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35 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Howardgreen2 sentences2023This Court “ha[s] permitted a statute-of-limitations defense to be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) —providing the alleged timing defect appears on the face of the complaint.” Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297 (R.I. 2001). 2019Additionally, "[a] party may raise a statute-of-limitations defense by way of a motion to dismiss, 'provided the alleged timing defect appears on the face of the complaint.' " Barrette v. Yakavonis , 966 A.2d 1231 , 1234 (R.I. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Martin v. Howard , 784 A.2d 291 , 297 (R.I. 2001) ). | 3 | 5 |
Boghossian v. Ferland Corp.green2 sentences2009A party may raise a statute-of-limitations defense by way of a motion to dismiss, “provid[ed] the alleged timing defect appears on the face of the complaint.” Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297 (R.I.2001) (citing Boghossian v. Ferland Corp., 600 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I.1991)). 2001Boghossian v. Ferland Corp., 600 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I.1991); McDonald v. Rhode Island General Council, 505 A.2d 1176, 1178 (R.I.1986); see also 1 Kent, R.I. | 3 | 3 |
Locke v. O'BRIENgreen2 sentences2011"A party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry for ten years." Locke , 610 A.2d at 556 . * * * Therefore, "the claimant must prove that the purported boundary line has been obvious to the allegedly acquiescing party." Powell on Real Property at 68-28. 2010"Like adverse possession, the doctrine of acquiescence to an observable physical boundary line constitutes a recognized means by which a claimant can gain title to the real estate encompassed by that boundary line, even though another party clearly possesses record title to that land." Pucino v. Uttley , 785 A.2d 183 , 186 (R.I. 2001) (citing DelSesto v. Unknown Heirs of Lewis , 754 A.2d 91 , 95 (R.I. 2000)). "[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations | 2 | 7 |
Pucino v. Uttleygreen2 sentences2026This is a two-part test, as “[t]he party claiming ownership by acquiescence must show ‘that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to - 19 - that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.’” DeCosta, 819 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 2001)). 2010"Like adverse possession, the doctrine of acquiescence to an observable physical boundary line constitutes a recognized means by which a claimant can gain title to the real estate encompassed by that boundary line, even though another party clearly possesses record title to that land." Pucino v. Uttley , 785 A.2d 183 , 186 (R.I. 2001) (citing DelSesto v. Unknown Heirs of Lewis , 754 A.2d 91 , 95 (R.I. 2000)). "[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations | 2 | 3 |
McDonald v. RI GENERAL COUNCILgreen2 sentences2001Boghossian v. Ferland Corp., 600 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I.1991); McDonald v. Rhode Island General Council, 505 A.2d 1176, 1178 (R.I.1986); see also 1 Kent, R.I. 1991Nevertheless, courts permit the statute-of-limitations defense “to be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in situations in which the defect appears on the face of the complaint.” McDonald v. Rhode Island General Counsel, 505 A.2d 1176, 1178 (R.I.1986); see also 1 Kent, R.I.Civ.Prac. § 12.10 at 116 (1969). | 2 | 2 |
DelSesto v. Unknown Heirs of Lewisgreen2 sentences2010"Like adverse possession, the doctrine of acquiescence to an observable physical boundary line constitutes a recognized means by which a claimant can gain title to the real estate encompassed by that boundary line, even though another party clearly possesses record title to that land." Pucino v. Uttley , 785 A.2d 183 , 186 (R.I. 2001) (citing DelSesto v. Unknown Heirs of Lewis , 754 A.2d 91 , 95 (R.I. 2000)). "[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations 2010"Like adverse possession, the doctrine of acquiescence to an observable physical boundary line constitutes a recognized means by which a claimant can gain title to the real estate encompassed by that boundary line, even though another party clearly possesses record title to that land." Pucino v. Uttley , 785 A.2d 183 , 186 (R.I. 2001) (citing DelSesto v. Unknown Heirs of Lewis , 754 A.2d 91 , 95 (R.I. 2000)). "[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations | 1 | 3 |
State v. Lambrechtsgreen2 sentences2006Mr. Brown failed to raise the statute of limitations defense before or at trial, hence "it is waived", Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116 , 1121 (2004) citing State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645 , 646 (R.I., 1991) but the Court noted: [E]ven if Brown had raised this defense at trial, he would not have succeeded on the merits of his statute-of-limitations defense. 2006See State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645, 646 (R.I.1991); see also Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I.2003). | 1 | 2 |
Rosa v. Oliveiragreen2 sentences2000Alternatively, a claimant may “gain title to a defendant’s property by operation of the doctrine of acquiescence despite the fact that defendant had record title.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 555 (citing Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239 , 366 A.2d 169 (1976)). “[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 556 . “[Acquiescence for the requisite number of years is ‘conclusive evidence of an agreement to establis 2000Alternatively, a claimant may “gain title to a defendant’s property by operation of the doctrine of acquiescence despite the fact that defendant had record title.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 555 (citing Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239 , 366 A.2d 169 (1976)). “[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 556 . “[Acquiescence for the requisite number of years is ‘conclusive evidence of an agreement to establis | 1 | 2 |
Nye v. Brousseaugreen1 sentence2026“A determination of acquiescence is a mixed question of law and fact.” Banville v. Brennan, 84 A.3d 424, 431 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002, 1009 (R.I. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Donna Banville v. Peter Brennangreen1 sentence2026“A determination of acquiescence is a mixed question of law and fact.” Banville v. Brennan, 84 A.3d 424, 431 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002, 1009 (R.I. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Ashey v. Kupchangreen1 sentence2013See O’Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d 179, 182-83 (R.I.2005) (explaining that, where the material facts are undisputed, the viability of a particular statute-of-limitations defense appropriately is decided at the summary-judgment stage); see also Hanson, 898 A.2d at 1248 (“The application of the statute of limitations is a matter of law for the trial justice to determine.” quoting Ashey, 618 A.2d at 1270 ); Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Hanson v. Singsengreen1 sentence2013See O’Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d 179, 182-83 (R.I.2005) (explaining that, where the material facts are undisputed, the viability of a particular statute-of-limitations defense appropriately is decided at the summary-judgment stage); see also Hanson, 898 A.2d at 1248 (“The application of the statute of limitations is a matter of law for the trial justice to determine.” quoting Ashey, 618 A.2d at 1270 ); Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Dionne v. Bautegreen1 sentence2013See O’Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d 179, 182-83 (R.I.2005) (explaining that, where the material facts are undisputed, the viability of a particular statute-of-limitations defense appropriately is decided at the summary-judgment stage); see also Hanson, 898 A.2d at 1248 (“The application of the statute of limitations is a matter of law for the trial justice to determine.” quoting Ashey, 618 A.2d at 1270 ); Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
O'Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospitalgreen1 sentence2013See O’Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d 179, 182-83 (R.I.2005) (explaining that, where the material facts are undisputed, the viability of a particular statute-of-limitations defense appropriately is decided at the summary-judgment stage); see also Hanson, 898 A.2d at 1248 (“The application of the statute of limitations is a matter of law for the trial justice to determine.” quoting Ashey, 618 A.2d at 1270 ); Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 835 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Santorogreen1 sentence2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional | 1 | 1 |
Little v. Bluntgreen2 sentences2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). 2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Managementgreen2 sentences2011II Standard of Review When considering issues brought before us pursuant to a writ of certiorari, “this Court conducts a de novo review with respect to all applicable questions of law.” Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 994 A.2d 64, 70 (R.I.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2011II Standard of Review When considering issues brought before us pursuant to a writ of certiorari, "this Court conducts a de novo review with respect to all applicable questions of law." Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 994 A.2d 64, 70 (R.I.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Atalanta Corp. v. Polskie Linie Oceanicznegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hanley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Government Development Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maughan v. Sw Servicing, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bader v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| LaBounty v. LaBountygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeCosta v. DeCosta
green
2 sentences2026This is a two-part test, as “[t]he party claiming ownership by acquiescence must show ‘that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to - 19 - that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.’” DeCosta, 819 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 2001)). 2007DeCosta , 819 A.2d at 1264 . | 4 | 2005–2026 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2006Mr. Brown failed to raise the statute of limitations defense before or at trial, hence "it is waived", Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116 , 1121 (2004) citing State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645 , 646 (R.I., 1991) but the Court noted: [E]ven if Brown had raised this defense at trial, he would not have succeeded on the merits of his statute-of-limitations defense. 2004Id. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
O'Donnell v. Penney
green
2 sentences2006At that time, we joined a number of other jurisdictions in holding that even when there has been no express agreement, adjoining landowners are “precluded from denying a boundary line recognized by both owners for a length of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations barring a right of reentry.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 556 (citing O’Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164 , 20 A. 305 (1890)). “[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary *465 marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar 2006At that time, we joined a number of other jurisdictions in holding that even when there has been no express agreement, adjoining landowners are “precluded from denying a boundary line recognized by both owners for a length of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations barring a right of reentry.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 556 (citing O’Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164 , 20 A. 305 (1890)). “[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary *465 marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar | 2 | 1976–2006 |
Peloquin v. Ciaccia
green
2 sentences2003The "party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized the boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years." Id. (citing Peloquin v. Ciaccia, 413 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1980) and R.I. 1992Peloquin v. Ciaccia, 413 A.2d 799 (R.I.1980); § 34-7-1. | 2 | 1992–2003 |
Paquin v. Guiorguiev
green
2 sentences2003The "party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized the boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years." Id. (citing Peloquin v. Ciaccia, 413 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1980) and R.I. 2000Alternatively, a claimant may “gain title to a defendant’s property by operation of the doctrine of acquiescence despite the fact that defendant had record title.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 555 (citing Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239 , 366 A.2d 169 (1976)). “[A] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.” Locke, 610 A.2d at 556 . “[Acquiescence for the requisite number of years is ‘conclusive evidence of an agreement to establis | 2 | 2000–2003 |
Barrette v. Yakavonis
green
1 sentence2019Additionally, "[a] party may raise a statute-of-limitations defense by way of a motion to dismiss, 'provided the alleged timing defect appears on the face of the complaint.' " Barrette v. Yakavonis , 966 A.2d 1231 , 1234 (R.I. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Martin v. Howard , 784 A.2d 291 , 297 (R.I. 2001) ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Adrian Hazard
green
1 sentence2019"We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo ." State v. Hazard , 68 A.3d 479 , 485 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Campbell v. State , 56 A.3d 448 , 454 (R.I. 2012) ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kyle Campbell v. State of Rhode Island
green
1 sentence2019"We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo ." State v. Hazard , 68 A.3d 479 , 485 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Campbell v. State , 56 A.3d 448 , 454 (R.I. 2012) ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope
green
2 sentences2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional 2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wetzell v. Bussard
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). 2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). 2011Id. at 725 , 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 , 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Gagner v. Strekouras
green
1 sentence2010In the specific context of a statute of limitations defense and an equitable estoppel argument in response thereto, summary judgment should be denied where "there are factual differences in the record which should be resolved by a trier of fact rather than by a motion for summary judgment." Gagner v. Strekouras , 423 A.2d 1168 , 1170-71 (R.I. 1980). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Acampora v. Pearson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Warren v. Providence Tool Co.
neutral
2 sentences2010Warren v. Providence Tool Co. , 19 R.I. 360 , 33 A. 876 (1896). 2010Warren v. Providence Tool Co. , 19 R.I. 360 , 33 A. 876 (1896). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| LaFreniere v. Sprague green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| The Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Malone v. O'CONNELL green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Essex v. Lukas green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Ungaro v. Mete green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Adams v. Rockwell green | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.