Fourth Amendment violation in Oklahoma

2019At 6:29 p.m., Officer Goins can be heard outlining his plan of action to his backup officer, and in referring to his attempts to get a trooper to investigate the log book violations he says, "Oh well, if a trooper shows up a trooper shows up." Four minutes later upon being informed by his backup officer that no trooper is available, Officer Goins remarks "Hah, its his lucky day." Although an officer's subjective intent ordinarily plays no role in Fourth Amendment analysis, Dufries v. State , 2006 OK CR 13, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d 887, 889, allowing the investigation of the logbook to serve as the basis

2019At 6:29 p.m., Officer Goins can be heard outlining his plan of action to his backup officer, and in referring to his attempts to get a trooper to investigate the log book violations he says, "Oh well, if a trooper shows up a trooper shows up." Four minutes later upon being informed by his backup officer that no trooper is available, Officer Goins remarks "Hah, its his lucky day." Although an officer's subjective intent ordinarily plays no role in Fourth Amendment analysis, Dufries v. State , 2006 OK CR 13, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d 887, 889, allowing the investigation of the logbook to serve as the basis

2019A police officer's "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Dufries v. State , 2006 OK CR 13, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d 887, 889, (quoting Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

2019A police officer's "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Dufries v. State , 2006 OK CR 13, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d 887, 889, (quoting Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

2019Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 317 , 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2136 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)("The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates.") ¶12 An analogous attempt to legislate a Fourth Amendment standard was at issue in Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court considered New York's "stop and frisk" statute, which allowed police to detain any person whom they reasonably suspected of committing certain crimes.

2019Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 317 , 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2136 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)("The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates.") ¶12 An analogous attempt to legislate a Fourth Amendment standard was at issue in Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court considered New York's "stop and frisk" statute, which allowed police to detain any person whom they reasonably suspected of committing certain crimes.

2018See Tollett v. State , 2016 OK CR 15 , ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 915 , 916-17 (holding that an appellant must prove plain error); England v. State , 1972 OK CR 75 , ¶ 9, 496 P.2d 382 , 385 (finding that where a defendant contends a search warrant was invalid, the burden is on him to establish the facts which render it invalid; the claim is waived where the record does not reflect either the affidavit for search warrant or the search warrant itself). ¶ 46 Appellant asks this Court to grant his motion to supplement the record under Rule 3.11(A) with the search warrant application presented to a Comanche Cou

2018See Tollett v. State , 2016 OK CR 15 , ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 915 , 916-17 (holding that an appellant must prove plain error); England v. State , 1972 OK CR 75 , ¶ 9, 496 P.2d 382 , 385 (finding that where a defendant contends a search warrant was invalid, the burden is on him to establish the facts which render it invalid; the claim is waived where the record does not reflect either the affidavit for search warrant or the search warrant itself). ¶ 46 Appellant asks this Court to grant his motion to supplement the record under Rule 3.11(A) with the search warrant application presented to a Comanche Cou

2018See Tollett v. State , 2016 OK CR 15 , ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 915 , 916-17 (holding that an appellant must prove plain error); England v. State , 1972 OK CR 75 , ¶ 9, 496 P.2d 382 , 385 (finding that where a defendant contends a search warrant was invalid, the burden is on him to establish the facts which render it invalid; the claim is waived where the record does not reflect either the affidavit for search warrant or the search warrant itself). ¶ 46 Appellant asks this Court to grant his motion to supplement the record under Rule 3.11(A) with the search warrant application presented to a Comanche Cou

2018See Tollett v. State , 2016 OK CR 15 , ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 915 , 916-17 (holding that an appellant must prove plain error); England v. State , 1972 OK CR 75 , ¶ 9, 496 P.2d 382 , 385 (finding that where a defendant contends a search warrant was invalid, the burden is on him to establish the facts which render it invalid; the claim is waived where the record does not reflect either the affidavit for search warrant or the search warrant itself). ¶ 46 Appellant asks this Court to grant his motion to supplement the record under Rule 3.11(A) with the search warrant application presented to a Comanche Cou

1987See Kimmelman v. Morrison, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (where failure to litigate a fourth amendment claim competently is principal assertion of ineffective assistance, defendant must prove merit of claim and a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to show prejudice).

1987See Kimmelman v. Morrison, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (where failure to litigate a fourth amendment claim competently is principal assertion of ineffective assistance, defendant must prove merit of claim and a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to show prejudice).

2019"If the police action could have been taken against an individual even absent the underlying intent or motivation, there is no conduct which ought to have been deterred and thus no reason to bring the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule into play for purposes of deterrence." Johnson v. State, 2012 OK CR 5, ¶ 12, 272 P.3d 720, 726 (quoting 1 Wayne R.

2019"If the police action could have been taken against an individual even absent the underlying intent or motivation, there is no conduct which ought to have been deterred and thus no reason to bring the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule into play for purposes of deterrence." Johnson v. State, 2012 OK CR 5, ¶ 12, 272 P.3d 720, 726 (quoting 1 Wayne R.

2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

2015Boone, 62 F.3d at 325 .

2015Boone, 62 F.3d at 325 .

2013Yet in Corter, the Supreme Court described the "standing" approach to the question of who can properly assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search or seizure as "an analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas." 525 U.S. at 87, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (citing Rakas ); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 , 99 S.Ct. at 428 ("[Wle think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."). 15 Nevertheless, the State is raising a pla

2013Yet in Corter, the Supreme Court described the "standing" approach to the question of who can properly assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search or seizure as "an analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas." 525 U.S. at 87, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (citing Rakas ); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 , 99 S.Ct. at 428 ("[Wle think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."). 15 Nevertheless, the State is raising a pla

2012"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and cireumstances confronting him at the time, ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken'" Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 136-39 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722 , 1724 n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978).

2012"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and cireumstances confronting him at the time, ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken'" Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 136-39 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722 , 1724 n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978).

2009See also Case v. State, 1974 OK CR 27, 16 , 519 P.2d 523, 524 ("once a defendant establishes that evidence was seized as a result of a search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to show that the search is reasonable because it falls within the few specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement that a search have the prior approval of a judge or magistrate").

2009See also Case v. State, 1974 OK CR 27, 16 , 519 P.2d 523, 524 ("once a defendant establishes that evidence was seized as a result of a search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to show that the search is reasonable because it falls within the few specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement that a search have the prior approval of a judge or magistrate").

1977Therefore, once a defendant establishes that evidence was seized as the result of a search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to show that the search is reasonable because it falls within the ‘few specifically established and well delineated exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment requirement that a search have the prior approval of a judge or magistrate. . . . ” (Citations omitted) Further, we said in Case v. State, supra, at page 524: “Where, as in this case, the exception to the requirement of a warrant claimed is that the defendant consented to the search, the proof offered by t

1974Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; Katz v. United States, supra; Norton v. State, supra; Sam v. State, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 291, 295 (1972); Edwards v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 340 , 177 P.2d 143, 147 (1947).

2025Accordingly, the officers' actions, although in violation of Colorado law, did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation."); United States v. Mikulski , 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[O]fficers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation." ¶12 This Court applied the Moore reasoning in an unpublished decision, Crawford Oliver Martin v. State , F-2013-538, December 4, 2014.

2025Accordingly, the officers' actions, although in violation of Colorado law, did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation."); United States v. Mikulski , 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[O]fficers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation." ¶12 This Court applied the Moore reasoning in an unpublished decision, Crawford Oliver Martin v. State , F-2013-538, December 4, 2014.

2019See Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d at 238; Fernandez , 18 F.3d at 879 ("nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion").

2019See Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 10 , 152 P.3d at 238 ; Fernandez , 18 F.3d at 879 ("nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion").

2019Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d at 237-38.

2019Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d at 237-38.

2013Yet in Corter, the Supreme Court described the "standing" approach to the question of who can properly assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search or seizure as "an analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas." 525 U.S. at 87, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (citing Rakas ); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 , 99 S.Ct. at 428 ("[Wle think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."). 15 Nevertheless, the State is raising a pla

2013Yet in Corter, the Supreme Court described the "standing" approach to the question of who can properly assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search or seizure as "an analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas." 525 U.S. at 87, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (citing Rakas ); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 , 99 S.Ct. at 428 ("[Wle think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."). 15 Nevertheless, the State is raising a pla

2009This is so in light of an inmate's diminished privacy rights, see Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir.1989) (in upholding AIDS testings against inmates' Fourth Amendment challenge, stating that "plaintiff's privacy expectation in his body is further reduced by his incarceration"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1059 , 110 S.Ct. 871 , 107 LEd.2d 954 (1990); the minimal intrusion of saliva and blood tests; and the legitimate government interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use of fing

2009Largely relying on its ruling in Boling and the conclusions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Cireuit turned away a Fourth Amendment challenge to the Oklahoma DNA testing statute in Shaffer v. Soffie, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir.1998). 1 53 We are persuaded by these authorities that the seizure of Appellant's blood and development of his DNA profile were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, section 80 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

2009Largely relying on its ruling in Boling and the conclusions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Cireuit turned away a Fourth Amendment challenge to the Oklahoma DNA testing statute in Shaffer v. Soffie, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir.1998). 1 53 We are persuaded by these authorities that the seizure of Appellant's blood and development of his DNA profile were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, section 80 of the Oklahoma Constitution.