statute of limitations defense in Washington

2002Co., Inc. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc., 105 Wash.2d 878, 885 , 719 P.2d 120 (1986).

2002Co., Inc. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc., 105 Wash.2d 878, 885 , 719 P.2d 120 (1986).

2021Donohoe v. Mid- Valley Glass Co., 84 Or.

2021Donohoe v. Mid- Valley Glass Co., 84 Or.

2021State v. Kerow, 192 Wn. 24 No. 37704-1-III cons. w/ 37705-9-III and 37706-7-III State v. Jones; State v. Mowen; State v. Robertson App. 843, 848 (2016); State v. Grantham, 174 Wn.

2021App. 399, 404 , 299 P.3d 21 (2013)). 8 Id. at 845-46. 9 Id. at 845. 4 No. 80501-1-I/5 cause.10 And both continuances were outside the 180-days.11 This court held that the trial court had the authority to continue the hearing beyond the 180-day statutory period.12 This court reasoned that the defendant waived the statute of limitations defense because defense counsel did not insist that the hearing occur within the statutory period, and the “only reasonable inference from the record” was that the defendant agreed to the continuances.13 Similar to the defendant in Kerow, the trial court continue

2015Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 620 , 238 P.3d 209 (2010) (holding that the fact the statute of limitations had run against decedent’s personal injury claim did not bar a wrongful death suit), Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 210 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013) (concluding that a statute of limitations defense against a decedent’s claim does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action), and Riggs v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2015 UT 17 , 345 P.3d 1219, 1224-25 (finding that a wrongful death action for asbestos-related death is a separate, nonderivative claim and it is not barred by prior personal injury actions for th

2015Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 620 , 238 P.3d 209 (2010) (holding that the fact the statute of limitations had run against decedent’s personal injury claim did not bar a wrongful death suit), Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 210 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013) (concluding that a statute of limitations defense against a decedent’s claim does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action), and Riggs v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2015 UT 17 , 345 P.3d 1219, 1224-25 (finding that a wrongful death action for asbestos-related death is a separate, nonderivative claim and it is not barred by prior personal injury actions for th

2015Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 620 , 238 P.3d 209 (2010) (holding that the fact the statute of limitations had run against decedent’s personal injury claim did not bar a wrongful death suit), Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 210 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013) (concluding that a statute of limitations defense against a decedent’s claim does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action), and Riggs v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2015 UT 17 , 345 P.3d 1219, 1224-25 (finding that a wrongful death action for asbestos-related death is a separate, nonderivative claim and it is not barred by prior personal injury actions for th

2015Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 620 , 238 P.3d 209 (2010) (holding that the fact the statute of limitations had run against decedent’s personal injury claim did not bar a wrongful death suit), Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 210 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013) (concluding that a statute of limitations defense against a decedent’s claim does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action), and Riggs v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2015 UT 17 , 345 P.3d 1219, 1224-25 (finding that a wrongful death action for asbestos-related death is a separate, nonderivative claim and it is not barred by prior personal injury actions for th

2010State v. Eppens, 30 Wash.App. 119, 124 , 633 P.2d 92 (1981). [2] Accordingly, a statute of limitations challenge in a criminal case can be raised for the first time on appeal.

2010State v. Eppens, 30 Wash.App. 119, 124 , 633 P.2d 92 (1981). [2] Accordingly, a statute of limitations challenge in a criminal case can be raised for the first time on appeal.

2010RAP 2.5(a)(1); State v. Novotny, 76 Wash.App. 343 , 345 n. 1, 884 P.2d 1336 (1994). ¶ 10 The question here is whether any time was tolled.

2010RAP 2.5(a)(1); State v. Novotny, 76 Wash.App. 343 , 345 n. 1, 884 P.2d 1336 (1994). ¶ 10 The question here is whether any time was tolled.

2007Sunding responds that "[i]nsufficiency of process is the issue here not failure to file before the expiration of the statute of limitations." A statute of limitations defense is not required because "[a]n untimely service of process is necessarily insufficient," Adkinson, 99 Wash.2d at 209 , 660 P.2d 756 .

2007Sunding responds that “[insufficiency of process is the issue here[,] not failure to file before the expiration of the statute of limitations.” A statute of limitations defense is not required because “[a]n untimely service of process is necessarily insufficient.” Adkinson, 99 Wn.2d at 209 .

2006Lybbert, 141 Wash.2d at 39 , 1 P.3d 1124 . ¶ 42 Here, APM Terminals did not act inconsistently with any previous behavior, nor was it dilatory in asserting the statute of limitations defense.

2006Lybbert, 141 Wn.2d at 39 . ¶42 Here, APM Terminals did not act inconsistently with any previous behavior, nor was it dilatory in asserting the statute of limitations defense.

2006In so doing, they knew that Mr. Teller would be unable to rely Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 815 P.2d 781 (1991), . . .” to toll the statute of limitations.

2006In so doing, they knew that Mr. Teller would be unable to rely Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 815 P.2d 781 (1991), . . .” to toll the statute of limitations.

2005Id. at 185 . ¶39 Unlike Marshall , Mr. Burbo’s deposition testimony does not negate objectively verifiable facts.

2005Id. at 185 , 782 P.2d 1107 .

2005Thus, their citation to Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215 , 543 P.2d 338 (1975) (injury and damages do not always occur simultaneously) is inapt.

2005Thus, their citation to Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215 , 543 P.2d 338 (1975) (injury and damages do not always occur simultaneously) is inapt.

2025It is just an affirmative defense like any other affirmative defense.” T & G, 165 Wn.2d at 265 . 15 No. 84795-3-I/16 D.

2025And in Simms v. Allstate Insurance Co., the court concluded that a finding of prejudice is unnecessary for a statute of limitations clause because it is merely a contractual modification. 27 Wn.

2025App. 872, 876-77 , 621 P.2d 155 (1980).

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024App. 2d 748, 759, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (“a defendant can waive a statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in the trial court and an express waiver is not required”); Matthies v. Knodel, 19 Wn.

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024Oja & Assocs. v. Wash. Park Towers, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 569 P.2d 1141 (1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942) (holding that the statute of limitations defense was personal and it did not result in a dismissal on the merits)).

2024Oja & Assocs. v. Wash. Park Towers, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 569 P.2d 1141 (1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942) (holding that the statute of limitations defense was personal and it did not result in a dismissal on the merits)).

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2024App. 1, 5 , 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (per curiam) (“There is a waiver of certain defenses under the civil rules if they are not affirmatively pleaded in the answer.” (citing CR 8 and 12(b)). 5 City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (holding that a party cannot either intentionally or accidentally set up an error and then “‘complain[] of it on appeal’” (quoting State v. Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511 , 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 319 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995))); see also State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 547 , 973 P.2d 1049 (

2023The principle was the basis for rejecting a similar statute of limitations defense in White v. Krutz, 37 Wash. 34, 36 , 79 P. 495 (1905).

2023The principle was the basis for rejecting a similar statute of limitations defense in White v. Krutz, 37 Wash. 34, 36 , 79 P. 495 (1905).

2021Peltier, 181 Wn.2d at 297 .