statute of limitations defense in Ohio

2025Partnership, 2013-Ohio-4530, ¶ 19 (where the Supreme Court reasoned, “a statute-of-limitations defense does not deny the benefit of immunity and is not a final, appealable order even though it arose along with a political subdivision's immunity claim”).

2019Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio- 4530, ¶20 (denying appellate review of the portion of an order overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings related to a statute of limitations defense) and Windsor Realty 7 & Mgt., Inc. v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 8th Dist.

2023Thus, this court concluded that Bergman “brought claims that were not warranted under existing law, and made factual contentions that lacked evidentiary support and were not warranted by the evidence.” Id. {¶ 69} Similarly, in Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799 , 2008-Ohio-3948 , 896 N.E.2d 191 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions where Stafford filed a complaint outside of the statute of limitations, and where “it was clear to [Stafford] at the time of the filing of CBC’s answer that CBC had not waived the statute-of-limitations de

2023Thus, this court concluded that Bergman “brought claims that were not warranted under existing law, and made factual contentions that lacked evidentiary support and were not warranted by the evidence.” Id. {¶ 69} Similarly, in Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799 , 2008-Ohio-3948 , 896 N.E.2d 191 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions where Stafford filed a complaint outside of the statute of limitations, and where “it was clear to [Stafford] at the time of the filing of CBC’s answer that CBC had not waived the statute-of-limitations de

2018However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held, "[t]hat a statute of limitations may bar the claims of some, but not all, class members does not compel a finding that individual issues predominate over common ones. * * * Rather, as long as there is a sufficient common nucleus of common issues, differences in the application of a statute of limitations to individual class members will not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3)." Hamilton , 82 Ohio St.3d at 84 , 694 N.E.2d 442 , quoting 5 Moore, Federal Practice, Section 23.46[3], at 23-210 to 23-211 (3d Ed.1997). {¶ 61} Based on the foregoing ana

2018However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held, "[t]hat a statute of limitations may bar the claims of some, but not all, class members does not compel a finding that individual issues predominate over common ones. * * * Rather, as long as there is a sufficient common nucleus of common issues, differences in the application of a statute of limitations to individual class members will not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3)." Hamilton , 82 Ohio St.3d at 84 , 694 N.E.2d 442 , quoting 5 Moore, Federal Practice, Section 23.46[3], at 23-210 to 23-211 (3d Ed.1997). {¶ 61} Based on the foregoing ana

2025As previously discussed, in evaluating whether the affirmative defense of statute of 10 January Term, 2025 limitations was preserved, this court preliminarily determined that the defendant “clearly” failed to raise the statute-of-limitations defense in its answer under Civ.R. 8(C) when it raised the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Mills at 58. {¶ 29} We held that the statute-of-limitations affirmative defense could be preserved in a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

2018Franklin No. 11AP-183, 2012-Ohio-1962 , 2012 WL 3085515 , ¶ 6-7 ("the better procedure is to address affirmative defenses by way of a motion for summary judgment that will allow introduction of additional facts beyond the complaint"). {¶ 42} Raising the statute of limitations in a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss "serves merely as a method for expeditiously raising the statute of limitations defense." Mills v. Whitehouse Trucking Co. , 40 Ohio St.2d 55 , 58, 320 N.E.2d 668 (1974).

2026Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 2015-Ohio-3143, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School Dist., 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.) (“If a statute of limitations defense is pleaded and the pleadings unequivocally demonstrate that the action was commenced after the limitations period expired, Civ.R. 12(C) relief is appropriate.”). {¶ 26} We therefore find merit to Jackson’s first issue within his first assignment of error.

2025Moreover, “‘[i]f a statute of limitations defense is pleaded, and the pleadings unequivocally demonstrate that the action was commenced after the limitations period expired, Civ.R. 12(C) relief is appropriate.’” Covarrubias v. Lowe’s Home Improvement, L.L.C., 2021-Ohio-1658, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), quoting Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 2015-Ohio-3143, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); see also Gides v. Marcus & Millichap, 2015-Ohio-4383 , ¶ 10 (8th Dist.) (“When a party raises a statute of limitations defense in its answer, the defense is available as grounds for a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).”).

2026Gore v. Mohamod, 2022-Ohio-2227, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); Singleton v. Adjutant Gen. of Ohio, 2003-Ohio-1838 , ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).

2026See, e.g., Gore, 2022-Ohio-2227, at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).

2026Bd. of Edn., 58 Ohio St.2d 31, 32 (1979). {¶ 8} A defendant may only assert a statute-of-limitations defense through a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion—and a court may only grant such a motion—when the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint.

2025Bd. of Edn., 58 Ohio St.2d 31, 32 (1979). {¶ 8} A defendant may only assert a statute-of-limitations defense through a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion—and a court may only grant such a motion—when the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint.

2016See, e.g., Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231 (7th Dist.2000) (action for fraud); Hutchinson v. Wenzke, 131 Ohio App.3d 613 (2nd Dist. 1999) (medical malpractice action); Schrader v. Gillette, 48 Ohio App.3d 181 (11th Dist.1988) (medical malpractice action). {¶14} This Court is unaware of any Ohio court that has addressed the issue in this case: whether equitable estoppel applies in a will contest action under R.C. 2107.76.5 This Court has addressed, however, a related issue: whether equitable principles apply in an action between a creditor and a decedent’s estate under R.C. 211

2013E.g., Hutchinson v. Wenzke, 131 Ohio App.3d 613, 616 (2d Dist. 1999) (finding that equitable estoppel barred the defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense); see also Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 246 (7th Dist. 2000) (“Under Ohio law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be employed to prohibit the inequitable use of the statute of limitations.”). {¶22} However, a review of all the materials in the record reveals no factual representation by any of Appellees that they would abstain from asserting a statute of limitations defense if the Ralls’ first action

2002Howard, 30 Ohio St.2d at 135 , 59 O.O.2d at 151 , 283 N.E.2d at 170 (interpreting R.C. 2305.19 as restricted “to suits * * * commenced or attempted to be commenced in Ohio prior to the running of Ohio’s statute of limitation, * * * in the absence of some manifest legislative intent to the contrary”).

2002Howard, 30 Ohio St.2d at 135 , 59 O.O.2d at 151 , 283 N.E.2d at 170 (interpreting R.C. 2305.19 as restricted “to suits * * * commenced or attempted to be commenced in Ohio prior to the running of Ohio’s statute of limitation, * * * in the absence of some manifest legislative intent to the contrary”).

2022No. 02AP-[29], 2003-Ohio-583 , ¶ 27." Kelley, 2010-Ohio-4522 , at ¶ 9 (adding, "[h]ere, the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of appellants' complaint," and affirming dismissal); see also, e.g., Brisk at ¶ 12 (quoting Kelley); Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , ¶ 11 ("A motion to dismiss based upon a statute of limitations may be granted when the complaint shows conclusively on its face that the action is time-barred") (citations omitted); Noe v. Smith, 143 Ohio App.3d 215, 218 (4th Dist.2000) ("When it is obvious from the face of a com

2018In support, appellants relied in part on Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006- Ohio-2625, in which the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the context of a statute of limitations defense. {¶ 35} In general, the doctrine of equitable estoppel "precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his [or her] position in good faith reliance upon that conduct." State ex rel.

2026Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 2015-Ohio-3143, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School Dist., 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.) (“If a statute of limitations defense is pleaded and the pleadings unequivocally demonstrate that the action was commenced after the limitations period expired, Civ.R. 12(C) relief is appropriate.”). {¶ 26} We therefore find merit to Jackson’s first issue within his first assignment of error.

2021Clark No. 11CA0050, 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 13 ; see also Gides v. Marcus & Millichap, 8th Dist.

2022And while the complaint reflected the limitations problem, it contained " 'no allegations that, if proved, would establish that the [defendant] did anything that was designed to prevent [plaintiff] from filing suit.' " Id. at 4, quoting Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 116 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2008-Ohio-67 , ¶ 8 (and No. 21AP-526 4 concluding, therefore, that "[b]ecause such allegation was not in the complaint, equitable estoppel does not apply"; also noting that the "statute of limitations for this case fell outside of the applicable periods" for pandemic-related tolling).

2018Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 116 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2008-Ohio- 67, ¶ 8-9 (defendant cannot be equitably estopped from asserting a defense premised on the expiration of the applicable limitations period when nothing in the complaint suggests defendant prevented plaintiff from timely filing suit).

2013E.g., Hutchinson v. Wenzke, 131 Ohio App.3d 613, 616 (2d Dist. 1999) (finding that equitable estoppel barred the defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense); see also Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 246 (7th Dist. 2000) (“Under Ohio law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be employed to prohibit the inequitable use of the statute of limitations.”). {¶22} However, a review of all the materials in the record reveals no factual representation by any of Appellees that they would abstain from asserting a statute of limitations defense if the Ralls’ first action

2000Appellant relies in part upon Hutchinson v. Wenzke (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 613 , 723 N.E.2d 176 , to support his claim that OSHP should be estopped from invoking the statute of limitations defense.

2026See State v. Climaco, 85 Ohio St.3d 582 , 587 (1997) (“[T]he state bears the burden of proving that the offense was committed within the appropriate statute of limitations.”). “[T]o challenge a charge on statute of limitations grounds, the defendant must file a motion to dismiss prior to trial.” State v. Bolton, 2017-Ohio- 7062, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Grant, 2004-Ohio-2810 (12th Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2009-Ohio-1773 (2d Dist.); and State v. Shipley, 2004-Ohio-434 (9th Dist.). “[F]ailure to file such a motion waives the statute of limitations defense.” Id., citing Grant, Jackson,

2022“When the statute-of-limitations is a defense to a criminal charge, the state bears the burden of proving that the prosecution of the crime comes within the appropriate statute-of-limitations.” Id., citing Climaco at 587 .

2012“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense, per Civ.R. 8(C), that ordinarily cannot be the basis of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. * * * An exception exists when the complaint demonstrates the statute of limitations violation.” Gessner v. Vore, Montgomery App. No. 22297, 2008-Ohio-3870, ¶13 (citations omitted). {¶ 10} In the present case, Auckerman does not challenge the trial court’s resolution of the statute-of-limitations issue in the context of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.1 Nor does she dispute that the applica

2012“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense, per Civ.R. 8(C), that ordinarily cannot be the basis of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. * * * An exception exists when the complaint demonstrates the statute of limitations violation.” Gessner v. Vore, Montgomery App. No. 22297, 2008-Ohio-3870, ¶13 (citations omitted). {¶ 10} In the present case, Auckerman does not challenge the trial court’s resolution of the statute-of-limitations issue in the context of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.1 Nor does she dispute that the applica

2026The trial court then stated that the assault and battery claims were subject to a one- year statute of limitations, and while intentional infliction of emotional distress claims ordinarily are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, “‘[w]hen the essential character of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort governs.’” Notice of Intent, p. 2, quoting Cleavenger v. B.O., 2022-Ohio-454, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

2026We note also that “[a] party cannot raise new issues or arguments for the first time on appeal; failure to raise an issue before the trial court results in a waiver of that issue for appellate purposes.” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-1026, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).