statute of limitations defense in New York

2025Accepting these allegations as true and according the complaint all favorable inferences, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged at this juncture that defendant forestalled plaintiff's ability to meaningfully uncover its deficient administration of the APP, and therefore, at this stage, defendant is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense ( see Zumpano v Quinn , 6 NY3d 666, 675 [2006]; Gerzog v Goldfarb , 206 AD3d 554 , 555-556 [1st Dept 2022]; Local No. 4, Intl.

2025Accepting these allegations as true and according the complaint all favorable inferences, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged at this juncture that defendant forestalled plaintiff's ability to meaningfully uncover its deficient administration of the APP, and therefore, at this stage, defendant is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense ( see Zumpano v Quinn , 6 NY3d 666, 675 [2006]; Gerzog v Goldfarb , 206 AD3d 554, 555-556 [1st Dept 2022]; Local No. 4, Intl.

2025We also reject plaintiff's contention that the Town should be equitably estopped from pleading a statute of limitations defense ( see Ross v Louise Wise Servs. , Inc. , 8 NY3d 478, 491 [2007]).

2025A defendant is estopped from pleading a statute of limitations defense if the " 'plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action' " ( id. ).

2022The amended complaint alleges, at most, "Defendants remained on the engagement to . . . cover up and fraudulently conceal their malfeasance." However, "[a] wrongdoer is not legally obliged to . . . alert people who may have claims against it, to get the benefit of a statute of limitations" ( Zumpano, 6 NY3d at 675 ; see also Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 789 [2012] ["in cases where the alleged concealment consisted of nothing but defendants' failure to disclose the wrongs they had committed, we have held that the defendants were not estopped from pleading a statute of limitations

2022The amended complaint alleges, at most, "Defendants remained on the engagement to . . . cover up and fraudulently conceal their malfeasance." However, "[a] wrongdoer is not legally obliged to . . . alert people who may have claims against it, to get the benefit of a statute of limitations" ( Zumpano, 6 NY3d at 675 ; see also Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 789 [2012] ["in cases where the alleged concealment consisted of nothing but defendants' failure to disclose the wrongs they had committed, we have held that the defendants were not estopped from pleading a statute of limitations

2026In Faison , the Court of Appeals concluded, based upon public policy considerations, that "challenges to forged deeds" are " distinct from other [fraud] claims, and exempt from a statute of limitations defense" ( id. at 227 [emphasis added]).

2022As to whether Supreme Court overlooked or misapprehended the law, we initially agree that, where a conveyance of real property is void ab initio, a challenge thereto cannot be said to be subject to a statute of limitations defense ( see Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 226 [2015]).

2024"Under this doctrine, a defendant is estopped from [*10]pleading a statute of limitations defense if the 'plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action'" ( Ross v Louise Wise Servs., Inc. , 8 NY3d 478, 491 [2007], quoting Simcuski v Saeli , 44 NY2d 442 , 449 [1978]; see Zumpano v Quinn , 6 NY3d 666, 674-675 [2006]; General Stencils, Inc. v Chiappa , 18 NY2d 125, 128 [1966]).

2012The Appellate Division, relying on General Stencils v Chiappa ( 18 NY2d 125 [1966]) and Simcuski v Saeli ( 44 NY2d 442 [1978]), held that Verizon was estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense because (assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true) Verizon concealed its wrongdoing from plaintiffs and so prevented them from bringing a timely lawsuit.

2024Hosp. , 7 NY3d 548, 552-553 ).

2018Hosp ., 7 NY3d 548, 552-553 [2006]), and the plaintiff's reliance on the fraud, misrepresentations or deception was reasonable ( see Putter , 7 NY3d at 552-553 ).

2014Thus, plaintiffs’ argument that Morgan Stanley is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense is unavailing (see Gonik v Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 80 AD3d 437, 438 [1st Dept 2011]).

2014Thus, plaintiffs’ argument that Morgan Stanley is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense is unavailing (see Gonik v Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 80 AD3d 437, 438 [1st Dept 2011]).

2016A defendant’s grand jury claim should be subject to the same standard as other ineffective assistance of counsel claims, such as those based on a lawyer’s failure to investigate and adequately prepare a defense (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 348 [2013]), failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct and inflammatory summation remarks (People v Wright, 25 NY3d 769 [2015]), failure to assert a statute of limitations defense to a charge (People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476 [2005]), failure to consider proper criminal procedure and evidentiary law (People v Oathout, 21 NY3d 127 [2013]), or failure to en

2016A defendant's grand jury claim should be subject to the same standard as other ineffective assistance of counsel claims, such as those based on a lawyer's failure to investigate and adequately prepare a defense (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 348 [2013]), failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct and inflammatory summation remarks (People v Wright, 25 NY3d 769 [2015]), failure to assert a statute of limitations defense to a charge (People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476 [2005]), failure to consider proper criminal procedure - 6 - - 7 - No. 18 and evidentiary law (People v Oathout, 21 NY3d 127 [2013]

2018Farmers Exch. v AG Assets , 168 AD2d 822, 823 [3d Dept 1990]; see Doyon v Bascom , 38 AD2d 645, 645-646 [3d Dept 1971]).

2018Farmers Exch. v AG Assets , 168 AD2d 822, 823 [3d Dept 1990]; see Doyon v Bascom , 38 AD2d 645, 645-646 [3d Dept 1971]).

2025Here, plaintiff has failed to show that the Town engaged in any fraud, misrepresentations, or deception ( see generally Merrill Lynch Credit Corp. v Smith , 87 AD3d 1391, 1393 [4th Dept 2011]; Pecoraro v M & T Bank Corp ., 11 AD3d 950, 952 [4th Dept 2004]).

2016Here, petitioner failed to establish that he was “induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action” (Pecoraro v M&T Bank Corp., 11 AD3d 950, 951-952 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]) and, in any event, the record establishes that petitioner was aware in 2006 of respondent’s intentions with respect to the real property.

2025Sinai Hosp., 47 NY2d 170, 175 [1979]).

2025Sinai Hosp., 47 NY2d 170, 175 [1979]).

2021Assoc. v Tausend , 19 NY3d 597, 602 [2012]).

2021Assoc. v Tausend , 19 NY3d 597, 602 [2012]).

2018Farmers Exch. v AG Assets , 168 AD2d 822, 823 [3d Dept 1990]; see Doyon v Bascom , 38 AD2d 645, 645-646 [3d Dept 1971]).

2018Farmers Exch. v AG Assets , 168 AD2d 822, 823 [3d Dept 1990]; see Doyon v Bascom , 38 AD2d 645, 645-646 [3d Dept 1971]).

2013The complaint, however, is still viable insofar as asserted against the defendants Tonya Lewis, also known as Tonya Taylor, also known as Tony Lewis Taylor, and Dorothy Lewis, since they failed to raise the statute of limitations defense in their answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Dougherty v City of Rye, 63 NY2d 989 [1984]; Horst v Brown, 72 AD3d 434 [2010]; Mann v Rusk, 14 AD3d 909 [2005]).

2013The complaint, however, is still viable insofar as asserted against the defendants Tonya Lewis, also known as Tonya Taylor, also known as Tony Lewis Taylor, and Dorothy Lewis, since they failed to raise the statute of limitations defense in their answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Dougherty v City of Rye, 63 NY2d 989 [1984]; Horst v Brown, 72 AD3d 434 [2010]; Mann v Rusk, 14 AD3d 909 [2005]).

2012Here, the defendants are estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense since a fiduciary relationship existed between Patrick and John Sr., who concealed from Patrick the fact that Patrick did not have a recorded 25% ownership interest in Gowanus, a fact which John Sr. was duty bound to disclose (see Zumpano v Quinn, 6 NY3d 666, 675 [2006]; Gonik v Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 80 AD3d 437, 438 [2011]; Gleason v Spota, 194 AD2d 764, 765 [1993]).

2012Here, the defendants are estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense since a fiduciary relationship existed between Patrick and John Sr., who concealed from Patrick the fact that Patrick did not have a recorded 25% ownership interest in Gowanus, a fact which John Sr. was duty bound to disclose (see Zumpano v Quinn, 6 NY3d 666, 675 [2006]; Gonik v Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 80 AD3d 437, 438 [2011]; Gleason v Spota, 194 AD2d 764, 765 [1993]).

2007Plaintiff may not avail herself of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude assertion of a statute of limitations defense because the alleged misrepresentation underlying the estoppel claim is one and the same as that forming the basis of the underlying substantive cause of action for negligence (see Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 105-106 [1989]; Transport Workers Union of Am.

1996In Simcuski v Saeli (supra, at 454), the Court of Appeals emphasized that, in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to defeat a defense predicated on the Statute of Limitations, the defendant’s conduct must be shown to transcend mere negligence and to comprise "the purposeful concealment and misrepresentation of the fact and consequences of the malpractice.” This subject was revisited in Rizk v Cohen ( 73 NY2d 98, 102 ), in which the Court rejected the contention that the "defendants should be estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations defense due to their fraudulent concea

2015Mere promises to pay in the future, however, are insufficient to support a theory of equitable estoppel where, as here, “[t]here is no evidence that the . . . promises to pay were intended to lull [decedents] into inactivity until after the expiration of the [s]tatute of [limitations” (Erlichman v Ventura, 271 AD2d 481, 481 [2000]; see Joseph Gaier, P.C. v Iveli, 287 AD2d 375, 375 [2001]; Donahue-Halverson, Inc. v Wissing Constr. & Bldg.

2007Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestions, the alleged actions of the Attorney General in assuring plaintiffs’ counsel that the amendment to the offering plan would be dealt with in the near future do not rise to the level of affirmative wrongdoing so as to equitably estop said defendant from asserting the statute of limitations defense (see Joseph Gaier, P.C. v Iveli, 287 AD2d 375 [2001]).

2012Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761, 762 [2008]; Garcia v Peterson, 32 AD3d 992, 992-993 [2006]).

2010Guarino’s contention that the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense is without merit (see Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761, 762 [2008]).

2024"Equitable estoppel may be invoked to defeat a statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action" ( Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City] , 17 AD3d 793, 794 [3d Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 6 NY3d 707 [2006]).

2015Additionally, where, as here, a fiduciary relationship is involved, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to defeat a statute of limitations defense so long as the plaintiff establishes that he or she commenced the action within a reasonable amount of time (see Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793, 794-796 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 707 [2006]).

2025"The party asserting the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proof on the issue" ( Matter of Baird , 58 AD3d at 959 ; see Matter of Rodken , 270 AD2d 784, 785 [3d Dept 2000]).

2019As the party asserting the statute of limitations defense, defendant "bore the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the time to sue had expired, and thus [was] required to establish, among other things, when . . . plaintiff's cause of action accrued" ( Haynes v Williams , 162 AD3d 1377 , 1378 [2018] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 32 NY3d 906 [2018]; see Matter of Baird , 58 AD3d 958, 959 [2009]).

2020Corp. , 38 NY2d 662, 668 [1976]; Young v New York City Health & Hosps.

2020Corp. , 38 NY2d 662, 668 [1976]; Young v New York City Health & Hosps.

2025"The party asserting the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proof on the issue" ( Matter of Baird , 58 AD3d at 959 ; see Matter of Rodken , 270 AD2d 784, 785 [3d Dept 2000]).

2020The party seeking the benefit of the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proof on the issue of open repudiation ( see Matter of Asch , 164 AD3d 787 ; Matter of Rodken , 270 AD2d 784, 785 ; see e.g.