statute of limitations defense in Delaware

2024Br. 55 49 “Although the limitations of actions applicable in a court of law are not controlling in equity, the Court of Chancery ordinarily will follow the applicable statute of limitations.” IAC/InterActiveCorp v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 177 (Del. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024Br. 55 49 “Although the limitations of actions applicable in a court of law are not controlling in equity, the Court of Chancery ordinarily will follow the applicable statute of limitations.” IAC/InterActiveCorp v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 177 (Del. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2006See e.g., McMillan v. State of Delaware, Del.Super., No. C.A. 02A-02-008, Bradley, J., 2002 WL 32054600 (2002) (citing Lankford, 570 A.2d at 1150 ; Samoluk v. Basco, Inc., 528 A.2d 1203, 1204 (Del.Super.Ct.1987)) ("An insurer who fails to comply with the notification requirements of Section 3914 is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense against the claimant.”). .

1988Cf. Samoluk v. Basco Inc., Del.Super., 528 A.2d 1203 (1987).

2026Co., 540 A.2d 435 , 440 & n.4 (Del. 1988) (concluding that the defendant waived the right to raise a statute of limitations defense); Cheswold, 489 A.2d at 420–22, 421 n.1 (declining to construe a statute of repose as a statute of limitations within the meaning of Superior Court Rule 8(c)); Jeffery v. Seven Seventeen Corp., 461 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Del. 1983) (concluding that the 32 Federal courts have wrestled with the question whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) applies to certain defenses, but, according to one respected treatise, the range of Rule 8(c)’s residuary clause remains “unce

2026Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006) (“The complaint generally defines the universe of facts that the trial court may consider in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). 4 plaintiff’s favor.15 In Delaware, the standard to survive a motion to dismiss is reasonable conceivability.16 In other words, the Court may not dismiss a claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.17 A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense.

2025United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 343 (Del. 1940)). 27 Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1982) (“Knowledge and unreasonable delay are essential elements of the defense of laches. . . .

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025See, e.g., Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The raising of the defense of the statute of limitations, [] is a personal privilege of the defendant.”); Gibson v. Hudock, 894 F.2d 407 , 1990 WL 4410, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (TABLE) (“A statute of limitations defense is one of the personal defenses listed in Fed.

2025United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 343 (Del. 1940)). 27 Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1982) (“Knowledge and unreasonable delay are essential elements of the defense of laches. . . .

2025No. 2024-0668-MTZ June 26, 2025 Page 7 of 34 resulting prejudice to that party.26 The defendant’s “[c]hange of position” is a “factor[] of supreme importance.”27 “[I]mplicit in the concept of laches is the requirement that there be a causal relationship between the delay [by a plaintiffs] and the alleged prejudice [to a defendant].”28 Only the defendant, or one in privity with her, has standing to complain of her prejudice caused by the plaintiff’s delay in suing her.29 Similarly, for a purely legal claim, only a defendant can wield a statute of limitations defense to preclude the plaintiff’s

2024Appellant argues that even if the statute of limitations does not bar these citations, the equitable doctrine of laches does.25 24 Dow Chemical Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 395 (Del. 2013) (quoting Am.

2022R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 4 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5 DISCUSSION Ms. Lewis c

2022R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 4 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5 DISCUSSION Ms. Lewis c

2022R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 4 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5 DISCUSSION Ms. Lewis c

2022R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 4 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5 DISCUSSION Ms. Lewis c

2022R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 4 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present.2 Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute.3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.4 The Court will not grant summary judgment if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.5 DISCUSSION Ms. Lewis c

2020Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party may not defeat agency authority to investigate with a claim that could be a defense if the agency subsequently decides to bring an action against it.” (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted)).

2020Guyer, 211 A.2d 910, 912 (1965) (“the statute [of frauds] does not extend to an agreement which may by any possibility be performed within a year, in accordance with the understanding and intention of the parties at the time when the agreement was entered into”). 14 find that Gilronan failed to raise the statute of limitations defense timely and the statute of frauds does not bar recovery.

2020That is not to say that any act by the medical professional in relation to the condition for which the plaintiff received negligent treatment can constitute the “last act.”40 The act must be one that, together with other acts taken during the course of treatment, forms the negligent whole. 39 Id. (emphasis added). 40 See Benge, 553 A.2d at 1183 (“The difference between the [continuing treatment doctrine and the continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine] . . . is that under the doctrine of continuous negligent medical treatment, the focus is limited to the last act in the negligent contin

2016C. § 3901_that is, the insurance contracts cover “subj ects resident, located or to be performed in this State.” In LaFayette v. Christian, the Court had to determine whether a non-Delaware insurance company was required to provide notice of the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to § 20 In Stop & Shop C0., Inc. v. Gonzales, 619 A.2d 896, 898 (Del. 1993), the Delaware Supreme Court held that § 3914 includes self-insurers The Court reasoned that “[W]hether the funding be through contract with an independent insurer, or self-funding, or a combination of the two through partial self-insur

2016Jur. 2d Accounts & Accounting § 6 (2015) (“All that is necessary to establish a mutual account is to show that an account was kept and that the parties regarded the items as constituting one account and as capable of being set off, one against the other, so that it is only the net balance which constitutes the claim.”); see also In re Lebling’s Estate, 42 Pa. D. & C. 151 , 153– 54 (Pa. Orph. 1941) (describing mutual accounts as requiring reciprocal demands, “as, for example, when A & B dealing together, A sells B an article of furniture, or any other 24 The only case the parties have cited whe

2006See e.g., McMillan v. State of Delaware, Del.Super., No. C.A. 02A-02-008, Bradley, J., 2002 WL 32054600 (2002) (citing Lankford, 570 A.2d at 1150 ; Samoluk v. Basco, Inc., 528 A.2d 1203, 1204 (Del.Super.Ct.1987)) ("An insurer who fails to comply with the notification requirements of Section 3914 is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense against the claimant.”). .