Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. I and antecedent provisions, relating to the creation of a state court of claims and incidentally to the reservation of the sovereign immunity of the state, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Some of the cases cited below were decided before the 1990 amendment which deleted provisions as to waiver to the extent of liability insurance.

Governmental immunity waived only by Constitution or General Assembly.

- Governmental immunity from suit is waived only when so provided by the Constitution or by the express act of the General Assembly. Porter v. Home Indem. Co., 168 Ga. App. 799, 310 S.E.2d 546 (1983).

Georgia Attorney General lacks statutory authority to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit; only the legislature can authorize a waiver of sovereign immunity. Ramey v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2001).

Under the Georgia Constitution, sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments, and may be waived only by a legislative act. DOT v. Watts, 260 Ga. App. 905, 581 S.E.2d 410 (2003).

Constitutionality.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para IX does not violate due process and equal protection guarantees. Dollar v. Dalton Pub. Schs., 233 Ga. App. 827, 505 S.E.2d 789 (1998).

For constitutionality of paragraph, see Clark v. State, 240 Ga. 188, 240 S.E.2d 5 (1977).

Constitutionality of provision for governmental immunity of counties.

- Amendment providing counties with the shield of governmental immunity was not ineffectual or invalid merely because it was in conflict with existing provisions. Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).

Constitutionality of statutory scheme for waiver of immunity by state and counties.

- The statutory scheme under which plaintiffs having tort claims against the state have the benefit of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity afforded by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., which does not extend to counties, whereas a county's waiver of immunity is allowed only to the extent of insurance purchased for negligence arising from the use of a motor vehicle, results in unequal treatment, however, it does not violate due process or equal protection. Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 456 S.E.2d 581 (1995).

Constitutional immunity of school district.

- School district was not an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if it was part of the state for purposes of state sovereign immunity. Lightfoot v. Henry County Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2014).

Suit challenging carrying weapon in school safety zone properly dismissed.

- Trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's suit challenging the enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1), making it a crime to carry a firearm in a school safety zone, by the school that the plaintiff's child attended because the school had sovereign immunity against state law claims and the threat of arrest if the plaintiff brought a weapon in the school safety zone did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation to be remedied by the suit. Evans v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 337 Ga. App. 690, 788 S.E.2d 577 (2016).

Tax waiver statute did not provide waiver as to school district.

- Taxpayer's suit against a school district seeking a refund was barred by immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para IX; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 provided for tax refunds by counties and municipalities but not school districts and, therefore, did not constitute a waiver of the school district's immunity. City of Dublin Sch. Dist. v. MMT Holdings, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 546, 816 S.E.2d 494 (2018).

Defense of sovereign immunity is not affirmative defense with respect to which the state has the burden of proof. Indeed, neither counsel for the state nor any of its agencies may, by affirmative action or by failure to plead, waive the defense of governmental immunity. Kelleher v. State, 187 Ga. App. 64, 369 S.E.2d 341 (1988).

This paragraph is not nullified by any illegality in its ratification. Clark v. State, 142 Ga. App. 272, 235 S.E.2d 614, aff'd, 240 Ga. 188, 240 S.E.2d 5 (1977); Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).

1982 amendment to 1976 Constitution properly substituted as this paragraph.

- The sovereign immunity amendment to the 1976 Constitution, 1982 Ga. L., p. 2546, was properly substituted as this paragraph in the 1983 Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. Pollard v. Board of Regents, 260 Ga. 885, 401 S.E.2d 272 (1991).

By virtue of adoption of this paragraph, doctrine of state sovereign immunity now has constitutional status and cannot be abrogated or modified by the Supreme Court. Clark v. State, 240 Ga. 188, 240 S.E.2d 5 (1977).

Immunity rule.

- The immunity rule as it has heretofore existed in this state cannot be abrogated or modified by the Supreme Court. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975).

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was given constitutional status by the 1974 amendment to this paragraph, and applies to any "suit" involving claims for "injury" or "damage" against the state unless and until there is a waiver by act of the General Assembly. Echols v. DeKalb County, 146 Ga. App. 560, 247 S.E.2d 114 (1978).

Doctrine of sovereign immunity is vested with constitutional status and applies to any action against the state unless there is an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789, 278 S.E.2d 648 (1981).

Doctrine of sovereign immunity is not bar to enforcement of constitutional rights. C.F.I. Constr. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 145 Ga. App. 471, 243 S.E.2d 700, cert. dismissed, 242 Ga. 96, 249 S.E.2d 613 (1978).

Violation of constitutional right of citizen must by necessary implication raise cause of action in favor of citizen unless some means of redress other than suit has been afforded by the legislature. C.F.I. Constr. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 145 Ga. App. 471, 243 S.E.2d 700, cert. dismissed, 242 Ga. 96, 249 S.E.2d 613 (1978).

Immunity of government officials.

- Government officials were not entitled to immunity from claims brought against the officials by a former government employee because the employee sufficiently alleged that the defendants acted with actual malice by conspiring to have the employee's employment terminated by undermining the employee's dignity and professional reputation with false, sexually charged ridicule to the employer and others, and by threatening the employer with withdrawal of financial support if the employee's employment was not terminated. Lee v. Christian, 98 F. Supp. 3d 11265 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2015).

Changes in immunity rule and extent of such changes are now solely within domain of General Assembly. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975).

Generally, the state and its political subdivisions are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the performance of governmental functions; this paragraph provides for waiver of immunity of the state from suit as is now or may hereafter be provided by Act of the General Assembly. National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789, 278 S.E.2d 648 (1981).

State courts have primary interest in adjudicating immunity claims.

- Court abstained sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and dismissed a Chapter 11 debtor's complaint against a county and various officials because, inter alia, only state law claims were raised; the issues were merely "related to" a case under Title 11, and accordingly were treated as described in 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); the parties had a right to a jury trial; and issues of state sovereign immunity were raised under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c), which the state had a primary interest in adjudicating. Old Augusta Dev. Group, Inc. v. Effingham County (In re Old Augusta Dev. Group, Inc.), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. May 16, 2011).

Only by express consent of state can the state be made amenable to suit and such consent is a matter of legislative grace, the extension of a privilege to which citizens have no right. Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981).

Statutory waiver of sovereign immunity as matter of grace may be granted, withdrawn, or restricted at will of legislature. Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981).

Waiver provisions of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX are prospective from their effective date. Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 309 S.E.2d 126 (1983); Holloway v. Rogers, 181 Ga. App. 11, 351 S.E.2d 240 (1986).

This provision is self-executing, and, as of the provision's effective date in 1983, it results in an automatic waiver by a municipality of the defense of sovereign immunity to the extent of any applicable general liability insurance coverage carried by the municipality, despite the language in O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a) limiting that section's effect to litigation pending after July 1, 1986. Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 360 S.E.2d 655 (1987) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Withdraw of waiver of immunity prior to 1991 amendment.

- If a cause of action accrues before the effective date of the 1991 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, withdrawal of the waiver of sovereign immunity remains effective regardless of whether the action was filed before or after the effective date of the amendment; Donaldson v. Dep't of Transp., 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992), is no longer controlling in light of Curtis v. Bd. of Regents, 416 S.E.2d 510 (1992). McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005).

1991 amendment applicable to action arising after January 1, 1991.

- The 1991 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, extending sovereign immunity "to the state and all of its departments and agencies," governed an action which arose on September 1, 1991, and was filed on November 24, 1992. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

The 1991 amendment extending sovereign immunity "to the state and all of its departments and agencies" includes county-wide school districts created pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 20-2-50. Coffee County Sch. Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995).

For application of 1991 amendment, see Rawls v. Bulloch County Sch. Dist., 223 Ga. App. 234, 477 S.E.2d 383 (1996).

1991 amendment does not apply retroactively.

- The 1991 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, eliminating the insurance waiver, under which sovereign immunity in tort actions was waived to the extent that the state agencies or employees were covered by insurance, is not to be applied retroactively. Brown v. Hall County, 262 Ga. 172, 416 S.E.2d 90 (1992).

When an action was filed before the effective date of the 1991 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, the amended provision did not apply. Vannostran v. Mountainside Bldrs. Inc., 262 Ga. 172, 416 S.E.2d 89 (1992).

The 1991 amendment has prospective effect only and does not act to withdraw any waiver of sovereign immunity for actions pending on January 1, 1991, the amendment's effective date. Donaldson v. DOT, 262 Ga. 49, 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

Since a plaintiff filed suit two months prior to January 1, 1991, the date the amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX became effective, the amendment did not apply, and the Department of Transportation waived its sovereign immunity to the extent of its available insurance. Bob v. Scruggs Co., 204 Ga. App. 375, 419 S.E.2d 100, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 921, 419 S.E.2d 100 (1992).

Although the complaint was filed after the effective date of the constitutional amendment, since the cause of action accrued before January 1, 1991, the waiver of any existing defense of sovereign immunity was not withdrawn. Dozier v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 206 Ga. App. 62, 424 S.E.2d 632 (1992).

Trial court erred in granting a school board's motion for summary judgment as to an injured party's personal injury claim based on sovereign immunity as: (1) the trial court applied the wrong version of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e), which was amended, prospectively, after the accident; (2) the applicable version of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) was in effect at the time of the accident in 1990; and (3) the parties agreed that an insurance policy would have constituted a waiver of the board's sovereign immunity, which implied that a policy existed; the case was remanded so that the trial court could reconsider its decision in light of the correct law and any insurance policy. Hart v. Appling County Sch. Bd., 266 Ga. App. 300, 597 S.E.2d 462 (2004).

Complaint filed prior to amendment's effective date.

- The trial court's dismissal of the negligence action alleging breach of contract in the death of plaintiff's spouse based on sovereign immunity was reversed when the plaintiff filed a complaint prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. These provisions do not withdraw any waiver of sovereign immunity for actions pending on the amendment's effective date of January 1, 1991. At the time of this action, the Board of Regents maintained a self-insurance program that provided liability insurance for board employees and under the constitutional provision then in effect, the board waived sovereign immunity to the extent of the liability insurance provided. Wilson v. Board of Regents, 262 Ga. 413, 419 S.E.2d 916 (1992).

Liability for actions accruing before effective date.

- In an action brought against a local school board for the wrongful death of a child struck and killed by an automobile, since the fatal accident occurred prior to the effective date of subsection (a) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, January 1, 1983, the board members' defense of sovereign immunity was not waived. Hill v. McClure, 171 Ga. App. 588, 320 S.E.2d 562 (1984).

Construction of duplicative constitutional grants of sovereign immunity.

- Since the authority to waive the sovereign immunity of the state, and concomitantly that of the counties of the state, is given to the General Assembly by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, it was not necessary for the people to give an identical authority of waiver to the General Assembly by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IX. However, this duplicative grant does not render the two provisions inconsistent and does not indicate an intent that the Article I provision would not reserve sovereign immunity to counties. Toombs County v. O'Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985).

The 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, extending sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies regardless of any insurance, did not divest the General Assembly of authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IX, to waive the immunity of counties based on motor vehicle liability insurance; therefore, the amendment did not abrogate the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 and a county's governmental immunity was waived to the extent of liability insurance purchased. Daniels v. Decatur County, 212 Ga. App. 378, 441 S.E.2d 790 (1994).

The term "governmental immunity," as used in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51, is synonymous with "sovereign immunity" and does not encompass both "sovereign" and "official" immunity. Thus, the waiver of immunity provided by the statute is not in conflict with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX since it provides both a waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver, i.e., the extent of liability insurance coverage. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

Construction with O.C.G.A.

§§ 9-4-7(c) and50-13-10(a). - Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed that the "may be determined" language in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10(a) was evidence that the statute was but one of several methods by which to challenge the validity of an agency rule and that O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), as well as case authority, impliedly contemplated the legitimacy of challenges to agency rules outside the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).

Construction of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. - In order for state policy decisions related to the provision of emergency services not to be directly or indirectly put on trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia construed O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6), an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity, to provide complete protection of the policy-making decisions in providing police and fire services from judicial review, as such construction accomplished a balance between the inherently unfair and inequitable results from the strict application of sovereign immunity and the need to limit the state's exposure to tort liability that the General Assembly expressed as its goal in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21. Ga. Forestry Comm'n v. Canady, 280 Ga. 825, 632 S.E.2d 105 (2006).

State immunity in federal court.

- Although the state has waived the state's sovereign immunity in state court to the extent the state agencies or employees were covered by insurance, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX cannot be read as waiving the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. Hobbs v. Georgia DOT, 785 F. Supp. 980 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).

Authority of state courts over federally-based claims against state officers and employees.

- The 1990 amendment addresses only the immunity defense of state officers and employees to state-based claims, not the authority of the state's courts to hear federally-based claims against state officers and employees. Thus, the amendment cannot be construed as removing subject matter jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims from the courts of Georgia. Turner v. Giles, 264 Ga. 812, 450 S.E.2d 421 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1108, 115 S. Ct. 1959, 131 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1995).

The courts of this state have subject matter jurisdiction over federally-based claims against state officers and employees and the consequent authority to rule on the merits of any defense that might be raised by the state officers and employees. Turner v. Giles, 264 Ga. 812, 450 S.E.2d 421 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1108, 115 S. Ct. 1959, 131 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1995).

Whoever contracts with the state trusts to the good faith of the state, unless the state sees fit to disrobe itself of its sovereignty. C.F.I. Constr. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 145 Ga. App. 471, 243 S.E.2d 700, cert. dismissed, 242 Ga. 96, 249 S.E.2d 613 (1978).

County waiver of immunity in employment contracts.

- Trial court erred in denying a county's motion for summary judgment because under the clear terms of the County Code, overtime-exempt fire captains, after being promoted to the rank of captain, were not entitled to use compensatory time accrued more than a year earlier and they were not entitled to receive payment for their unused compensatory time as there was no written contract that promised them compensation for such time, thus, there was no waiver of the county's sovereign immunity. DeKalb County v. Kirkland, 329 Ga. App. 262, 764 S.E.2d 867 (2014).

Rule permitting action against local government for constitutional question not applicable to state.

- The rule which permits a citizen and taxpayer to maintain an action against a municipality or county to test the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute cannot be applied by analogy to a suit against the state, the latter being a sovereign power and not subject to suit without its consent. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392 (1935).

Standing to seek reformation of liability contract.

- In certifying certain questions to the Georgia Supreme Court, the federal Court of Appeals concluded that it is an open question of Georgia law whether a person injured by a municipality has a beneficial interest in the municipality's liability contract sufficient to provide standing to seek reformation. Florida Int'l Indem. Co. v. City of Metter, 952 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1992).

Immunity extends to counties.

- Builder's contractual and quasi-contractual claims against a county and county officials for an interest in a sewer pumping station were properly dismissed by the trial court because the claims were barred by sovereign immunity as there was no written contract to enforce. Layer v. Barrow County, 297 Ga. 871, 778 S.E.2d 156 (2015).

Immunity does not extend to counties.

- Both the county and the county's sheriff were entitled to sovereign immunity against the state-law tort of conversion because the plaintiffs could not show that sovereign immunity had been waived. The sovereign immunity waiver provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not extend to a county. Carter v. Butts Cnty., 821 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).

Consent to suit required for constitutional questions on abortion statute.

- Suit by physicians against state officials alleging that O.C.G.A. § 31-9B-1 et seq., regulating abortions, violated the state constitution in several respects, was barred by sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, because there was no consent to such a suit in any statute or in the state constitution. Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).

Scope of trial court's authority under Service Delivery Strategy Act.

- Trial court's ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar claims under the Service Delivery Strategy Act, O.C.G.A. § 36-70-20 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 36-70-25.1(d)(2), was affirmed because sovereign immunity was waived only to the extent of the statute, which extends no further than the remedies specifically authorized by the Act and the trial court could not exceed the scope of § 36-70-25.1(d)(2) by granting relief not provided therein for claims brought under the Act. City of Union Point v. Greene County, 303 Ga. 449, 812 S.E.2d 278 (2018).

County's sovereignty for tax refund claims was waived only for three-year window.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380(b) limited taxpayer recovery to overpayments made within three years of a written claim for refund, the county's sovereign immunity was waived only for the improper payments made within that three-year window. In a class action, the class members' three-year window was determined as of the date of filing the action. Mandamus and equity were unavailable to circumvent this limitation. Coleman v. Glynn County, 344 Ga. App. 545, 809 S.E.2d 383 (2018).

Cited in Hight v. Burden, 180 Ga. App. 716, 350 S.E.2d 471 (1986); Price v. DOT, 182 Ga. App. 353, 356 S.E.2d 45 (1987); Ostuni Bros. v. Fulton County Dep't of Pub. Works, 184 Ga. App. 406, 361 S.E.2d 668 (1987); Poss v. Georgia Regional Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Ga. 1987); Cooper v. Swofford, 258 Ga. 143, 368 S.E.2d 518 (1988); Kurtz v. Williams, 188 Ga. App. 14, 371 S.E.2d 878 (1988); Jarrett v. Butts, 190 Ga. App. 703, 379 S.E.2d 583 (1989); Rogers v. Sharpe, 206 Ga. App. 353, 425 S.E.2d 391 (1992); Winchester Constr. Co. v. Miller County Bd. of Educ., 821 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Newsome v. Webster, 843 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Deaton v. Department of Cors., 212 Ga. App. 612, 443 S.E.2d 8 (1994); Miller v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. App. 876, 460 S.E.2d 100 (1995); Christensen v. State, 219 Ga. App. 10, 464 S.E.2d 14 (1995); Northwest Ga. Regional Hosp. v. Wilkins, 220 Ga. App. 534, 469 S.E.2d 786 (1996); Miller v. Department of Pub. Safety, 221 Ga. App. 280, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996); Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997); Smith v. Little, 234 Ga. App. 329, 506 S.E.2d 675 (1998); Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998); Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.3d 658 (11th Cir. 1998); Phillips v. Walls, 242 Ga. App. 309, 529 S.E.2d 626 (2000); Department of Veterans Servs. v. Robinson, 244 Ga. App. 878, 536 S.E.2d 617 (2000); Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Coley, 247 Ga. App. 392, 544 S.E.2d 165 (2000); Price v. State, 250 Ga. App. 872, 553 S.E.2d 194 (2001); Sylvester v. DOT, 252 Ga. App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740 (2001); Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 572 S.E.2d 34 (2002); Johnson v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 278 Ga. 714, 606 S.E.2d 270 (2004); EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006); Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharm. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2008); Romano v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 303 Ga. App. 347, 693 S.E.2d 521 (2010); Nelson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 307 Ga. App. 220, 704 S.E.2d 868 (2010); Laskar v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 320 Ga. App. 414, 740 S.E.2d 179 (2013); Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 759 S.E.2d 857 (2014); Effingham County v. Roach, 329 Ga. App. 805, 764 S.E.2d 600 (2014), overruled on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016); Considine v. Murphy, 297 Ga. 164, 773 S.E.2d 176 (2015).

Specific waiver of immunity to provide limited time to file a claim.

- Trial court did not err in granting the motion by the state transportation department to dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity barred the claimant's personal injury claim against the state because the claimant did not timely file the claimant's notice of claim, as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a), and substantial compliance was not sufficient to meet that statute's requirement of proper notice; since the claimant did not timely file the claimant's notice of claim, the trial court was not permitted to consider the claimant's claim because the state only waived its sovereign immunity to the extent of providing a limited time to file a claim against the state, and since the claimant did not meet that requirement the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Williams v. Ga. DOT, 275 Ga. App. 88, 619 S.E.2d 763 (2005).

When waiver occurs.

- The operation of the waiver occurs at the time the action arises, not at the time the allegedly negligent act was committed. Ethridge v. Price, 194 Ga. App. 82, 389 S.E.2d 784 (1989), cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 82, 389 S.E.2d 784 (1990).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an applicant for university employment as to the issue of finding a valid and written contract, thus finding that the state's sovereign immunity was waived; however, summary judgment was reversed, as jury issues remained as to: (1) whether the university Board of Regents breached the contract; (2) whether university officials violated an implied duty to use their best efforts to secure the Board's approval of the applicant's appointment, whether the officials acted in bad faith when they withdrew the appointment, and whether the officials were solely responsible for the failure of the Board to vote on the appointment; and (3) whether the applicant's alleged misconduct rendered the continued pursuit of the appointment impossible or impracticable, and whether the applicant ratified the withdrawal of the appointment. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Doe, 278 Ga. App. 878, 630 S.E.2d 85 (2006).

Immunity not waived by removal to federal court.

- When plaintiffs, a gun advocacy group and one of the group's members, and a church and the pastor, sought a declaratory judgment that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, regulating possession of weapons in a place of worship, violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, although defendant State of Georgia may have waived the state's immunity by removing the case to federal court, the state's underlying sovereign immunity against the claims remained and the state was immune from suit. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Ga. 2012).

No legislative act providing for waiver found.

- Plaintiff employee did not show that defendant school system waived its immunity, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e), because plaintiff pointed to no legislative act providing for a waiver. In addition, because defendant superintendent was a state employee whose alleged tort was committed while acting within the scope of the defendant's employment, the defendant also was entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a). Polite v. Dougherty County Sch. Sys., F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2008)(Unpublished).

O.C.G.A.

§ 45-1-4 waives sovereign immunity. - Appellate court properly interpreted O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 as creating an express waiver of sovereign immunity by prohibiting a public employer from retaliating against its employees, defining a public employer, and providing remedies available to an employee upon a successful retaliation claim being established. Colon v. Fulton County, 294 Ga. 93, 751 S.E.2d 307 (2013), overruled on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 248 (Ga. 2016).

Equity claims against the state have not been waived by statute. Dollar v. Olmstead, 232 Ga. App. 520, 502 S.E.2d 472 (1998).

Reliance on waiver.

- A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be withdrawn after a suit is filed in reliance on that waiver. Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).

Nuisance exception.

- The 1990 constitutional amendment eliminating the insurance waiver provision and substituting a Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., waiver did not conflict with the nuisance exception to sovereign immunity and a municipality can be liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance which constitutes a danger to life and health or a taking of property. City of Thomasville v. Shank, 263 Ga. 624, 437 S.E.2d 306 (1993).

Trial court properly denied a city's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity because the landowners asserted that the damage from the city's drainage system amounted to an unlawful taking of their property for which sovereign immunity has been waived. City of Greensboro v. Rowland, 334 Ga. App. 148, 778 S.E.2d 409 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0305, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 154 (Ga. 2016).

No actions may be filed against a county without express statutory authority, except to the extent of any waiver of immunity provided in the Constitution and such waiver or qualification of immunity as is now or may hereafter be provided by Act of the General Assembly. Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978).

County's participation in an interlocal risk management plan constituted liability insurance for the purpose of waiving the county's sovereign immunity to the extent of the plan's coverage. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

Even though the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX eliminated the language under which O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 was found unconstitutionally void, the revision did not resurrect the statute and, accordingly, the statute provided no basis for finding a county's participation in an interlocal risk management plan was not a waiver of sovereign immunity. The county's purchase of such insurance agreement constituted the purchase of insurance under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) and the county waived its sovereign immunity to the extent of such coverage; reversing in part, Gilbert v. Richardson, 211 Ga. App. 795, 440 S.E.2d 684 (1994). Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

County's "risk management fund" for the investigation and defense of tort claims was a self-insurance plan constituting liability insurance which waived sovereign immunity within the meaning of the former provisions of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51. Mims v. Clanton, 222 Ga. App. 657, 475 S.E.2d 662 (1996).

County's purchase of a general liability insurance policy for purposes of the waiver of sovereign immunity was authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and an accident involving the operation of a back hoe owned by the county was covered by the policy. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 177, 474 S.E.2d 89 (1996).

In a negligence action by a student against a school system and physical education teacher, the system and teacher were entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity, and there was no waiver of immunity by the mere existence of the system's liability insurance policy. Crisp County Sch. Sys. v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. 800, 487 S.E.2d 512 (1997).

In a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Corrections and state and county officials, the admitted existence of liability insurance did not amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity. Bontwell v. Department of Cors., 226 Ga. App. 524, 486 S.E.2d 917 (1997).

In an arrestee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a lead pursuit deputy and the supervisor for using excessive force to stop the arrestee's car during a high-speed chase, a county was not entitled to immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) from liability for negligence because the county waived its immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) by purchasing liability insurance coverage to cover the negligence of county employees arising from the use of a motor vehicle. Harris v. Coweta County, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003).

In a worker's suit alleging negligence on the part of a county with regard to the county allegedly failing to properly instruct and supervise the worker in the use of a portable tar kettle machine, the trial court erred by granting the county's motion for a judgment on the pleadings based on sovereign immunity as the worker sufficiently alleged that the machine was a vehicle as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity if the county had purchased liability insurance to cover damages and injuries arising from the use of motor vehicles under the county's management. Hewell v. Walton County, 292 Ga. App. 510, 664 S.E.2d 875 (2008).

Waiver through furnishing insurance.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 45-9-5 expresses a legislative intent that sovereign immunity of the state is not to be waived through the furnishing of insurance authorized by O.C.G.A. § 45-9-4, the language of this provision of the constitution forces the court to reach a contrary result. Price v. DOT, 257 Ga. 535, 361 S.E.2d 146 (1987) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

When negligence in performing official acts is covered by liability insurance, the officers' official immunity is waived to the extent to which this coverage will pay for the claims asserted. Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 360 S.E.2d 624, aff'd, 258 Ga. 143, 368 S.E.2d 518 (1987) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

While sovereign immunity is waived by a county to the extent of the county's liability coverage under an insurance agreement, the existence and amount of the coverage is not a proper subject for jury consideration. Early County v. Fincher, 184 Ga. App. 47, 360 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 909, 360 S.E.2d 602 (1987) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

When insurance coverage is obtained by a government entity, the government entity waives its sovereign immunity to the extent of such insurance coverage; however, when the plain terms of the policy provide that there is no coverage for the particular claim, the policy does not create a waiver of sovereign immunity as to that claim. Dugger v. Sprouse, 257 Ga. 778, 364 S.E.2d 275 (1988) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

The mere purchase of liability insurance does not automatically waive sovereign immunity. Rather, sovereign immunity is waived only when the insurer of a state entity satisfies a claim under the coverage provided. If payment is not required under the contract, and bad faith has not been shown, there is no waiver of immunity. Ward v. Bulloch County, 258 Ga. 92, 365 S.E.2d 440 (1988) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Case was remanded to the trial court to allow the parties to perfect the record on the issue of insurance coverage which could constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Carter v. Fulton-DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 209 Ga. App. 384, 433 S.E.2d 433 (1993).

Because there was no evidence of record that a city maintained liability insurance that would cover the occurrences forming the basis of the developers' claims, there was no waiver of the city's sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a); thus, sovereign immunity was a viable defense as to the city and the city officials acting in their official capacities. Wendelken v. JENK LLC, 291 Ga. App. 30, 661 S.E.2d 152 (2008).

In determining if a county waived the county's sovereign immunity through the voluntary purchase of liability insurance under the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), a trial court erred in considering the definition of "motor vehicle" provided in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1; rather, "any motor vehicle" was defined as a vehicle that was capable of being driven on the public roads that was covered by a liability insurance policy purchased by the county. Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563, 716 S.E.2d 611 (2011), aff'd, 291 Ga. 350, 729 S.E.2d 361 (2012).

County purchase of liability insurance.

- The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to all state department and agencies, including counties, regardless of the purchase of liability insurance. Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga. App. 848, 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).

Private liability insurance of public official.

- A teacher's private liability insurance did not result in a waiver of sovereign immunity available to the teacher as an agent of the school district; a negligence action against the teacher was barred by official immunity as there was no waiver by the school district. Parker v. Wynn, 211 Ga. App. 78, 438 S.E.2d 147 (1993).

Purchase of insurance by government employees.

- In action against a school principal and teacher accruing prior to the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, official immunity enjoyed by the defendants was not waived by their individual purchase of liability insurance through their professional associations. Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga. App. 502, 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993), disapproved in part, Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

In a personal injury action against a county when the county's liability insurance policy did not pay unless the insured's obligation exceeded a floor of $250,000, and the policy provided a ceiling of $750,000 per occurrence, immunity was waived only to the extent of the available insurance coverage. Mims v. Clanton, 215 Ga. App. 665, 452 S.E.2d 169 (1994), cert. denied, 1995 Ga. Lexis 404 (1995).

Trial court erred in dismissing the farmers' tort claims based on sovereign immunity as the date that an action was filed did not determine whether the 1991 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX controlled; as a truck was used for spreading sewage sludge on the farmers' property, damages resulting from the spreading of the sludge from the truck were injuries arising by reason of use of the truck for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b). McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005).

County's maintenance of a reserve fund for the purpose of paying claims and the payment of claims therefrom did not constitute a self-insurance plan so as to defeat its right to assert sovereign immunity. Tillman v. Mastin, 216 Ga. App. 3, 453 S.E.2d 85 (1994).

Establishment of general liability trust fund waived immunity.

- Establishment of comprehensive general liability trust fund for Department of Public Safety employees, covering negligence in performance of official acts, constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of the available insurance in the case of an accident resulting from a high-speed chase by police. Martin v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 257 Ga. 300, 357 S.E.2d 569 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 998, 108 S. Ct. 685, 98 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1988) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Umbrella liability policy, together with trust fund created by hospital, constituted "liability insurance protection" within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and therefore acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Nothing in the constitution or the statutes requires that governmental entities elect commercial insurance coverage rather than self-insurance or a combination of self-insurance and commercial insurance in order to waive sovereign immunity. Litterilla v. Hospital Auth., 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992).

Entering into contractual obligation no waiver of immunity without written proof of the contract.

- The mere activity of the state or one of its political subdivisions in entering into an otherwise valid contractual obligation with one of its citizens is not an implied waiver of its cloak of immunity. C.F.I. Constr. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 145 Ga. App. 471, 243 S.E.2d 700, cert. dismissed, 242 Ga. 96, 249 S.E.2d 613 (1978).

Waiver with regard to contracts did not apply to university course catalog.

- Waiver of the state's sovereign immunity with regard to contracts in writing did not apply to permit a state university student to assert breach of contract by suspending the student for theft, since the university's undergraduate catalog, which expressly stated that it was informational rather than contractual, did not constitute a contract that could be breached. Carr v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007)(Unpublished).

No waiver of immunity in oral contracts.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) provides governmental defendants with sovereign immunity unless the immunity has been specifically waived. Even though sovereign immunity has been waived for the breach of any written contract, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-1, there has been no such waiver for oral contracts. Soloski v. Adams, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

Unsigned contract document did not waive sovereign immunity.

- Computer contractor that had an unsigned copy of an agreement and an invoice for services rendered failed to show that the contractor had a signed agreement with a state agency for purposes of the state's waiver of immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c). The contractor's claims for unjust enrichment were also barred by sovereign immunity. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 683, 722 S.E.2d 403 (2012).

Waiver via contract.

- Trial court properly denied the Georgia Department of Corrections' (GDOC's) motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds because the GDOC waived sovereign immunity by entering into a contract with the roofing company and the doctrine of equitable subrogation gave the roofing company's surety the ability to step into the shoes of the roofing company and file suit against the GDOC once the surety incurred liability and paid the obligations of the surety's principal under the bond. State Dep't of Corr. v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 324 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 697 (2013).

To the extent that Handex of Florida, Inc. v. Chatham County, 268 Ga. App. 285, 602 S.E.2d 660 (2004) can be interpreted as creating a waiver of sovereign immunity for a breach of contract claim solely as a result of the parties' course of conduct, that case is disapproved. Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

To the extent DOT v. Dalton Paving & Construction, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 207, 489 S.E.2d 329 (1997) can be interpreted as creating a waiver of sovereign immunity for a breach of contract claim as a result of the parties' course of conduct, that case is disapproved. Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

No waiver without written contract.

- In Board of Regents v. Tyson, 261 Ga. 368, 404 S.E.2d 557 (1991), the Georgia Supreme Court held that even if a contract with a state agency is formed by the parties' conduct, if it is not a written contract the state's sovereign immunity is not waived. Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

Arbitration award against county not barred by immunity.

- Dismissal of the law clerks' motion to confirm an arbitration award in the clerks' favor on the clerks' group-pay grievance against a county due to alleged pay disparity was not warranted as the back pay award was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; accordingly, there was no manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator. Fulton County v. Lord, 323 Ga. App. 384, 746 S.E.2d 188 (2013).

Waiver of immunity for design claims did not waive immunity for inspection claims.

- Dismissal of an injured couple's claims against the DOT to the extent the claims were based on a theory of negligent inspection of the county-owned area in which the accident occurred was proper under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8); the waiver of immunity with respect to design claims under § 50-21-24(10) did not extend to waive immunity for inspection claims. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189, 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014).

Tort Claims Act not exclusive means for legislature to waive immunity.

- Considering the 1991 amendment as a whole, sovereign immunity is waived by any legislative act which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver; thus, the enactment of the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., was but one of the ways the legislature could constitutionally waive sovereign immunity. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

No legislative intent to withdraw sovereign immunity.

- The 1991 constitutional amendment, when viewed in light of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-21-20 et seq., that was passed under its authority, does not evidence any intent by the legislature to withdraw the waiver of sovereign immunity, rather, the apparent intent of the amendment and the Tort Claims Act enacted under its authority is to redraw and redefine the terms of the state's waiver of sovereign immunity. Curtis v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 262 Ga. 226, 416 S.E.2d 510 (1992).

Trial court did not err in dismissing the spouse's wrongful death claim against the county based on sovereign immunity because O.C.G.A. § 46-5-131(a) did not strictly meet the criteria for statutory wavier of sovereign immunity. Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 759 S.E.2d 269 (2014).

Venue under the Tort Claims Act.

- The enactment of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28, the venue provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., was a valid exercise of the General Assembly's authority pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. Campbell v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 408, 490 S.E.2d 99 (1997).

Exclusion of counties and school districts.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, provided that counties and other political subdivisions of the State of Georgia were absolutely immune from suit for tort liability, unless that immunity was specifically waived pursuant to an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provided that sovereign immunity was waived and the extent of such waiver, and the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., provided for a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity for the torts of its officials and employees. However, the Act expressly excluded counties and school districts from the waiver, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(5); because plaintiff failed to identify any legislative Act that waived the immunity of defendant county or school district, the county defendants were immune from suit on plaintiff's state law claims. McDaniel v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

Highway design exception.

- Decedent was killed when the taxi in which the decedent was riding spun out of control on a rain-slick interstate highway and hit a tree. Assuming arguendo that the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) was immune from a negligence suit under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 for a city employee's negligent inspection of the taxi's tires, expert testimony that the tree's proximity to the highway may have violated generally accepted engineering standards rendered the DOT liable under § 50-21-24(10), the design standards exception. Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

Use of PIT manuever by officers.

- When the plaintiff alleged that an officer negligently implemented a Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) policy, and performed an unjustified PIT maneuver by using a patrol vehicle to intentionally strike the plaintiff's vehicle, causing the plaintiff to lose control, strike a tree, and suffer injuries, the trial court abused the court's discretion by deferring until a trial on the merits the determination of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for losses resulting from an assault or battery as the factors controlling the court's exercise of discretion were clearly balanced in favor of a prompt pre-trial determination of the DPS's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dep't of Public Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 806 S.E.2d 195 (2017).

Slip and fall on sidewalk.

- Trial court did not err by dismissing a pedestrian's slip and fall claims against the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) based on the bar of sovereign immunity because GDOT's specific decision to forego routine inspections, repairs, or maintenance of sidewalks within a state right-of-way as a result of prioritizing maintenance activities based on budgetary constraints fell under the discretionary function exception. Hagan v. Ga. DOT, 321 Ga. App. 472, 739 S.E.2d 123 (2013).

Actions motivated by intent or malice.

- Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., provided immunity from liability for torts committed during a state employee's performance of official duties without regard to intent or malice. Therefore, despite evidence that two university officials' actions in locking a suspended professor out of the professor's office and laboratory were motivated by malice and ill-intent, the officials were entitled to immunity under the Act. Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents, 302 Ga. App. 1, 689 S.E.2d 352 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0824, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. 2010); overruled on other grounds by Wolfe v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2016).

Action against officer or agent of state not permitted.

- No citizen and taxpayer, as such, has the right to initiate in the citizen's own behalf, without the consent of the state, an action against a state officer in the officer's official capacity, to enjoin and restrain the officer from acting under a statute which is alleged to be unconstitutional and void; such an action being in effect an action against the state itself. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392 (1935).

Any action against an officer or agent of the state, in the officer's or agent's official capacity, in which a judgment can be rendered controlling the action or property of the state in a manner not prescribed by statute, is an action against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent. Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980).

Action against officer or agent of state permitted.

- Trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against the school superintendent because the plaintiff sufficiently pled facts invoking the limited exception to qualified immunity based on allegations that the superintendent maliciously and intentionally injured the plaintiff by firing the plaintiff after seeing the superintendent and another engage in illegal activities. Everson v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665, 811 S.E.2d 9 (2018).

Agent of state cannot be made party to action.

- The state cannot be made a party defendant in an action in any court, except by consent of the proper authorities; nor can this be done so as to affect the rights of the state by making the agent of the state, appointed by its authorities, a party; and any judgment against such agent cannot affect the rights of the state, or affect its position. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392 (1935).

Based on O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, an arrestee's excessive force claim against a sheriff's major in the major's individual capacity was revived after a voluntary dismissal but assuming that the complaint alleged actual malice under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), as to the major's conduct, the tort claim had to brought against the state under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b); however, the state did not waive the state's sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) for such claim to be brought in federal court. Jude v. Morrison, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

Scope of immunity granted public official.

- In Georgia, the distinction between a ministerial and a discretionary act, and therefore the scope of the immunity granted a public official in any given situation, turns upon the specific character of the complained-of act, not the more general nature of the job. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

The term "official functions," as used in subsection (d) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, means any act performed within a public officer's or employee's scope of authority, including both ministerial and discretionary acts. No immunity is provided for ministerial acts negligently performed or for ministerial or discretionary acts performed with malice or an intent to injure; however, consistent with prior law, immunity is provided for the negligent performance of discretionary acts. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

Pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), a police officer's fingerprinting of a plaintiff, in a way that caused the plaintiff's body to be pulled against the officer's body, was sufficient to support a state law assault and battery claim; officer's motion for summary judgment on grounds of official immunity was properly denied. Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005).

The term "actual malice" as it is used in the context of official immunity requires a deliberate intention to do wrong and excludes any liability for injuries or damages if officers and employees act with implied malice in the performance of their official functions. Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 467 S.E.2d 336 (1996). But see Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), overruled on other grounds, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010).

"Ill will" is itself not enough to establish actual malice; rather, ill will must also be combined with the intent to do something wrongful or illegal. Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999).

Acting with implied malice will not deny a defendant an official immunity defense. Coffey v. Brooks County, 231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998).

Actual malice of officer.

- In an action against a police officer for injuries sustained in a collision with a patrol car, summary judgment for the officer was proper because the officer was exercising the officer's discretion in deciding to pursue a suspected stolen car and, therefore, was liable only if the officer acted "with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury." Williams v. Solomon, 242 Ga. App. 807, 531 S.E.2d 734 (2000).

Actual malice of officer not shown.

- Because the plaintiff did not establish that the sheriff's deputies possessed "a deliberate intention to do wrong" sufficient to satisfy the actual malice standard to fit the exception to the deputies' official immunity from liability, the plaintiff's tort claims were properly dismissed on summary judgment; contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, actual malice could not be inferred from the facts of the warrantless arrest. Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

Violation of police manual did not make decision ministerial act.

- Georgia Court of Appeals properly held that a county police officer was entitled to summary judgment on the officer's claim of official immunity as the officer's violations of a county police manual did not change the officer's discretionary decision to engage in a high-speed chase into a ministerial act; the bumping of a fleeing suspect's car did not constitute a deliberate intention to do wrong so as to satisfy the actual malice requirement of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) since: (1) in a prior case, an officer did not act with a deliberate intent to do wrong in violating a state law; (2) although the officer bumped the fleeing vehicle during a high-speed chase on the interstate system of a major city, which might be considered reckless, actual malice required more than reckless conduct; and (3) the officer did not intend to physically harm the suspect or any bystander. Phillips v. Hanse, 281 Ga. 133, 637 S.E.2d 11 (2006).

District court erred when the court denied the police officers' motion to dismiss claims a demonstrator filed against the officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, which alleged that the officers violated the demonstrator's rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Georgia law when the officers arrested the defendant for violating Georgia's mask statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38, during a demonstration in Atlanta in 2014; the officers had qualified immunity from liability on the demonstrator's claims under federal law because the officers had probable cause to arrest the demonstrator when the officers saw the demonstrator wearing a "V for Vendetta" mask after the police directed demonstrators to remove masks the demonstrators were wearing, and official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018).

Suit in official capacity.

- Plaintiff's state-law tort claims against a police chief, two police officers, and a county were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e), since the individual defendants were sued in their official capacities, and there was no statutory waiver of immunity as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4. Payne v. Dekalb County, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

Immunity if acts done within scope of authority and without wilfulness, fraud, malice, or corruption.

- Under sovereign immunity principles, a public officer or employee acting within the scope of the employee's authority and engaged in discretionary as opposed to ministerial functions is entitled to immunity from suit, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without wilfulness, fraud, malice, or corruption. Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992); Teston v. Collins, 217 Ga. App. 829, 459 S.E.2d 452 (1995).

Since at the time the sheriff terminated certain deputies, a county sheriff believed with some justification that the sheriff had the authority to hire and fire deputies, and there was no evidence that the sheriff acted with malice or intent to injure the deputies when the sheriff refused to rehire them, the sheriff was entitled to official immunity from their claims for tortiously interfering with employment contracts. Aspinwall v. Herrin, 879 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D. Ga. 1994).

An officer who, in the performance of the officer's official duties, shoots another in self-defense is shielded from tort liability by the doctrine of official immunity. Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33, 518 S.E.2d 124 (1999).

Although a county police officer's actions in seeking arrest warrants may have been misguided, because there was no evidence that the actions were taken with actual malice, the officer was protected by official immunity as a police officer, and the officer's motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Todd v. Kelly, 244 Ga. App. 404, 535 S.E.2d 540 (2000).

Without proof by the administrator of the decedent inmate's estate that any actions undertaken by the county officers and employees sued for wrongful death amounted to wilfulness, malice, or corruption, they were entitled to official immunity as a matter of law; further, any failure to adopt other or additional requirements as to their policies of supervision and training in dealing with a suicidal inmate did not amount to wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 261 Ga. App. 382, 582 S.E.2d 539 (2003).

Officer was performing a discretionary act when the officer concluded that a person was driving recklessly and under the influence in a fatal traffic accident; since there was no evidence that the officer acted with actual malice, summary judgment in favor of the officer and a county in a suit brought by the person against the officer and the county, based on the filing of criminal charges which were later dropped, was proper. Tant v. Purdue, 278 Ga. App. 666, 629 S.E.2d 551 (2006).

Because two police officers were performing an official discretionary function when they arrested a former arrestee, and the former arrestee failed to show that the officers acted with the intent to do something wrong or illegal, both officers were entitled to official immunity pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d). Carroll v. Henry County, 336 Bankr. 578 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Deputy did not show entitlement to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) as to the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution because plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the deputy violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20; thus, there were material fact issues precluding summary judgment. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007).

City officials were entitled to summary judgment to the extent developers asserted claims against them in their personal capacities because the evidence was insufficient to create a jury issue on whether they acted with actual malice as required for official immunity pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) where the developers pointed to no specific evidence in the record to support the characterization of the officials' actions. Wendelken v. JENK LLC, 291 Ga. App. 30, 661 S.E.2d 152 (2008).

In an action alleging, inter alia, assault and false arrest, three police officers were entitled to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) because the officers' conduct in arresting plaintiff arrestee for disorderly conduct was based on a discretionary act and was not shown to be based on actual malice; the arrestee had used expletives in telling the officers to leave the arrestee's home after the officers executed an arrest warrant for the arrestee's fiance, and there were children who heard the offensive language outside the arrestee's home. Selvy v. Morrison, 292 Ga. App. 702, 665 S.E.2d 401 (2008).

Public official protected from liability in performance of discretionary duties.

- A discretionary act is generally characterized as one which is the result of personal discretion or judgment. A ministerial act, on the other hand, requires merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed or designated facts. A public official is protected from liability in the performance of discretionary duties, whereas ministerial acts are committed at the official's own risk. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Discretionary duties found.

- In a personal injury action against a county, sheriff, and deputy sheriff, arising from an automobile collision which occurred when the deputy was on an emergency call, since the deputy was performing an official discretionary function, the deputy was immune from personal liability under the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994); Tkacik v. Chriss, 247 Ga. App. 86, 543 S.E.2d 392 (2000).

Police officer's decision to pursue a car in response to reports that it had eluded police and under a reasonable perception that it could be stolen was discretionary. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 Ga. App. 653, 472 S.E.2d 480 (1996).

School officials' actions in monitoring activities associated with a school sponsored carnival were discretionary rather than ministerial. Larkins v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 225 Ga. App. 387, 484 S.E.2d 10 (1997).

Detective who sought an arrest warrant against an arrestee for simple battery was properly granted summary judgment in the arrestee's subsequent lawsuit for, inter alia, false arrest, because, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), the detective, as a county employee, was immune from liability since the decision to seek an arrest warrant was a discretionary act and there was no evidence that the detective acted with actual malice, even if the arrestee was correct that the detective could have performed a better and more thorough investigation before seeking an arrest warrant. Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 573 S.E.2d 417 (2002).

As a student's personal injury damages claims against three school employees were based on the employees negligent failure to supervise the student when the student was with a non-party, and that such failure allegedly led to the student being molested by the third-party, the supervisory decisions made were discretionary acts requiring personal deliberation and judgment; hence, any reliance on O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 did not provide a basis for civil liability against the employees for a negligent breach of a ministerial duty, and the student's claims were barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law. Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 643 S.E.2d 814 (2007).

Officers, who shot and killed a fleeing suspected felon armed with a knife, were entitled to official immunity because it was a discretionary act, during pursuit a bystander twice identified the suspect, and the suspect slashed a knife at one officer, posing an immediate threat of physical violence. Williams v. Boehrer, 530 Fed. Appx. 891 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

In an arrest for driving under the influence, the arrestee's false imprisonment claim failed because the officer was entitled to official immunity since the officer was performing a discretionary act when the officer arrested the arrestee; the arrestee's general allegations of malice did not overcome official immunity. Bannister v. Conway, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013).

When a police dog attacked the plaintiff's son, the officer's motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity was improperly denied because the officer, who was a dog handler for the police department, did not act with malice or an intent to injure anyone when the officer failed to secure the police dog outside the officer's home; and the duties that the officer was alleged to have violated were not ministerial ones because, although the duties reflected in the statute regarding the restraint of vicious or dangerous animals and a county ordinance might be definite, they required an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what was reasonable regarding the restraint of the police dog. Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015), overruled on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 248 (Ga. 2016).

Discretionary act calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

The decision to permit a patient to leave a mental hospital for home visitation is indisputably a discretionary act and is precisely the type of governmental decision that discretionary immunity was designed to protect from tort litigation by after-the-fact review. Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 360 S.E.2d 624, aff'd, 258 Ga. 143, 368 S.E.2d 518 (1987).

Contention that a stop sign at a county road had become obscured by tree limbs and that procedures established by county employees for removing such obstructions were inadequate, alleged negligence in the performance of a discretionary act, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employees. Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 456 S.E.2d 581 (1995).

Probation officer was immune from liability for actions of a probationer because the officer's supervision of the probationer was a discretionary act. Georgia Dep't of Cors. v. Lamaine, 233 Ga. App. 271, 502 S.E.2d 766 (1998).

The school principal's task of making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school children and the teacher's task to monitor, supervise, and control students are both discretionary actions protected by the doctrine of official immunity. Kelly v. Lewis, 221 Ga. App. 506, 471 S.E.2d 583 (1996); Payne v. Twiggs County Sch. Dist., 232 Ga. App. 175, 501 S.E.2d 550 (1998).

The general task imposed on a school principal to monitor, supervise, and control the movement of students during a change in classes is a discretionary action protected by official immunity. Crisp County Sch. Dist. v. Pheil, 231 Ga. App. 139, 498 S.E.2d 134 (1998).

The supervision of a prisoner work detail is a discretionary function by virtue of which the supervisor is entitled to official immunity. Parrish v. State, 270 Ga. 878, 514 S.E.2d 834 (1999), reversing Simmons v. Coweta County, 229 Ga. App. 550, 494 S.E.2d 362 (1997).

Operation of a police department, including the degree of training and supervision to be provided its officers, is a discretionary governmental function of the municipality as opposed to a ministerial, proprietary, or administratively routine function. Carter v. Glenn, 249 Ga. App. 414, 548 S.E.2d 110 (2001).

Sheriff's deputies and the police officers were entitled to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), as their failure to provide cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to the son of the parents was discretionary, and no malice was shown; the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., and the departments for which the officers and deputies worked did not require them to maintain CPR certification or to carry CPR equipment and they were not certified to perform CPR, and, even if the deputies and officers moved people away who were trying to help the son, this did not show malice, as they were concerned the persons might harm the son. Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga. App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376 (2006).

Discretionary act found.

- Deputy was entitled to immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX after the deputy collided with a third party while pursuing a suspect; although the deputy was not responding to a bona fide emergency and another deputy was in position to intercept the suspect, the guidelines governing the deputy called for termination of pursuit "by decision of pursuing officer." Morgan v. Causey, 910 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Ga. 1996).

Teacher's grasping student's face to get the student's attention fell within the teacher's discretionary tasks of monitoring, supervising and controlling students in the teacher's class, and no liability could attach to the teacher's actions unless the teacher acted with actual malice. Daniels v. Gordon, 232 Ga. App. 811, 503 S.E.2d 72 (1998).

Police officers' conduct, arresting and subduing a fleeing suspect, clearly constituted a discretionary act. Therefore, unless plaintiff could show that the officers acted with actual malice or with the intent to injure the suspect, the officers were immune from liability. Garrett v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ga. 2003).

Because a mayor's failure to execute a contract was an act of discretion, and an association and a taxpayer did not assert that the mayor acted with actual malice or actual intent to cause injury or that any damages flowed to the city from that failure, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), the complaint was properly dismissed. Common Cause/Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 614 S.E.2d 761 (2005).

Ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Negligent performance of ministerial duty.

- Removal of a tree which fell across a road was a ministerial duty of a county road superintendent, not a discretionary one; thus, a suit against the superintendent based on the superintendent's failure to act to remove a fallen tree was not barred by official immunity. Lincoln County v. Edmond, 231 Ga. App. 871, 501 S.E.2d 38 (1998).

In a wrongful death and nuisance suit wherein the victim was killed while traveling in a taxicab on a state highway, and the taxicab had passed a mandatory city inspection the day prior, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city inspector on the basis of official immunity as the inspector's act of inspecting the tires on the taxicab was a ministerial function since the inspector was required to check for minimum tread depth and complete the inspection checklist before passing the vehicle as safe, which were simple, absolute, and definite tasks of a ministerial nature. As a result, the inspector was not entitled to official immunity and it was for the jury to determine if the inspector performed the tasks negligently. Heller v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. App. 345, 659 S.E.2d 617 (2008), aff'd, Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

Decedent was killed when the taxi in which the decedent was riding spun out of control on a rain-slick road and hit a tree. The city employee who cleared the taxi for use on the roads was not shielded from liability by the doctrine of official immunity because: (1) inspection of tires was a ministerial act; (2) the employee did nothing to verify whether the taxi's badly worn tires had the legally required minimum amount of 2/32 inch of tread on them under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-74(e)(1); and (3) the employee had no "discretion" to ignore this minimum legal requirement. Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

In a parent's wrongful death action, a trial court erred in granting a county road superintendent summary judgment on the ground that the superintendent was entitled to official immunity because the superintendent conceded that the superintendent had actual knowledge of water pouring across a road one hour before a decedent's fatal accident, and the superintendent's knowledge of the hazardous condition on the road gave rise to a ministerial duty to take remedial action; the superintendent had discretion in the manner in which the superintendent took remedial action, but the notice the superintendent received of the dangerous condition on the road triggered a ministerial duty to act, and whether the superintendent breached such a duty was an issue for a jury to decide. Barnard v. Turner County, 306 Ga. App. 235, 701 S.E.2d 859 (2010).

In a detainee's suit against a sheriff, county, and city arising out of the detainee's improper detention, the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied as to the sheriff's individual liability for violations of federal law, and for failure to update the detainee's criminal record as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-4-7 and bring the detainee before a judicial officer; however, claims against the city and county were dismissed based on immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IX. Purvis v. City of Atlanta, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015).

Ministerial duty created by traffic policy.

- While the act of a county traffic department that established a policy for handling complaints about safety or traffic conditions in the first place was discretionary, the acts of following the established policy of writing up the complaint and investigating it were ministerial. Wanless v. Tatum, 244 Ga. App. 882, 536 S.E.2d 308 (2000).

Ministerial duty not created by criminal statute.

- Hazing statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-61, did not transform the discretionary policing functions of school officials into a ministerial duty to enforce that law. Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 232 Ga. App. 892, 503 S.E.2d 43 (1998).

Ministerial duty created by Family Violence Act.

- Officers' duty to investigate a report of family violence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1(c) was ministerial, and, accordingly, official immunity did not apply, as such immunity was only applicable to performance of discretionary functions, unless those functions were undertaken with malice or intent to cause injury pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d). Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga. App. 639, 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003).

Tax commissioner immune to action for damages for failure to give notice.

- Property owner's claim for damages based on a county tax commissioner's failure to properly send notices required by O.C.G.A. §§ 9-13-13,48-3-3,48-3-9(a), and48-4-1, was barred by sovereign immunity; O.C.G.A. §§ 15-13-2 and48-5-137 did not render the tax commissioner liable as an ex-officio sheriff because the notices did not constitute a "false return" or legal neglect to make a "proper return". Raw Properties, Inc. v. Lawson, 335 Ga. App. 802, 783 S.E.2d 161 (2016).

Failure of sheriff to perform ministerial duty did not cause death.

- Grant of summary judgment in favor of the sheriff in a wrongful-death action brought by the decedent's spouse was appropriate under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c) because the majority of the acts complained of were discretionary. To the extent that certain acts were ministerial, the sheriff's alleged failure to perform those acts did not cause the decedent's death. Butler v. Carlisle, 299 Ga. App. 815, 683 S.E.2d 882 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0052, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 155 (Ga. 2010).

County sheriff office employees liability for suicide.

- In a wrongful death action arising from the suicide death of an inmate, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of one of three county sheriff office employees based on official immunity because there was conflicting evidence about whether the one employee was notified of the suicide watch order, triggering the duties created by policies applicable to that employee. Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 783 S.E.2d 719 (2016).

Unclear if discretionary function applied to child services worker failing to investigate abuse allegations.

- In a suit against the state arising out of the death of an infant at the hands of the infant's drug-addicted parents, dismissal of claims for battery on the child was proper under the assault and battery exception to the state's waiver of sovereign immunity, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7); however, more information was needed to determine if the discretionary function exception, § 50-21-24(2), applied. Cowart v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ga. App. 183, 796 S.E.2d 903 (2017).

Jury question existed as to whether police patrol was ministerial or discretionary act.

- In a wrongful death suit brought after a patrol car driven by a sheriff's deputy struck and killed the decedent, there was a jury issue was to whether the deputy's patrol of the area was a ministerial or discretionary act. Nichols v. Prather, 286 Ga. App. 889, 650 S.E.2d 380 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 766 (Ga. 2007).

Liability of governmental entity under doctrine of respondeat superior.

- The official immunity of a public employee does not protect a governmental entity from liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, a county may be liable for a county employee's negligence in performing an official function to the extent the county has waived sovereign immunity. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

In a personal injury action against a county, sheriff, and deputy sheriff, arising from an automobile collision which occurred when the deputy was on an emergency call, even though the deputy was performing an official discretionary function and was immune from personal liability, the sheriff could not claim the benefit of the deputy's official immunity defense, but the deputy was entitled to the benefit of the county's sovereign immunity defense, except to the extent of liability insurance purchased by the county. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

Sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief against the state at common law.

- Sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief against the state at common law, and therefore, IBM Corp. v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215 (453 S.E.2d 706) (1995) is overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).

Georgia Supreme Court finds IBM Corp. v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215 (453 S.E.2d 706) (1995) unsound because: (1) the clear language of the Georgia Constitution authorizes only the Georgia General Assembly to waive sovereign immunity; (2) the Constitution does not provide for an exception; (3) the Court mischaracterizes a waiver; and (4) cases the Court relies on either predated the incorporation of sovereign immunity into the Georgia Constitution or ignored the impact thereof. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).

Injunctive relief against state or official acting outside scope of lawful authority.

- An action by a company against a state department and the commissioner thereof, in the commissioner's official capacity, to enjoin the department from awarding a contract to a competitor of the company or to have the department re-bid the contract was not barred by sovereign immunity. IBM Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Admin. Servs., 265 Ga. 215, 453 S.E.2d 706 (1995).

Failure to name responsible personnel.

- Parents of deceased mental health facility patient not only had the burden of establishing that the Department of Human Resources (DHR) waived sovereign immunity by obtaining liability insurance protection, but their failure to name the department personnel allegedly responsible for the negligence within the applicable limitations periods warranted summary judgment in favor of DHR. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Poss, 263 Ga. 347, 434 S.E.2d 488 (1993).

Sheriff's responsibility for rape by deputy.

- Arrestee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a county sheriff, alleging that she was raped by a deputy at the county jail, failed as a matter of law because the sheriff was entitled to official immunity for the state law claims brought against the sheriff in the sheriff's individual capacity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d); hiring and supervision of employees was a discretionary governmental function of the county as opposed to a ministerial, proprietary, or administratively routine function. Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Ga. 2009).

In a suit based on the actions of a deputy sheriff at a courthouse security checkpoint, official immunity barred the plaintiff attorney's battery claim under the Georgia Constitution because the summary judgment evidence did not show actual malice or intent to cause injury. West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2014).

Officer not entitled to summary judgment on official immunity.

- In a suit involving an arrest, an officer was not entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity as to the arrestee's state law claims because the officer's statements, the officer's justifications for the arrest, and the orientation of the parties just before the arrest could support a jury's reasonable inference that the officer deliberately intended to wrongfully arrest or commit battery against the arrestee. Turner v. Jones, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011).

Officer entitled to immunity for arrest.

- In a driver's action for false imprisonment, the officer was entitled to official immunity because the act of arresting the driver was discretionary and the driver could not overcome the officer's immunity defense by showing that the officer acted with malice or an intent to injure. Watkins v. Latif, 323 Ga. App. 306, 744 S.E.2d 860 (2013).

Officer entitled to immunity for trespass.

- Nothing in the record suggested that the deputies acted with actual malice since the deputies consistently stated that the deputies entered the trailer due to exigent circumstances, a burglary, and their assessment was not baseless; the residents did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact about the presence of actual malice, and the deputies were entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2016).

Physicians employed by state medical college.

- Two physicians were entitled to official immunity in a medical malpractice suit brought against the physicians by the parents of a newborn infant injured by the medical team's failure to ensure the child was adequately oxygenated during intubation because the physicians were acting within the scope of the physicians' state employment at the Medical College of Georgia in rendering the medical care at issue. However, the effect of recognizing official immunity does not necessarily leave the injured plaintiff without recourse as, while official immunity relieves the state employee of personal liability, the injured plaintiff may still seek relief against the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting, pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-23 and50-21-25(b). Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013).

Georgia Supreme Court overrules Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997) and holds that the analysis of a physician's official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., shall proceed exclusively on the basis of whether the physician was acting within the scope of the physician's state employment in performing the treatment that is the subject of the malpractice action. Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013).

State authority is not state or state agency.

- A state authority is not the state, nor a part of the state, nor an agency of the state; it is a mere creature of the state, having distinct corporate entity. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981).

Whether immunity barred personal injury suit had to be determined.

- Appellate court erred by affirming the grant of the individual defendants' motion to dismiss in a personal injury suit involving a pedestrian falling at a high school because whether official immunity barred the action was a fact-specific inquiry that had not been definitively answered since limited discovery had been undertaken. Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 755 S.E.2d 796 (2014).

Immunity extends to counties.

- The state is immune to suit for any cause of action unless that immunity is expressly waived by constitutional provision or legislative enactment. That immunity extends to counties, as subdivisions of the state. James v. Richmond County Health Dep't, 168 Ga. App. 416, 309 S.E.2d 411 (1983).

In a negligence action against a county, the county's motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IX (sovereign immunity) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX (waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of liability insurance coverage) not applying to counties. Bliss v. Cobb County, 599 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, sovereign immunity is extended to the counties of the State of Georgia. Toombs County v. O'Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985); DOT v. Land, 181 Ga. App. 94, 351 S.E.2d 470 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 257 Ga. 657, 362 S.E.2d 372 (1987).

The provisions of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX apply to counties. Curtis v. Cobb County, 254 Ga. 673, 333 S.E.2d 595 (1985).

The Constitution of Georgia extends sovereign immunity to counties and their instrumentalities as well. Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 905, 411 S.E.2d 75 (1991).

The 1991 amendment's extension of sovereign immunity to the state and it's departments and agencies also applies to counties. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).

A county is not liable for nuisance claims arising from personal injuries or wrongful death. Coffey v. Brooks County, 231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998).

Sovereign immunity applies to counties and protects county employees who are sued in their official capacities. Banks v. Happoldt, 271 Ga. App. 146, 608 S.E.2d 741 (2004).

Because a county enjoyed sovereign immunity from a pedestrian's negligence and nuisance claims asserted in a personal injury action against the county for its alleged failure to maintain a water meter cover, the trial court properly dismissed the claims. Rutherford v. DeKalb County, 287 Ga. App. 366, 651 S.E.2d 771 (2007).

Sheriff's deputy chased a parent who was carrying a baby; the two struggled for the deputy's gun, which discharged, killing the baby. As there was no evidence that the county waived the county's sovereign immunity, the sheriff's department was entitled to summary judgment on an estate's respondeat superior claim. Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009).

County board of elections (BOE) and board members were entitled to sovereign immunity on a candidate's claims that they violated the candidate's rights under the Georgia Constitution and that they conspired to commit fraud against the candidate by attempting to have the candidate's name removed from the ballot in an election for county commissioner; the candidate cited no act of the General Assembly that would permit recovery on the state law claims against the county, the BOE, or the board members in their official capacities. Johnson v. Randolph County, 301 Ga. App. 265, 687 S.E.2d 223 (2009).

Trial court correctly ruled that sovereign immunity barred a parent's wrongful claim against a county because the county did not waive the county's sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e); the bar of sovereign immunity neither results in a deprivation of property without just compensation nor constitutes a denial of equal protection or due process under the federal or state constitutions. Barnard v. Turner County, 306 Ga. App. 235, 701 S.E.2d 859 (2010).

Sovereign immunity barred the claimants' personal injury and nuisance claims against the members of a county board of commissioners in the commissioners' official capacities because the claimants did not show that the county waived the county's sovereign immunity with regard to the county's operation of a mosquito control helicopter which sprayed one of the claimants with chemicals. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Johnson, 311 Ga. App. 867, 717 S.E.2d 272 (2011).

City manager had official immunity.

- City manager had official immunity in a defamation case under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) and O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4 since: (1) the city finance director did not show that a statement the city manager made to the media regarding the city manager's concerns in the city finance director's department was outside the scope of the city manager's authority; (2) the city manager did not disclose anything to the city finance director's prospective employer that the prospective employer did not obtain through a Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., request; and (3) there was no policy that prohibited the city manager from verbally responding in conjunction with the city manager's Open Records Act response. Smith v. Lott, 317 Ga. App. 37, 730 S.E.2d 663 (2012).

Municipalities.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, which prior to the 1991 amendment waived immunity to the extent of insurance, applied to municipalities. Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).

Municipalities do not come within the ambit of the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. City of Thomaston v. Bridges, 264 Ga. 4, 439 S.E.2d 906 (1994).

Sovereign immunity applied to city.

- In an action arising out of an arrest, despite the way the arrestee was treated, the trial court properly dismissed a complaint against a county, and granted summary judgment on the same complaint against a city, on sovereign immunity grounds and due to a failure by the arrestee to show that the immunity had been waived. Scott v. City of Valdosta, 280 Ga. App. 481, 634 S.E.2d 472 (2006).

When officers arrested a decedent who died shortly after the arrest, a city which employed one of the officers could not be held liable because: (1) the city was immune from claims involving police work unless the city waived that immunity; and (2) it was not shown that the city waived immunity. Hoyt v. Bacon County, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2011).

In a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Public Safety in which the decedent died from injuries sustained in a high-speed chase with the Georgia State Patrol officers, the Department's motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction was properly granted based on sovereign immunity because the officer's actions during the pursuit were objectively reasonable and in compliance with the Department's pursuit policy, and the execution of the Precision Immobilization Technique was done in compliance with the policy; the officer considered the factors set forth in the policy in deciding to continue the pursuit; and none of the circumstances that would have prohibited a pursuit under the policy existed. James v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 789 S.E.2d 236 (2016).

Quantum meruit unavailable against county and officials.

- Former employee, seeking employment compensation against a board of education, a school system, a principal, and a Superintendent, made no allegations of negligence, malice, or intent with respect to the claims for quantum meruit, and a trial court properly entered summary judgment dismissing those claims. Harden v. Clarke County Bd. of Educ., 279 Ga. App. 513, 631 S.E.2d 741 (2006).

Waiver and damages for invalid state regulation.

- There is no express constitutional right to recover damages against the state based upon the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the rules and regulations promulgated and implemented by its departments and agencies. Accordingly, unless and until there is a waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as provided in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, the judiciary is compelled to hold that the victims of such state rules and regulations have no viable state claim for damages and that they must be relegated to the express remedies which do exist, such as initiation of a declaratory judgment action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10. State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 437 S.E.2d 290 (1993).

No right to damages based upon invalidity of rules and regulations.

- There is no express constitutional right to recover damages against the state based upon the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the rules and regulations promulgated and implemented by its departments and agencies. State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 437 S.E.2d 290 (1993).

County's failure to maintain road.

- County officials were protected from liability with regard to a personal injury and wrongful death suit arising from an alleged failure of the county to maintain a road, because sovereign immunity protected the county officials from any liability with regard to an alleged failure to maintain, which was a discretionary function. Banks v. Happoldt, 271 Ga. App. 146, 608 S.E.2d 741 (2004).

No liability for defective bridges.

- There is no language in O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41 specific enough to waive sovereign immunity and make a county liable for the county's defective bridges. Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga. App. 848, 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).

Department of Transportation employees.

- Department of Transportation employees are immune from suit for negligence in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment since the state has waived its sovereign immunity and not the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thorne v. Littlefield Constr. Co., 782 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

DOT duty to monitor for hazardous conditions.

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity filed by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) because it was clear from a review of the agency agreement and the GDOT Policy that the plaintiff's claims for failing to monitor I-16 for hazardous conditions were barred since neither policy imposed any duty on the GDOT to monitor roadways for hazardous conditions. Grant v. Ga. Forestry Comm'n, 338 Ga. App. 146, 789 S.E.2d 343 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0003, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, No. S17C0037, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2017).

County personnel issues.

- Employee was not entitled to damages arising out of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(b) in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the employee as the county had sovereign immunity and the county manager and the county attorney had sovereign immunity in their official capacities; the county manager and the county attorney had official immunity in their individual capacities as obtaining the TRO was a discretionary action that they undertook to protect the public and workplace safety after they were advised of the employee's actions. Wallace v. Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

Wrongful termination of state employee with contract.

- In a claim for wrongful termination when a former state employee alleges the existence of a contract, state officials are not entitled as a matter of law to a judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity. Parrish v. State, 184 Ga. App. 195, 361 S.E.2d 57 (1987).

Paramedic employed by county was entitled to official immunity because of any negligence on the paramedic's part arising during the performance of the paramedic's official duties; the county's purchase of insurance did not affect immunity since the action was based on the paramedic's misdiagnosis or choice of treatment and did not "arise from the use of a motor vehicle.". Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).

Driver of emergency response vehicles.

- Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), the county emergency rescue vehicle driver was immune from liability after the driver was accused of negligently colliding with the decedent's vehicle, because the damages arose from the driver's discretionary action, the decision to rush to the scene of an accident. Anderson v. Barrow County, 256 Ga. App. 160, 568 S.E.2d 68 (2002).

In a tort action for personal injuries and property damage arising from an auto collision filed against a city and its police officer, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the officer, given that the officer was engaged in a discretionary function of responding to an emergency situation at the time the accident at issue occurred. Weaver v. City of Statesboro, 288 Ga. App. 32, 653 S.E.2d 765 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0421, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 221 (Ga. 2008).

Investigatory stops.

- Sovereign immunity extended by the Georgia Constitution to the state and its departments and agencies also applied to Georgia counties, as well as the consolidated government of the City of Columbus and Muscogee County, the Muscogee County sheriff, and the sheriff's deputies; consequently, sovereign immunity barred the Georgia state law claims asserted against the consolidated government and the sheriff and deputies in their official capacities by a vehicle's occupants that the deputies subjected to an investigatory stop. Beaulah v. Muscogee County Sheriff's Deputies, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2006), vacated, in part, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11020 (M.D. Ga. 2008).

In an action in which the plaintiff landowners filed suit against the defendant county alleging trespass, negligence and negligence per se, and violation of the landowners' riparian rights, in connection with the county's recreational development of its adjoining property, the county was entitled to sovereign immunity because there was no showing by the landowners that the county had waived sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4. Carney v. Gordon County, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2006).

Law enforcement not entitled to immunity when actual malice used in application of excessive force.

- When a taser was used on an arrestee standing with hands in the air at least four feet off the ground in a tree, officers were not entitled to official immunity as to the arrestee's state law claims at the motion to dismiss stage because the complaint alleged actual malice under Georgia law. Harper v. Perkins, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012)(Unpublished).

High-speed pursuit.

- After the plaintiffs were injured when a speeding car driven by a suspect who was fleeing law enforcement crashed into the plaintiffs' car, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Lamar Sheriff as the plaintiffs' claims against the Lamar Sheriff were barred as a matter of law by sovereign immunity because, by the time the plaintiffs were injured by the fleeing driver, the Lamar deputy's patrol car was immobile and inoperative on the side of the road approximately 20 miles away as the result of a blown tire; thus, the plaintiffs' injuries did not arise out of the "use" of the patrol car, and the sovereign immunity of the Lamar Sheriff was not waived. Wingler v. White, 344 Ga. App. 94, 808 S.E.2d 901 (2017).

Sheriff's department.

- Sheriff's deputy chased a parent who was carrying a baby; the two struggled for the deputy's gun, which discharged, killing the baby. As the deputy's decision to pursue the parent was a discretionary act, and there was no evidence the deputy acted with malice or intent to injure, the deputy had qualified immunity from suit under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d); therefore, an estate's claim against the sheriff's department was properly dismissed. Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009).

Sheriff's deputy chased a parent who was carrying a baby; the two struggled for the deputy's gun, which discharged, killing the baby. As operation of the sheriff's department was a discretionary governmental function, and there was no evidence of malice, the sheriff and the department were entitled to sovereign immunity on an estate's claims of failing to instruct, train, and supervise. Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009).

Deputy and sheriff were entitled to official immunity because there was no evidence that they acted with actual malice or intent to injure in obtaining arrest warrants. Plaintiff did not allege, and there was no evidence to show, that the deputy and the sheriff were motivated by a "personal animus" toward the plaintiff or that they manufactured evidence or knowingly presented perjured testimony to obtain the arrest warrants. Taylor v. Taylor, 649 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. May 3, 2016)(Unpublished).

Because there was no evidence that deputies acted with actual malice towards the decedent when they arrested and transferred the decedent to jail instead of the hospital, official immunity protected the sheriff and the deputies with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims. Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).

Sheriff's deputy entitled to qualified immunity.

- A sheriff's deputy chased a parent who was carrying a baby; the two struggled for the deputy's gun, which discharged, killing the baby. As the deputy's decision to pursue the parent was a discretionary act, and there was no evidence the deputy acted with malice or intent to injure, the deputy had qualified immunity from suit under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d); therefore, an estate's negligence and assault and battery claims against the deputy were properly dismissed. Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009).

Record supported a district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of sheriff's deputies in an action an arrestee filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the deputies violated the arrestee's constitutional rights by procuring an arrest warrant without probable cause and using excessive force during an illegal arrest; the arrestee did not show that the officers who were sued violated clearly established law, and the officers had qualified immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX because the officers acted within the scope of the officers' authority. Smith v. Mercer, 572 Fed. Appx. 676 (11th Cir. 2014)(Unpublished).

Immunity extends to school boards.

- The 1991 amendment extending sovereign immunity "to the state and all of its departments and agencies" includes school boards. Davis v. Dublin City Bd. of Educ., 219 Ga. App. 121, 464 S.E.2d 251 (1995).

In an action against a school board and school principal for injuries to a student who tripped and fell through a glass door at the school entrance, the board was entitled to sovereign immunity and the principal to official immunity for injuries sustained as a result of the negligent performance of discretionary official acts. Davis v. Dublin City Bd. of Educ., 219 Ga. App. 121, 464 S.E.2d 251 (1995).

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county school board and its superintendent in a parents negligence action arising out of an attack on school grounds that injured their child, as the board and the superintendent presented sufficient evidence that a school safety plan was in place at the elementary school at the time the child was attacked, entitling the board and the superintendent to official immunity barring the parents' negligence claims. Leake v. Murphy, 284 Ga. App. 490, 644 S.E.2d 328 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 671 (Ga. 2007).

County school district was immune from liability for a student's state tort claims arising out of the use of a Facebook photo of the student in a bikini in an internet security presentation pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e). Chaney v. Fayette County Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2013).

School superintendent.

- Trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against the school superintendent because the plaintiff sufficiently pled facts invoking the limited exception to qualified immunity based on allegations that the superintendent maliciously and intentionally injured the plaintiff by firing the plaintiff after seeing the superintendent and another engage in illegal activities. Everson v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665, 811 S.E.2d 9 (2018).

Immunity extends to Board of Regents.

- Lower courts properly dismissed the foreign college students' declaratory judgment action seeking in-state tuition because the suit against the University System of Georgia's Board of Regents was barred by sovereign immunity and waiver did not apply. Olvera v. Univ. Sys. of Georgia's Bd. of Regents, 298 Ga. 425, 782 S.E.2d 436 (2016).

Immunity extends to county boards of education.

- For purposes of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, a county board of education is included within the definition of "the state and any of its departments and agencies." Thigpen v. McDuffie County Bd. of Educ., 255 Ga. 59, 335 S.E.2d 112 (1985).

A county board of education, unlike the school district which it manages, is not a body corporate and does not have the capacity to sue or be sued. This rule was not changed by the 1983 adoption of this provision or its 1990 amendment. Cook v. Colquitt County Bd. of Educ., 261 Ga. 841, 412 S.E.2d 828 (1992).

When a former member of a parent-teacher student association asserted false arrest, defamation, and other claims, the claims against an education board and a superintendent in the superintendent's official capacity were properly dismissed because the member failed to show that the board waived sovereign immunity. Reeves v. Wilbanks, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2013)(Unpublished).

School district's claim for disgorgement of funds against State Board of Education was disallowed, as it amounted to an action for money had and received or for unjust enrichment, and such actions are barred by sovereign immunity. Bulloch County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. Dep't of Educ., 324 Ga. App. 691, 751 S.E.2d 495 (2013).

Recreational Property Act did not waive official immunities.

- Although finding that official immunity shielded a county employee from liability for injuries suffered by a child when that child fell from a swing on county property that the employee previously inspected, and that sovereign immunity shielded the county, the trial court nonetheless erred in concluding that the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., waived these immunities, as: (1) implied waivers of governmental immunity were not to be favored; (2) the employee was entitled to official or qualified immunity, which could not be waived; and (3) even assuming a partial waiver of sovereign and official immunity through enactment of the Act, no evidence was presented that the employee acted wilfully and the defect complained about by the child's mother was apparent to those using the property. Norton v. Cobb, 284 Ga. App. 303, 643 S.E.2d 803 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 634 (Ga. 2007).

School districts.

- Neither the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., nor any other act of the General Assembly, has waived the sovereign immunity of county-wide school districts. Teston v. Collins, 217 Ga. App. 829, 459 S.E.2d 452 (1995).

Sovereign immunity extends to school districts under the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, and the legislature has not provided for a waiver of such immunity. Bitterman v. Atkins, 217 Ga. App. 652, 458 S.E.2d 688 (1995).

Claims of student's mother against a school district and employees for breach of fiduciary duties and invasion of privacy were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Wellborn v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 227 Ga. App. 377, 489 S.E.2d 345 (1997).

In regard to a personal injury action arising from an accident involving a school bus, the school district waived sovereign immunity to the extent it was covered by liability insurance. Coffee County Sch. Dist. v. King, 229 Ga. App. 143, 493 S.E.2d 563 (1997).

Trial court properly dismissed a parent's tort claims against the school district and its employees, as they were immune from suit and excluded from the limited waiver provision under both O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-22(5) and50-21-23(a). Moreover, none of the alleged acts showed the malicious, wilful, or wanton conduct necessary to overcome that immunity. Chisolm v. Tippens, 289 Ga. App. 757, 658 S.E.2d 147 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 576, 172 L. Ed. 2d 431 (2008).

Sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) extended to a county school district. Foster v. Raspberry, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. July 29, 2009).

Trial court erred in denying a school district's motion to dismiss a contractor's action seeking restitution because recovery was precluded under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c) to the extent that the restitution claim sought compensation for work that was not contemplated by the parties' multi-year contract. Greene County Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Constr., Inc., 308 Ga. App. 837, 708 S.E.2d 692 (2011).

School official's liability in hazing incident.

- Proof of actual malice by school officials in connection with injuries received by a student in a hazing incident was not sufficient to show that officials were not entitled to immunity. Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 232 Ga. App. 892, 503 S.E.2d 43 (1998).

Immunity extends to school district employees.

- Parents, who were sued in their personal capacities for actions taken within the scope of their duties as employees of the school district, are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of official immunity. Coffee County Sch. Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995).

An appellate court's reversal of a grant of judgment on the pleadings to defendants, the members of a school board of education, a school principal, the assistant principal, and a clinic nurse in their individual capacities, was in error in a negligence suit brought by the parents of a student who was assaulted by another student; the mandated action set forth in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185 on the part of a school to create a safety plan was a discretionary duty rather than a ministerial duty, and while O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1184 establishes Georgia's public policy concerning the need to report timely to the appropriate authorities the identity of students who commit certain proscribed acts on school grounds, the statute did not create a civil cause of action for damages in favor of a victim or anyone else for the purported failure to report timely. Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007).

Sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) extended to employees of a county school district, who were sued in their official capacities. Foster v. Raspberry, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. July 29, 2009).

Trial court erred in denying the county school district employees' motion to set aside a default judgment entered against the employees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b) in the parents' wrongful death action because, while the employees were sued in both the employees' official and individual capacities, the parents' wrongful-death suit arose from actions the employees took in the employees' official capacities as employees of the school, and thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the entry of the default judgment barred the employees from being able to assert that official immunity protected the employees from the parents' wrongful death action; official immunity is not a mere defense but rather an entitlement not to be sued that must be addressed as a threshold matter before a lawsuit may proceed. Cosby v. Lewis, 308 Ga. App. 668, 708 S.E.2d 585 (2011).

In a personal injury suit, the plaintiff failed to point to any evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the conduct of the two teachers in organizing and conducting the tug-of-war contest constituted a simple, absolute, and definite act that required merely the execution of a specific duty; to the contrary, pretermitting whether one of the teachers was acting in the teacher's capacity as an employee or as a parent volunteer, the evidence was undisputed that the teachers exercised personal judgment and acted on the facts presented in a way not specifically directed by the school district; thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that the teachers were engaged in discretionary rather than ministerial activities. Davis v. Brantley County Sch. Dist., 334 Ga. App. 684, 780 S.E.2d 60 (2015).

In a suit by a deceased high school student's parents against the teacher for leaving the classroom unsupervised, the teacher's act was a discretionary act entitled to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), although an unambiguous school policy prohibited leaving students unsupervised; the teacher asked a teacher in an adjoining classroom to listen out for the students, demonstrating some discretion. Barnett v. Atlanta Independent School System, 339 Ga. App. 533, 792 S.E.2d 474 (2016), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018).

Teacher was entitled to official immunity because the parents could not show that the school's policy stating that students were never to be left in the classroom unsupervised was so clear, definite, and certain in directing the teacher's actions that the policy established a ministerial duty requiring no exercise of discretion whatsoever, particularly given the principal's testimony that teachers could leave a classroom unsupervised in an emergency or to run to the restroom or something. Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018).

Immunity extended to Ohio school district, board of education, and teacher.

- In an action arising from injuries to a student while on a school band trip, Ohio defendants including a school district, board of education, and teacher had sovereign and official immunity from negligence liability. Holbrook v. Executive Conference Ctr., Inc., 219 Ga. App. 104, 464 S.E.2d 398 (1995).

Preparation of school safety plan is discretionary, not ministerial, duty.

- The mandated action set forth in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185 with regard to every public school preparing a school safety plan is a discretionary duty rather than a ministerial duty; by so deciding, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the holding in Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219 (2005) was incorrect and such holding is overruled. Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007).

Stone Mountain Memorial Association.

- Stone Mountain Memorial Association is a state department or agency for purposes of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and, accordingly, a former inmate was required to file an ante litem notice in accordance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., for asserting the inmate's negligence claim; as the inmate failed to file such required notice, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Association pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) was proper. Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004).

Ports Authority immune.

- The Georgia Ports Authority is a state "department or agency" that is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity but which may be liable for the torts of state officers and employees because of the state's waiver of immunity in the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. Miller v. Georgia Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 470 S.E.2d 426 (1996).

State court decision holding that the Georgia Ports Authority was immune did not apply to a longshoreman's personal injury claim against the Authority, which was governed by admiralty law, as the longshoreman was injured while on a ship in navigable waters performing traditional maritime functions, and did not determine whether the Authority was immune as an "arm of the state," under the Eleventh Amendment. Hines v. Ga. Ports Auth., 278 Ga. 631, 604 S.E.2d 189 (2004).

Action to restrain Regents of University System not permissible.

- Action seeking to restrain the payment of certain funds to the Regents of the University System, and their receipt and use of the funds, against state officers in their official capacity, and not as individuals committing any trespass upon the petitioners, is in effect an action against the state without its consent, and the action cannot be maintained. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392 (1935).

Sovereign immunity applies to Board of Regents.

- The Board of Regents is the state agency vested with the governance, control, and management of the University System of Georgia and therefore, the board is an agency of the state to which sovereign immunity applies. Wilson v. Board of Regents, 262 Ga. 413, 419 S.E.2d 916 (1992).

Because Georgia had not waived the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the student's breach of contract claim against the board of regents. Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2012).

Trial court erred by finding that a university board waived sovereign immunity in a breach of contract suit brought by a student because the court erroneously relied upon an unauthenticated copy of the student code of conduct, which was not signed by either party; thus, since no written contract existed wherein the board waived sovereign immunity, the board was entitled to summary judgment on the student's breach of contract claims. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Barnes, 322 Ga. App. 47, 743 S.E.2d 609 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Wolfe v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2016).

Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia was immune from a suit by employees of a contractor who provided a forged payment bond to the Board; the maintenance contract was not for "public works construction" as defined in O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12); therefore, the provisions for payment bonds in O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-62 and13-10-63 did not apply. Further, the Board had no duty to investigate the information presented on the face of the payment bond. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Brooks, 324 Ga. App. 15, 749 S.E.2d 23 (2013).

No genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether subsequent communications with retirement employees or officials modified the settlement agreement providing for an employee's early retirement from a university because the notes and email correspondence did not constitute signed, contemporaneous agreements demonstrating an intent to modify the settlement agreement, thus, the employee could not avoid the bar of sovereign immunity possessed by the board of regents. Carroll v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 324 Ga. App. 598, 751 S.E.2d 421 (2013).

Trial court did not err in finding that sovereign immunity barred the action because the court correctly treated the policies of the Board of Regents regarding non-citizen eligibility for in-state tuition as falling outside the waiver of sovereign immunity found in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10; thus, the students did not meet the students' burden of showing that the policies at issue were agency rules adopted pursuant § 50-13-10's waiver, rather than interpretive rules exempt from § 50-13-10. Olvera v. Univ. Sys. of Georgia's Bd. of Regents, 331 Ga. App. 392, 771 S.E.2d 91 (2015).

Regents' immunity not waived.

- Board of Regents' immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not waived where hospital records, including a "consent to care" form, upon which a patient's action was based, did not constitute a written contract. Board of Regents v. Tyson, 261 Ga. 368, 404 S.E.2d 557 (1991).

Department of Revenue.

- The Georgia Department of Revenue is a state entity, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Miles v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue, 797 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ga. 1992).

Sales tax refund.

- Electrical membership corporation lacked associational standing to seek a sales tax refund on behalf of its members/patrons, as it was a non-taxpayer acting in a representative capacity and there was a very limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided by O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35 which did not extend to non-taxpayers; further, the waiver of sovereign immunity of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) was to be strictly construed, and even a taxpayer was prohibited from bringing a refund action on behalf of other taxpayers similarly situated, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35. Sawnee Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 279 Ga. 22, 608 S.E.2d 611 (2005).

Georgia Forestry Commission.

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred in finding that the Georgia Forestry Commission (GFC) was not negligent in carrying out the Commission's duty to advise Georgia State Patrol (GSP) of a fire and that the Commission was entitled to sovereign immunity on that ground because the record showed that an agency agreement imposed a separate and independent duty on GFC, regardless of visibility conditions, to advise GSP of the existence of any large controlled burns or wildfires in the vicinity of state roadways. Grant v. Ga. Forestry Comm'n, 338 Ga. App. 146, 789 S.E.2d 343 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0003, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, No. S17C0037, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2017).

Georgia Lottery Corporation.

- The Georgia Lottery Corporation is not a state "agency" entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity under the facts and law of an action brought to have certain lottery games declared illegal and unconstitutional. Jackson v. Georgia Lottery Corp., 228 Ga. App. 239, 491 S.E.2d 408 (1997).

Georgia Lottery Corporation (GLC) is entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, and the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., because under the Georgia Lottery for Education Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-27-1 et seq., the purpose, function, and management of the GLC are indelibly intertwined with the state in a manner that qualifies the GLC for the protection of sovereign immunity as a state instrumentality; thus, the GLC must be classified as an instrumentality of the state to which sovereign immunity applies. Kyle v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 290 Ga. 87, 718 S.E.2d 801 (2011).

Hospital authorities.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX does not require courts to construe the "sue and be sued" language of O.C.G.A. § 31-7-75, governing functions and powers of hospital authorities, as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Howard v. Liberty Mem. Hosp., 752 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Ga. 1990).

Hospital was entitled to sovereign immunity for any judgment in a medical malpractice action in excess of the hospital's liability insurance. Howard v. Liberty Mem. Hosp., 752 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Hospital authorities established pursuant to the Hospital Authorities Law are entitled to the defense of governmental immunity except to the extent there has been a waiver under the state constitution. Hospital Auth. v. Litterilla, 199 Ga. App. 345, 404 S.E.2d 796 (1991).

Hospital authority's receipt of funds from two counties in general support of an indigent treatment program did not divest the authority or its hospital of their character as county agencies or instrumentalities so as to waive sovereign immunity. Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 905, 411 S.E.2d 75 (1991).

Hospital authorities, because they are neither the state nor a department or agency of the state, are not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity. Thomas v. Hospital Auth., 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994); Randolph County Hosp. Auth. v. Johnson, 215 Ga. App. 283, 450 S.E.2d 318 (1994).

Immunity of a physician at a state medical college.

- Two physicians, who were faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia Children's Medical Center, did not establish in a medical malpractice action that the physicians were entitled to qualified immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) and O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b), because the child whom the physicians treated at the center was a private-pay patient. Notwithstanding the physicians' official duties as faculty members, when they acted as physicians, the physicians' primary duty was to the child, rather than to the State of Georgia. Jones v. Allen, 312 Ga. App. 762, 720 S.E.2d 1 (2011).

Physician, who was a second-year fellow at the Medical College of Georgia Children's Medical Center's Graduate Medical Education Program, was entitled to official immunity in a medical malpractice action under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) and O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b) because the physician, who provided followup medical treatment to a child, was operating under the general supervision of an attending physician who was a faculty member and an employee of the Medical College of Georgia. Jones v. Allen, 312 Ga. App. 762, 720 S.E.2d 1 (2011).

Employees of the state mental hospital were entitled to immunity from claims by patients arising from the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Hightower by Dehler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

Employees of Department of Family and Children Services.

- Caseworker and supervisor in the Department of Family and Children Services acted within the scope of their official duties in the placement and supervision of children in a foster home and, thus, were entitled to official immunity. Miracle by Miracle v. Spooner, 978 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Departments of Human Resources and Juvenile Justice.

- Trial court, in a wrongful death suit, erred by denying the motions of the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice to dismiss and for a directed verdict, following the death of a juvenile the agencies placed in a corporate child care institution, as the two agencies were immune from suit under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., and there was no waiver of sovereign immunity by the state. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124 (2003).

The immunity granted to agencies under the Community Services Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-71(d), promotes a public policy that was not superseded or repealed by implication by the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX providing for the waiver of the state's sovereign immunity or by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., which was enacted pursuant to the amendment. Department of Human Resources v. Mitchell, 238 Ga. App. 477, 518 S.E.2d 440 (1999).

Immunity extends to community service boards.

- Considering the public purpose for which they were were created, a community service board is a "state department or agency" entitled to raise the defense of sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX. Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001).

Because community service boards are agencies or departments of the state, the legislature acted unconstitutionally when it ignored Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) and the express terms of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., by enacting O.C.G.A. § 37-2-11.1(c)(1) so as to denominate these newly created state agencies or departments as unclassified public entities to be accorded the same immunity as counties. Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001).

Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, which sets forth the Georgia constitution's limits on waiving sovereign immunity, were inapplicable to the inquiry of whether a community service board was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity since nothing in the state constitutional provision suggested that it limited the legislature's ability to create different governmental entities, like counties and municipalities. Johnson v. Ogeechee Behavioral Health Servs., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2007).

Community Service Act.

- When a decedent fell off a sanitation truck while performing court-ordered community service, sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against a county under the Community Service Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-70 et seq. ; O.C.G.A. § 42-8-71(d) does not specifically provide either that sovereign immunity is waived or the extent of the waiver, as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, and the court cannot read such a waiver into the act. DeKalb State Court Prob. Dep't v. Currid, 287 Ga. App. 649, 653 S.E.2d 90 (2007), aff'd, Currid v. DeKalb State Court Prob. Dep't, 285 Ga. 184, 674 S.E.2d 894 (2009).

County did not waive sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-71(d) of the Community Service Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-70 et seq., in a wrongful death action because the plain language did not expressly waive sovereign immunity and the extent of any waiver was not expressed; thus, both prongs of the constitutional test under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e) were not met. Currid v. DeKalb State Court Prob. Dep't, 285 Ga. 184, 674 S.E.2d 894 (2009).

Failure to provide medical care.

- In a parent's wrongful death action, the trial court erred in denying a county's motion for summary judgment because O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 did not waive the county's sovereign immunity for claims based on failure to provide medical care; § 42-5-2 does not provide an express waiver, and nothing in the statute can be read to imply a waiver. Gish v. Thomas, 302 Ga. App. 854, 691 S.E.2d 900 (2010).

Provision of medical care to inmates is ministerial act.

- Providing adequate medical attention for inmates is a ministerial act by the sheriff, because medical care is a fundamental right and is not discretionary; thus, such act is not subject to either sovereign immunity or official immunity. Since the plaintiff's contention was that it was the failure to provide adequate medical care that created liability and not the choice of treatment by the health care provider, sovereign and official immunity did not apply. Cantrell v. Thurman, 231 Ga. App. 510, 499 S.E.2d 416 (1998).

Prison officials.

- Trial court incorrectly denied a prison official's motion for summary judgment on the estate administrators' state causes of action, following the death of an inmate who overdosed on Tylenol, because the administrators failed to prove that the official was acting outside the scope of the person's official duties or employment; consequently, even if the official acted with malice or intent to injure the decedent, the official was immune from liability on the administrators' state law claims against the official. Minor v. Barwick, 264 Ga. App. 327, 590 S.E.2d 754 (2003).

Inmates.

- County was not entitled to sovereign immunity in an estate's claim arising from the death of an inmate because the county had bought the type of insurance defined in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51; the estate claimed that the inmate's death resulted from an officer's negligent supervision of the inmate's actions in maintaining a tractor by trying to replace a tire. The policy covered negligence for autos, the tractor was an auto under the statute and the policy, and the policy covered maintenance of a covered auto, which included changing a tire. McDuffie v. Coweta County, 299 Ga. App. 500, 682 S.E.2d 609 (2009).

Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant deputies were performing discretionary acts during the incident alleged in a plaintiff inmate's complaint such that the standard of liability was malice or intent to injure, the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to meet that standard. The plaintiff sufficiently alleged malice or intent to injure on the defendants' part by accusing the defendants of beating the plaintiff while handcuffed because the plaintiff refused to make the plaintiff's bed, and the defendants therefore were not entitled to official immunity, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, at the dismissal stage in the litigation. Muckle v. Robinson, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2013).

Georgia Supreme Court finds that the care of inmates in the custody of a municipal corporation is a governmental function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived. City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320 (2015).

Parole board immune.

- The defense of sovereign immunity applies to a complaint against the parole board and its former chairman acting in the chairman's official capacity. Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 213 Ga. App. 545, 445 S.E.2d 535 (1994), cert. denied, 5 U.S. 1040, 115 S. Ct. 1409, 131 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1995).

No waiver for parole board.

- When a prisoner alleged racial discrimination with respect to the policies, practice, and racial balance of the parole board, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the parole board on the grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, it was held that the Georgia Constitution, in subsection (a) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, specifically states that "[s]overeign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies," and although this same provision of the constitution waives sovereign immunity in circumstances in which liability insurance protection has been provided, as there was nothing in the record indicating that liability insurance had been provided to the parole board or that the waiver was applicable, the district court was affirmed. Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1988) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Claim for attorney fees in criminal case barred.

- There is no statutory or constitutional basis for the award of attorney fees in a criminal action; in fact, sovereign immunity barred a criminal defendant's claim for attorney fees when the charge against the defendant was dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Bennett v. State, 210 Ga. App. 337, 436 S.E.2d 40 (1993).

Violation of Civil Rights Act.

- When a governing body has worked a constitutional deprivation of a citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate, a cause of action is accrued against the governing body and its employees under the federal Civil Rights Act in spite of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d 892 (1984).

State did not waive immunity by enacting O.C.G.A. § 38-2-279. - State employee allegedly terminated for military service could not recover against the state under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) and O.C.G.A. § 38-2-279(e). The employee's claim under USERRA was barred by U.S. Const., amend. 11, and the claim under § 38-2-279 was barred by sovereign immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e). Anstadt v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 303 Ga. App. 483, 693 S.E.2d 868 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1291, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. 2010).

State not vicariously liable for negligence of employees.

- In a negligence action against the state, the Department of Human Resources, and a state hospital, that accrued prior to the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, defendants could not be held vicariously liable so as to invoke coverage of the Liability Trust Fund covering employees of the department and, thus, sovereign immunity was not waived respecting the death of plaintiff's son, allegedly caused by the department's employees whom plaintiffs failed to identify or name as defendants. Davis v. State, 211 Ga. App. 285, 439 S.E.2d 40 (1993).

Negligent failure to maintain building is tort action.

- Action against a county for negligent failure to maintain a county building sounded in tort, not contract, and therefore, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity. Burton v. DeKalb County, 209 Ga. App. 638, 434 S.E.2d 82 (1993).

Damage of home due to police action.

- Trial court properly dismissed an insurance company's suit for inverse condemnation against a county because the insured's home was damaged during the exercise of police power and, thus, did not fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e). Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinnett County Police Dep't, 319 Ga. App. 780, 738 S.E.2d 622 (2013).

Consequential damages for water meter leakage.

- The plaintiff in a federal civil rights action had an adequate state law tort remedy, consequently, the plaintiff was not deprived of the plaintiff's rights without due process of law when a water meter leaked, the county did not repair the meter, water flowed onto a nearby road and froze, and the plaintiff's car skidded on the ice and collided with another car, causing extensive injuries, notwithstanding the fact that the county and its officers were immune from suit for negligence. Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).

Release of stolen property to wrong party.

- The state may assert its immunity from suit in an action brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-50, relating to disposition of stolen property, to recover a sum which the state has improperly released to another party. State v. Collins, 171 Ga. App. 225, 319 S.E.2d 84 (1984).

Recovery for implied contracts and under eminent domain precluded.

- Because one can now sue the state on an express contract, this viability of a claim on an express contract precludes recovery on an implied contract theory and under an eminent domain theory. DOT v. Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 206 Ga. App. 821, 426 S.E.2d 905 (1992).

Sovereign immunity barred a conventional quiet title action against the state, which was immune from suit under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40. Sovereign immunity was not applicable to an in rem quiet title action against all the world under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 as such an action was against the underlying property itself. TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).

Breach of contract claim barred.

- A claim for breach of contract brought by a homeowner against a county after a sewer line flooded part of the home was barred by sovereign immunity since there was no written contract; furthermore, the claim, even though couched in contract, sounded in tort and was, also, barred by sovereign immunity. Merk v. DeKalb County, 226 Ga. App. 191, 486 S.E.2d 66 (1997).

The plaintiff's claim for back pay was barred by sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that the claim arose out of an employment contract with the defendant county, since the mere acceptance by the plaintiff of a written offer of employment for an indefinite term did not create an enforceable written contract. Waters v. Glynn County, 237 Ga. App. 438, 514 S.E.2d 680 (1999).

Ex contractu action not barred.

- Highway construction contractor's action against the Department of Transportation based on design errors and omissions and on the department's breach of certain implied contractual obligations was ex contractu and was not barred by sovereign immunity. DOT v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 103, 456 S.E.2d 668 (1995), cert. denied, 1995 Ga. Lexis 825 (1995).

No waiver without written contract.

- Developer failed to meet the developer's burden of showing waiver of sovereign immunity because even if the parties' conduct after the expiration of the contract could be found to demonstrate that the developer was to continue to perform under the original contract, as a matter of law, neither that conduct nor the internal documents created by a state agency after the contract expired established a written contract to do so and without a written contract, the state's sovereign immunity was not waived. Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

Surety on a public contract, after assisting the contractor in completing the project, stood in the place of the contractor and was subrogated to the contractor's right of action for breach of contract against the Georgia Department of Corrections; under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c), the state waived sovereign immunity for contracts. State Dep't of Corr. v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 295 Ga. 741, 763 S.E.2d 868 (2014).

Ultra vires contract not enforceable under quantum meruit theory of recovery.

- Appellate court erred by holding that an environmental engineering company could recover against a city on its quantum meruit claim because quantum meruit was not an available remedy against the city since the claim was based on a municipal contract that was ultra vires as it was never approved by city council. City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 743 S.E.2d 381 (2013).

Effect of O.C.G.A.

§ 32-2-6(a). - Through the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-6(a), the General Assembly has said that when a cause of action accrues on a public road which is part of the state highway system, suit may be brought against the county (which is merely a political subdivision of the state), but the Department of Transportation shall defend any such suit and be responsible for all damages awarded therein. What the General Assembly has thus done is to prescribe the terms and conditions on which the state consents to be sued, and these terms and conditions did not deprive the plaintiff of any constitutional rights. Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981).

Action for taking of private property for public purpose is specifically exempted from jurisdiction of State Court of Claims. Harrell v. Monroe County, 147 Ga. App. 685, 250 S.E.2d 20 (1978).

Action for value of private property taken or damaged for public purpose is not either tort or contract; it is simply a constitutional right which the citizen may not be denied. C.F.I. Constr. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 145 Ga. App. 471, 243 S.E.2d 700, cert. dismissed, 242 Ga. 96, 249 S.E.2d 613 (1978).

County's immunity regarding tax sale.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(e), a county was immune from a lender's suit because the lender pointed to no statute creating a waiver of immunity or any factual scenario warranting a waiver with respect to the lender's claim that the county failed to give it notice of the availability of excess funds following a tax sale as required by O.C.G.A. § 48-4-5. Bartow County v. S. Dev., III, L.P., 325 Ga. App. 879, 756 S.E.2d 11 (2014).

Actual malice not shown.

- In a suit by developers against city officials, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. While the officials might have acted with conscious disregard of the consequences to the developers if the city's water issues with a state agency were not resolved, this did not create a jury issue as to actual malice. Paul Wendelken v. Jenk, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Mar. 18, 2008).

Parent's allegations that a county and a county road superintendent gave false statements and committed acts that were willful, intentional, fraudulent, and reckless were insufficient to state a claim that the superintendent acted with actual malice as that term was used in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d); because the parent did not allege that the superintendent intended to cause a decedent's fatal accident, the parent did not state a claim for actual malice. Barnard v. Turner County, 306 Ga. App. 235, 701 S.E.2d 859 (2010).

Officer was entitled to official immunity under Georgia law because no evidence in the record suggested that the officer intended to cause the harm suffered by the appellant when the officer threw a "flashbang" into a dark room occupied by two sleeping individuals, without first inspecting the room. Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2017).

Factual issue regarding actual malice.

- When an investigator added a pawn shop owners' home address to a search warrant without the magistrate judge's approval, the investigator and the sheriff were properly denied summary judgment based on official immunity under Georgia law because there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the investigator acted with actual malice and whether the sheriff knew of the investigator's actions. Gordon v. Chattooga County, F.3d (11th Cir. July 3, 2012)(Unpublished).

Law clerks' claim against a county for back pay based on an alleged disparity between their salaries and salaries of other county employees was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity as the claim was based on contract; immunity was specifically waived for an action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract. Fulton County v. Lord, 323 Ga. App. 384, 746 S.E.2d 188 (2013).

When officers responded to a call reporting a domestic disturbance at a residence, the decedent resisted the officers' attempt to arrest the decedent, and an officer shot and killed the decedent, it was error to grant the shooting officer official immunity as to a wrongful death claim because a jury could find that the officer intentionally shot the decedent after the struggle ended and at a time when the decedent was lying on the floor, unarmed and compliant. Felio v. Hyatt, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2016)(Unpublished).

Department of Offender Rehabilitation employees have qualified immunity.

- Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Corrections) employees, authorized by law to supervise probationers while they are performing approved court-ordered tasks under O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-71,42-8-72, and42-8-73 are performing a governmental function as opposed to a ministerial task, and therefore will not be personally liable for injuries to the probationers sustained while performing the tasks unless the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Corrections) employees' conduct is willful and wanton. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-18.

The potential liability of probation supervisors supervising court-ordered community service by probationers (a discretionary function as opposed to a ministerial duty) is, notwithstanding the waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of any liability insurance provided, only for conduct which is willful, wanton, or outside the scope of authority of the supervisor. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-18 (rendered prior to 1990 amendment).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 99.

C.J.S.

- 81A C.J.S., States, § 541 et seq.

ALR.

- Officers or privates in military service as "officers" or "employees" within statute waiving state's immunity from liability for torts, 129 A.L.R. 911.

Liability for injury or damages resulting from traffic accident on highway involving vehicle in military service, 147 A.L.R. 1431.

Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents, 167 A.L.R. 1114.

Tortious breach of contract as within consent to suit against United States or state on contract, 1 A.L.R.2d 864.

Liability for injury from defective condition or improper operation of lift bridge or drawbridge, 90 A.L.R.2d 105.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries caused by driver of third vehicle to person whose vehicle had been stopped by police car, 17 A.L.R.4th 897.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit, 43 A.L.R.4th 19.

Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.

Official immunity of state national guard members, 52 A.L.R.4th 1095.

Right of insured, precluded from recovering against owner or operator of uninsured motor vehicle because of governmental immunity, to recover uninsured motorist benefits, 55 A.L.R.4th 806.

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.

Tort liability of public authority for failure to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by activities of hospital "rescue team", 64 A.L.R.4th 1200.

State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L.R.4th 204.

Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating, or supervising private day-care home in which child is injured, 68 A.L.R.4th 266.

Liability of school or school personnel for injury to student resulting from cheerleader activities, 25 A.L.R.5th 784.