in a death penalty case, defendant was

1999See Eaddy v. State, 638 So.2d 22 (Fla.1994) (a defendant’s mere request for jury instructions on time-barred lesser included offenses is not an effective waiver of the statute of limitations defense); Tucker v. State, 459 So.2d 306 (Fla.1984) (same).

2009Fla., 961 So.2d 1083, 1085-86 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that prohibition was not available to review the trial court's order that rejected an affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations); O'Donnell's Corp. v. Ambroise, 858 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon a statute of limitations defense by either a writ of certiorari or a writ of prohibition); Panagakos v. Laufer, 779 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

2009Fla., 961 So.2d 1083, 1085-86 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that prohibition was not available to review the trial court’s order that rejected an affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations); O’Donnell’s Corp. v. Ambroise, 858 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon a statute of limitations defense by either a writ of cer-tiorari or a writ of prohibition); Panaga-Icos v. Laufer, 779 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

2002See Southern Bell v. MacDonald, 671 So.2d 207, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("If the employer breaches its duty to inform the employee of his rights, the running of the statute of limitations will be tolled until such time that the employee obtains actual knowledge from any source that he may be entitled to compensation benefits."); Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So.2d 811, 815-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (discussing and citing cases for the principle that, since 1979, courts have construed the Workers' Compensation Act limitations to be tolled if the employer fails to comply with its statuto

1997The order stated that Mr. Acle’s entitlement to future medical treatment was “for the time and in the manner provided by law.” His former attorney certified that he had explained the contents of the settlement agreement to Mr. Acle; that Mr. Acle had signified “his full understanding of its meaning and intent;” and that this “understanding” included an understanding of the stipulation’s provisions awarding future medical care “pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act.” In support of his argument that employer/carrier should be estopped from asserting

2026Beachway Rests. 2 v. Santo & June, Inc., 386 So. 3d 961 , 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); accord Toledo Park Homes v. Grant, 447 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (explaining that, generally, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised in an answer).

1993See Toledo Park Homes v. Grant, 447 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Estate of James v. Martin Memorial Hospital, 422 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

2025Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“Where, as here, the statute of limitations defense 2 motion in an unelaborated order with no attachments or references to relevant portions of the record.

2018Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("Where, as here, the statute of limitations defense appears on the face of the complaint, it is permissible to assert the statute of limitations defense by motion to dismiss."), with Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ("Considering the complaint on its face, we cannot say as a matter of law that the limitations period commenced to run in 1988 when the Homeowner first experienced 'problems with the roof.' Further facts may or may not establish that other problems around the wi

2018It is true that "[o]rdinarily, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense; however, an affirmative defense appearing on the face of a prior pleading may be asserted as a ground for a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)." Hofer v. Ross, 481 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (citing Fla. R.

1987Though the voluntarily dismissed cause has no effect upon the limitations period, Fernon v. Itkin, 476 F.Supp. 1 (M.D.Fla.1977), aff’d, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.1979); see also Hamilton v. Largo Paint & Decorating, Inc., 335 So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and thus the statute of limitations bar might present a valid affirmative defense if asserted by the appellants upon the re-filing of this action, cf. Hofer v. Ross, 481 So.2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pled by the defendant to be a valid defense), it has no impact upon a determination o

2018As Judge Emas observes, had defense counsel raised a statute-of-limitations defense on Smith’s remaining charges, “the State could validly have amended the information to charge the very same burglary, but as a life felony (a crime for which there is no statute of limitations).” Smith, 211 So. 3d at 202 (Emas, J., concurring).

2018As Judge Emas observes, had defense counsel raised a statute-of-limitations defense on Smith's remaining charges, "the State could validly have amended the information to charge the very same burglary, but as a life felony (a crime for which there is no statute of limitations)." Smith , 211 So.3d at 202 (Emas, J., concurring).

2016See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.2001) (holding that equitable estoppel may bar a party’s assertion of a statute of limitations); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Sarasota, 361 So.2d 156, 158 (Fla.1978) (holding that equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or affirmative deception).

2016See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (holding that equitable estoppel may bar a party's assertion of a statute of limitations); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Sarasota, 361 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1978) (holding that equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or affirmative deception).

2015See, e.g., Brooke v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, 828 So.2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs complaint based on the expiration of the statute of limitations because the facts necessary to determine the statute of limitations defense were not apparent on the face of the complaint and its attachments).

2015See, e.g., Brooke v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, 828 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's complaint based on the expiration of the statute of limitations because the facts necessary to determine the statute of limitations defense were not apparent on the face of the complaint and its attachments).

2019With respect to the statute of limitations defense, Nationstar contends that the trial court erred by agreeing with Hudson's position that the law changed concerning the application of the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association , 211 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), as well as this Court's en banc decision in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais , 188 So.3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (en banc), and these two decisions should not "revive" Nationstar's foreclosure action.

2019With respect to the statute of limitations defense, Nationstar contends that the trial court erred by agreeing with Hudson's position that the law changed concerning the application of the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association , 211 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), as well as this Court's en banc decision in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais , 188 So.3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (en banc), and these two decisions should not "revive" Nationstar's foreclosure action.

2020In response, relying on Cartagena v. State, 125 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the State argued that appellant could not waive the statute of limitations defense because he previously moved to dismiss the action based on that defense.

2020In response, relying on Cartagena v. State, 125 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the State argued that appellant could not waive the statute of limitations defense because he previously moved to dismiss the action based on that defense.

2018To hold otherwise, the Supreme Court explained, would result in a windfall to the borrower constituting “unjust enrichment or other inequitable results.” Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1017 (quoting Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007-08 ); Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 943-44 .

2016Specifically, the majority’s principal conclusions are untenable because they: (i) contradict the express language of Singleton that only an adjudication that denies acceleration and foreclosure reinstates the loan (Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007 ); (ii) effectively rewrite the parties’ contract documents, both by adding a new reinstatement provision and by redefining acceleration; (iii) rewrite Florida dismissal law, visiting upon a form dismissal order unprecedented adjudicatory effect; (iv) effectively rewrite the statute of limitations defense in foreclosure cases; and (v) conflate Florida’

2016See Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction; to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment, it is one which can be waived); Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265, 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (observing that “[s]tatutes of limitations on crimes are not jurisdictional, and may be waived”); Morris, 909 So. 2d at 431 (same); Lowe v. State, 501 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (noting that “[i]n Florida, statutes of limitations on crimes do no

2016See Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding a statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction; to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment, it is one which can be waived); Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265, 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (observing that “[s]tatutes of limitations on crimes are not jurisdictional, and may be waived”); Morris v. State, 909 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (same); Lowe v. State, 501 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (same).22 Any 22 It is noteworthy that the Unite

2024“A statute of limitations ‘runs from the time the cause of action accrues’ which, in turn, is generally determined by the date ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’” Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 , 1184–85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987)).

2017“A statute of limitations ‘runs from the time the cause of action accrues’ which, in turn, is generally determined by the date ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” Heamdon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987)).

2023Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190 So. 3d 1028, 1042 (Fla. 2016) (Polson, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be in the Engle class and therefore get the benefit of the Engle class action jury’s findings, a plaintiff’s tobacco- related disease or condition must have manifested itself between the statute-of-limitations bar date of May 5, 1990, and the judicially imposed bar date of November 21, 1996.”); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Russo, 175 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2015); Fanali v. R.J.

2019If courts were to find that "creeping diseases" "manifest" at first sign of "symptoms," [the policy of the statute of limitations] would be disserved, as the statute of limitations would bar plaintiffs from pursuing fruitful causes of action before the plaintiff even knows enough "to commence a non- frivolous tort lawsuit." -4- Id. (citations omitted).

2019Id.; Rigby v. Liles, 505 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). 3 Tejera alleged that ACV’s corporate predecessor was Okeechobee. 3 Defendants.

1995Rigby v. Liles, 505 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), sets forth the applicable principles: ... [T]he statute of limitations and laches are affirmative defenses which should be raised by answer rather than by a motion to dismiss the complaint; and only in extraordinary circumstances where the facts constituting the defense affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and establish conclusively that the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law, should a motion to dismiss on this ground be granted.