131 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Workman v. Stategreen2 sentences2012We note, however, that the Petitioner anticipated the statute of limitations defense, contending in his petition that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds pursuant to Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 101-02 , and Freshwater v. State, 161 S.W.3d 548 (Tenn. Crim. 2010See Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that the principles of due process may preclude the use of the statute of limitations to bar a coram nobis claim). | 14 | 21 |
Sands v. Stategreen2 sentences2016As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained: -6- It is well settled . . . that if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it, failure to specifically plead a statute of limitations defense will not result in a waiver. [Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)]. 2016As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained: It is well settled . . . that if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it, failure to specifically plead a statute of limitations defense will not result in a waiver. [Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)]. | 10 | 16 |
Norman Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphisgreen2 sentences2022“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims’ under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 465 (applying this burden-shifting framework to a motion to dismiss)). 2021In considering a statute of limitations defense, we typically examine three interrelated elements: “the length of the limitations period, the accrual of the cause of action, and the applicability of any relevant tolling doctrines.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 456 (Tenn. 2012). | 9 | 14 |
Ricky Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2003)). 2017Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris, 102 S.W.3d at 593 ). | 6 | 8 |
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered2 sentences2024The petitioner, the Court noted, was not alleging factual innocence of the offense, and it concluded that intellectual disability did “not equate to actual innocence.” Id. at 612–13. 12 Coram nobis petitioners are “not entitled to equitable tolling to pursue a patently non-meritorious ground for relief.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 831 (quoting Harris II, 301 S.W.3d at 153 (Koch, J., concurring in part)). - 16 - Unlike Keen, we are not interpreting a statute; we are instead addressing a judge- made exception to the statute of limitations in error coram nobis cases. 2018Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2003)). | 4 | 9 |
Fahrner v. SW Manufacturing, Inc.green2 sentences2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)). 2008Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Tenn.2001); cf. Fairway Vill., 934 S.W.2d at 346 (explaining that equitable estoppel is less a tolling mechanism and more a doctrine used to prevent a party from relying on a statute of limitations defense). | 4 | 5 |
Burford v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001); Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995); Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992). 2012Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001). “‘[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 102 (quoting Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992)). | 3 | 10 |
George v. Building Materials Corp. of Americagreen2 sentences2022Managers, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 543, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (involving a statute of limitations defense) (citing George v. Building Materials Corporation of America, 44 S.W.3d 481 , 486–87 (Tenn. 2001)). 2018Materials Corp. of Am., 44 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining that mere introduction of evidence regarding dates did not amount to trial of a statute of limitations defense by implied consent when the evidence was used to establish another issue at trial); Long v. Long, No. M2015-00592-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 9584393 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2015) (vacating an order regarding military retirement pay where the issues before the court were modification of alimony and child support, and although retirement pay was a factor to be considered with respect to those issues, no one asked the c | 3 | 5 |
Ingram v. Earthmangreen2 sentences2018Revival is an appropriate response to a statute of limitations defense when a debtor has “revive[d] a plaintiff’s remedy that had been barred by the running of a statute of limitations either by expressly promising to pay the debt or by acknowledging the debt and expressing a willingness to pay it.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (footnote omitted). 2006“Statements or conduct that support an estoppel claim include representations, made prior to the expiration of the limitations period, that the defendant either would not assert a statute of limitations defense or that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). | 3 | 4 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2002) (statute of limitations tolled due to a late arising suppression of exculpatory evidence claim); Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 477 (Tenn. 2001) (misrepresentation by attorney as to continuing representation, rather than mere attorney negligence, possibly tolled the statute of limitations); Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 278-79 (statute of limitations tolled due to mental incompetence 2 W e have previously expressed our concern with the State raising the statute of limitations defense for the first time on appeal. 2001In Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court determined that “due process preclude[d] application of the statute of limitations to bar consideration of the writ of error coram nobis[.]” In Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court considered a situation similar to that of the instant case. | 3 | 4 |
Sparks v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Countygreen2 sentences2021Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 771 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) and Ingram v. Elledge, No. 01-A-019101-CV- 00009, 1991 WL 83349 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991) in making this argument. 2005Sparks v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Co., 771 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). | 3 | 3 |
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennesseegreen2 sentences2017See Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 . 2017The State, however, is not deemed to have waived the defense, if the petitioner “‘is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it’ because ‘the purpose of the specific pleading requirement is to prevent a party from raising a defense at the last possible moment and thereby prejudicing the opposing party’s opportunity to rebut the defense.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995). | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. Southeastern Properties, Ltd.green2 sentences2015Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989)); Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Auth., Serv. 2015See Deal v. Hastings, No. W2003-00912-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23100341 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)); Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Auth., Serv. | 3 | 3 |
Stockburger v. Raygreen2 sentences2013See Deal v. Hastings, No. W2003-00912-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23100341 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (“When a defendant establishes their entitlement to a statute of limitations defense, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception.”) (citing Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App.1989); Stockburger v. Rhea, 488 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)). 2003Smith v. Southeastern Props., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Stockburger v. Rhea, 488 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Mixongreen2 sentences2022State v. Mixon, 983 SW2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999); Workman v. State, 41 SW3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001). 2014Id. | 2 | 4 |
Steed Realty v. Oveisigreen2 sentences2016Accordingly, if the defense “is not pleaded within the proper time and in the proper manner, it is deemed waived and cannot be relied upon as a defense.” Steed Realty v. Oveisi, 823 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). 2016Accordingly, if the defense “is not pleaded within the proper time and in the proper manner, it is deemed waived and cannot be relied upon as a defense.” Steed Realty v. Oveisi, 823 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Robert Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2016Co., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that the statute of limitations has run. 2016Co., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001) (―Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that the statute of limitations has run. | 2 | 2 |
Carr v. Borchersgreen2 sentences2016See Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (“Since . . . a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense and no prima facie showing of the running of the statute of limitations is made by the record, the burden of establishing that the statute has run is upon the defendant.”); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R. 2016See Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (―Since . . . a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense and no prima facie showing of the running of the statute of limitations is made by the record, the burden of establishing that the statute has run is upon the defendant.‖); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Ina Ruth Browngreen2 sentences2016“A statute of limitations defense challenges the sufficiency of a particular claim, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in which the claim is filed.” Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tenn. 2013) (citation omitted). 2016“A statute of limitations defense challenges the sufficiency of a particular claim, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in which the claim is filed.” Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tenn. 2013) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Nestor Ayala Serrano v. Jorge L. Collazo Torresgreen2 sentences2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005) 2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. | 2 | 2 |
Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. Lujangreen2 sentences2013Accordingly, failure to raise an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss does not mean that the defense has been waived.”); Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. Lujan, 797 F.Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.1992) (“While it is the general practice to raise a statute of limitations defense by motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it is not an error to fail to do so.... [T]his defense cannot be waived by the failure to interpose it in a motion under Rule 12.”). 2013Accordingly, failure to raise an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss does not mean that the defense has been waived.”); Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Lujan, 797 F.Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.1992) (“While it is the general practice to raise a statute of limitations defense by motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it is not an error to fail to do so . . . . [T]his defense cannot be waived by the failure to interpose it in a motion under Rule 12.”). | 2 | 2 |
Ford Motor Company v. Moultongreen2 sentences2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the -6- time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 2001See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A- Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co.green2 sentences2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the -6- time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 2001See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tenn. 1974). “[I]n Tennessee a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense if the cause of action has accrued and the time allotted has expired.” Wyatt v. A- Best Products Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Freshwater v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Coram nobis claims are “singularly fact-intensive” and “are not easily resolved on the face of the petition and often require a hearing.” Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tenn. Crim. 2011Because coram nobis claims are “singularly fact-intensive,” they “are not easily resolved on the face of the petition and often require a hearing.” Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
| Locust v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Hardcastle v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2015“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle, 170 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001)). 2005Hite, 801 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)). “[E]quitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d 67, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 5 |
Young ex rel. estate of Young v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2018Young v. Kennedy, 429 S.W.3d 536, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a statute of limitations defense is properly characterized as failure to state a claim). 2014Young v. Kennedy, 429 S.W.3d 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (considering whether the statute of limitations defense was waived by failure to timely plead specific facts to support the defense). | 1 | 2 |
| Stanbury v. Bacardigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Wilkins v. Third National Bank in Nashvillegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Whitlow v. Hardin Co., Tenn.green | 1 | 2 |
| Pate v. City of Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tip's Package Store, Inc. v. Commercial Insurance Managers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rainey Bros. Construction Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Board of Adjustmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gunter v. Laboratory Corp. of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gore v. Tennessee Department of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kenneth E. King v. Anderson County, Tennesseegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craiggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alan Cartwright v. Alan Garnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sharon M. Smith v. Read Hauck
green
2 sentences2025“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). 2022“When the undisputed facts establish a statute of limitations defense, as they do here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to articulate at least a colorable basis for concluding that the statute of limitations has not run on his claims’ under an equitable doctrine such as the discovery rule.” Smith v. Hauck, 469 S.W.3d 564 , 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 465 (applying this burden-shifting framework to a motion to dismiss)). | 3 | 2020–2025 |
Cherry v. Williams
green
2 sentences2019“In considering a statute of limitations defense, we examine three interrelated elements: ‘the length of the limitations period, the accrual of the cause of action, and the applicability of any relevant tolling doctrines.’” Id. (quoting Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 456 (Tenn. 2012)). 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2019 |
Bennett v. Mueller
green
2 sentences2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005) 2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute
green
2 sentences2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir.1985) (“There is ... no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal.2005) 2013We thus deem it premature, at this stage, to hold that the government has waived any possible procedural default defense.”); U.S. v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the defendants initial motions were not “responsive,” the defendant had not waived their affirmative defense by failing to include it in the initial motions); Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985) (“There is . . . no requirement under Rule 12 to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations defense by motion.”); Bennett v. Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Doe a v. Coffee County Board of Education green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennessee green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| David Keen v. State of Tennessee green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Baxter green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Overton v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| McCarley v. West Quality Food Service green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Roe v. Jefferson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Scott green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Crafton v. Van Den Bosch green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Hanna v. Sheflin green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Ratliff green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Callahan v. Town of Middleton green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Consumer Credit Union v. Hite green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Watkins v. State red | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Bonde v. Bishop green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.