statute of limitations defense in Arizona

2024Exch., 200 Ariz. 572, ¶ 8 (App. 2001) (“We review de novo ‘any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense.’” (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 (App. 1996))). ¶8 “An action for debt shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, if the indebtedness is evidenced by or founded on . . . [a] contract in writing that is executed in this state.” § 12-548(A)(1).

2017Given our preference to resolve claims on their merits, “the statute of limitations defense is not favored.” CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d 979 (App. 2000) (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 22 , 932 P.2d 281, 287 (App. 1996)).

2017Given our preference to resolve claims on their merits, “the statute of limitations defense is not favored.” CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d 979 (App. 2000) (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 22 , 932 P.2d 281, 287 (App. 1996)).

2017Given our preference to resolve claims on their merits, “the statute of limitations defense is not favored.” CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d 979 (App. 2000) (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 22 , 932 P.2d 281, 287 (App. 1996)).

2024Consistent with this rule, our court concluded that waiver of a statute-of-limitations defense is effective only “if not asserted prior to judgment.” Romo v. Reyes, 26 Ariz. App. 374, 376 (1976). ¶12 Liberti’s waiver argument also relies on Rule 12(g)(2).

2023Romos v. Reyes, 26 Ariz. App. 374, 376 (1976).

2002See CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173 , 7 P.3d 979 (App.2000); Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402 , 884 P.2d 1100 (App.1994). ¶5 The legislature has provided for the tolling of the period of limitations under certain circumstances.

2002See CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173 , 7 P.3d 979 (App.2000); Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402 , 884 P.2d 1100 (App.1994). ¶5 The legislature has provided for the tolling of the period of limitations under certain circumstances.

2014Citing Nolde v. Frankie, 192 Ariz. 276 , 964 P.2d 477 (1998), Appellants responded that Quarles & Brady was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.

2014Citing Nolde v. Frankie, 192 Ariz. 276 , 964 P.2d 477 (1998), Appellants responded that Quarles & Brady was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.

2026Code § 2058(3) (1928), now A.R.S. § 12-541(5)). ¶26 After the case was remanded to the trial court and tried, this Court rejected the county’s statute of limitations defense against the city finding that the nullum tempus doctrine applied “unless the Legislature has expressly permitted such a [defense].” City of Bisbee v. Cochise County (“Bisbee II”), 50 Ariz. 360, 369 (1937).

2017On a second appeal after the case was remanded and tried, this Court again rejected the county’s statute-of-limitations defense against the city’s attempted collection of tax revenues, finding the nullum tempus doctrine applied “unless the Legislature has expressly permitted such a [defense].” City of Bisbee v. Cochise Cty., 50 Ariz. 360, 369 , 72 P.2d 439, 443 (1937).

2023Cf. Rogers, 233 Ariz. at 266, ¶ 12 (“A quiet title action seeks a judicial determination of adverse claims in order to clear title of the disputed property.”). ¶29 To be sure, we have held that the statute of limitations can bar a plaintiff from beginning a foreclosure on a mortgage.

2017See Rogers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 233 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“A statute of limitations defense to a quiet title action turns on whether the claimant asserts a possessory interest in the land.”).

2019Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner, 15 Ariz. 517, 518 (1914) (“[The statute of limitations defense] prevents a recovery when properly invoked by the debtor.

2017Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner, 15 Ariz. 517, 518 (1914) (recognizing that the statute of limitations defense “prevents a recovery when properly invoked by the debtor.

2017Nevertheless, “claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” Montaño v. Browning, 202 Ariz. 544, 546, ¶ 4 , 48 P.3d 494 (App. 2002).

2017Nevertheless, “claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” Montaño v. Browning, 202 Ariz. 544, 546, ¶ 4 , 48 P.3d 494 (App. 2002).

2012Comm'n, 152 Ariz. 405, 412 , 733 P.2d 290, 297 (1987), which the ALJ expressly declined to rule upon.

2012Comm'n, 152 Ariz. 405, 412 , 733 P.2d 290, 297 (1987), which the ALJ expressly declined to rule upon.

2008More specifically, “[w]hether a particular statute of limitations applies is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Harris Trust Bank v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162-63 , 933 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (App.1996); see also Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 , 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App.1996) (we “independently review any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense”). ¶ 16 In interpreting statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 6 , 52 P.3d 218, 220 (App.2002).

2008More specifically, “[w]hether a particular statute of limitations applies is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Harris Trust Bank v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162-63 , 933 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (App.1996); see also Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 , 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App.1996) (we “independently review any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense”). ¶ 16 In interpreting statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 6 , 52 P.3d 218, 220 (App.2002).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008More specifically, “[w]hether a particular statute of limitations applies is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Harris Trust Bank v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162-63 , 933 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (App.1996); see also Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 , 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App.1996) (we “independently review any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense”). ¶ 16 In interpreting statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 6 , 52 P.3d 218, 220 (App.2002).

2008More specifically, “[w]hether a particular statute of limitations applies is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Harris Trust Bank v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162-63 , 933 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (App.1996); see also Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 , 932 P.2d 281, 283 (App.1996) (we “independently review any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense”). ¶ 16 In interpreting statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 6 , 52 P.3d 218, 220 (App.2002).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2007The party opposing a motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitations defense “bears the burden of proving the statute has been tolled.” Id.; see also Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, 484 F.Supp.2d 822, 826 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (“It is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate why he or she is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.”). ¶ 9 Although the state moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R.

2007The party opposing a motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitations defense “bears the burden of proving the statute has been tolled.” Id.; see also Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, 484 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (S.D.

1997Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 405 , 884 P.2d 1100, 1103 (App.1994); Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 39 , 764 P.2d 772, 774 (App.1988).

1997Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 405 , 884 P.2d 1100, 1103 (App.1994); Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 39 , 764 P.2d 772, 774 (App.1988).

1983Nelson v. Industrial Commission, 134 Ariz. 369 , 656 P.2d 1230 (1982) (reh'g denied 1983); Van Horn v. Industrial Commission ( Van Horn II ), 111 Ariz. 237, 239 , 527 P.2d 282, 284 (1974); Priedigkeit v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz. App. 594 , 514 P.2d 1045 (1973).

1983Nelson v. Industrial Commission, 134 Ariz. 369 , 656 P.2d 1230 (1982) (reh'g denied 1983); Van Horn v. Industrial Commission ( Van Horn II ), 111 Ariz. 237, 239 , 527 P.2d 282, 284 (1974); Priedigkeit v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz. App. 594 , 514 P.2d 1045 (1973).

1996In Arizona, however, the statute of limitations defense is not favored, Gust, Rosenfeld, 182 Ariz. at 590, 898 P.2d at 968 , “and the discovery rule developed as a tool to mitigate the harshness of applying the statute to a plaintiff who could not have known any of the facts underlying the cause of action.” Doe, 187 Ariz. at 609 , 931 P.2d at 1119 , citing Gust, Rosenfeld, 182 Ariz. at 588, 898 P.2d at 966 .

1996In Arizona, however, the statute of limitations defense is not favored, Gust, Rosenfeld, 182 Ariz. at 590, 898 P.2d at 968 , “and the discovery rule developed as a tool to mitigate the harshness of applying the statute to a plaintiff who could not have known any of the facts underlying the cause of action.” Doe, 187 Ariz. at 609 , 931 P.2d at 1119 , citing Gust, Rosenfeld, 182 Ariz. at 588, 898 P.2d at 966 .

2012World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 , 100 S.Ct. 580 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 21 In its motion to dismiss, Jabirú acknowledged it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee and “waive[d] the statute of limitations defense that may be available.” And at oral argument on the Van Heeswyks’ motion for reconsideration, Jabirú argued that as a foreign corporation it “does business based on expectations” and Tennessee is the better forum because it “ha[s] a reasonable expectation” of being sued where its distributors are located.

2012World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 , 100 S.Ct. 580 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 21 In its motion to dismiss, Jabiru acknowledged it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee and "waive[d] the statute of limitations defense that may be available." And at oral argument on the Van Heeswyks' motion for reconsideration, Jabiru argued that as a foreign corporation it "does business based on expectations" and Tennessee is the better forum because it "ha[s] a reasonable expectation" of being sued where its distributors are located.

2024Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 541 (1982) (a statute of limitations defense was waived because defendants failed to raise it before the court issued its judgment); Uyleman v. D.S.

2014Co., 132 Ariz. 529 , 647 P.2d 1127 (1982) and Romo v. Reyes, 26 Ariz. App. 374 , 548 P.2d 1186 (1976) for the proposition that the statue of limitations defense is waived only if not raised prior to the entry of a final, appealable judgment.

2020Co., 158 Ariz. 273 , 277–79 (App. 1988) (holding that a defendant may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if he induced the plaintiff to delay filing suit by leading the plaintiff to believe that the claim would settle without filing suit). ¶26 Husband argues nonetheless he was prejudiced by the delay because relevant financial records are no longer available, and his memory has faded.

2011Co., 158 Ariz. 273, 277-79 , 762 P.2d 560, 564-66 (App.1988) (insurance company estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the facts in the case showed that the insurance company “consistently took the position that it was undisputed that a debt was owed and that the only question remaining was the exact amount of the debt owed”); Kelley, 121 Ariz. at 230 , 589 P.2d at 473 (“In order to establish a prima facie case of estoppel there must be some conduct on the part of the “estopped” party which a person could reasonably interpret to mean that his claim is being accepted.”

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

2008Under “ ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, ... the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 26 , 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 , 78 P.3d 732, 735 (2003); State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 12 , 150 P.3d 252, 256 (App.2007).

1993We agree that the defense is not favored, Continental Casualty Co. v. Grabe Brick Co., 1 Ariz.App. 214 , 401 P.2d 168 (1965), and that, “where two constructions are possible, the one which gives the longer period of limitations is the one which is to be preferred.” O’Malley v. Sims, 51 Ariz. 155, 165 , 75 P.2d 50, 54-55 (1938).

1993We agree that the defense is not favored, Continental Casualty Co. v. Grabe Brick Co., 1 Ariz.App. 214 , 401 P.2d 168 (1965), and that, “where two constructions are possible, the one which gives the longer period of limitations is the one which is to be preferred.” O’Malley v. Sims, 51 Ariz. 155, 165 , 75 P.2d 50, 54-55 (1938).

2026See Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Pima Cnty., 200 Ariz. 199 , 204 ¶ 20 (App. 2001) (the “affirmative defense of a statute of limitations may be raised in a motion to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that the claim is barred”). ¶22 Turning to the equitable tolling argument, this Court reviews a superior court’s application of equitable tolling involving a mix of law 5 PARKER v. MEEKS Decision of the Court and fact for an abuse of discretion.