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12 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1925–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swinney v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In 2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In | 1 | 2 |
Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius Xgreen2 sentences2019Div., 2013 WY 86, ¶ 14 , 304 P.3d 977, 981 (Wyo. 2013) (determining that “equitable estoppel cannot apply to prevent the application of the thirty-six month limitation” under the particular circumstances); Mitchell v. State 7 where either the employer or a Division representative unintentionally made misleading statements to the claimant or the claimant’s representative, 5 and to prevent the employer and the Division from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 6 This case presents unique circumstances that require us to address when the application of equitable estoppel is limited. [¶23] 2019Div., 2013 WY 86, ¶ 14 , 304 P.3d 977, 981 (Wyo. 2013) (determining that “equitable estoppel cannot apply to prevent the application of the thirty-six month limitation” under the particular circumstances); Mitchell v. State 7 where either the employer or a Division representative unintentionally made misleading statements to the claimant or the claimant’s representative, 5 and to prevent the employer and the Division from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 6 This case presents unique circumstances that require us to address when the application of equitable estoppel is limited. [¶23] | 1 | 1 |
Nicholas A. Picozzi v. State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Divisiongreen2 sentences2019Div., 2013 WY 86, ¶ 14 , 304 P.3d 977, 981 (Wyo. 2013) (determining that “equitable estoppel cannot apply to prevent the application of the thirty-six month limitation” under the particular circumstances); Mitchell v. State 7 where either the employer or a Division representative unintentionally made misleading statements to the claimant or the claimant’s representative, 5 and to prevent the employer and the Division from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 6 This case presents unique circumstances that require us to address when the application of equitable estoppel is limited. [¶23] 2019Div., 2013 WY 86, ¶ 14 , 304 P.3d 977, 981 (Wyo. 2013) (determining that “equitable estoppel cannot apply to prevent the application of the thirty-six month limitation” under the particular circumstances); Mitchell v. State 7 where either the employer or a Division representative unintentionally made misleading statements to the claimant or the claimant’s representative, 5 and to prevent the employer and the Division from asserting a statute of limitations defense. 6 This case presents unique circumstances that require us to address when the application of equitable estoppel is limited. [¶23] | 1 | 1 |
Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In 2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In | 1 | 1 |
Ballinger v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In 2014To make that showing, Inman's evidence must show: "1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 8) the plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner." See Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc., Inc., 2009 WY 69, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 57, 66 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 22 , 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo.2005)); see also Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 9 , 199 P.3d 512, 516 (Wyo.2008). [126] In opposition to Boykin's motion, In | 1 | 1 |
40 North Corp. v. Morrellgreen1 sentence2014Under these circumstances, we find it proper to disregard the lack of notice concerning the summary judgment conversion, and we will thus treat the district court's dismissal order as an order granting Boykin summary judgment and will review the order accordingly. [120] Our standard of review when considering a summary judgment order is as follows: We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same standards. [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo.1999)]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Lovercheckgreen1 sentence2014Under these circumstances, we find it proper to disregard the lack of notice concerning the summary judgment conversion, and we will thus treat the district court's dismissal order as an order granting Boykin summary judgment and will review the order accordingly. [120] Our standard of review when considering a summary judgment order is as follows: We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same standards. [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo.1999)]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartmangreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 52 , 226 P.3d 889, 912 (Wyo.2010). ¶36] While we have ruled that, on the record before us, Daniel's successors are obligated to specifically perform their contractual obligation, we note that Daniel's successors have pleaded additional affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense. 2011See, e.g., Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 52 , 226 P.3d 889, 912 (Wyo.2010). ¶36] While we have ruled that, on the record before us, Daniel's successors are obligated to specifically perform their contractual obligation, we note that Daniel's successors have pleaded additional affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense. | 1 | 1 |
Dorsett v. Mooregreen2 sentences2010"Laches is defined as such delay in enforcing one's rights that it works to the disadvantage of another." Dorselt v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9 , 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo.2003). 2010"Laches is defined as such delay in enforcing one's rights that it works to the disadvantage of another." Dorselt v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9 , 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. Laramie Rivers Companygreen2 sentences1993Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo.1971). 1993Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo.1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield, Limited
green
2 sentences1995However, the court went on to state, in response to the fear that parties will not agree to arbitrate if there is no temporal limit on the obligation to arbitrate, "the parties to a contract embodying an arbitration clause can, of course, easily put in it an `express time limitation.'" Reconstruction, 204 F.2d at 370 ; and see generally Joel E. 1995However, the court went on to state, in response to the fear that parties will not agree to arbitrate if there is no temporal limit on the obligation to arbitrate, “the parties to a contract embodying an arbitration clause can, of course, easily put in it an ‘express time limitation.’ ” Reconstruction, 204 F.2d at 370 ; and see generally Joel E. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Alan G. Moats and Chleo I. Moats v. Professional Assistance, LLC, d/b/a Summit Title Services, Kuzma Success Realty, and P. Olen Snider, Jr.
green
1 sentence2024Id. at ¶ 28, 319 P.3d at 900 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Archuleta v. City of Rawlins
green
1 sentence2014In Archuleta v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404 (Wyo.1997), we were presented with the following: Archuleta filed a claim with the city manager on April 7, 1994. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Vassos v. Roussalis
green
1 sentence1991This contention is confusing because the basic thrust of the statute of limitations defense is emplaced in W.S. 1-3-105 relating to civil actions on a contract. 13 Whether the professional malpractice statute, W.S. 1-3-107, applies to Soil Lab will not be determined in this opinion, but suffice it to say that the premise of professional malpractice is usually based in tort. 14 Vas *801 sos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (1981), after remand 658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo.1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Vassos v. Roussalis
green
1 sentence1991This contention is confusing because the basic thrust of the statute of limitations defense is emplaced in W.S. 1-3-105 relating to civil actions on a contract. 13 Whether the professional malpractice statute, W.S. 1-3-107, applies to Soil Lab will not be determined in this opinion, but suffice it to say that the premise of professional malpractice is usually based in tort. 14 Vas *801 sos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (1981), after remand 658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo.1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Turner v. Turner
green
1 sentence1985Turner v. Turner, supra. In the present case summary judgment was proper because looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant and relying on her testimony, it is apparent that she knew of her injury and the cause thereof in 1973. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Miller v. Mills County
green
2 sentences1925It is held to he proof of so conclusive a nature that the party is precluded from offering any evidence to the contrary. ’ ’ In Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 658 , 82 N. W. 1038, 1040 , the court said: “Under either of these rules, however, the first inquiry always is, where is the true'boundary between the tracts of. land ? 1925It is held to he proof of so conclusive a nature that the party is precluded from offering any evidence to the contrary. ’ ’ In Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 658 , 82 N. W. 1038, 1040 , the court said: “Under either of these rules, however, the first inquiry always is, where is the true'boundary between the tracts of. land ? | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Baldwin v. . Brown
green
1 sentence1925I. 164, 167, 20 A. 305, 306 , the court said: “And even when no express agreement is shown, the authorities are numerous that acquiescence in a boundary line, assumed or established for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar an entry, is conclusive evidence of such an agreement, and will preclude the parties from setting up the claim that the line so acquiesced in is not the true boundary. * * # This rule appears to have been adopted as a rule of repose, for the purpose of quieting titles, and preventing the uncertainty and confusion, and consequent litigation, | 1 | 1925–1925 |
O'Donnell v. Penney
green
1 sentence1925I. 164, 167, 20 A. 305, 306 , the court said: “And even when no express agreement is shown, the authorities are numerous that acquiescence in a boundary line, assumed or established for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar an entry, is conclusive evidence of such an agreement, and will preclude the parties from setting up the claim that the line so acquiesced in is not the true boundary. * * # This rule appears to have been adopted as a rule of repose, for the purpose of quieting titles, and preventing the uncertainty and confusion, and consequent litigation, | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.