statute of limitations defense in Indiana

2003"The doctrine of fraudulent concealment operates to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense when that person, by deception or a violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff thereby preventing discovery of a wrong." Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995) (quotation omitted).

2003"The doctrine of fraudulent concealment operates to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense when that person, by deception or a violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff thereby preventing discovery *1213 of a wrong." Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995) (quotation omitted).

2018Nevertheless, we note that, "our courts have stated that 'a statute of limitations defense may properly be raised by a motion for summary judgment' even if not raised in the pleadings." Mizen , 72 N.E.3d at 466 (quoting Honeywell, Inc. v. Wilson , 500 N.E.2d 1251 , 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), reh'g denied , trans. denied ).

2016Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) states that a responsive pleading, such as an answer, “shall set forth affirmatively and carry the burden of proving ... statute of limitations ... and' any other matter constituting an ... affirmative defense.” In its summary judgment order, the trial court acknowledged that a statute of limitations defense may be raised for the first time in a summary judgment motion, citing Honeywell, Inc. v. Wilson, 500 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied (1987).

2026“The statute of limitations defense is particularly suitable as a basis for summary judgment.” Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

2019See Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267 , 1277 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that allegations of constructive fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress were substantively part of the legal malpractice claim), trans. denied; Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, Dumas, Burke, Backs, Long, & Salin, 461 N.E.2d 749, 751-752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (treating a claim for constructive fraud as, substantively, one for legal malpractice for purposes of a statute of limitations analysis). [13] The record reveals that the alleged malpractice occurred in 2014, this Court issued its opinion on M

2019“The plaintiff ‘need not anticipate a statute of limitations defense and plead matter[s] in avoidance in the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 , 755 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2664 | October 31, 2019 Page 18 of 26 (Ind. 1986)).

2017The plaintiff “need not anticipate a statute of limitations defense and plead matter[s] in avoidance in the complaint.” Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ind. 1986) (adopting statement of Judge Ratliff, who dissented-from denial of rehearing, in Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).

1987Statutes of Limitations Barring Recovery Against INT This court very recently declared the function of a summary judgment in the context of a statute of limitations defense: "[When the moving party asserts ... the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations and presumptively establishes that defense by placing before the trial court Trial Rule 56(C) materials showing there is no question that the action against him was initiated beyond the limited statutory period, then the burden of establishing the existence of material facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense shifts to

1985In Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 130 , we reversed the trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion, based on a statute of limitations defense, filed by the defendant in a medical malpractice action.

1999See Schnell v. Hayes, 710 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Mack v. American Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied).

1999Mack v. American Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied.

2011The doctrine will apply to prevent a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when “such party by fraud or other misconduct has prevented a party from commencing his action or induced him to delay the bringing of his action beyond the time allowed by law.” Id. at 1243 (quoting Donnella, Admrx. v. Crady, 135 Ind.App. 60 , 185 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1962), trans. denied.).

1983See also Martin v. Levinson, (1980) Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1239 , where this court, in addressing a related estoppel issue in connection with a statute of limitations defense quoted with approval the following passage from an Illinois case: "'The fact that an insurer negotiates with a claimant is not conduct amounting to waiver by estoppel unless the negotiations contain statements or conduct which are calculated to lull the claimant into a reasonable belief that his claim will be settled without suit.

2018"Where a trial court enters specific findings and conclusions, they offer insight into the rationale for the trial court's judgment and facilitate appellate review, but are not binding upon this court." Id. [7] "The statute of limitations defense is particularly suitable as a basis for summary judgment." Anonymous Physician v. Wininger , 998 N.E.2d 749 , 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

2016Anonymous Physician v. Wininger, 998 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind.Ct.App.2013).

2011Ind. Code § 84-11-2-4 ; see Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind.1990).

1999The Shenefields correctly note that intent to defraud need not be proven in order to give rise to an estoppel based on constructive fraud, Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind.1990), and they argue that “[rjegardless of intent, the defendant’s office manager made an oral promise ... that the defendant doctor did, in fact, have insurance coverage.

2004Schnell v. Hayes, 710 N.E.2d 208 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

1999See Schnell v. Hayes, 710 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Mack v. American Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied).

2019See Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267 , 1277 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that allegations of constructive fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress were substantively part of the legal malpractice claim), trans. denied; Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, Dumas, Burke, Backs, Long, & Salin, 461 N.E.2d 749, 751-752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (treating a claim for constructive fraud as, substantively, one for legal malpractice for purposes of a statute of limitations analysis). [13] The record reveals that the alleged malpractice occurred in 2014, this Court issued its opinion on M

2016See Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, Dumas, Burke, Backs, Long, and Salin, 461 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (treating a claim for constructive fraud as, substantively, one for legal malpractice for purposes of a statute of limitations analysis). .

2017The plaintiff “need not anticipate a statute of limitations defense and plead matter[s] in avoidance in the complaint.” Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ind. 1986) (adopting statement of Judge Ratliff, who dissented-from denial of rehearing, in Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).

2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied.

2016See also, Horvath v. Davidson (1970), 148 Ind.App. 203 , 264 N.E.2d 328 .

2016See also, Horvath v. Davidson (1970), 148 Ind.App. 203 , 264 N.E.2d 328 .

2016The trial court held that the defense was waived since it had not been pleaded and since the answers had not been amended.” Id. at 1252 . [11] Our Court disagreed with this determination: The Indiana Supreme Court in Shideler v. Dwyer (1981), 275 Ind. 270 , 417 N.E.2d 281 , clearly held that a statute of limitations defense may properly be raised by a motion for summary judgment.

2016The trial court held that the defense was waived since it had not been pleaded and since the answers had not been amended.” Id. at 1252 . [11] Our Court disagreed with this determination: The Indiana Supreme Court in Shideler v. Dwyer (1981), 275 Ind. 270 , 417 N.E.2d 281 , clearly held that a statute of limitations defense may properly be raised by a motion for summary judgment.

2000See, e.g., Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ind.1999) ("In the medical malpractice context, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may operate to toll the statutory period until the termination of the physician-patient relationship, or until the patient did discover, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the doctor’s alleged malpractice.”); Martin v. Rinck, 501 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (“[A] physician is under a duty to disclose material information to his patient; and failure to do so results in fraudulent concealment.”); Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466

2000See, e.g., Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ind.1999) ("In the medical malpractice context, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may operate to toll the statutory period until the termination of the physician-patient relationship, or until the patient did discover, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the doctor’s alleged malpractice.”); Martin v. Rinck, 501 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (“[A] physician is under a duty to disclose material information to his patient; and failure to do so results in fraudulent concealment.”); Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466

2025See, e.g., Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692 , 694–95 (Ind. 2000) (affirming entry of summary judgment on a motion for preliminary determination raising a statute-of-limitations defense); Wood v. Schuen, 760 N.E.2d 651, 654, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming entry of summary judgment on a motion for preliminary determination where claimant presented no evidence of a physician-patient relationship).

2013Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, “a person is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense if that person, by deception or violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff and thereby prevented discovery of a wrong.” Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 698 (citing Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1995)).

2020This burden is satisfied by demonstrating “(1) the nature of the plaintiff[’]s action, so that the relevant statute of limitations period may be identified; (2) the date the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was brought, being beyond the relevant statutory period.” Id. (quoting McMahan v. Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). [16] Whether a statute of limitations defense is applicable is generally a question of law.

2016“Only when the moving party demonstrates these matters properly does the burden shift to the opponent of the summary judgment motion to establish facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense.” Id. [16] In their counter motion for summary judgment, Appellants characterized Pioneer’s claims as actions on “accounts and contracts not in writing” subject to the six-year limitation period of Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-7.

2000See, e.g., Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ind.1999) ("In the medical malpractice context, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may operate to toll the statutory period until the termination of the physician-patient relationship, or until the patient did discover, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the doctor’s alleged malpractice.”); Martin v. Rinck, 501 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (“[A] physician is under a duty to disclose material information to his patient; and failure to do so results in fraudulent concealment.”); Spoljaric v. Pangan, 466

1989Cyrus, supra; Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias v. Trustees of Indiana University (1983), Ind.App., 444 N.E.2d 1204 , trans. denied.

1996Id. at 844 ; Yarnell v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied.

1996Id. at 844 ; Yarnell v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied.

2020This burden is satisfied by demonstrating “(1) the nature of the plaintiff[’]s action, so that the relevant statute of limitations period may be identified; (2) the date the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was brought, being beyond the relevant statutory period.” Id. (quoting McMahan v. Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). [16] Whether a statute of limitations defense is applicable is generally a question of law.

2016“A statute of limitations defense is particularly appropriate for summary judgment determination.” Stick doRN v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

2017Ganz Builders & Development Co. v. Pioneer Lumber, Inc., 59 N.E.3d 1025, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017), we discussed that when a statute of limitations defense is asserted, the party asserting the defense has the burden to show that the action was commenced outside the statutory period.

2017Ganz Builders & Development Co. v. Pioneer Lumber, Inc., 59 N.E.3d 1025, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017), we discussed that when a statute of limitations defense is asserted, the party asserting the defense has the burden to show that the action was commenced outside the statutory period.

2019The State acknowledges that our Supreme Court has allowed a statute-of-limitations defense to be raised for the first time on appeal, see Wallace v. State, 753 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001), but argues that Justice Boehm’s dissent in that case should be the law in Indiana.

2007Specifically, Justice Boehm wrote that he “believefs] both the current Trial Rules and policy considerations dictate that a defendant waives a statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in the trial court.” Id. at 571 (Boehm, J., dissenting).

2016Companies, 957 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Martin v. Levinson, 409 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)), trans. denied. [24] Equitable . estoppel is available if one party, through its representations or course of conduct, knowingly misleads or induces another party to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith and without knowledge of the facts.

2014Id.