Fourth Amendment violation in Louisiana

2020The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is generally the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence.6 In State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 752 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 835 S.Ct. 407 , 416 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that the exclusionary rule “bars physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful search or seizure.” With these principles in mind, we turn to the State’s arguments. 6 In McClendon, 13-1454, p. 5, 133 So.3d at 245 , this Court cautioned: A Fourth Amendment violation alone,

2020The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is generally the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence.6 In State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 752 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 835 S.Ct. 407 , 416 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that the exclusionary rule “bars physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful search or seizure.” With these principles in mind, we turn to the State’s arguments. 6 In McClendon, 13-1454, p. 5, 133 So.3d at 245 , this Court cautioned: A Fourth Amendment violation alone,

2017Perry, 502 So.2d at 558 ; State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492, 497 (La. 1980) (“The test for determining whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy is not only whether the person had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, but also whether that expectation is of a type which society at large is prepared to recognize as being reasonable.”).

2017Perry, 502 So.2d at 558 ; State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492, 497 (La. 1980) (“The test for determining whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy is not only whether the person had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, but also whether that expectation is of a type which society at large is prepared to recognize as being reasonable.”).

2010Generally speaking, the subjective intentions or beliefs of the police “play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. Sherman, 2005-0779 p. 14 (La.4/4/06), 931 So.2d 286, 295 .

2008In State v. Sherman, 05-779 p. 15 (La. 4/4/06), 931 So.2d 286, 295 , the supreme court discussed Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996), as follows: In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that when a purportedly pretextual traffic stop has been made where there was probable cause to believe the motorist violated the traffic laws, no Fourth Amendment challenge may be undertaken on the basis the subjective intent of the officers was to use the traffic stop as a means of investigating other law violations.

1986"The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a `constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1986"The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a `constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

2020Should we find no reversible legal error in the court’s reasonableness determination, we then review the district judge’s decision to grant a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, see Wells, 08-2262 at p. 5, 45 So.3d at 581 , as the ruling as to whether the exclusionary rule is being properly applied under Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact.

2014Should we find no reversible legal error in the court’s reasonableness determination, we then review the district judge’s decision to grant a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, see Wells, 08-2262 at p. 5, 45 So.3d at 581 , as the ruling as to whether the exclusionary rule is being properly applied under Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact.

2020The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is generally the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence.6 In State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 752 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 835 S.Ct. 407 , 416 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that the exclusionary rule “bars physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful search or seizure.” With these principles in mind, we turn to the State’s arguments. 6 In McClendon, 13-1454, p. 5, 133 So.3d at 245 , this Court cautioned: A Fourth Amendment violation alone,

2020The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is generally the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence.6 In State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 752 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 835 S.Ct. 407 , 416 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that the exclusionary rule “bars physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful search or seizure.” With these principles in mind, we turn to the State’s arguments. 6 In McClendon, 13-1454, p. 5, 133 So.3d at 245 , this Court cautioned: A Fourth Amendment violation alone,

2017Similarly, in State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 3 (La. 9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881 , the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: That Officer Brashier was conducting a drug interdiction patrol when' he pulled over the Camry had no bearing on the legality of the initial stop for improper lane use.

2003Similarly, in State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 3 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881 , the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: That Officer Brashier was conducting a drug interdiction patrol when he pulled over the Camry had no bearing on the legality of the initial stop for improper lane use.

2017United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464 (5th Cir. 1993).

2008United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 944 , 113 S.Ct. 2427 , 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 , 120 S.Ct. 117 , 145 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999) and 528 U.S. 845 , 120 S.Ct. 312 , 145 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999). [2] See also State v. Williams, 38,379 (La.App. 2d Cir. 11/25/03), 858 So.2d 878 , writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.3/12/04), 869 So.2d 807 , finding that a driver and passenger had common authority over a vehicle and the passenger could give valid consent to search the vehicle after the driver refus

2012The governmental intrusion required for triggering a Fourth Amendment inquiry includes the necessary (but not sufficient) component that “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).

2012The governmental intrusion required for triggering a Fourth Amendment inquiry includes the necessary (but not sufficient) component that “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).

2009“If there is no detention — no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment— then no constitutional rights have been infringed.” Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1324 .

1984“If there is no detention — no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment — then no constitutional rights have been infringed.” Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1324 . 2 Detective Paxiao testified that he requested defendant’s I.D.

2007It is well-established that "a physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." In re Shabazz 200 F.Supp.2d at 581 , citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 , 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test for alcohol), and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (order to compel surgical operatio

2007It is well-established that "a physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." In re Shabazz 200 F.Supp.2d at 581 , citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 , 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood test for alcohol), and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (order to compel surgical operatio

2000To measure the effectiveness of the seizure for "advancing the public interest," the Court noted that: Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.... [F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 496 U.S. at 453-5

2000To measure the effectiveness of the seizure for "advancing the public interest," the Court noted that: Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.... [F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 496 U.S. at 453-5

1985Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); State v. Owen, supra; State v. Zeilman, 384 So.2d 359 (La.1980); State v. Bennett, 383 So.2d 1236 (La.1980) (on rehearing); State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492 (La.1980); State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La.1978); State v. Summers, supra. In State v. Bennett the court stated: Satisfying the Fifth Amendment voluntariness grounds is only the "threshold" condition of Fourth Amendment analysis required by Brown.

1985Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); State v. Owen, supra; State v. Zeilman, 384 So.2d 359 (La.1980); State v. Bennett, 383 So.2d 1236 (La.1980) (on rehearing); State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492 (La.1980); State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La.1978); State v. Summers, supra. In State v. Bennett the court stated: Satisfying the Fifth Amendment voluntariness grounds is only the "threshold" condition of Fourth Amendment analysis required by Brown.

2025Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006).

2025Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006).

2025Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006).