Fourth Amendment violation in Pennsylvania

2026“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious[.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

2026“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious[.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

2026“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2026“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2024See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment as “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Commonwealth v. Mathis, 173 A.3d 699 , 713 n.12 (Pa. 2017) (indirectly citing Whren; concluding that “[a]lthough Agent Welsh testified that, in addition to safety reasons, he intended that [Mathis] not leave the residence with drugs, … this subjective - 13 - J-A21041-23 alternative basis for the frisk does not invalidate the protective search, since the agent articulated objective, pe

2023See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio

2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio

2024The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”32 The touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is “reasonableness.”33 The “general rule” is that reasonableness requires a demonstration of probable cause. 34 Terry is an exception—a “narrow” 35 one—to this general rule. 31 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 32 U.S.

2021See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (“[T]he appropriate standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional meaning.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (“Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”), 15 citing, inter alia, Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 , 15 The majority cites T.L.O. to support its pronouncement the Fourth Amendment “applies equa

2025See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time[.]” (cleaned up)).

2025See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time[.]” (cleaned up)).

2019This Court ruled and maintains that the search was valid . based upon Ms. Anderson's parolee status, combined with reasonable suspicion formed while viewing suspected contraband during a valid home-visit Judge Boyer's Order of Court, July 24, 2018. "[l'[he threshold question . : . in any Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether the conduct of the police amounted to a search." Commonwealth v. Robbins, 647 A.2d 555 ) 558 (Pa. Super.

2016He further suggests Sergeant Imhoff invalidly based the search warrant upon such stale information. [T]he threshold question ... in any Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether the conduct of the police amounted to a search.” Commonwealth v. Robbins, 436 Pa.Super. 177 , 647 A.2d 555, 558 (1994) quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2019These out-of-court identifications were ultimately suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, because Crews was arrested without probable cause. 2 Proceeding to address the admissibility of the witness' in-court identification, the Crews Court observed that, "[i]n the typical 'fruit of the poisonous tree' case ... the challenged evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation[.]" Id. at 471 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 .

2019These out-of-court identifications were ultimately suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, because Crews was arrested without probable cause. 2 Proceeding to address the admissibility of the witness' in-court identification, the Crews Court observed that, "[i]n the typical 'fruit of the poisonous tree' case ... the challenged evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation[.]" Id. at 471 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 .

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2021See Strickler, supra at 56 , 757 A.2d at 888 .

2021See Strickler, supra at 56 , 757 A.2d at 888 .

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2014The same day Salvucci was filed, the High Court released its decision in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), where it refined the standard articulated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 5.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), and merged the requirement of standing, which it defined as the “reasonable expectation of privacy,” into the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim, see id., at 139 , 99 S.Ct. 421 (“[W]e think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti

2014The same day Salvucci was filed, the High Court released its decision in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), where it refined the standard articulated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 5.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), and merged the requirement of standing, which it defined as the “reasonable expectation of privacy,” into the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim, see id., at 139 , 99 S.Ct. 421 (“[W]e think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti

2019In Maryland v. Macon , 472 U.S. 463 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985), a case assessing the validity of a seizure of obscene magazines, the Supreme Court wrote: "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' [...] and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken ." Id. at 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 (quoting Scott , 436 U.S. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 )(emphasis added).

2019In Maryland v. Macon , 472 U.S. 463 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985), a case assessing the validity of a seizure of obscene magazines, the Supreme Court wrote: "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' [...] and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken ." Id. at 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 (quoting Scott , 436 U.S. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 )(emphasis added).

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2019See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79 , 82-83 {Pa. Super. 2017) citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they m

2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio

2025In his famous concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan explained that, for a person to demonstrate an expectation of privacy, “there is a twofold requirement.” 18 First, that person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (explaining that a “State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violatio

2024When we adopted our automatic standing rule in Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 468 (Pa. 1983), we agreed with Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (rejecting an automatic standing rule in federal courts), where he reasoned that a possessory charge “itself alleges a[ possessory] interest sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim” and that to hold otherwise allows the prosecution to take diametrically opposed positions during the prosecution of the same criminal offense.

2024When we adopted our automatic standing rule in Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 468 (Pa. 1983), we agreed with Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (rejecting an automatic standing rule in federal courts), where he reasoned that a possessory charge “itself alleges a[ possessory] interest sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim” and that to hold otherwise allows the prosecution to take diametrically opposed positions during the prosecution of the same criminal offense.

2021See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 954 (Dougherty, J., concurring), quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (where legislature exercises its exclusive power to pronounce which acts are crimes and define them, “it is the elements of those crimes that officers must consider when determining whether there is ‘reasonable, 4 The majority criticizes my analysis here as failing to indicate what evidence might be required to establish probable cause in the child welfare context.

2021See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 954 (Dougherty, J., concurring), quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (where legislature exercises its exclusive power to pronounce which acts are crimes and define them, “it is the elements of those crimes that officers must consider when determining whether there is ‘reasonable, 4 The majority criticizes my analysis here as failing to indicate what evidence might be required to establish probable cause in the child welfare context.

2021See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (“[T]he appropriate standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional meaning.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (“Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”), 15 citing, inter alia, Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 , 15 The majority cites T.L.O. to support its pronouncement the Fourth Amendment “applies equa

2021See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (“[T]he appropriate standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional meaning.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (“Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”), 15 citing, inter alia, Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 , 15 The majority cites T.L.O. to support its pronouncement the Fourth Amendment “applies equa

2019“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).

2019“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).

2026“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2026“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2023The Court further emphasized that “we have not hesitated to follow the prevailing Fourth Amendment standard in appropriate instances.” Smith, 836 A.2d at 15 (citing Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 431-32 ).

2006The Court further emphasized that “[w]e have not hesitated to follow the prevailing Fourth Amendment standard in appropriate instances.” 20 Smith, 575 Pa. at 219, 836 A.2d at 15 (emphasis added) (citing Cleckley, 558 Pa. at 524 , 738 A.2d at 431-32 ).

2025Further, an “established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , (1969).

2025Further, an “established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , (1969).

2020“For this reason, in particular, those litigants wishing to advance lines of departure, under Article I, Section 8, from Fourth Amendment doctrine, must bring the matter into sharp focus in their advocacy.” Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. 2012).

2017See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)) (officer free to ask for identification without implicating Fourth Amendment, and requests for identification do not, by themselves, constitute seizures); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (even when officers lack suspicion, no Fourth Amendment violation where they merely approach individuals on street to question them or request ide

2019Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2173 .

2019Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2173 .

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.