statute of limitations defense (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
← Tennessee issues

statute of limitations defense in Tennessee

131 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2026 11 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (59)

CaseFollowedCited
Workman v. Stategreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 21 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2022
2 sentences

2012We note, however, that the Petitioner anticipated the statute of limitations defense, contending in his petition that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds pursuant to Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 101-02 , and Freshwater v. State, 161 S.W.3d 548 (Tenn. Crim.

2010See Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that the principles of due process may preclude the use of the statute of limitations to bar a coram nobis claim).

1421
Sands v. Stategreen
tenn · 1995 · cited in 16 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2018
2 sentences

2016As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained: -6- It is well settled . . . that if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it, failure to specifically plead a statute of limitations defense will not result in a waiver. [Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)].

2016As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained: It is well settled . . . that if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it, failure to specifically plead a statute of limitations defense will not result in a waiver. [Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)].

1016
Norman Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphisgreen
tenn · 2012 · cited in 14 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2012–2025
2 sentences

2022“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims’ under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 465 (applying this burden-shifting framework to a motion to dismiss)).

2021In considering a statute of limitations defense, we typically examine three interrelated elements: “the length of the limitations period, the accrual of the cause of action, and the applicability of any relevant tolling doctrines.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 456 (Tenn. 2012).

914
Ricky Harris v. Stategreen
tenn · 2003 · cited in 8 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018
2 sentences

2018Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2003)).

2017Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris, 102 S.W.3d at 593 ).

68
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered
tenn · 2010 · cited in 9 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
2 sentences

2024The petitioner, the Court noted, was not alleging factual innocence of the offense, and it concluded that intellectual disability did “not equate to actual innocence.” Id. at 612–13. 12 Coram nobis petitioners are “not entitled to equitable tolling to pursue a patently non-meritorious ground for relief.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 831 (quoting Harris II, 301 S.W.3d at 153 (Koch, J., concurring in part)). - 16 - Unlike Keen, we are not interpreting a statute; we are instead addressing a judge- made exception to the statute of limitations in error coram nobis cases.

2018Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2003)).

49
Fahrner v. SW Manufacturing, Inc.green
tenn · 2001 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2015
2 sentences

2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)).

2008Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Tenn.2001); cf. Fairway Vill., 934 S.W.2d at 346 (explaining that equitable estoppel is less a tolling mechanism and more a doctrine used to prevent a party from relying on a statute of limitations defense).

45
Burford v. Stategreen
tenn · 1992 · cited in 10 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2013
2 sentences

2013See Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001); Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995); Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992).

2012Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001). “‘[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 102 (quoting Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992)).

310
George v. Building Materials Corp. of Americagreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2022
2 sentences

2022Managers, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 543, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (involving a statute of limitations defense) (citing George v. Building Materials Corporation of America, 44 S.W.3d 481 , 486–87 (Tenn. 2001)).

2018Materials Corp. of Am., 44 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining that mere introduction of evidence regarding dates did not amount to trial of a statute of limitations defense by implied consent when the evidence was used to establish another issue at trial); Long v. Long, No. M2015-00592-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 9584393 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2015) (vacating an order regarding military retirement pay where the issues before the court were modification of alimony and child support, and although retirement pay was a factor to be considered with respect to those issues, no one asked the c

35
Ingram v. Earthmangreen
tennctapp · 1998 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2024
2 sentences

2018Revival is an appropriate response to a statute of limitations defense when a debtor has “revive[d] a plaintiff’s remedy that had been barred by the running of a statute of limitations either by expressly promising to pay the debt or by acknowledging the debt and expressing a willingness to pay it.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (footnote omitted).

2006“Statements or conduct that support an estoppel claim include representations, made prior to the expiration of the limitations period, that the defendant either would not assert a statute of limitations defense or that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).

34
Williams v. Stategreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2013
2 sentences

2004See Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2002) (statute of limitations tolled due to a late arising suppression of exculpatory evidence claim); Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 477 (Tenn. 2001) (misrepresentation by attorney as to continuing representation, rather than mere attorney negligence, possibly tolled the statute of limitations); Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 278-79 (statute of limitations tolled due to mental incompetence 2 W e have previously expressed our concern with the State raising the statute of limitations defense for the first time on appeal.

2001In Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court determined that “due process preclude[d] application of the statute of limitations to bar consideration of the writ of error coram nobis[.]” In Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court considered a situation similar to that of the instant case.

34
Sparks v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Countygreen
tennctapp · 1989 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2021
2 sentences

2021Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 771 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) and Ingram v. Elledge, No. 01-A-019101-CV- 00009, 1991 WL 83349 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991) in making this argument.

2005Sparks v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Co., 771 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989).

33
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennesseegreen
tenn · 2012 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2017
2 sentences

2017See Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 .

2017The State, however, is not deemed to have waived the defense, if the petitioner “‘is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it’ because ‘the purpose of the specific pleading requirement is to prevent a party from raising a defense at the last possible moment and thereby prejudicing the opposing party’s opportunity to rebut the defense.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995).

33
Smith v. Southeastern Properties, Ltd.green
tennctapp · 1989 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2003–2015
2 sentences

2015Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989)); Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Auth., Serv.

2015See Deal v. Hastings, No. W2003-00912-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23100341 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)); Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Auth., Serv.

33
Stockburger v. Raygreen
tennctapp · 1972 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1991–2013
2 sentences

2013See Deal v. Hastings, No. W2003-00912-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23100341 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App.1989); Stockburger v. Rhea, 488 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)).

2003Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Stockburger v. Rhea, 488 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

33
State v. Mixongreen
tenn · 1999 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2022
2 sentences

2022State v. Mixon, 983 SW2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999); Workman v. State, 41 SW3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001).

2014Id.

24
Steed Realty v. Oveisigreen
tennctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Accordingly, if the defense “is not pleaded within the proper time and in the proper manner, it is deemed waived and cannot be relied upon as a defense.” Steed Realty v. Oveisi, 823 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).

2016Accordingly, if the defense “is not pleaded within the proper time and in the proper manner, it is deemed waived and cannot be relied upon as a defense.” Steed Realty v. Oveisi, 823 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).

22
Robert Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Companygreen
ca6 · 2001 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Co., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that the statute of limitations has run.

2016Co., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001) (―Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that the statute of limitations has run.

22
Carr v. Borchersgreen
tennctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (“Since . . . a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense and no prima facie showing of the running of the statute of limitations is made by the record, the burden of establishing that the statute has run is upon the defendant.”); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R.

2016See Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (―Since . . . a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense and no prima facie showing of the running of the statute of limitations is made by the record, the burden of establishing that the statute has run is upon the defendant.‖); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R.

22
In Re Estate of Ina Ruth Browngreen
tenn · 2013 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016“A statute of limitations defense challenges the sufficiency of a particular claim, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in which the claim is filed.” Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tenn. 2013) (citation omitted).

2016“A statute of limitations defense challenges the sufficiency of a particular claim, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in which the claim is filed.” Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tenn. 2013) (citation omitted).

22
Nestor Ayala Serrano v. Jorge L. Collazo Torresgreen
ca1 · 1985 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005)

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D.

22
Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. Lujangreen
dcd · 1992 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Accordingly, failure to raise an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss does not mean that the defense has been waived.”); Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. Lujan, 797 F.Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.1992) (“While it is the general practice to raise a statute of limitations defense by motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it is not an error to fail to do so.... [T]his defense cannot be waived by the failure to interpose it in a motion under Rule 12.”).

2013Accordingly, failure to raise an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss does not mean that the defense has been waived.”); Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Lujan, 797 F.Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.1992) (“While it is the general practice to raise a statute of limitations defense by motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it is not an error to fail to do so . . . . [T]his defense cannot be waived by the failure to interpose it in a motion under Rule 12.”).

22
Ford Motor Company v. Moultongreen
tenn · 1974 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2012
2 sentences

2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the -6- time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

2001See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A- Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

22
Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co.green
tennctapp · 1995 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2012
2 sentences

2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the -6- time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

2001See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A- Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

22
Freshwater v. Stategreen
tenncrimapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Coram nobis claims are “singularly fact-intensive” and “are not easily resolved on the face of the petition and often require a hearing.” Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tenn. Crim.

2011Because coram nobis claims are “singularly fact-intensive,” they “are not easily resolved on the face of the petition and often require a hearing.” Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tenn. Crim.

22
Locust v. Stategreen
tennctapp · 1995 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001
22
Hardcastle v. Harrisgreen
tennctapp · 2004 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2005–2021
2 sentences

2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)).

2005Hite, 801 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)). “[E]quitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d 67, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

15
Young ex rel. estate of Young v. Kennedygreen
tenn · 2013 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2018
2 sentences

2018Young v. Kennedy, 429 S.W.3d 536, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a statute of limitations defense is properly characterized as failure to state a claim).

2014Young v. Kennedy, 429 S.W.3d 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (considering whether the statute of limitations defense was waived by failure to timely plead specific facts to support the defense).

12
Stanbury v. Bacardigreen
tenn · 1997 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2010
12
Wilkins v. Third National Bank in Nashvillegreen
tennctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1995–1999
12
Whitlow v. Hardin Co., Tenn.green
tennctapp · 1930 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1989–1998
12
Pate v. City of Martingreen
tenn · 1981 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
11
Tip's Package Store, Inc. v. Commercial Insurance Managers, Inc.green
tennctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Rainey Bros. Construction Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Board of Adjustmentgreen
tennctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Gunter v. Laboratory Corp. of Americagreen
tenn · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green
tenn · 2015 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Gore v. Tennessee Department of Correctiongreen
tennctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Kenneth E. King v. Anderson County, Tennesseegreen
tenn · 2013 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craiggreen
tenn · 2012 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Alan Cartwright v. Alan Garnergreen
ca6 · 2014 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
Morgan v. Stategreen
tenncrimapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (21)

CaseCitedYears
Sharon M. Smith v. Read Hauck green
tennctapp · 2015
2 sentences

2025“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).

2022“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims’ under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 465 (applying this burden-shifting framework to a motion to dismiss)).

32020–2025
Cherry v. Williams green
tennctapp · 2000
2 sentences

2019“In considering a statute of limitations defense, we examine three interrelated elements: ‘the length of the limitations period, the accrual of the cause of action, and the applicability of any relevant tolling doctrines.’” Id. (quoting Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 456 (Tenn. 2012)).

2015Id.

22015–2019
Bennett v. Mueller green
cacd · 2005
2 sentences

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005)

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D.

22013–2013
United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute green
ca5 · 1987
2 sentences

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005)

2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D.

22013–2013
Doe a v. Coffee County Board of Education green
tennctapp · 1992
22001–2001
Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennessee green
· 2018
12024–2024
David Keen v. State of Tennessee green
tenn · 2012
12024–2024
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Baxter green
tenn · 1962
12019–2019
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville green
tenn · 2015
12017–2017
Overton v. State green
tenn · 1994
12016–2016
Brady v. Maryland green
scotus · 1963
12015–2015
McCarley v. West Quality Food Service green
tenn · 1998
12011–2011
Roe v. Jefferson green
tenn · 1994
12010–2010
United States v. Scott green
scotus · 1978
12010–2010
Crafton v. Van Den Bosch green
tennctapp · 2005
12010–2010
Hanna v. Sheflin green
tennctapp · 2008
12009–2009
State v. Ratliff green
tenncrimapp · 2001
12005–2005
Callahan v. Town of Middleton green
tennctapp · 1954
12005–2005
Consumer Credit Union v. Hite green
tennctapp · 1990
12005–2005
Watkins v. State red
tenn · 1995
12004–2004
Bonde v. Bishop green
calctapp · 1952
12002–2002

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105 (37) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103 (34) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (19) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 (18) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109 (10) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (9) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (9) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 (7) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305 (7) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116 (5) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110 (5) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 423 (1894–2026) CA 395 (1864–2026) TX 189 (1940–2026) CT 184 (1909–2026) IL 177 (1887–2025) FL 173 (1972–2026) PA 165 (1904–2026) OH 136 (1939–2026) TN 131 (1984–2026) IN 128 (1862–2026) MI 123 (1901–2026) NC 99 (1884–2026) AL 81 (1891–2026) NJ 77 (1882–2026) IA 71 (1880–2026) AZ 70 (1969–2026) MS 67 (1877–2024) UT 58 (1906–2026) NM 58 (1946–2026) MO 48 (1978–2025) KS 48 (1905–2025) ME 46 (1982–2026) WA 46 (1985–2025) MA 46 (1931–2026) MN 46 (1894–2026) CO 45 (1976–2026) WI 45 (1884–2025) SC 44 (1922–2025) VA 40 (1906–2025) OR 40 (1917–2025) ID 38 (1977–2025) OK 36 (1875–2024) RI 35 (1890–2026) WV 33 (1902–2025) NE 32 (1982–2026) DC 30 (1978–2025) MD 30 (1944–2026) ND 28 (1912–2024) VT 24 (1996–2025) KY 24 (1917–2026) GA 24 (1848–2023) AR 24 (1914–2023) DE 20 (1987–2026) NH 20 (1993–2025) SD 16 (1912–2025) NV 16 (1979–2022) MT 16 (1933–2024) WY 12 (1925–2024) HI 10 (1967–2026) VI 10 (2002–2026) AK 10 (1987–2025) LA 5 (1967–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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