statute of limitations defense in Georgia

2019See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2014See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga.App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted *271 after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel”).

2019See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2019See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2019See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2014See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 514, 518 ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (finding no prejudice where the appellant did “not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the state to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome”); Washington v. State, 298 Ga.App. 105, 106 ( 679 SE2d 111 ) (2009) (“[B]ecause a defendant can be re-indicted *271 after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel”).

2017See Musacchio v. United States, 577 U. S. _ , _ ( 136 SCt 709, 718 , 193 LE2d 639) (2016).

2017See Musacchio v. United States, 577 U. S. ___ , ___ ( 136 SCt 709, 718 , 193 LE2d 639) (2016).

2022“The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute of limitations defense is a de novo review of the issue of laws.” Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 720 (1) ( 681 SE2d 174 ) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute of limitations defense is a de novo review of the issue of laws.” Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 720 (1) ( 681 SE2d 174 ) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019(Emphasis added.) OCGA § 9-10-31.1 was adopted in derogation of the common law 3 and therefore " 'must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute.' " Wegman v. Wegman , 338 Ga. App. 648 , 652 (1), 791 S.E.2d 431 (2016) (quoting Couch v. Red Roof Inns , 291 Ga. 359 , 364, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) ).

2019(Emphasis added.) OCGA § 9-10-31.1 was adopted in derogation of the common law 3 and therefore " 'must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute.' " Wegman v. Wegman , 338 Ga. App. 648 , 652 (1), 791 S.E.2d 431 (2016) (quoting Couch v. Red Roof Inns , 291 Ga. 359 , 364, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) ).

2019(Emphasis added.) OCGA § 9-10-31.1 was adopted in derogation of the common law 3 and therefore " 'must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute.' " Wegman v. Wegman , 338 Ga. App. 648 , 652 (1), 791 S.E.2d 431 (2016) (quoting Couch v. Red Roof Inns , 291 Ga. 359 , 364, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) ).

2019(Emphasis added.) OCGA § 9-10-31.1 was adopted in derogation of the common law 3 and therefore " 'must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute.' " Wegman v. Wegman , 338 Ga. App. 648 , 652 (1), 791 S.E.2d 431 (2016) (quoting Couch v. Red Roof Inns , 291 Ga. 359 , 364, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) ).

2018Co. , 323 U.S. 574 , 580-581, 65 S.Ct. 421 , 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945) ).

2018Co. , 323 U.S. 574 , 580-581, 65 S.Ct. 421 , 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945) ).

2018The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, in a case "where there was but one episode-in-suit," and no "separate episodes" at a "different time and place," an "amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute of limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not originally asserted." Mayle , 545 U.S. at 659 -660 , 125 S.Ct. 2562 (explaining Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.

2018The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, in a case "where there was but one episode-in-suit," and no "separate episodes" at a "different time and place," an "amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute of limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not originally asserted." Mayle , 545 U.S. at 659 -660 , 125 S.Ct. 2562 (explaining Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.

2023See, e.g., Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga. App. 77, 79 (2) ( 561 SE2d 212 ) (2002) (“Because it appears that [the injured spouse] could have recovered absent the statute of limitations bar, [the other spouse] can recover for loss of consortium.”).

2023See, e.g., Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga. App. 77, 79 (2) ( 561 SE2d 212 ) (2002) (“Because it appears that [the injured spouse] could have recovered absent the statute of limitations bar, [the other spouse] can recover for loss of consortium.”).

2023See also OCGA § 9-3-33 (establishing a limitation period of two years for personal injury claims, but four years for loss of consortium claims). 4 also Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga. App. 242, 243 ( 124 SE2d 313 ) (1962) (Georgia law recognizes a spouse’s “independent cause of action for the loss of consortium of [the other spouse] due to a tortious injury inflicted upon him [or her.]”).

2023See also OCGA § 9-3-33 (establishing a limitation period of two years for personal injury claims, but four years for loss of consortium claims). 4 also Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga. App. 242, 243 ( 124 SE2d 313 ) (1962) (Georgia law recognizes a spouse’s “independent cause of action for the loss of consortium of [the other spouse] due to a tortious injury inflicted upon him [or her.]”).

2018See also Sam Finley, Inc., 135 Ga. App. at 18, 20 (apparently the first Georgia case to use this language, based on an extensive quote from Moore’s Federal Practice). 10 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, in a case where “[t]here was but one episode-in-suit,” and no “separate episodes” at a “different time and place,” an “amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute of limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not originally asserted.” Mayle, 545 U. S. at 659-660 (explaining Tiller

2016OCGA § 9-10-31.1 (b). “[S]uch a written stipulation ... is a mandatory condition precedent to the dismissal of a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 273 Ga. App. 242, 250 (3) ( 614 SE2d 875 ) (2005), overruled on other grounds, Wang, 292 Ga. at 571 (1).

2016OCGA § 9-10-31.1 (b). “[S]uch a written stipulation ... is a mandatory condition precedent to the dismissal of a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 273 Ga. App. 242, 250 (3) ( 614 SE2d 875 ) (2005), overruled on other grounds, Wang, 292 Ga. at 571 (1).

2016OCGA § 9-10-31.1 (b). “[S]uch a written stipulation ... is a mandatory condition precedent to the dismissal of a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 273 Ga. App. 242, 250 (3) ( 614 SE2d 875 ) (2005), overruled on other grounds, Wang, 292 Ga. at 571 (1).

2012An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment.16 The form of the indictment may be challenged by a special demurrer, but even if the trial court grants a special demurrer and quashes the indictment, it does not bar the State from re-indicting the defendant.17 Chapman does not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the State to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome in this case.18 Therefore, Chapman has “fail

2012An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment.16 The form of the indictment may be challenged by a special demurrer, but even if the trial court grants a special demurrer and quashes the indictment, it does not bar the State from re-indicting the defendant.17 Chapman does not demonstrate a statute of limitations defense or other manner in which requiring the State to re-indict him was reasonably likely to result in a different outcome in this case.18 Therefore, Chapman has “fail

2009“The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute of limitations defense is a de novo review of the issue of laws. [Cit.]” State v. Conzo, 293 Ga. App. 72, 73 ( 666 SE2d 404 ) (2008).

2009“The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute of limitations defense is a de novo review of the issue of laws. [Cit.]” State v. Conzo, 293 Ga. App. 72, 73 ( 666 SE2d 404 ) (2008).

2008Biscuit Co. v. Martin, 225 Ga. 198, 199 , 167 S.E.2d 140 (1969) (Civil Practice Act provisions regarding taking of depositions not applicable to workers' compensation claims unless made so by statute). [10] OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq. [11] In addition to the claims considered in Divisions 1 and 2, supra, McLendon argues that the ALJ erred in (i) not postponing the hearing, sua sponte, after learning that multiple claims had been filed on his behalf; (ii) allowing an oral, as opposed to written, dismissal of his January, July, and October claims, and then recognizing the legitimacy of the dismissal;

2008Counsel did go on to argue, however, that his client’s inability to precisely identify the date of the accident should not bar the claim, citing Skinner Poultry Co., supra. Atlantic Bitulithic Co. v. Maxwell, 40 Ga. App. 483, 487 ( 150 SE 110 ) (1929) (“[w]e can not sustain this contention, for the simple reason that it was not raised in the appeal to the superior court”).

2008Biscuit Co. v. Martin, 225 Ga. 198, 199 , 167 S.E.2d 140 (1969) (Civil Practice Act provisions regarding taking of depositions not applicable to workers' compensation claims unless made so by statute). [10] OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq. [11] In addition to the claims considered in Divisions 1 and 2, supra, McLendon argues that the ALJ erred in (i) not postponing the hearing, sua sponte, after learning that multiple claims had been filed on his behalf; (ii) allowing an oral, as opposed to written, dismissal of his January, July, and October claims, and then recognizing the legitimacy of the dismissal;

2008Counsel did go on to argue, however, that his client’s inability to precisely identify the date of the accident should not bar the claim, citing Skinner Poultry Co., supra. Atlantic Bitulithic Co. v. Maxwell, 40 Ga. App. 483, 487 ( 150 SE 110 ) (1929) (“[w]e can not sustain this contention, for the simple reason that it was not raised in the appeal to the superior court”).

2007Instead of unpredictability, "[i]t is desirable to have stability and certainty in the law. . . . [Cits.]" Dowis v. Mud Slingers, 279 Ga. 808, 811 , 621 S.E.2d 413 (2005).

2007Instead of unpredictability, "[i]t is desirable to have stability and certainty in the law. . . . [Cits.]" Dowis v. Mud Slingers, 279 Ga. 808, 811 , 621 S.E.2d 413 (2005).

1983Although not ruling on this particular code section, the court in Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 250 Ga. 397, 400 ( 297 SE2d 462 ) (1982), also dealt with whether or not a statute effective July 1,1978, was to have retroactive application and held that “ ‘[statutory amendments changing limitations periods are generally not applied retroactively, whether the effect of the change would be to improve or worsen the claimant’s position, 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation 15-209, § 78.80 (1976).” In the present case, the former code section must be held to apply and the statute of limitations defense f

1983Although not ruling on this particular code section, the court in Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 250 Ga. 397, 400 ( 297 SE2d 462 ) (1982), also dealt with whether or not a statute effective July 1,1978, was to have retroactive application and held that “ ‘[statutory amendments changing limitations periods are generally not applied retroactively, whether the effect of the change would be to improve or worsen the claimant’s position, 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation 15-209, § 78.80 (1976).” In the present case, the former code section must be held to apply and the statute of limitations defense f

1983Held: We held in King v. Seitzingers, 160 Ga. App. 318, 320 (287 SE2d *567 252), a similar products liability case, that “a tort cause of action does not accrue unless the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should have known that he suffered an injury. . . . [The] cause of action did not accrue and the statute of limitation did not run against him until he knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only the nature of his injury but also the causal connection between the injury and the alleged negligent conduct of appellee.” (Emphasis supplied.) We